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 Preface
He’s f ive-foot-two, and he’s six-feet-four, 
He f ights with missiles and with spears. 
He’s all of thirty-one, and he’s only seventeen, 
He’s been a soldier for a thousand years. 
... 
He’s the one who gives his body 
As a weapon of the war, 
And without him all this killing can’t go on. 
– Buffy Sainte-Marie, “Universal Soldier” (1964)
This pioneering volume is a remarkable international attempt to bridge 
the gap between military history and labour history, by exploring the 
labour of the military as a subject in its own right. During 2009-2012, a 
team of twenty researchers from nine countries led by Erik-Jan Zürcher 
systematically reconstructed the similarities and differences between 
military recruitment and employment systems in Asia and Europe from 
the sixteenth century onwards. Their comparative approach has made 
it possible to discover general historical patterns. In turn, these patterns 
suggest causal relationships which could, should, and no doubt will be the 
subject of more in-depth studies in the future.
Until now, military historians and labour historians inhabited separate 
worlds. Military historians were concerned with wars, military doctrines, 
arms technology, campaign logistics, and similar issues. For them, soldiers 
usually enter into the picture as the executors of commands, and, in the 
narrative of military historians, what decides the outcome of battles are the 
numbers, skills, weaponry and morale of the combatants. Labour historians 
by contrast regard soldiers above all as the oppressors of labour resistance, 
who sometimes – in revolutionary situations – change sides and join the 
workers. According to many labour historians, what soldiers do as soldiers is 
not “work” – since work is constructive, not destructive – but instead a kind 
of “anti-work”. The military are indeed conventionally excluded from “the 
labour force”, and therefore they are not counted in labour force statistics.
The idea that what soldiers do “cannot be work” is a moralistic prejudice, 
however. Work is the purposeful production of useful objects or services. 
Thus, work is a purposive activity, and work creates objects or services that 
are useful to the people for whom the work is done. That makes participation 
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in military activities just as much a labour process as any other, even if 
many civilians do not regard it as a “useful activity” and have no use for it.
Soldiers’ work can involve all kinds of different jobs. Of course, the 
subjugation and killing of people and the destruction of enemy positions 
are “core tasks”, but the military can also perform guard duties, dig ditches, 
look after the transport of goods and messages, and construct buildings, 
roads, canals, and dams. What most soldiers do in army life obviously differs 
from what labourers do in a factory, or nurses in a hospital. Yet, in real life, 
soldiers are workers just as much as labourers and nurses are. Signif icantly, 
the English word “mercenary” is derived from the Latin mercenarius, which 
literally meant no more than “a hireling”, that is, someone who is paid for 
his work (in Latin, merx = commodity).
In their team effort, the authors of this volume have made a great 
contribution to a new kind of historiography, one that integrates differ-
ent subdisciplines, and incorporates local f indings in a globally oriented 
approach. The readers of this book have in their hands a path-breaking 
collection of essays which, I am sure, will inspire historical research about 
military labour for many years to come.
Marcel van der Linden
Amsterdam, March 2013
 Introduction
Understanding changes in military recruitment and 
employment worldwide
Erik-Jan Zürcher
For a long time, labour historians have not regarded the activities of soldiers 
as work. Work was def ined as an activity yielding surplus value and the 
efforts of soldiers were seen as being essentially destructive rather than 
productive. This assumption that military work is necessarily destructive 
and does not produce surplus value is debatable for at least two reasons. 
The f irst is that soldiers everywhere spend far more time in barracks than 
on campaign and, while they are garrisoned, they have very often been 
employed as cheap labour in agriculture or in building works and road 
repair. Many of the greatest infrastructural works in countries as far apart 
as France and China – city walls, dikes, canals – would never have been 
realized except for the massive use of military manpower. Soldiers have 
frequently been employed in the wake of natural disasters, in which case 
their labour should be regarded as similar to that of nurses and ambulance 
drivers. The second, more profound reason is that, as Peter Way has argued, 
the end result of warfare, if successful, is that surplus value for states and 
their elites is created through territorial gain or economic advantage.1
Whatever the merits of the argument, the result of the view that what 
a soldier does is not work has been that military labour has not become 
the object of research in the same way as the labour of, for instance, dock-
workers, textile workers, miners, or agricultural workers.2 One of the very 
f irst people to resist this approach was Jan Lucassen of the International 
Institute of Social History (IISH). As early as 1994, he considered the “pro-
letarian experience” of mercenaries in early modern Europe.3 That was a 
pioneering effort, because it is only very recently that the topic of military 
labour has begun to receive attention from social historians. In 2003, Bruce 
1 Following Marx, Peter Way closely identif ies the growth of capitalism and the modern state 
with warfare, particularly, colonial warfare. See Way, “Klassenkrieg”.
2 Chris Tilly and Charles Tilly express this point of view in their book Work Under Capitalism, 
p. 23: “To be sure, not all efforts qualify as work; purely destructive, expressive, or consumptive 
acts lie outside the bound; in so far as they reduce transferable use value, we might think of 
them as antiwork.”
3 Lucassen, “The Other Proletarians”, p. 185.
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Scates published “The Price of War: Labour Historians Confront Military 
History”, in the Australian journal Labour History, and this journal has 
since continued to show an interest in the subject with the publications 
of Nathan Wise.4 However, the scope of the Australian publications had 
been limited in time and space (mainly the Australian volunteer army 
of the First World War). In 2006, German historical anthropologist Alf 
Lüdtke published a text with a broader comparative scope – “War as Work: 
Aspects of Soldiering in 20th Century War” – which was, however, as the 
title implies, limited to the recent past. In 2011, the journal International 
Labor and Working-Class History devoted a special feature to “Labor and 
the Military”, which contained six very interesting articles on the subject. 
The approach, however, is different from ours in that the military (or the 
army) and labour, both in the sense of work and in that of the workforce, 
are seen as two separate elements in the equation, the relation between 
which is studied, whereas in the context of Fighting for a Living questions 
are asked about military service itself as a form of labour.5 In our view, 
soldiers are not a separate category of people who sometimes fulf il the role 
of workers; they are workers.
Another recent initiative that indicates a growing interest in the subject 
was a conference at Duke University in April 2011 entitled “Beyond the Bat-
tlef ield: The Labor of Military Service in Latin America and the Caribbean”, 
which treats some of the same issues in a regional context. But once more, 
the papers at this conference largely concentrated on the non-military, or at 
least non-martial, roles played by soldiers in the societies and economies of 
the region and thus seemed to understand labour as something essentially 
outside the core business of soldiering.
I became more and more aware of the degree to which a soldier’s life itself 
can be understood in terms of labour when I did empirical research in the 
1990s on the everyday realities of Ottoman soldiers’ lives during the First 
World War.6 The paths of Jan Lucassen and myself converged and in 1999 we 
published “Conscription as Military Labour: The Historical Context”. Over 
the years, my specialist interest in the history of conscription in the Middle 
East convinced me that there was a need to pursue more wide-ranging 
4 Wise, “The Lost Labour Force”, “‘In Military Parlance, I Suppose We Were Mutineers’”. 
5 One article that does strike at the heart of the discussions in Fighting for a Living is the 
contribution by Jennifer Mittelstadt, “The Army Is a Service, Not a Job”, in the special feature 
edited by Joshua B. Freeman and Geoffrey Field. 
6 Zürcher, “Between Death and Desertion”, “The Ottoman Conscription System in Theory 
and Practice”, “Ottoman Labour Battalions in World War I”, “Hizmet Etmeyi Başka Biçimlerle 
Reddetmek”. 
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research into the circumstances which have produced starkly different 
systems of recruiting and employing soldiers in different parts of the globe, 
as well as to analyse the social and political implications that the different 
systems have had in a number of states and societies. When I moved to 
the IISH in 2008, this idea was received enthusiastically by the research 
department of the institute and, as a consequence, the project Fighting for a 
Living was started in 2009, of which this book is the result. It concentrated 
on land armies in Europe, the Middle East, India, and China in the period 
1500-2000 because the project was limited explicitly to state armies in the 
context of advanced state formation. That means that important areas and 
categories were not included – Latin America, Africa and Australasia – but 
also non-state forces (guerrilla movements, slave or peasant rebel armies). 
That we also excluded the navy may be seen as a serious omission, but this 
is because we recognized that navies, which in many respects are very 
different from land armies in their skill levels, in their traditions, and in 
their recruitment, offer a hugely interesting f ield for comparative research 
on military labour in their own right. We have decided to leave that topic 
to a possible separate project.7
Of course, it might be argued that “the state” in a sense is a modern 
concept and that to use it to categorize pre-modern phenomena is anach-
ronistic. Doubtless, neither the sixteenth-century Landsknecht nor the 
nineteenth-century Swiss mercenary8 would see himself as f ighting for 
a “state”. They were members of corporate bodies whose identities were 
to a large extent formed in the f ield, and they were hired by kings. Early 
twentieth-century Ottoman soldiers certainly saw themselves as defending 
their ruler and their religion, but that does not have to prevent us, as twenty-
f irst-century historians, from using the state as an analytical category, to 
distinguish the soldiers recruited by monarchs and republics (directly or 
indirectly) from guerrilla forces and rebel movements.
7 Such a project could build on the work done by maritime and labour historians in the 
mid-1990s, which has resulted in the volume of conference proceedings edited by Van Royen, 
Bruijn, and Lucassen, Those Emblems of Hell? This book is not exclusively about navies, however. 
It is primarily about commercial shipping.
8 The term “mercenary” over time has acquired very negative connotations, especially since 
the advent of the nation-state, when defending the fatherland came to be denoted as both a 
duty and a privilege of citizens. Throughout this book, however, we use it without expressing 
any value judgement, simply to denote those soldiers who operated in a market in the sense that 
they had a choice of employers and engaged themselves at least formally on the basis of free 
will. This serves to distinguish them from those soldiers who were also paid for their services 
(and sometimes generously), but who did not operate under market conditions and had only 
one possible employer.
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If we decide to regard the work of the military as labour, one legitimate 
question to ask is, of course, whether military labour is in any fundamental 
sense different from other forms of labour. One could argue that one aspect 
of military work is unique in that it explicitly transcends humankind’s 
greatest taboo: killing members of the same species. Even if soldiers spend 
far more time in barracks or on the march than in actual battles, the fact 
that the ultimate purpose of an army is to f ight and kill makes it different 
– more so, certainly, than the fact that there is risk involved, as for most 
people in most societies exposure to risk has been the normal condition, be 
it from violence, starvation, childbirth, or contagious disease. But whatever 
its exceptionality, ultimately an army is built on the factors of capital and 
labour just like any other industry, and it is this that makes it possible to 
analyse the activities of the soldier as just another form of work.
Fighting for a Living has yielded twenty hugely interesting case studies 
covering four continents and f ive centuries and these are now presented in 
this study. The following is an attempt, based on the twenty draft chapters 
that the members of the research group have produced and the many 
thought-provoking discussions we have had, to construct a taxonomy of 
military labour relations in Europe and Asia over the previous f ive hundred 
years, to discern underlying patterns and make some suggestions about 
what kind of determinants influence the prevalence or demise of certain 
types of labour relations within the military.
Huge variations
On a phenomenological level, even when we limit ourselves to land armies 
in the service of the state, the variety of forms of military labour is almost 
endless but, to make meaningful comparisons possible, a basic classification 
has to be applied. The search for such a classification was high on the agenda 
of the research group of Fighting for a Living.
One way of grouping the different phenomena is that employed by John 
Lynn in his seminal work on the developments of European armies.9 Lynn 
distinguishes four basic “army styles”: the “feudal army”, the “aggregate con-
tract army”, the “state commission army”, and the “conscript army”. Central 
to his thesis is the notion that, around 1650, the aggregate contract army, 
which Lynn describes as “a force cobbled together from a small number of 
state troops, the hiring of mercenary bands, and the incorporation of private 
9 Lynn, “The Evolution of Army Style in the Modern West”. 
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armies raised by major aristocrats and put at the ruler’s service”,10 gave way 
to a recognizably different style, that of the state commission army. The 
state commission armies that came to dominate in Europe after 1650 were 
both more national in composition and more uniform, as well as much 
bigger than the mercenary armies had been. States took upon themselves 
more of the responsibility for clothing, feeding, and equipping the troops, 
something that, among other things, led to the invention of the uniform 
itself. However, in his recent work, Lynn has recognized that in some coun-
tries, such as the Dutch United Provinces with their small population but 
well-f illed coffers, the mercenary remained very important after that date. 
In fact, the eighteenth century was the heyday of the seigneurial system, 
in which smaller German states hired out their regiments to richer, more 
powerful states in exchange for “subsidies”. As is well known, the British 
fought their wars in North America partly with Hessian and Hanoverian 
regiments acquired in exchange for subsidies.
Although the dividing line of 1650 has kept its validity, the exceptions 
show that army styles in fact rarely occur in a pure form. Like Max Weber’s 
bureaucracy, they are ideal types. In reality, our research shows that armies 
were composite bodies with different army styles coexisting at the same 
time. Mercenaries continued to play a role in the state commission armies of 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, even if they no longer dominated 
and, as Thomas Hippler shows, the army of the ancien régime also included 
conscripted soldiers long before the formal introduction of conscription 
during the French Revolution.
Lynn’s classif ication is both convincing and useful as an analytical 
tool, but it has to be recognized that it is based on European history only. 
Several “army styles” that have been extremely important in Asia and the 
Middle East in the early modern period and even later therefore are not 
included. The first to come to mind is that of the “slave army”. For a thousand 
years, from the early ninth century to the early nineteenth, mamluks or 
ghulams, soldiers who were bought as slaves by rulers outside their realm 
and regarded as their private possessions, were a prominent feature from 
Algiers to India. Regions as far apart as the steppes of Central Asia and 
Ethiopia exported soldier-slaves on a large scale. The janissaries of the Ot-
toman Empire clearly belonged to the same category, slave troops, although 
they were levied within the Ottoman domains and not bought abroad. The 
10 Noted military historian John Lynn unfortunately had to withdraw from the project at an 
early stage, but he kindly supplied a written commentary that served as the basis for discussions 
in the Fighting for a Living working party. This description is taken from p. 2 of his commentary.
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second style is that of the tribal forces, which were no longer an important 
feature of warfare in early modern Europe, but remained important to the 
Ottoman, Mogul, and Chinese Empires until their demise.
Naturally, a classif ication of army styles pertains to forms of military 
organization, and not to labour relations. The temptation is great to assume 
that the different army styles coincided with different forms of labour 
relation, but as the case studies in our project have shown, the two do not 
necessarily coincide. While in what we may perhaps broadly call “feudal” 
armies – that is to say, in armies raised by landlords from among their own 
retinue and dependent peasantry – one type of labour tributary relation 
seems to dominate (the one that we will call “tributary”), the studies show 
us that not only can two or more army styles coexist, in a single army style 
(for instance, a state commission army or a conscript army), different labour 
relations can coexist as well. In other words: a single type of army may 
contain very different types of labour relation. Following Lynn, Michael 
Sikora describes how the Prussian canton system was a “hybrid military or-
ganization” with a standing army consisting partly of foreigners (designated 
as mercenaries) and a militia within one structure. Virginia Aksan in her 
chapter gives a particularly rich example. In 1708, the military population 
of Damascus consisted of local janissaries or guards, imperial janissaries 
sent from Istanbul, mercenaries paid by the governor (who themselves 
seem to have been composed of Anatolian levends, Kurdish musketeers, 
and North Africans), and the timariot (or sipahi) cavalry – a mixture of 
forces that had been around since the early f ifteenth century and “army 
styles” that had developed in the seventeenth. The French army of the Third 
Republic was on paper a conscript army, in which citizens exercised their 
right and duty to defend their fatherland, but like all nineteenth-century 
conscription systems, the French one enabled its more aff luent citizens 
to pay for replacements, an opportunity they availed themselves of on a 
very large scale. As most of the people who were available as replacements 
were soldiers who had served their turn but because of their long service 
in the army had little chance of a job in civil society, the conscript army 
in fact consisted to a considerable degree of veteran professionals. The 
Italian case, studied by Marco Rovinello, reflects the same reality, but in 
an extreme form: the state was quite happy that the extra income from 
bourgeois “liberations” (exemptions) allowed it to recruit veterans to beef 
up the army and, accordingly, no fewer than forty-six articles of the 1854 
regulations detailed “how enlisted people can be exonerated from service”. 
In the Netherlands, too, we see the same phenomenon of volunteers re-
engaging as substitutes after the reintroduction of conscription in 1819-1828.
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The studies in this book are about soldiers, not about officers. Everywhere 
and always, the off icer corps was treated very differently from the rank and 
f ile and had its own set of labour relations. States have never been able to 
recruit or control armies on their own. They have always needed to rely 
on status groups (nobility, landowners, educated middle classes) for this, 
and mechanisms of negotiation rather than of coercion are typical of the 
relationship between the state and these status groups. The same seems to 
be true for cavalry forces, which only rarely seem to have been recruited 
through coercion.
We are faced with different army styles that succeed each other but in 
part also overlap, and we also note that within a single identif iable army 
style a variety of labour relations is possible. The twenty cases studied in 
the context of the project in total yield about a hundred different forms of 
labour relation. As I shall discuss below, there are several reasons for this, 
but one of them is that, in many places, smaller forces of “experts” coexisted 
with the mass of the main army: from the European Landsknechte and 
Albanian cavalry to the Ottoman and later Portuguese artillery experts 
in the Mogul army and the French off icers of Mehmed Ali Pasha’s new 
Egyptian army, armies have always felt the need to employ high-skilled 
specialists for specif ic tasks. The seventeenth-century Swedish army of 
Gustavus Adolphus II offers a very good example of the coexistence of 
different army styles and labour relations within a single institution. In 
many ways the most modern army of its day, it rested on Europe’s oldest 
conscription system, but at the same time the Swedish king was one of the 
biggest employers of mercenaries in Europe with an army, only 12 per cent 
of which consisted of native Swedes.
Once we have learned to look at the different forms of military labour in 
terms of commonalities rather than differences, we then need to establish 
a taxonomy in which all the different forms of military employment that 
have occurred in the different areas over a period of f ive hundred years can 
f ind a place. For this we can have recourse to the basic threefold division of 
labour relations developed earlier in the IISH’s Global Collaboratory on the 
History of Labour Relations 1500-2000: reciprocal labour, tributary labour, 
and commodified labour.11 Providing work within a household or community 
11 Of course, one could argue that besides the three broad categories outlined (reciprocal, 
tributary, and commodif ied), volunteerism should f igure as a fourth variant. There are several 
reasons why we prefer to avoid this. First of all, and except for individual cases, it is almost 
impossible to get accurate information about people’s motivations in joining the military. 
Representatives of the state and commanding off icers may grossly misrepresent people’s 
mindset. Even if the soldiers themselves are literate and write about it in ego-documents, there 
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(on the basis of shared assumptions about obligations) is subsumed under 
reciprocal labour. Workers who are obliged by the polity (most often the 
state) to provide work are categorized as tributary labour. Their labour is 
owned by the polity. In the third category, commodif ied labour, labour 
power is acquired by the employer (the army, the state) in the marketplace.
Our research group has tried to place the different phenomena described 
in the case studies in the taxonomy and to use the result to help answer 
the following questions:
1 How can we explain the predominance of certain types of labour rela-
tions, and combinations of labour relations, in certain circumstances? 
and
2 How can we explain the replacement of one dominant system by 
another?
It goes without saying that the taxonomy is a tool to make fruitful com-
parison possible and should not be forced onto historical phenomena as a 
straitjacket.
The very empirical richness that makes military labour such an attractive 
subject to a social historian means that it is as yet too early to give a def ini-
tive answer, but in this synthesis I should like to present some preliminary 
f indings that have come out of the project. The aim is not to give a complete 
overview of the cases and their relevance, but to illustrate the main findings 
of the project with examples taken from the case studies in order to give a 
sense of what is possible with this kind of comparative approach, both in 
terms of testing the usefulness of the basic taxonomy (reciprocal/tributary/
commodif ied) and in terms of f inding determinants for the dominance of 
a particular system of army recruitment and employment, or the change 
from one system to another.
is no telling how accurate this information is. It may be a rationalization or self-justif ication. 
Tradition, economic need, or social pressure may force people to volunteer and in some cases 
(as the US Army during the Vietnam War) volunteering may even be a stratagem to avoid being 
drafted and so get a privileged position within the army. It is not the volunteer character of 
the “all-volunteer force” of the United States introduced in 1973 that is relevant for us, but its 
all-professional nature and the fact that it can be seen as a form of free and commodif ied labour.
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Reciprocal, tributary and commodified labour
To determine where a particular form of military labour should be placed 
in this taxonomy, we can look at the following variables:
 – Income (wages or fees, high or low, coin or kind, regular/irregular);
 – Duration of service (short-term contracts to lifelong employment); and
 – Legal constraints (freedom to enter or leave the system, to change 
employers).
The reciprocal form of labour relations perhaps f igures least in our stud-
ies. Nevertheless, we see references to the use of tribal forces by the Ming 
emperors in China and by the Ottoman sultans. The states of Hindustan 
often had recourse to Afghan tribal warriors. Whether the Eight Banners of 
Ch’ing China, the original Manchu tribal forces, represented reciprocal or 
tributary labour seems debatable. Perhaps one was succeeded by the other 
as the Manchu tribal chiefs acquired their new status of Chinese emperor 
and old tribal allegiances were given a place in the Chinese imperial order. 
Local militias very often were also based on reciprocity: there was a gener-
ally recognized mutual obligation within closely knit communities to share 
the burden of defence. But when state, or “national”, armies were built by 
incorporating these militias into centralized structures commanded by 
professional off icers, as we see in Ming China or ancien régime France, but 
also during the American War of Independence, militias evolved into a kind 
of primitive conscription system. The gradual transformation of militias 
that were primarily a form of reciprocal labour bound up in local duties 
to protect the community, into a form of permanent duty to the state, is 
traced by Sikora to early seventeenth-century Germany. The problem is 
that the term “militia” is really too all-embracing. Clearly for any analysis 
the terminology would need to be ref ined to make a clear distinction 
between militia systems in which the influence of local society dominates 
and those governed by the interests of the state. Frank Tallett describes 
how f irst France under Louis XIV and then many German states developed 
the militia system to create a trained manpower pool that could be drafted 
into the army as the need arose. In these systems, which culminated in 
the Prussian canton system, clearly a tributary rather than a reciprocal 
relationship dominates. The roots of modern conscription clearly lie in the 
militia system of France, which already used a form of conscription with 
the attendant mechanisms of a draft and exemptions. On the other hand 
we can also argue that, at the lowest level of early conscription systems 
like those of seventeenth-century Sweden or eighteenth-century Russia, 
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the fact that the local village community, which was charged with deliver-
ing recruits under the supervision of the landed nobility, spread out the 
burden of conscription in much the same way as it shared out the use 
of common lands or the obligation of agricultural labour means that a 
degree of reciprocity – an equal sharing of burdens and benefits within 
the community – was involved. As Elise Kimerling Wirtschafter notes, 
at least until the codif ication of recruitment rules in 1831, the practices of 
peasants and local landlords determined the recruitment process in Russia. 
We can also note that followers of military leaders who themselves had 
a contractual relationship with the court or the state were tied to these 
leaders through bonds of kinship or patronage and that because of this their 
labour relations with their commanders were of a reciprocal nature even if 
this relationship was itself part of a larger system in which other types of 
labour relation (the free commodified labour of the mercenary) dominated. 
The Scottish mercenaries quite often seem to fall into this category, but, 
as Herman Amersfoort notes, Swiss mercenaries in early modern Europe 
often had kinship ties with their recruiters as well. As all of these examples 
demonstrate, reciprocity should not be confused with equality.
The large majority of military labour relations and recruitment prac-
tices surveyed in our project fall into one of the other two categories of 
the IISH Collaboratory on the History of Labour Relations: tributary or 
commodif ied. Tributary labour occurs when the off icial position of the 
state is that serving in the military is an obligation that can be legally 
imposed and that is essentially interchangeable with the categories of 
tax and corvée – other obligations imposed by the state. This concept is 
usually well understood by the populations as is evident from the name 
given in France to conscription – the “blood tax”. The precise form that 
the tributary labour relationship takes can vary from legal enslavement 
(as in the Ottoman devşirme) to levies for specif ic campaigns, hereditary 
obligations (as in the case of the Ming where households were obliged to 
provide one member of the household for military service instead of corvée 
or tax obligations) and early and modern forms of conscription. In levies 
and early forms of conscription the obligation is typically imposed on a 
community (the “People’s Stalwarts” of the Ming or the peasants of the 
Russian mir) while in modern conscription systems it is essentially an 
individual duty incumbent on the citizen. Tributary and reciprocal forms 
intermingle in the case of tribes that have a tributary relationship with, 
for instance, the Mogul, Ottoman or Ming Empire, but that mobilize their 
own tribal warriors on the basis of reciprocity.
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The second quite common category is that of commodif ied labour. This 
seems to be the category into which both the aggregate contract army 
and the state commission army of Lynn’s classif ication fall. Typical for 
these categories is that there is a contractual relationship for a limited 
time between the court or state on the one hand and the military on the 
other. Both the modern volunteer army (like the all-volunteer force of the 
United States studied by Beth Bailey) and the contractors operating in Iraq 
or Afghanistan, on whom Yelda Kaya reports, fall into this category as well.
A complicating factor is that different types of labour relationships 
sometimes f igure on different levels of a single system. In analogy to food 
chains or commodity chains, one could perhaps speak about “recruitment 
chains”. An early modern European state may contract a mercenary colonel, 
who will then contract with off icers, often from the nobility, who will 
bring to the army peasants from their feudal estates, who have a tributary 
relationship with their lord. The fact that early modern states, whether 
European, Middle Eastern, or Indian, as a rule relied on the landlords or 
notables to execute levies on a local level opened the door to all kinds of 
combinations of reciprocal and tributary systems, with the local notables 
and off icials sometimes becoming military contractors. In the Ottoman 
army of the nineteenth century and right up until the First World War, Kurd-
ish tribal chiefs were given off icer rank and placed in the army hierarchy, 
but it proved impossible to impose regular army discipline on the Kurdish 
units commanded by these off icers, because the rank and f ile recognized 
only tribal allegiance, not the hierarchy of the army. Theirs was a reciprocal 
mini-system within a tributary (because conscription-based) whole of the 
Ottoman army, with free commodif ied labour (the off icers) at the top. A 
particularly complex case is that of the Soldatenhandel discussed by Tallett 
and Lynn. The soldiers hired out by, for instance, the state of Hesse-Cassel 
to the British crown, were hired and had no interest in the British cause, 
and in that sense and on that level they were mercenaries; but, one level 
down, they had in most cases been recruited by their own state through 
a form of coercion, be it a cantonal militia system or impressment. If they 
were “volunteers”, it was often in the form of indentured labour to pay off 
family debts. Robert Johnson gives the example of the native soldiers of the 
East India Company Army, who enlisted as volunteers, but who at the same 
time were offered to the army by the heads of their families, who expected 
these family members to serve out of tradition (and undoubtedly to add to 
the family income or at least save having to feed an extra mouth). This is 
a case of a commodif ied labour relation on top of a tributary or possibly 
even reciprocal one.
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In order to create a basis for comparative analysis of all these forms of 
military labour relations, we need to f ind a common language to describe 
the phenomena, one that is not bound up exclusively in the historical 
development of one of the regions studied. In other words: rather than 
busy ourselves overmuch with the question of whether the timar system 
of the Ottoman Empire or the mansabdari system in Mogul India is a form 
of feudalism (which is, after all, a term from European social history), we 
should recognize that for hundreds of years states have been in need of 
a form of military service in which soldiers, mostly relatively expensive 
mounted warriors, were remunerated with land or the usufruct of land in 
exchange for exclusive service to one court or state.
Pay and labour relations
The question of pay does not in itself determine in which category (tributary 
or commodif ied) the different forms of military labour should be placed, 
although it can be an indicator: the porters recruited by the Ch’ing army 
from native tribes were not paid when they carried foodstuffs for their 
chieftain, because their work was considered corvée, but they were paid 
when employed directly by the state, so the very same work was tributary in 
one context and commodif ied in the other. It is true that def ining military 
service as a duty analogous to the payment of taxes allows the state to 
escape the need to compete in the labour market and therefore to offer 
competitive wages, but most troops in tributary systems were in fact paid. 
The Chinese Empire, for example, did pay its garrison troops during the 
Ming era, even if these troops were made up of members of hereditary 
military households that were obliged to produce soldiers, and the Ot-
tomans paid their janissary troops handsomely, even if legally they were 
the sultan’s slaves and the members of the corps had originally been levied 
as a form of tax-in-kind in Christian Balkan villages.
On the other hand, mercenaries and state-commissioned armies – 
examples of commodif ied labour – were often paid badly. Mercenaries 
could be compensated by giving them the right to pillage (about which 
more later) but once armies grew in size and permanence (something that 
seems to have happened in China f ive hundred years before it happened 
in seventeenth-century Europe), states were forced to allow soldiers to pay 
their way (and earn a living), either by doing non-military labour for the 
state (road repair being a popular option all over the world) or by producing 
goods for the market. Otherwise, these mass armies would simply have been 
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unaffordable. Here the Russian example is very clear. The soldiers of the 
Russian army were nominally full-time soldiers, but they were allowed to 
do productive work and even benefit from their own workshops and farms 
while they were garrisoned. The tributary labour of the soldiers thus became 
partly commodif ied. Standing armies, such as state-commissioned armies 
in early modern Europe, the Ottoman janissary garrisons, or the military 
households of the Ming, could (and in fact had to) reduce their costs by 
allowing soldiers to become part-time producers. The garrison troops of the 
Ming military households spent most of their time in agricultural labour, 
not on military duties and half of the grain they raised in the f ields had to 
be handed over to the local garrison to cover the expenses of the troops. 
Janissaries very often became co-owners of shops in the bazaar in cities 
such as Istanbul, Damascus, Aleppo, or Cairo and, as Gilles Veinstein notes, 
this was not some form of “degeneration” of the corps in the seventeenth or 
eighteenth century: it had always been part of the system. Problems arose 
only when the janissaries became primarily involved in non-military trades.
If it is true that many soldiers in standing armies were part-time agricul-
turalists or artisans, the reverse is also true: peasants and artisans could 
become part-time or short-term soldiers. Dirk Kolff in his description of the 
north Indian labour market makes the point that we should primarily look 
at soldiering as part of the survival strategy of families and village com-
munities. Peasants could turn into weavers or soldiers as the opportunity 
arose, and making use of the full range of opportunities was a sensible living 
strategy for families. For this reason, the Hindustani villagers equipped 
themselves with f irearms on a massive scale, much as they would acquire 
or make looms or hoes. It is very likely that a similar logic holds true for the 
communities that delivered levends to the Ottoman army and for villages 
in south-western Germany that provided Landsknechte. Spreading the risk 
is an essential strategy for peasant communities, and seasonal soldiering 
could compensate for a bad harvest.
Forms of remuneration
Basically, the state has three options in the way it remunerates its soldiers: 
through the apportioning or the usufruct of land; through cash payment or 
payment in moveable goods; or through granting rights, notably the right 
to pillage. The granting of land or usufruct was always a popular option for 
cash-strapped states. It had clear advantages for societies with low levels of 
monetization, and it seems to have been the preferred option for relatively 
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expensive cavalry forces and commanding off icers in medieval Europe as 
well as in India and the Middle East in the early modern period. Generally 
the rank and f ile were paid in cash or kind, but both in Europe (Cossacks, 
Croats on the Austrian military border) and in China (Banner troops) we 
see the phenomenon of troops settled on the borders as colonists, who were 
given land in the area they settled.
Both copper and silver played an important role in systems based on cash 
payments. Where soldiers were paid on a weekly or monthly basis, copper 
coin seems to have been used frequently, while silver was preferred when 
larger sums were involved, as for signing bonuses or payments of arrears. 
In the Chinese army, soldiers were paid in copper when in their garrisons, 
but in silver when on campaign, as carrying large amounts of copper coin 
would have been too burdensome.
Generally, cash payment became more widespread after the flow of silver 
from the Spanish Americas started, but it was primarily an attractive option 
for states with a high degree of centralization and huge powers of extraction 
(the Chinese Empire being in a class of its own in this respect) or states with 
highly developed credit and banking systems like the Italian city-states, 
the Dutch Republic, or Britain. Spain and Japan were in an exceptional 
position in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, because their direct 
access to rich silver stocks gave them a unique ability to raise troops for 
cash. For most early modern European states, however, but also for the 
Ottoman Empire, raising the cash for the aggregate contract armies of the 
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries and for the expanding armies of 
the later seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was, of course, notoriously 
diff icult. One way of overcoming the problem was by allowing soldiers to 
raise their income by granting them the right to pillage. As both Lynn and 
Tallett show, for the mercenaries in the armies of the Thirty Years War this 
source of income was far more important than their nominal wage, and 
Tallett clearly has a point when he says that this makes the soldier less a 
wage-earner than a petty entrepreneur. While this kind of remuneration 
seems to have lost its importance in Europe from the mid-seventeenth 
century onwards as states grew stronger and increased their ability to raise 
taxes (as Charles Tilly has famously argued), it continued in other areas. As 
Mehmet Beşikçi shows, the Ottoman Empire in 1914 gave volunteer bands 
the right to collect “donations” from the local population, acting as a kind 
of de facto tax collector.
In addition to regular pay, there are many examples of bonus and incen-
tive systems in the form of rewards for valour in battle, for the number of 
enemies killed, for signing up, or for extending one’s service. Aksan quotes 
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the memoirs of an Ottoman soldier of the early nineteenth century, who 
confesses to cutting off the heads of unsuspecting Christian villagers with 
the intention of handing them in as proof of the number of enemies he had 
killed. When he then meets a company of janissaries, the f irst thing they do 
is to rob him of his heads. The incentive, both for him and for the janissaries, 
is not bloodthirstiness or fanaticism, but simple material gain – the heads 
represent a source of extra income in the form of a bonus. Signing bonuses 
were a double-edged sword for the recruiters, however. On the one hand, 
the immediate attraction of an up-front payment in cash was hard to resist 
for many poor peasants or casual labourers in the towns, so they were very 
effective. On the other hand, the cash in hand gave recruits the means of 
survival (albeit a for a limited period), and deserting immediately after the 
receipt of the bonus seems to have been a common strategy for recruits the 
world over. Signing bonuses were expensive for the state or its recruiters 
and, as Sikora points out, imposing military service as a duty (in other words, 
turning it into tributary labour), for instance, in the form of state-controlled 
militias, saved a great deal of money.
Perhaps a distinction should be made between the right granted to 
soldiers to live off the land and exact “contributions” from the population, 
especially in enemy territory, which can be regarded as a form of regular 
income, and the right to pillage, for instance after the taking of a town, 
which, because of its unpredictable nature, can more properly be regarded 
as a bonus or incentive.
Throughout the period studied there seem to have been huge differences 
in remuneration between off icers and troops, in both Europe and Asia, 
but also between the well-trained professionals that were hired for their 
expertise (and who on the whole were much smaller in number) and large 
masses of peasant soldiers with only basic skills. Off icers were not only 
much better remunerated, either in land/usufruct or cash, but in many cases 
(European and Indian mercenaries seem to be prime examples) off icers 
also functioned as recruiters and were regarded, as Amersfoort says, as 
“owners” of their regiments. This allowed them to run their units as private 
enterprises and turn military service into a very prof itable business. As 
Amersfoort shows, getting rid of these intermediaries, who controlled the 
military labour market, was a strong argument in favour of the establish-
ment of cadre-militia or conscript armies in the nineteenth century.
The professional mercenaries of early modern Europe, the Household 
Men of Ming China, and the Ottoman janissaries, with their strong cor-
porate identity and hierarchy based on skill and experience, can perhaps 
best be compared to guild members and artisans. Landsknechte regarded 
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their units as independent corporations and as a rule even elected their 
own off icers without interference from any state. The soldiers of the mass 
armies raised in eighteenth-century France or Prussia, the levends of the 
Ottoman Empire, the garrison troops of the Ming, or the Green Standard 
forces of the Ch’ing can be more usefully compared with unskilled labour. 
The evidence seems to show that pay levels for this type of soldier were fairly 
consistent with wages being paid at the lower end of the civilian labour 
market, in both Europe and Asia. Where soldiers were recruited in the 
labour market, the army generally seems to have been an employer of last 
resort, as shown by the fact that recruitment generally was easier in times 
of economic crisis, or in the seasons with little agricultural work, when it 
was hard to f ind other jobs. The trump card of armies no doubt was the 
fact that, apart from the basic wage, they offered a degree of security in the 
form of board and lodging, however dismal it may have been.
When discussing the remuneration of soldiers it is important to include 
the long-term effects as well as the immediate reward. Some of the most 
valuable elements of remuneration may be in the shape of future rewards 
such as upward social mobility, land, pensions or (in the modern state) 
insurance, and educational opportunities for the soldiers themselves or 
their children. This is true of civilian labour as well, of course, but armies 
have often pioneered this kind of remuneration scheme. Especially in the 
late twentieth century the cost of the non-pay elements in the total remu-
neration of soldiers became very considerable. As Kaya writes (citing James 
Jay Carafano), in the US Army it doubles the cost of employing a soldier.
The duration of military service
When we look at the practices in Europe and Asia in the past f ive hundred 
years, the basic distinction we see in the term of service is that between 
long-term and short-term. Long-term service seems to be associated with 
reciprocal and tributary labour relations. The most extreme form is, of 
course, military service that is in principle an engagement for the rest of 
a person’s life, as was the case with the Ottoman janissaries, mamluks, 
sipahis and mansabdars, Ming household troops, and Ch’ing Eight Banner 
forces. Obligations within (reciprocal) tribal systems are also generally of 
a lifelong nature.
Still long-term, although not lifelong, was the obligation that came with 
militia and canton systems and more generally, with the state commission 
armies in Europe and, for instance, the Green Standard Army of the Ch’ing. 
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In the modern all-volunteer army, military service is def ined as a career 
and therefore fundamentally seen as a long-term engagement but, as it 
is contract-based, the labour relation cannot be defined as tributary and 
long-term service cannot be enforced.
At the opposite side of the spectrum we f ind the short-term contracts 
of mercenaries, tribal auxiliaries, and levies such as the Ottoman levends. 
Sometimes these were hired for a single campaign season, but more gener-
ally the – often implicit rather than explicit – term of contract seems to 
have been until the end of the present conflict or emergency.
One system of recruitment moved from long-term to short-term over 
time: conscription. In the older (seventeenth- and eighteenth-century) 
conscription systems, such as the Russian and the Swedish, service was for 
an indefinite term, which in practice usually meant twenty-f ive to thirty 
years. In the modern conscription systems introduced in the nineteenth 
century the term of service was much more limited and in general was 
lowered signif icantly over the course of the century. Hence, the mass 
conscript armies of the century between 1870 and 1970, with their two- to 
three-year service, formed a halfway house between the lifelong soldier 
and the soldier engaged for one single campaign that is so characteristic of 
earlier times. It has to be remembered, however, that all conscript armies 
have been built around a core of long-term professionals.
Free or unfree? Legal constraints
The problem with determining whether soldiers in the different armies can 
be classif ied as free or unfree labour is complex. Soldiers serving within 
a system of reciprocal obligations must at all times count as unfree (as 
reneging on the communal obligation usually carries a very high social 
cost), but very few soldiers in history have been legally completely free 
actors in the sense that they could terminate or change their employment 
without being subject to prosecution under criminal law. In almost every 
country, joining the army altered people’s legal status. In most cases this 
restricted their freedom, but in the case of Russia the opposite was true: 
conscription turned serfs into free men (and their wives into free women), 
albeit free men subject to military discipline. As in many other f ields, the 
prototypical Marxian free worker historically seems to have been a quite 
exceptional phenomenon in the world of the military. In his essay “Who Are 
the Workers?”, Marcel van der Linden has argued that “there is an almost 
endless variety of producers in capitalism, and the intermediate forms 
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between the different categories are fluid rather than sharply def ined”.12 
He gives examples of slaves working voluntarily for wages part of their 
time, and he also points out that “free” wage-labourers have at times been 
locked up by their employers, a practice that in countries such as China or 
India is still a regular occurrence. Our research seems to confirm the truth 
of this statement.
Members of aggregate contract armies undoubtedly come closest to the 
status of free worker. In theory they were free to choose their employer, 
which gave them some negotiating power, and their contracts were of 
limited duration, although, as James Miller notes, the actual term of service 
often seems to have been unrecorded. The premise seems to have been that 
soldiers served as long as hostilities required their presence. But even the 
mercenaries were subject to articles of war once they had signed up and 
received their bonus. According to a decree of December 1789 quoted by 
Hippler, the soldiers of the French revolutionary army would lose their civic 
rights for the duration of their (voluntary) service and even the all-volunteer 
force of the United States, which, according to Bailey, in the 1970s explicitly 
sought to redefine military service from a citizen’s obligation to the state 
to just another form of labour, comparable to work in services or industry, 
subjected its soldiers to a legal regime distinct from the civilian code. The 
criminalization of breach of contract seems to be an enduring characteristic 
of military employment that sets it apart from most civilian labour relations.
Appearances can be deceptive: the Ottoman janissaries were technically 
possessions of their sultan, but had accumulated traditional rights, which 
they guarded jealously, much like a guild. Many of the janissary mutinies 
that occurred from the seventeenth to the early nineteenth centuries 
started as “industrial actions” or pay disputes, when they interpreted 
government measures as unjustly transgressing on their acquired rights.13 
On the other hand, soldiers who signed up of their own accord, as free 
men, for an eighteenth-century state commission army were faced with 
draconian regulations and frequent physical abuse, which in armies such 
as the Prussian could be quite as bad as what plantation slaves had to face.
When judging conditions of service, whether in terms of pay or in terms 
of the opposition free/unfree, we should always take into account contem-
porary conditions in society at large. Conditions of service that may seem 
unfair or even atrocious in our eyes may have looked very different to a 
Scottish day labourer, a Russian serf, or a Hindustani peasant. The status 
12 Van der Linden, “Who Are the Workers?”
13 See Stremmelaar, “Justice and Revenge in the Ottoman Rebellion of 1703”. 
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of free actor in the labour market, as enjoyed by a European mercenary 
or a Rajput warrior, historically is the exception rather than the rule, and 
that is true for the military profession just as much as for society at large.
Determinants: general considerations
Hopefully, the preceding paragraphs have shown that it is possible to 
classify the different forms of military labour by looking at their shared 
characteristics and to place them in a taxonomy based on a distinction 
between reciprocal, tributary, and commodified labour. Taking into account 
the variables of remuneration, term of service, and legal status, we can try 
to gauge which factors influence the choice for a particular form of military 
employment on the part of the state: in other words, which were the most 
important determinants?
All forms of military recruitment and labour represent different solutions 
to shared problems. To f ind the determinants, we f irst have to look at the 
basic problems and aspirations of the people and the state. As a rule, people 
like to be left alone. Outside the ruling elite, they are fully occupied by their 
daily concerns to make a living, to preserve their health, to protect their 
children, and, in the more dynamic societies, also to gain advancement 
or amass wealth. They are prepared to defend their homes and families 
and throughout recorded history they have also shown themselves ready 
to defend the larger community of which they perceive themselves to be 
a part: the village, the town, or the tribe. Indeed, in some societies (those 
of border and highland Scotland, of Albania, and of the Central Asian 
steppes, for instance), small-scale local armed conflict was the normal 
state of things, and it is no coincidence that these societies produced highly 
sought-after soldiers. Of course, history is also riddled with instances in 
which people have united in much larger, more anonymous groups to f ight 
in a “cause”: the crusades in medieval Europe, rebellions such as those of the 
Celalis in the early seventeenth-century Ottoman Empire or the Tai Pings 
in nineteenth-century China. Sometimes hundreds of thousands, even 
millions, of people have taken part in these armed movements, but two 
characteristics distinguish these movements from the kind of organized 
violence we discuss in our project: they are generally short-lived (even the 
longest lasting only about f ifteen years, most being much shorter) and at 
least at the start spontaneous. In our project we deal with military systems 
established by states for the longer term.
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States therefore have a problem: it is very diff icult to get people to devote 
themselves exclusively or predominantly, on a permanent basis, to f ighting, 
killing, and dying in the service of distant entities such as courts or abstract 
notions such as the state or the nation. Yet this is exactly what princes and 
states need. Faced with the need to raise soldiers, states have a basic choice 
between two options. To put it in Gramscian terms they can either coerce 
people into serving or convince them to do so through the establishment of 
a hegemonic cultural code, in other words, to create a measure of consent. 
Both coercion and consent have obvious advantages and disadvantages, 
which are well known from the debates about slavery versus wage labour.14 
At f irst sight the hiring of professionals, in the form of both mercenaries and 
standing armies, may seem the more expensive option, because it makes 
high demands on the state’s ability to pay and often forces the state to 
compete with other employers in the labour market, but at least mercenaries 
(but also levies) have the huge advantage that they can be contracted for a 
single campaign season or emergency only and that they can be disbanded 
thereafter. This seems to have been the practice in India and Europe as early 
as the fourteenth century, but also in the Middle East from the seventeenth 
century onwards. Coercion may seem cheap, but it is more expensive than 
it appears at f irst sight, because of the need for forceful recruitment and 
constant supervision after soldiers have been recruited. Like slaves, coerced 
soldiers may also be less motivated or “productive” than those who have 
joined the colours of their own free will. In the Ottoman army in the First 
World War, conscripted Arab soldiers were sometimes marched to the front 
in chains and this army had the highest proportion of deserters by far of all 
armies engaged in the war.
On the other hand, coercion allows the state to escape the need to 
compete in the labour market. It does not have to entice people to become 
soldiers with signing bonuses nor does it have to pay wages in conformity 
with the market. Ultimately, what is the decisive factor may not be cost 
in itself, but value for money or, in other words, cost-effectiveness. It is 
extremely diff icult to introduce the concept of “productivity” into discus-
sions on military labour. After all, what is a soldier’s productivity when he 
is engaged in his core business of f ighting and killing? Is it the measure of 
destruction he manages to inflict on the enemy? Or is it the degree to which 
his activities help to enlarge the tax base of the state through conquests, 
or further the economic interests of the elites that control the state? In 
economics, productivity is the total production divided by the necessary 
14 Fenoaltea, “Slavery and Supervision in Comparative Perspective”.
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workforce, so we not only have to take into account the end result of military 
campaigns, but also the size of the armed force needed to achieve the result. 
Although an interesting topic, this issue is too complicated to deal with in 
the context of this synthesis or even the Fighting for a Living project. In this 
context it is perhaps best to see cost-effectiveness as the lowest expenditure 
that would still give a state good prospects of success on the battlef ield.
Whatever the definition, it seems to be the case that courts and states his-
torically are looking for the army that is most effective on the battlefield at the 
lowest possible cost (that even this lowest possible cost can still be crippling 
to state and society alike is another matter). However, there can be a huge 
difference between the immediate costs and the long-term financial burden: 
both early seventeenth-century mercenaries and early twenty-first-century 
contractors have been expensive in the short run, but they were and are easily 
dismissed at the end of the conflict, while standing state commission armies 
were a continuous drain on the treasury and the modern all-volunteer forces 
bring with them huge long-term obligations to the soldiers and their families.
The choice made by different states at different times is influenced by 
many more factors than economic or f inancial ones alone, however. If 
maintaining a monopoly of violence, or, to put it more realistically, getting 
as close as it can to a monopoly of violence, is a central function of the state, 
the dilemma faced by states that create a powerful military they may not 
be able to control, and that may threaten the established order, is a very 
real one. This is just as true for the state that recruits highly specialized 
military experts (like the mamluks of the Middle East or the Turks and 
Afghans of Hindustan) as for the one that, through conscription, recruits 
mass armies from a population that is at the same time denied access to 
civil rights (as in the cases of Prussia and Russia). Apart from this kind of 
political consideration, ideological considerations or cultural prejudices 
may play a part. The Ottoman decision to exclude non-Muslim citizens 
from the conscription system (a decision that cost them up to 40 per cent 
of their manpower pool before 1878 and at least 20 per cent thereafter) is a 
case in point, but so is the commitment to general conscription of the late 
nineteenth-century French Republic and the Kingdom of Italy, which was 
informed by notions of patriotism and nation-building. As Jörn Leonhard 
shows, the rejection of conscription in Great Britain was influenced both 
by the Whig interpretation of history, which saw large standing armies as 
instruments of tyranny and essentially un-British, and by an idealized view 
of the army as representing traditional country values, with aristocratic 
off icers and a sturdy peasantry for soldiers. This shifted toward the end of 
the nineteenth century with a changing image of the imperial military and 
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an intensified perception of continental models of the nation-in-arms – still 
it needed the new realities of the First World War to introduce general 
conscription in Britain.
Many states held strong opinions about which populations produced 
good soldiers, and these ideas were not without foundation. As Miller 
writes, one factor that made soldiering attractive for Scotsmen and made 
Scotsmen attractive as soldiers was the long tradition in the country of 
military training through the state-imposed tradition of regular weapons 
training shows. In addition, the internecine small-scale warfare among the 
Scottish nobles and clans formed a permanent training ground for future 
soldiers. The same is true for the Albanians, who gained a reputation as 
warriors both in early modern Europe and in the Middle East. The Albanian 
Mehmed Ali Pasha of Egypt turned to conscripting the fellahs of the Nile 
valley into his army only when he had no other options left, partly because 
the docile peasant population of Egypt was regarded as completely devoid of 
martial qualities. In the end, it turned out that with extreme coercion and 
professional leadership these peasants could be made into a very effective 
army, but as Khaled Fahmy shows, the population continued to see military 
service as a kind of corvée and never developed a “military ethos”.15
The exemption and substitution systems that were introduced into all 
countries parallel to the introduction of modern conscription were often 
motivated by economic and ideological concerns. On the one hand, there 
was the fear that conscripting the most economically productive males 
(white-collar workers, people with education) would damage the economy, 
as the French debates charted by Hippler show. In the Kingdom of the Neth-
erlands even wage-earners were exempted. On the other hand, the tendency 
of regimes as far apart as the Dutch, the Russians, and the Ottomans to 
exempt clerical students shows a concern with maintaining the ideological 
bases of the social order. In Germany, Helmuth von Moltke (1800-1891) feared 
that the arming of the workers would constitute a permanent danger for 
the new nation-state.
Universal patterns
When surveying the different case studies in our project, we are struck by 
a number of characteristics that seem to be almost universal. One is, as 
noted before, that we always see different types of army style, and different 
15 Fahmy, All the Pasha’s Men, p. 99.
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forms of recruitment and labour relations, coexisting. One telling example 
is that of the Delhi sultanate described by Kaushik Roy: its army consisted 
of mercenaries, retainers of tributary chieftains, slave soldiers, and troops 
maintained by holders of f iefs. Change from one army style to another 
may be sudden, but is rarely absolute (the transition of the US Army from 
conscription to an all-volunteer force in 1973, followed by similar transitions 
in most NATO countries, seems to be the exception that confirms the rule). 
While it is true that war nearly always brings with it some degree of change, 
the introduction of new types of armed forces triggered by developments 
in war very often takes place side by side with the continued existence of 
older forces, which remain important even if they are obsolete and have lost 
their credibility on the battlef ield. The Ottomans kept their sipahi forces 
in existence for at least two centuries after their military usefulness had 
ended, and the Chinese Empire seems to have been equally conservative, as 
is shown by the example of the Eight Banners of the Ch’ing, who, according 
to Christine Moll-Murata and Ulrich Theobald, were militarily effective 
until about 1680, but were kept in existence until 1912 and consumed about 
a f ifth of state revenues.
It is not hard to see why. Military corps were, after all, in an excellent posi-
tion to defend their vested interests, especially when garrisoned in major 
cities or the capital. This is one reason why both the Ming and the Ottomans, 
when they started hiring, or levying, mercenary troops, left their obsolete 
formations (garrison troops and household troops in the case of the Ming, 
sipahis and janissaries in that of the Ottomans) in place. Another, almost 
inverse reason, also evident in both these cases, seems to be that a military 
system, even when obsolete on the battlef ield, can still be an important 
element of control inside the country, not just in terms of law and order, 
but also in ideological terms. Military elites often exemplif ied the existing 
social order. The concept of military households was important to the Ming 
as a vital element in its social order, just as the concept of a “military class” 
(askeri) was to that of the Ottomans. Moll-Murata and Theobald, basing 
themselves on the work of Mark Elliott, say that the militarily useless Eight 
Banners were kept in being and paid by the state primarily because they 
served “the display of the presence of the ruling elite in the capital and in 
the provincial garrisons.” The continued reliance of the French state on its 
nobility for the recruiting and off icering of its army even after that nobility 
had lost its autonomy can be interpreted in the same sense.
Hereditary military labour has been judged very differently in different 
states and societies. On the one extreme, we f ind the Ming Empire, which 
originally imposed hereditary military service on a section of the popula-
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tion. On the other, we f ind the Egyptian mamluks and Ottomans, who (at 
least in theory) explicitly rejected the idea that sons should follow their 
fathers in the military profession. In both cases the injunction was closely 
linked to ideas about a stable social order, as hereditary service under the 
Ming was only one part of a rigid division of society into hereditary profes-
sions, while in the Middle East exclusion of offspring from the military elite 
was seen as a way to buttress a social order with a military elite (askeri) 
that was theoretically completely separated from the mass of the ruled in 
a way that is a perfect illustration of Ernest Gellner’s famous description 
of the “agro-literate polity”.
Apart from the formal positions of states on hereditary service, for 
or against, hereditary elements often played a role in communities that 
traditionally provided mercenary soldiers, such as the Swiss, the Scots, the 
Rajputs, the Gurkhas, or the “House Men” of the Ming. As Roy says for India, 
“at times military service def ined the identity of various communities”. 
Indeed, in early modern aggregate contract armies in Europe children 
often accompanied their fathers (and mothers) on campaign, and being a 
member of a family with military experience was considered an advantage. 
Off icers the world over mostly came from “military” families, although 
Europe from medieval times to the twentieth century seems to have been 
unique in the degree to which performing military service was considered 
the noble occupation par excellence and a hallmark of noble status. The 
Rajputs display the same characteristics, but in the Indian context their 
case seems to have been rather exceptional.
What is very clear is that there is no teleological sequence. There is no 
single process of armies progressing from one stage to another on some 
developmental or modernization path. Because of the strong ideological 
resistance in the Anglo-Saxon world to the idea of conscription, which was 
closely identif ied with tyranny, this system, which became universal in 
nineteenth-century Europe, was not introduced in Britain until a century 
later and then only temporarily. A century later again, the reduction of 
the armed forces of industrialized countries after the end of the Cold 
War, in combination with a glut of arms and off icers caused in part by 
the end of the Warsaw Pact and in part by the end of apartheid in South 
Africa, led to a resurgence of mercenary forces in the form of “contractors” 
such as Blackwater as a major component in military campaigns of NATO 
countries. Only decades before, when mercenaries played a role only in 
post-colonial conflicts in Africa, the resurgence of a form of military labour 
that had been in decline since the seventeenth century was not predicted 
by anyone. Nevertheless, although there is no single path of development, 
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in some periods certain systems clearly come to dominate while others 
fade. As Lynn has noted, the mercenary did not disappear after 1650, but 
in Europe the state commission army did become the norm. In the Middle 
East the janissaries remained in existence until 1826, but irregular levies 
had become the mainstay of the army by the eighteenth century. After 1815, 
many restoration regimes, like those in the Netherlands or Italy, rejected 
conscription as a revolutionary legacy, but in the decades thereafter the 
system became dominant throughout Europe and the Middle East. What 
were the factors determining these changes?
Now let us try to draw up a preliminary survey of those factors that act 
as determinants where military employment is concerned.
Manpower and money
The availability of people and of money seem to be the most important 
determinants. It is these two factors, the classic factors of labour and capital, 
that create the parameters within which choices can be made. In these 
choices political, ideological, and cultural considerations very often play 
a signif icant role.
Let us f irst look at demographics, at manpower. Both the Chinese and 
Indian experience is determined f irst and foremost by the availability of an 
enormous, and seemingly unlimited, manpower pool. This gave the Mogul 
Empire the chance to raise vast peasant armies and the Chinese Empire the 
opportunity to raise armies that were of a different order of magnitude al-
together, when compared with European, South Asian, and Middle Eastern 
examples. As Roy notes, at the end of the sixteenth century the population 
of the Indian subcontinent was f ive times that of the Ottoman Empire, 
ten times that of France, and thirty times that of England. The Chinese 
manpower pool was clearly unique when looked at in a global comparative 
perspective, as it was almost as large as that of the subcontinent in 1600 
(and became much bigger later on), but much more of this population fell 
under the central control of Beijing than was the case in India. As Bailey 
shows, the transition from a conscript army to an all-volunteer force in the 
United States was also very much the result of demographic development, 
i.e. the baby boom, which “translated into a flood of young men eligible for 
military service in the early 1960s”. Scotland in the sixteenth and seven-
teenth centuries had a very small population, but – relative to its size – an 
abundance of surplus labour that was used to handling weapons. When 
population growth stagnated in the eighteenth century, the recruitment 
of Scots by the British Army became a problem. The manpower demands 
of the army in the nineteenth century meant that the British had to start 
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recruiting in the urban centres of England, rather than in the countryside, 
in spite of strong objections to the enlisting of urban riff-raff in the army. 
For the Dutch, as Amersfoort shows, the small population in combination 
with the drying up of foreign recruitment sources meant that a return to 
conscription became inevitable after 1813. This drying up was due to the 
expansion of the textile industry in Switzerland, which created attractive 
alternatives to the traditional practice of hiring oneself out as a soldier. 
Conversely, according to Zhao Zhongnan and Suzuki Tadashi (cited by 
David M. Robinson in this volume), the manpower pool available to the 
Ming army increased considerably when civilian farmers and military 
household soldiers lost their land to increasingly powerful landlords in the 
late sixteenth century, and this allowed the state to recruit on a large scale.
The second factor is money. Where labour markets were tight, states 
essentially had only two ways to strengthen their armies: either through 
more coercion (isolating groups of people from the labour market), which 
also carries a cost, or through improving the position of the army in the 
labour market by offering higher wages or other benefits. Coercion is much 
in evidence, and here too we see recurrent patterns in a number of cases. 
The “press”, or similar systems, although not used as frequently and bru-
tally as in the case of the navy, was used by British, German, and Ottoman 
authorities to get rid of social undesirables, which usually meant vagrants, 
beggars, and more generally men without property, protection, or regular 
work. Miller gives a telling example from 1630, when the Privy Council 
of Scotland ordered “all beggars, vagabonds, and masterless men with no 
lawful trade or means of livelihood” to enlist. In 1769 an Ottoman chronicler 
noted that provincial governors recruited thieves and the homeless. In 
Russia, communities and landlords used conscription to send off criminals, 
troublemakers, drunkards and men deemed disobedient, unruly or simply 
lazy. It is hardly surprising that armies time and again complained about the 
quality of the personnel that was provided to them in this way. As Johnson 
shows, this meant that well-trained native troops in the East India Company 
Army, who were essentially volunteers, were considered much better than 
the soldiers shipped out from the mother country.
Paying higher wages was a diff icult option for the state. Financing the 
troops was a continuous problem for most states, certainly in Europe and 
the Middle East. This is true as much for the Habsburgs during the Thirty 
Years War, who became dependent on a new breed of general contractors 
that provided credit as well as an army, as it was for France in the late 
seventeenth century or the Ottomans in the nineteenth. As Tallett notes, 
states such as Prussia in the eighteenth century –those which maintained 
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a disproportionally large army compared to population size and had under-
commercialized economies – needed a high degree of coercion to f ill their 
ranks. The Dutch Republic was on the opposite side of the spectrum. In 
spite of its small population, which was averse to military service because 
there were more profitable opportunities in the labour market, the Dutch 
managed to raise sizeable aggregate contract armies because of their 
f inancial strength and advanced banking system. The Chinese Empire, 
when united under the Ming and Ch’ing dynasties, was at the opposite 
side of the spectrum from Prussia in a different way. Its huge population in 
combination with its ability to extract and import such enormous amounts 
of silver and grain that it could provide for its armies in spite of their huge 
size (between f ive and ten times that of the biggest European armies) 
meant that it needed relatively little coercion. Roy draws attention to the 
fact that, because of their huge manpower pool, neither India nor China 
has ever had to introduce conscription. France, on the other hand, did. 
After the restoration of 1814, conscription was abolished, as it was under 
nearly all other restoration regimes as a detested revolutionary legacy, 
but according to Hippler the pay offered to soldiers was so low that only 
3,500 recruits came forward, and in 1818 a form of compulsory military 
service was re-established. Conscription was seen as a cheap alternative 
to the pre-revolutionary state commission army and, faced with the choice 
between higher rewards to make the army more attractive as an employer 
(persuasion) and the imposition of a tributary labour relation (coercion), 
the French state opted for the latter.
Technology
As mentioned above, most states were constantly on the lookout for the best 
army at the lowest cost to the treasury. But the army had to be effective 
as well, which meant – and means – being technologically state-of-the-art 
and reliable. Many of the most far-reaching changes in army recruitment 
and employment were due to the desire to apply lessons learned in war 
(primarily through defeat) and to emulate more successful competitors. As 
Tallett has shown, this did not necessarily centre on new technologies (in 
the sense of hardware) but more often on that of “social technologies”, things 
such as new forms of discipline, training, and institutional structures. This 
seems to have been a decisive factor in the long Austro-Ottoman wars of 
the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries as well as in the success 
of relatively small European colonial forces all over Asia. Ultimately, this 
led to the adoption of Western-style discipline, with uniforms and drill, in 
Egypt, the Ottoman Empire, and China. That the change was not necessarily 
38 Erik-Jan ZürchEr 
always in the direction of technological innovation is demonstrated by 
the case of French revolutionary and Napoleonic armies, which replaced 
the perfectionist drill of the eighteenth-century professional armies with 
armies that were poorly trained and armed, but possessed overwhelming 
manpower, speed, and high morale.
Changes in military technology, f inancial constraints, and the size of 
the available labour pool undoubtedly were the most important factors 
determining the choice for a specif ic form of recruitment and military 
employment, with defeat in war acting as a catalyst, but other considera-
tions also played a role.
Politics
Political considerations were always important, as balancing the need for a 
larger army with the need to maintain control over those who could provide 
it or f inance it (in the early modern states) or the need to manufacture or 
maintain consent among the public (in modern states) has always been 
high on the agenda of those in power. As Charles Tilly has argued, the 
development of the modern state rested on its ability to offer protection 
and the benefits, or rent, of that protection to the interest groups that made 
the waging of war possible in the f irst place.16 The same large modern army 
that allowed a prince to be successful in f ighting external wars and in 
maintaining a monopoly of violence at home risked delivering him into the 
hands of his creditors. High numbers of casualties or exorbitant expendi-
ture bring with them the risk of loss of political support. One of the major 
reasons behind the widespread use of contractors by the US Army in Iraq 
and Afghanistan has been the way it lessens the state’s need to maintain 
public support for its policies.
Ideological and cultural factors
Ideological and cultural factors determining who should f ight or should be 
excluded from the bearing of arms are also prominent. Conscription was 
so bound up with the revolutionary period in the eyes of the restoration 
regimes after 1815 that they preferred to fall back on state commission 
professional armies and militias (as Amersfoort shows for the Dutch case), 
while for the French Third Republic conscription as an expression of citizen-
ship and as the supposed legacy of the great revolution became an issue 
of almost mythical proportions, as Hippler demonstrates. As noted before, 
the refusal of the Ottomans to conscript non-Muslims severely limited 
16 Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime”. 
introduc tion 39
their manpower base until 1909. Rovinello highlights a problem that was 
faced by many states: while in itself the Italian population after the wars of 
unif ication was more than ample to fulf il the manpower needs of the army, 
the Piedmontese army command had severe doubts about “diluting” the 
army with unreliable southerners. The same kind of doubts can be found 
in Britain and France, not so much in terms of regional preferences but in 
terms of a distrust of the urban proletariat, especially after the Paris Com-
mune of 1871. The reservations of Moltke in this respect have been noted 
already. The Ottomans considered recruiting Christians and Jews bad for 
morale, and the Russians rejected Central Asians as unsuitable until 1916.
A change in the dominant ideological paradigm sometimes exerted pow-
erful influence on recruitment practices, especially if it went hand in hand 
with economic or demographic change. It may have been true that sources 
for mercenary recruitment in Switzerland dried up primarily because of 
the expansion of the textile industry, but it was also true that the spread of 
enlightenment ideas about citizenship and the nation made soldiering for 
money a disreputable trade. And, while the baby boom certainly decreased 
the need for forced conscription in the United States in the 1970s and made 
volunteerism possible, the rise of neo-liberal free-market economists and 
politicians, who defined conscription as a “hidden tax” and who advocated 
recruitment through the labour market, was a decisive factor in forcing 
through the transition to a professional army.
Popular cooperation and resistance
The analysis thus far concentrates almost exclusively on the needs and 
actions of the state, but we should not, of course, envisage the people who 
were the objects of the state’s intervention as being merely passive; they had 
and have agency as well. As much as the state has a repertoire of options, 
the people also have a repertoire of options open to them. Of course, they 
can comply with the demands of the state, and this may simply be a form 
of acquiescence on the part of communities faced with the power of the 
state. On the other hand, compliance does not necessarily have to equal 
acquiescence. People can see the army as an opportunity structure, offering 
them chances of social advancement or of improving their living standards, 
the chance to escape issues at home including getting women pregnant, 
feuds, or crimes (as Johnson notes), or simply the possibility to travel and 
see more of the world than their own village or valley. Rovinello shows that 
this was a factor for Italian recruits in the nineteenth century. He also makes 
the point that the draft acquired a symbolic meaning as a rite of passage to 
adulthood. Being declared fit for the army was a “public certif ication of their 
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masculinity” (and, one might add, of their health). In the industrialized world 
of the twentieth century, young healthy males who had served their country 
in the army were seen as attractive workers, as they had been declared 
healthy (psychologically as well as physically) and had acquired discipline.
The fact that the state is in need of manpower to f ill the ranks of its 
army also enables people to instrumentalize military service for their own 
ends. Communities that provided soldiers during levies often managed to 
get compensation in the form of tax breaks. The Cossacks of the Russian 
Empire are perhaps the most telling example of a community that managed 
to exchange its loyalty and military prowess for concessions in the form of 
autonomy, royal protection, and tax exemption. Another interesting form 
of “exchange” is the one that Beşikçi describes for the Ottoman Empire in 
the First World War, when prisoners were released in large numbers if they 
agreed to serve in labour battalions or in militia units.
There is evidence that, whether in Asia, the Middle East, or Europe, the 
army was rarely a popular employer, at least where the rank and f ile were 
concerned. It was often an employer of last resort. But even so, when work 
was scarce, when harvests failed, or when industries went through a slump, 
the army offered low but regular pay, food, and lodging – in other words a 
security that was hard to f ind anywhere else.
On the other hand, people may also resist. But, to borrow from Charles 
Tilly’s conceptualization of social movements,17 the repertoire of resistance 
is also varied. First there is the tendency to avoid service altogether. Con-
scription systems, old and new, just like enslavement, have generally been 
deeply unpopular. As Beşikçi says (citing Alan Forrest), “conscription can 
also be depicted as a battleground between individual and local communi-
ties on the one hand and a distant impersonal state on the other”. Privileged 
sections of society have generally been able to make use of exemptions, and 
both communities and local authorities seem to have done their best to 
make sure that ”undesirables”, who were unproductive and might otherwise 
create unrest in society, were taken into the army. This is a clear case of 
instrumentalization of the state’s recruitment drive on the part of social 
actors. For populations that were faced with coercion on the part of the 
state and its representatives, different forms of avoidance were open: going 
into hiding or self-mutilation, which, according to Fahmy, was especially 
widespread in nineteenth-century Egypt.18 Once in the army, both desertion 
and defection became options, even if sometimes highly dangerous ones. 
17 Tilly, Social Movements 1768-2004.
18 Fahmy, All the Pasha’s Men, pp. 260-263.
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The ultimate form of resistance was mutiny. “Industrial action” by its own 
armed forces was of course the most serious crisis any ruling elite could 
face. There seems to be some evidence that groups with a strong corporate 
identity that could be regarded as “artisans of war” such as mercenaries 
or janissaries, and troops raised from an urban background, seem to be 
more prone to mutiny while, on the other hand, peasant armies seem to 
be more prone to desertion. This may well be linked, as Sikora suggests, to 
the fact that peasant armies, whether early modern state commissioned 
armies or conscripted ones, were subjected to stronger coercion, control, 
and discipline from the late seventeenth century onwards. It may also be 
linked, I would suggest, to the different repertoires of resistance in towns 
and in the countryside. To an urban population, industrial action and collec-
tive protest were familiar, even before the advent of industrialization, while 
traditionally desertion – that is, fleeing the land and going into hiding – had 
been a form of resistance to the demands of the state and the landowning 
class in many rural societies.
A final word
What the project has shown us is that there is, to paraphrase van der Linden, 
an almost endless variety of military workers in history, but also that we can 
develop a taxonomy that allows us to group all these different forms from 
many different countries and periods in categories on the basis of shared 
characteristics and to do so in a meaningful way. When we combine the 
classif ication thus achieved with a set of the most important determinants, 
we can discern a number of patterns and reach tentative conclusions about 
the circumstances that influence the choice for a certain type of recruit-
ment and a certain form of military employment. It is hoped that, alongside 
similar research conducted at the IISH on industries that offer opportunities 
for comparative research because of their global nature (textiles, docks, 
prostitution), this study of military labour helps us to increase our under-
standing of labour relations worldwide.19
19 In writing this synthesis I have prof ited from the comments and suggestions of the col-
leagues who participated in the project and of Jan Lucassen and Marcel van der Linden. My 
special thanks go to Elise Kimerling Wirtschafter for kindly correcting the English of the original 
text.

 Military labor in China, c. 1500
David M. Robinson
Military labor markets have a long history in China. In fact, as Mark Lewis 
has shown, policy debates over such issues as conscription, professional 
standing armies, recruitment, and rewards predated the emergence of the 
f irst imperial dynasty, the Qin, in 221 BC.1 Given this background, modern 
scholars’ relative indifference to this cluster of issues is striking. This chap-
ter briefly reviews a few key works and debates related to military labor in 
China c. 1500, most especially recruitment, then moves to consideration 
of the Chinese example in the light of our common comparative axes and 
taxonomies, and finally concludes with an effort to assess the causal factors 
that accounted for the particular forms of military labor in China c. 1500.
A review of the field
In 1937, a pioneering scholar of the Ming period (1368-1644), Wu Han, wrote 
the f irst major scholarly essay on the Ming military. His central concern was 
the transition from what he described as a hereditary conscription military, 
tightly controlled by the central government, to a system of hired soldiers 
that ultimately gave greater power to leading generals than to the dynasty. 
Wu described the transformation in the following terms:
From a garrison system that supported 3 million men at the cost of 
not a single penny to the state to a mercenary system whose costs 
fell entirely to the people and dynastic coffers; from garrison troops 
with f ixed levels of men to mercenaries with no f ixed numbers; from 
hereditary garrison troops to hired mercenaries: this sea change was 
central to the rise and fall of the Ming period and was the largest shift 
in modern history.2
Before examining Wu Han’s arguments, a thumbnail sketch of the Ming 
military system is useful here. Borrowing a model developed by his prede-
cessors (the Mongol rulers of the Yuan dynasty, who had controlled China 
1 Lewis, Sanctioned Violence in Early China, esp. ch. 2, “The Warring State”, pp. 53-96.
2 Wu, “Mingdai de jun bing”, p. 149.
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for much of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries), the Ming founder, Zhu 
Yuanzhang (1328-1398), had assigned hereditary obligations to the state to 
individual households.3 He divided the population into dozens of categories 
– saltern households, mining households, and farming households, to name 
just a few.4 Military households were among the largest of such categories. 
The Ming founder drew upon four major sources of troops for his dynastic 
army: (a) men who had joined him when he had been a rebel leader during 
the 1350s and early 1360s, (b) surrendering troops of rival warlords who 
were integrated into his army, (c) criminals sentenced to military service, 
and f inally (d) forced conscripts, usually assessed as a given percentage of 
the local population and used to f ill out the ranks of the early Ming army.5
The imperial army in general and military households in particular 
were intended to be self-replicating and self-supporting. Each household 
was responsible for providing one active service member to the state at all 
times instead of the standard corvée and/or tax obligations rendered by 
other subjects. Further they were to supply one, two, or three other males 
whose labor and/or income was to support the active-service soldier. If 
through death, accident, desertion, or dismissal, the active-service soldier 
was no longer able to fulf ill his responsibilities to the state, the family was 
to supply a replacement, beginning with the nuclear family and extending 
out to brothers, cousins, and beyond.6 By the late fourteenth century, active-
service soldiers were stationed in more than three hundred garrisons spread 
across the empire. The economic foundation of this hereditary garrison 
system, like the foundation for the dynasty as a whole, was agriculture.
During the early decades of the Ming, the central government seized 
huge swathes of territory that were turned over to garrisons, which were 
responsible for opening and working agricultural lands. The primary duty 
of approximately 70 per cent of the entire 1.2 million-man Ming army (but 
rising brief ly to a reputed 3 million in the early f ifteenth century) was 
raising grains, half of which were to be used by the farmer-soldiers and half 
to be turned over to the local garrison to cover expenses for active-service 
3 Taylor, “Yuan Origins of the Wei-so System”.
4 Wang, “Some Salient Features of the Ming Labor Service System”.
5 For a recent review, see Zhang, Mingdai weisuo junhu yanjiu, pp. 20-50. Another essential 
set of essays by a leading scholar of the social and institutional histories of the Ming garrisons 
is Yu, Weisuo, junhu, yu junyi.
6 Yu, Mingdai junhu shixi zhidu.
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troops such as wages, equipment, medical costs, and clothing.7 This was 
Wu Han’s self-suff icient and well-controlled garrison system.8
For Wu and many later scholars, the shift to hired troops grew out of 
off icial corruption and exploitation.9 Underpaid and exploited by their 
officers, by early in the fifteenth century garrison soldiers began to desert in 
large numbers. Desertion undermined not only troop strength but also the 
economic foundation of the system, as fewer and fewer men were available 
to farm the garrison f ields. Other soldiers offered gifts and monthly fees to 
their superiors to avoid military duties. Efforts to track down deserters or 
replace them with family members, who might live corvée-free and far away, 
led to further opportunities for graft. Bribes were demanded to turn a blind 
eye. Authorities responsible for f illing the ranks were not above arbitrarily 
registering unrelated or unqualif ied men to serve as replacements. From 
the early decades of the dynasty, the central government responded with 
orders for local authorities to compile more accurate registers, eliminate 
fraud, and locate replacements from the families of soldiers who deserted.10 
In his famous “Placards to Instruct the People” issued in 1398, the Ming 
founder repeatedly urged members of rural communities to turn in desert-
ing soldiers who sought to hide from imperial authority.11 The results were 
mixed at best.
Another complaint heard with increasing frequency over the f ifteenth 
century was the misuse of military personnel. Off icers often treated 
soldiers in their units as private labor gangs: they tilled off icers’ f ields, 
tended livestock, felled trees for lumber, gathered valuable roots such as 
ginseng (along the northeastern border), conducted trade, and acted as 
personal servants. In fact, the central government and its agents also used 
the army for nonmilitary purposes but on a much grander scale. Garrison 
soldiers provided the labor for many if not most large-scale construction 
7 Wang, Mingdai de juntian; Ming, “Tuntian Farming of the Ming Dynasty”.
8 Even during the early years of the dynasty, the military system had never been economically 
self-suff icient but instead relied on regular infusions of “gifts” from the throne. See Huang, 
“Military Expenditures in Sixteenth-Century Ming China”.
9 For a fairly recent essay that ascribes manpower shortages – and the dynasty’s ultimate 
collapse – primarily to corruption among military off icers and other administrators, see Liu, 
“Mingdai weisuo quewu de yuanyin tanxi”. Liu explicitly argues that the dangers of corruption 
in the Ming have lessons for contemporary leaders in China. The same line of argumentation 
of course was true for Wu Han writing in the 1930s; he was criticizing the practices of the 
Guomintang (or Nationalist) government under Chiang Kai-shek.
10 Ma, “Mingdai de jiading”. For an early example of desertion, see Ming Taizu shilu, 193.8a-b. 
11 Zhu, “The Placards of the People’s Instructions”.
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projects sponsored by the state, including palaces, city walls, dikes, border 
fortif ications, and even stupas for Tibetan monks resident in the capital.12
The Ming was the f irst Chinese dynasty to institutionalize the use of 
military personnel as transport workers on a permanent and wide-scale 
basis. During the late fourteenth century, more than 80,000 soldiers were 
used to transport grain to the distant but strategically vital northeast border 
region of Liaodong.13 Early in the f ifteenth century, the principal dynastic 
capital was relocated northward from Nanjing to Beijing. From this time 
onward, an even greater number of men moved tax grain along the Grand 
Canal to the capital in Beijing from agricultural centres in the southeast. 
Figures from the f irst half of the f ifteenth century suggest that each year 
more than 100,000 men drawn from approximately 170 garrisons moved 3 
million piculs of rice in 3,000 barges along the Grand Canal system from 
Ningbo to the capital, a distance of approximately 2,300 km.14 However, the 
military labor pool that supported the arrangement on occasion proved too 
tempting to the court. For instance, in 1448 nearly 20,000 grain-shipment 
soldiers were deployed elsewhere to suppress a major insurrection, severely 
disrupting the delivery of the grain to the capital. This in turn strained 
dynastic logistics – the approximately 700,000 imperial troops stationed 
in Beijing and its environs depended on the timely arrival of tax grain from 
the productive southern provinces.
The disruption catalyzed reform in the late f ifteenth century that re-
sulted, on paper at least, in an even more ambitious program to ship grain 
along the Grand Canal: 121,500 soldiers moving grain on 11,775 transport 
barges. The state permitted each grain-shipment soldier to carry items to 
engage in a limited amount of customs-free trade. The state also built and 
maintained a series of hostels and pharmacies along the Grand Canal for 
transport soldiers. The result was a stable and expanded flow of grain. By 
1500 or so, approximately 4 million piculs of grain arrived in the capital each 
year.15 Court off icials congratulated themselves on their success, putting 
in the mouths of a foreign envoy who traveled the Grand Canal to the 
capital the following testimony: “The rudders of the Central State are more 
numerous than the soldiers of this small barbarian kingdom. Would we 
dare harbor traitorous aspirations?” 16
12 For the staggering costs of building of the Ming’s northern fortif ications, see Waldron, The 
Great Wall of China, pp. 91-164. 
13 Ming Taizu shilu, 193.5a-b.
14 Lin, “Mingdai caojunzhi chutan”, p. 183.
15 Ibid., pp. 183-187.
16 “Xu” in Cao chuan zhi, juan 6, cited in Lin, “Mingdai caojunzhi chutan”, p. 187.
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For Wu Han and others, however, the state’s use of military personnel in 
major infrastructure projects and for other purposes not only drove many 
to desertion but also undermined military training. The young and the 
strong were favored for such labor gangs. The old and inf irm were most 
available but least likely to benefit from regular military drill. According 
to this line of analysis, by no later than the 1430s, the armies of the Ming 
dynasty were in steep decline. A disastrous defeat in 1449 at the hands of 
the Mongol leader Esen at Tumu Fort (north of the capital at Beijing) is often 
offered as evidence for this collapse.17
The debacle at Tumu represented a major crisis for the Ming dynasty. The 
reigning emperor was taken captive; his half-brother was hurriedly put on 
the throne in his place; the survival of the dynasty, especially the capital 
in Beijing, seemed uncertain. To revitalize the military, the Ming court 
enacted several reforms, two of which are most critical to our interests. 
The f irst was the augmentation of garrison troops through local militias. 
The second was the f irst large-scale effort to hire troops. In 1449 the central 
government instructed local off icials to conscript between one and four 
men from each administrative community (which putatively contained 
110 families). These men were to drill several weeks each fall and spring 
during lulls in the farming calendar. These local militias (literally “people’s 
stalwarts”) were intended for short-term defense of their localities. When 
called up for service, each man was to be provided with “travel grain”, i.e., 
a wage to feed him while on campaign.
The second effort to augment the garrison system during the f ifteenth 
century was the initial and limited use of hired troops. The Ming imperial 
state employed a range of recruiting methods: it recruited men from within 
the ranks of garrison soldiers, that is, men from hereditary military house-
holds who were already legally bound to fulf ill their family’s obligations 
to the state; it recruited members of hereditary military households who 
were not actively serving as soldiers but who were supposed to provide 
income to support their active-service relative; and it recruited those with 
no military obligations to the state. In each case, recruits generally received 
signing bonuses and monthly salaries. Later, during the widespread coastal 
piracy of the mid-sixteenth century, many generals actively recruited hired 
troops, offering competitive wages and intensive training in weapons and 
group combat.
Hired troops were especially numerous along the northern border. Al-
ready by 1500 or so, nearly 20,000 hired troops augmented dynastic defense 
17 Mote, “The T’u-mu Incident of 1449”.
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in the single northwestern region of Yansui.18 By 1550, off icials were recruit-
ing on a large scale. In the wake of destructive raiding in the capital region 
by the Mongol leader Altan in 1550, recruiting in several northern provinces 
yielded as many as 40,000 men in the single year of 1550. Wu Han argued 
that, by this point, hired troops had become the principal f ighting forces 
of the Ming military – not in terms of numbers but in terms of eff icacy. 
Garrison troops were not abolished but neither did they contribute greatly 
to the defense of the dynasty.19 As noted above, however, the state put them 
to use in a variety of ways.
For Wu Han and others, corruption again eroded whatever military 
advantages the hired troops offered. Part of the problem was that men 
signed up, received their bonuses, and fled as soon as possible. Off icials at 
the time claimed that some men did this on a serial basis. At the same time, 
hired troops expected to be paid on time and did not hesitate to riot when 
the state failed to fulf ill its obligations. As the dynasty’s f iscal conditions 
worsened in the early seventeenth century, wages were frequently in ar-
rears. Wu Han estimated that, between 1610 and 1627, wages to hired troops 
were in arrears by nearly 10 million taels of silver (although it is not clear if 
they were being paid in grain, silver, or a mix of the two).20 To put this f igure 
in perspective, the average annual income of the central government was 
somewhere in the neighborhood of 30 million taels of silver.
Overall, the system of hiring troops contributed to higher costs for 
military defense, especially along the northern border. In the mid-f ifteenth 
century, the central government began to provide “annual subsidies” to 
garrisons to support the growing expenses of the northern border. By the 
early sixteenth century, such subsidies reached 430,000 taels and continued 
to rise steadily until the end of the dynasty. To cover the higher costs, court 
and local government levied surtaxes, sometimes years or even decades in 
advance, which according to Wu Han and others, in turn increased land 
flight, social discontent, and support for the rebels who eventually toppled 
the dynasty. During the last reign of the dynasty (1628-1644), these surtaxes 
amounted to nearly 30 million taels of silver.21
Finally, on the political and social fronts, a common perception at the 
time and in much modern scholarship is that, by the early seventeenth 
century, hired soldiers felt greater loyalty to their individual commanders 
18 Li, “Mingdai mubingzhi jianlun”, p. 64.
19 Wu, “Mingdai de jun bing”, p. 188.
20 Ibid., p. 197.
21 Li, “Mingdai mubingzhi jianlun”, p. 68.
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than they did to the court or central government. In a similar vein, the 
most powerful generals, who considered their troops as a source of personal 
power, were loath to waste them in combat with the court’s enemies. Wu 
Han argued that during the dynasty’s last decades, these generals were 
unwilling to fully engage with rebel forces, which led directly to the fall 
of the Ming.22
Other, less well-known scholars have characterized the growth in hired 
soldiers in different ways. In 1940, the Japanese scholar Suzuki Tadashi 
examined the emergence and signif icance of “people’s stalwarts” and hired 
soldiers during the Ming.23 Like Wu, Suzuki contextualized the appearance 
of the people’s stalwarts as a response to the decline of the garrison system, 
a decline thrown into clear relief with the 1449 Tumu debacle. Suzuki, 
however, pointed to the great regional variation in the size and function 
of people’s stalwarts. He also viewed the people’s stalwarts as a facet of 
longstanding traditions of local self-governance, a characterization fully 
congruent with Japanese Sinology of the first half of the twentieth century.24 
Thus, where Wu Han had written chiefly from the perspective of the central 
government’s efforts to revive the dynasty’s military, Suzuki more fully 
acknowledged the role of local government and local elites.
Suzuki’s understanding of mercenaries, too, differed from that of Wu 
Han. Although both argued that the widespread use of hired soldiers dated 
from the piracy crises of the mid-sixteenth century, Suzuki held that hired 
soldiers, particularly jia bing and jia ding, which might be translated as 
“house soldiers” and “housemen”, respectively, not only bolstered impe-
rial military strength but also enjoyed considerable appeal among the 
general populace. He offered numerous examples of where contemporary 
observers portrayed carefully selected housemen as the key to success in 
battle. Enjoying preferential economic treatment and holding some level 
of personal loyalty to an individual commander, housemen were thought 
most effective as shock troops or as vanguard forces. Whereas duty as a 
people’s stalwart was an onerous obligation, to be evaded if at all possible, 
service as a houseman was an opportunity to earn cash and a means of 
escape from a village economy that had suffered considerable damage as 
22 Wu, “Mingdai de jun bing”, p. 190. More recently, Kenneth Swope has similarly observed, 
“the military families in Liaodong came to form a martial caste of sorts, largely independent 
from central government control” (Swope, “A Few Good Men”, pp. 40-41). Swope, however, offers 
a far more positive treatment of the contribution of the leading military families of Liaodong 
to dynastic defenses.
23 Suzuki, “Mingdai kahei kō”.
24 Ibid., pp. 7-10, 24. 
50 david M. robinson 
a result of piracy and efforts to suppress it. Thus, large numbers of young 
men were willing to f ight for pay.25 Although Suzuki too acknowledged that 
their growing ranks imposed a serious f iscal strain on the dynasty in the 
long term, he argued that hired soldiers were militarily effective.
Finally, Suzuki disagreed with Wu about the challenge that late Ming 
commanders posed to the central government. He acknowledged that 
border generals did have the potential to become “minor warlords”, but he 
maintained that f ighting with the Manchus prevented them from develop-
ing into a serious threat to Beijing. If the Qing had failed and these Ming 
border commanders had continued to grow in power, however, they would 
have emerged as warlords and brought “a revolution” similar to those that 
had ended many previous dynasties, Suzuki speculated.26
In 1952, Suzuki published an additional study that focused more squarely 
on the socioeconomic conditions that gave rise to the “housemen”.27 Suzuki 
saw the housemen as part of a widespread desire for social advancement 
that predated the sixteenth century. Its background was the monetization 
of the economy, including the payment of some taxes in silver, improved 
standards of living, and changed attitudes toward the acquisition of 
wealth.28 Self-castration in the hope of securing employment in the imperial 
palace and “placing oneself in the care of the powerful” (tou chong) were 
simply different manifestations of this same desire to advance, he wrote. He 
characterized housemen as sharing certain similarities with the long-term 
tenants of landlords in that they were sometimes cast as sharing f ictive kin 
ties with their patrons. Suzuki described the housemen as simultaneously 
“trusted intimates, claws and teeth, and hawks and hounds”. He empha-
sized, however, that the sources for military housemen were by no means 
restricted to household servants.
Suzuki stressed not only the push/pull factor of the new opportunities. He 
also maintained that the supply of potential housemen had its roots in the 
intersection of land tenure patterns and strong state influence prevalent in 
North China, especially in the borderlands. During the f ifteenth and early 
sixteenth centuries, military commanders, palace eunuchs, and imperial 
aff ines used their influence to encroach upon relatively plentiful farmlands 
that enjoyed tax-free status (whether because they were garrison f ields, 
imperial horse pasturages, or acreage opened up under special government 
25 Ibid., pp. 17-22, 25.
26 Ibid., pp. 23-24.
27 Suzuki, “Mindai katei kō”.
28 Ibid., p. 27.
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incentives). As a result, the tax burden for the village or county as a whole 
fell heavily on those who remained in the rolls. In response, many placed 
themselves under the protection of powerful patrons. Farming households 
provided the labor to work the f ields and tend livestock; they also paid rent 
to their patrons. The patrons in turn used their political connections to 
shield them from tax and labor obligations to the state and, perhaps even 
more importantly, from extra-legal levies that local off icials imposed with 
great frequency.29 Later scholars, such as Ray Huang and Wang Yuquan, 
would debate whether this arrangement represented a form of political 
and economic exploitation by elites that reduced hapless peasants to the 
status of serfs or an economically beneficial accord that allowed farmers to 
keep more of the harvest for themselves and avoid arbitrary exactions from 
local off icials.30 In any case, for Suzuki the basic equation was clear – the 
more land that military commanders controlled, the greater their ability to 
support housemen, which in turn increased their ability to extract rewards, 
honors, and special privileges from the court.
Although it is common to date the widespread use of housemen to the 
mid-sixteenth century, Suzuki pointed out that, by no later than the mid-
f ifteenth century, some military commanders maintained housemen on 
whose behalf they tried to secure rewards from the throne for battlef ield 
exploits.31 By the mid-sixteenth century, the central government was issuing 
orders for commanders to recruit housemen (again along the northern 
border).32 During the late sixteenth and mid-seventeenth centuries, house-
men grew even more prominent in contemporary consciousness.
Many writers at the time felt that housemen demonstrated superior 
valor on the battlef ield. Border commanders were often careful to cultivate 
personal ties with their housemen, “sharing equally their joys and hard-
ships”. Some housemen adopted the surname of their commander. In other 
cases, the housemen were bound through adoption or marriage ties to 
their commanders.33 Thus, it was felt, housemen soldiers were uniquely 
29 Ibid., pp. 27-32.
30 Huang, Taxation and Government Finance in Sixteenth-Century China, pp. 107, 325-326; 
Wang, “Mingdai xungui dizhu de dianhu”. For a summary of the question and references to 
related Chinese and Japanese scholarship, see Robinson, Bandits, Eunuchs, and the Son of Heaven, 
pp. 36-37.
31 Ma, “Mingdai de jiading”, pp. 214-218.
32 Ibid., pp. 222-223.
33 These familial ties are especially stressed by Zhao (“Lun Mingdai jundui zhong jiading de 
tedian yu diwei”, p. 146), who argues that the prevalence of adoption within the ranks of the 
military surpassed that of any earlier period in Chinese history. 
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cohesive as units and willing to endure great suffering on behalf of their 
commanders. Commanders used units of housemen that might number 
in the hundreds to anchor much larger and less committed forces. Such 
bands of housemen sometimes appear in contemporary records as “death 
soldiers” (si shi) or “dare-to-die soldiers” (gan si shi) because of their reputed 
willingness to sacrif ice their lives on behalf of their commander. Despite 
these strong ties of personal loyalty, as noted above, Suzuki maintained 
that both commanders and housemen remained under state control and 
did not pose a serious threat to the dynasty.34
For a variety of reasons, research on housemen all but stopped until the 
mid-1980s when scholars revisited the topic, often using new materials and 
offering new perspectives. In 1984, the Chinese scholar Xiao Xu examined 
housemen with particular attention to their development in Liaodong 
(sometimes referred to as southern Manchuria), a strategic region that 
bordered Korea, Jurchen lands (i.e., whose inhabitants would become the 
Manchus), and the eastern edge of Mongolia.35 Like Wu Han and most 
Chinese scholars, Xiao attributed the rise of housemen to the collapse of 
the garrison system and dated it to early in the f ifteenth century, when 
a portion of housemen was recruited from among the ranks of garrison 
soldiers – a practice that was not off icially recognized until late in the 
century. Xiao argued, however, that the primary source of housemen was 
hired soldiers, that is, men not registered in hereditary military households 
who voluntarily undertook military service for a limited term in exchange 
for money.
Perhaps Xiao’s greatest contribution was his attention to shifting patterns 
of funding for housemen. Early housemen were privately recruited and 
privately funded by commanders. One early source of funding was the 
income derived from lands seized by military commanders, as Suzuki had 
noted. Some commanders squeezed funds allocated for garrison troops 
under their commander to support their housemen. Others resorted to 
criminal activities. Late Ming commanders such as the famed Li Chengliang 
supported themselves through war booty, horse rustling in the borderlands, 
and coercive manipulation of prices in border markets.36
As the number of housemen grew and their importance to dynastic 
defenses became clearer, the central government took a more prominent 
role in f inancing their upkeep. Xiao observed that, during the mid-sixteenth 
34 Suzuki, “Mindai katei kō”, pp. 36-39.
35 Xiao, “Mingdai jiangshuai jiading de xingshuai ji qi yingxiang”. 
36 Ibid., pp. 110-111; Ma, “Mingdai de jiading”, pp. 234-235.
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century, the central government gradually made explicit its commitment 
to supplying funds for food, arms, rewards, and mounts for the housemen. 
The process accelerated during the last quarter of the century until the 
costs for housemen were being f igured into the annual subsidies supplied 
by the central government to cover border defenses.37
Although scholarly literature generally casts any deviation from the 
founding Ming emperor’s policies as decline or collapse, a far better ap-
proach is to understand such changes as f lexible responses to evolving 
challenges. As one of the largest and most important imperial institutions 
in Ming China, the military was sensitive to developments in many quarters, 
from demographic trends (including not only population size but also migra-
tion and family structure), economic transformation (including the growing 
size of regional markets and the spreading use of silver), shifting labor 
supplies, bureaucratic imperatives (such as commuting corvée labor and 
tax obligations into silver payments), and logistics needs (such as supplying 
large numbers of men far from economic centres for extended periods of 
time).
As already noted, such annual subsidies posed an increasingly heavy 
burden on the f inances of the central government. By 1590, efforts were 
afoot to cut costs by thinning the ranks of housemen, either by removing 
their weakest members or imposing strict caps on the number of housemen 
allowed for commanders of different ranks – ranging from ten to sixty. 
The most important commanders in Liaodong, including members of the 
Li family, however, ignored the new measures. The court did not push the 
issue for fear of alienating the generals in a time of dynastic crisis, and the 
restrictions became an empty writ.38
Xiao also offered several interesting observations on the changing nature 
of the patronage system surrounding the housemen. Xiao argued that state 
funding for the housemen often undermined the strong personal tie estab-
lished between housemen and patrons when recruiting and support had 
been private. In some cases, personal bonds suffered from the very success of 
housemen. Xiao offered the examples of the housemen of Li Chengliang (all 
“surrendered barbarians”), who were rewarded for their battlefield exploits 
with high positions and independent commands, which in time, weakened 
37 Xiao, “Mingdai jiangshuai jiading de xingshuai ji qi yingxiang”, pp. 111-112; Ma, “Mingdai de 
jiading”, pp. 235-237; Zhao, “Lun Mingdai jundui zhong jiading de tidian yu diwei”, p. 147.
38 Xiao, “Mingdai jiangshuai jiading de xingshuai ji qi yingxiang”, pp. 113-114; Zhao, “Lun 
Mingdai junshi jiading zhidu xingcheng de shehui jingji tiaojian jiqi fazhan”, pp. 88-89.
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their ties to their patron.39 He also noted the distinction between “in-garrison” 
and “accompanying” housemen. The former were recruited to serve for a 
designed term in a particular garrison, regardless of the comings or goings of 
individual commanders. The latter, in contrast, followed their patron, even 
into retirement when they would continue to serve and be supported by their 
commander despite his no longer holding a command.40 Housemen who 
followed their patron in retirement might become indistinguishable from the 
servants or long-term tenants of local elites. In other cases, they comprised a 
latent pool of manpower that local and central officials attempted to mobilize 
in times of crisis.41 For the most part, Zhao Zhongnan (see below) highlighted 
the durability of the personal ties between housemen and their patrons in 
contrast to Xiao who emphasized their provisional nature.42
Critics during the Ming period objected that the growth in the numbers 
of housemen ultimately did not serve dynastic interests. Drawing able men 
from the garrison troops only hastened the garrison system’s collapse. The 
housemen’s military successes brought their commanders dangerous power 
and ambition. The privileges housemen enjoyed eroded morale within the 
ranks of ordinary soldiers. Qi Jiguang (1528-1588), a prominent general who 
had made skilled use of housemen and mercenaries, wrote:
Garrison soldiers’ horses are given to housemen to ride; garrison 
soldiers themselves are given to housemen as servants; garrison 
soldiers’ grain is given to housemen for their support. In this way, we 
secure the hearts of 200 or 300 men but completely lose the hearts of 
3,000 garrison soldiers under our command.43
Other off icials of the late sixteenth century characterized the housemen 
as essentially parasitic, siphoning off food, labor, horses, and money from 
garrison and civilian populations. One popular jingle of the time held, “If 
you meet up with the Mongols, you’ll still have your life. If you meet up 
with the housemen, you’ll have nothing left.” Xiao thus concluded, “The 
housemen system not only held within itself the dependency and abuses 
inherent in the garrison system, which was a tool that exploited the classes 
and oppressed the people”, it added entirely new abuses. Among these he 
39 Xiao, “Mingdai jiangshuai jiading de xingshuai ji qi yingxiang”, pp. 114-116.
40 Ibid., p. 115. See also Ma, “Mingdai de jingding”, pp. 229-231.
41 Zhao, “Lun Mingdai jundui zhong jiading de tidian yu diwei”, p. 147.
42 Ibid., pp. 147-148.
43 Qi Jiguang, “Deng tan kou shou”, in Qi Jiguang, Lian bing shi ji, juan 4, cited in Xiao, “Mingdai 
jiangshuai jiading”, p. 117.
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included a shameless pursuit of self-interest over loyalty to commander 
or dynasty and a sharp decline in the quality of housemen by the early 
seventeenth century as men signed on for wages and commanders padded 
the rolls in order to extract more resources from the state.
The last major essay on Ming housemen appeared nearly two decades 
ago. In 1991, Zhao Zhongnan examined the socioeconomic conditions that 
undergirded the emergence of the housemen. Building on the much earlier 
work of Suzuki Tadashi and Wang Yuquan, Zhao Zhongnan emphasized the 
centrality of shifting patterns in land tenure. The concentration of lands in 
the hands of powerful landlords during the fifteenth and especially sixteenth 
century is taken as granted by many Chinese and Japanese scholars. Zhao, 
like Suzuki, believed that military commanders used their influence to 
privatize garrison lands on a large scale, creating a revenue stream sufficient 
to support housemen and withdrawing the lands from tax registers. At the 
same time, garrison soldiers and civilian farmers lost their lands in large 
numbers, producing a pool of men in need of employment and protection. 
The result, maintained Zhao, was multiple layers of dependence that bound 
the housemen to their commanders/patrons.44 Again following Suzuki, Zhao 
noted that the shift to mercenaries in general and housemen in particular 
depended on the partial monetization of tax and labor obligations to the 
state.45 Finally, perhaps Zhao’s most important contribution was the explicit 
discussion of regional variation or specif icity in the growth of housemen. 
In this, he drew on the work of previous scholars interested in Liaodong.46
In addition to garrison regulars drawn from Chinese households and 
the use of hired soldiers, the Ming state drew soldiers from non-Chinese 
sources in the wider eastern Eurasian military labor market.47 Through a 
variety of institutional mechanisms and personal connections, the Ming 
state actively recruited Mongols, Jurchens, Tibetans, Yao, Zhuang, and 
others into its military. The Ming valued such men for their specialized 
skills in riding, mounted archery, and mountaineering, their temperament 
(f ierceness and indifference to cold, heat, and hunger) as “martial races”, 
and the fear they inspired among others.48
44 Zhao, “Lun Mingdai junshi jiading zhidu”, pp. 86-88.
45 Ibid., p. 88.
46 Ibid., pp. 88-89.
47 For preliminary discussion of Ming efforts to integrate non-Chinese personnel into the 
garrison system, see Sŏ, “Eijo to eijogun – gunshi no senjū hōhō o chūshin ni”. 
48 A small number of Japanese laborers and warriors who f led the harsh conditions of Hidey-
oshi’s campaigns in Korea in the 1590s were also impressed into Ming military service (Swope, 
A Dragon’s Head and a Serpent’s Tail, p. 215).
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For the most part, such non-Chinese in the employ of the Ming state were 
settled on the northern frontier. Their leaders generally received military 
titles within the imperial Ming government commensurate with their previ-
ous local status. On one end of the spectrum, those settled within Ming 
borders received lands, salaries, and periodic gifts from the throne. They 
were also expected to f ight in imperial campaigns, usually against relatively 
nearby foes. They could expect promotions and further rewards for valor 
and success on the battlefield. Although recognized as distinct from regular 
garrison troops, these men and their families were subject to supervision by 
Ming military authorities (both local and central). Thus, while Mongol men 
might f ight as a Mongol unit under a Mongol commander perhaps against 
other Mongols (but equally likely against Chinese rebels or aboriginal 
revolts), overall command remained in the hands of Chinese generals. 
Chinese bureaucrats vetted battlef ield exploits, processed paperwork for 
promotions or permission to relocate, maintained household registration 
in military garrisons, and adjudicated criminal and civil legal matters.49
At the other end of the spectrum, Ming control was largely nominal. The 
Ming state recognized certain Jurchen leaders, granted them nominal titles 
in the Ming military, designated their polities as garrisons, and permitted 
them access to the Chinese economy through horse markets on the border 
and gift exchanges (and opportunities for private trade) during “tribute” 
missions to the capital in Beijing. Through appeals to their sense of obliga-
tion, gratitude, and self-interest, the Ming state attempted to influence 
the behavior of Jurchen groups. Such efforts ranged from trying to ensure 
the safe passage of Korean envoys through Jurchen lands to allying with 
certain Jurchen leaders against others to prevent unif ication in Manchuria. 
During the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, many of the 
leading commanders in Liaodong maintained as many as several hundred 
Mongol and Jurchen warriors as housemen. Contemporary writings stressed 
their ferocity in battle, their skill in scouting, and their importance to their 
commanders’ success.50 Mongol and Jurchen leaders, however, also recruited 
Ming personnel, including military men; the rise of the Manchus (who 
would eventually conquer the Ming and establish the Qing dynasty, which 
49 Henry Serruys wrote the foundational work on the Ming Mongols. For more recent work (and 
full citation to Serruys), see Robinson, “Images of Subject Mongols under the Ming Dynasty”, 
“Politics, Force, and Ethnicity”.
50 Xiao, “Mingdai jiangshuai jiading”, pp. 108-109; Zhao, “Lun Mingdai jundui zhong jiading 
de tidian yu diwei”, pp. 144-145. Like Wu Han, Ma Chujian noted that the practice of recruiting 
Mongols and Jurchen as mercenaries dated back to the early f ifteenth century: “Mingdai de 
jiading”, pp. 223-225. For the Jurchens, see Rossabi, The Jurchens in the Yüan and Ming.
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is discussed in the chapter by Christine Moll-Murata and Ulrich Theobald) 
is inseparable from this phenomenon.51 Thus, at least on the northern 
border, the Ming state (and individual commanders) had to compete on 
an international military labor market with other prospective employers.
Somewhere in the middle were communities of non-Chinese that were 
loosely integrated into the Ming polity and that were expected to contribute 
military forces only upon request. On the southwestern and northwestern 
peripheries, the Ming state recognized local leaders from families that had 
often held power for centuries. Recognition from the Ming throne, access 
to Chinese economic resources, and occasional recourse to Ming military 
support strengthened the position of these local leaders. However, the admin-
istration of regions under their control was staffed by local men rather than 
officials dispatched by the central government.52 Local populations were not 
rigorously integrated into the household registration system. One scholar has 
characterized the result as “dual sovereignty”.53 During the periodic struggles 
among local elites, incumbents and challengers might call upon Ming sup-
port. The Ming state, however, had a poor record of exercising effective con-
trol. Many officials argued against becoming entangled in violent struggles 
that were imperfectly understood and seldom essential to critical strategic 
interests of the dynasty.54 However, local leaders regularly contributed units of 
men to bolster Ming imperial forces in campaigns throughout most of China.
Finally, before turning to our common comparative axes and taxonomies, 
some discussion of the changing composition of wages is in order. Early in 
the dynasty, active-service men from hereditary military households – from 
senior off icers to humble soldiers – picked up salaries in kind each month 
from imperial granaries. Dynastic regulations stipulated that each month 
a garrison commander was to receive 12 shi (each shi was equivalent to 3.1 
bushels or about 130 pounds), an assistant commander 8.5 shi, a chiliarch 
(that is, a commander of roughly 1,000 troops) 5.4 shi, a battalion com-
mander 1.5 shi, and a common soldier 1 shi. Married soldiers with depend-
ants generally received approximately 20 per cent to 30 per cent more than 
single soldiers without dependants. However, due to a variety of factors, 
all ranks generally received only between half and two-thirds of their 
51 Iwai, “China’s Frontier Society in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries”; Wei, “Mingdai 
Menggu zhubu dui guishun Hanren de renyong jiqi junshi yingxiang”.
52 There was periodic debate about the relative advantages of staff ing by local men or those 
dispatched from the central government.
53 Herman, Amid the Clouds and Mists, pp. 105-117.
54 Shin, The Making of the Chinese State, pp. 56-105.
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off icial salaries (see below).55 Even taking into account the loss of wages 
to individual soldiers, the f inancial burden to the state was considerable. 
In 1373 for instance, the state distributed more than 3 million shi of grain 
just to troops in the capital at Nanjing.56 Finally in the early decades of the 
dynasty, the state provided monthly stipends of 0.5 shi to the widows of 
soldiers, provided they did not remarry.57
Before I address the considerable temporal and spatial variations behind 
these f igures, however, a broader picture of wages and prices provides some 
perspective on the position of military labor. As an overarching general-
ity, garrison soldiers earned approximately the same wages as an average 
urban laborer, while off icers received more. According to Ray Huang, rural 
men specially recruited by the famous general Qi Jiguang during the mid-
sixteenth century were also “paid at the rate of day laborers”.58 Both garrison 
regulars and hired soldiers enjoyed the possibility of rewards for action on 
the battlef ield such as taking enemy heads or particularly valorous acts.
During the waning decades of the sixteenth century, servants in the 
county off ices of Wanping (in Beijing) earned on average 4.2 ounces of 
silver each year, wages in rice having largely been converted to payments 
in silver. Porters, water carriers, and day laborers in the capital earned 
about the same. During the last half of the sixteenth century, 1 shi of rice 
was normally worth a bit more than half a tael of silver (but subject to 
market fluctuations especially in times of harvest failures). Clerks in the 
government off ices in Wanping earned 6 dou (one dou was equivalent to 
9.9 quarts) each month but also received accommodation and furnishings. 
The income of most of the working urban population in Beijing fell between 
4 and 6 ounces of silver a year.
Given the relatively modest wages of Ming soldiers, rewards and bonuses 
could constitute a signif icant addition to their routine revenue. The variety 
and scale of “gifts” from the throne are discussed below. Killing an enemy in 
battle could earn bonuses of between 10 and 30 ounces of silver – provided 
that a state off icial verif ied the circumstances of the kill and the identity 
55 Kawagoe, “Dai Min kai ten ni mieru Mindai eijokan no getsuryōgaku o megutte”, pp. 39-40.
56 Okuyama, “Kōbuchō no men ma no shikyū ni tsuite”, p. 12.
57 Okuyama, “Minsho ni okeru gunshi no kazoku to yūkyū ni tsuite”. Okuyama suggests that 
as a result of government stipend incentives, the early Ming capital in Nanjing was home to a 
large number of military widows.
58 Huang, 1587, A Year of No Significance, p. 172. Qi’s men, who were recruited in southern China, 
received 10 ounces of silver a year. When they were deployed near the Great Wall in the north, 
wages increased to 18 ounces a year (ibid., p. 251 n. 67). These are prescriptive f igures that do 
not take into account possible losses through corruption or administrative ineff iciency.
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of the corpse. Even amounts that might seem trivial on f irst glance in fact 
were proportionally large. For instance, in 1510 as part of its effort to mollify 
soldiers from the northwestern garrisons of Ningxia, the court awarded 
each soldier 1 ounce of silver, a bonus amounting to approximately one 
month’s wages.59
In terms of purchasing power, in the capital during the late sixteenth 
century, 1.3 pounds of wheat flour cost 0.008 ounces of silver; a pound of pork 
was 0.02 ounces of silver; a pound of either mutton and beef was 0.015 ounces 
of silver; a pound of pears was 0.05 ounces of silver, and eggplants cost 0.004 
ounces of silver each.60 During the late sixteenth and early seventeenth 
centuries, a painting from the previous Song or Yuan dynasties might fetch 
anywhere from 5 to 10 ounces of silver to the astronomical f igure of 1,000 
ounces.61
As noted above, the Ming founder hoped that military units would be 
largely self-supporting. To that end, each active-service soldier was to re-
ceive 50 mou (1 mou was approximately 0.14 acre; 50 mou was about 7 acres) 
of land, which he shared with other male immediate family members of the 
original military household who had traveled with him. The active-service 
soldier was to keep half of the harvest to support himself and his family; 
the rest was to be turned over to garrison authorities. In reality, variation 
in the quality and availability of land ensured that soldiers received plots of 
different sizes. On the northern border, where soil was relatively poor and 
the population relatively sparse, and where this arrangement was intended 
as a way to stimulate agricultural development, a soldier might farm 70 or 
80 mou (approximately 10 and 11 acres, respectively), whereas in places like 
the southeast with more productive lands and less land available, he might 
receive only 20 mou (less than 3 acres).
During the f irst half of the f ifteenth century, the amount of grain that the 
state derived from these lands (nominally half the production) fluctuated 
sharply. One Japanese scholar has documented a dramatic drop from ap-
proximately 20 million shi (62 million bushels or 1.3 million tons) to 5 million 
shi (325,000 tons) in the two decades between 1403 and 1424. After a brief 
rise to 9 million shi, by 1434, the f igure seems to have dropped to 2 million. 
Thus within the space of thirty years, the revenue from farmlands available 
59 Ming Wuzong shilu, 62.10a-12a; 67.1b. However, to put this into perspective, one senior court 
minister received 100 ounces of silver for his contribution to putting down the same abortive 
princely revolt. See Li, “Zou wei ci mian en ming shi”, II, pp. 518-519.
60 These f igures come from Geiss, “Peking under the Ming (1368-1644)”, pp. 156, 177-189.
61 Clunas, Appendix II, “Selected Prices for Works of Art and Antique Artifacts c. 1560-1620”.
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for soldiers’ salaries dropped by 90 per cent.62 It is unclear, however, whether 
this was merely the amount transported to the capital or if it included the 
amount received locally by the garrison administration. After all, there had 
to be suff icient grain available locally for the garrisons to feed the troops.
The government responded in several ways, depending on the nature of 
the local economy and the particular needs of the moment. In economically 
developed regions, commercial taxes were used to pay military salaries. For 
instance, in affluent Jiading, a portion of commercial taxes civil authorities 
assessed on shop fronts went to salaries in nearby Taicang and Zhenjiang 
Garrisons. As noted above, salaries for soldiers on the northern border were 
often subsidized by generous annual payments from the central government.
A related question is the nature of wages. The Ming founder set salaries 
in rice. Rice does not grow equally well in all places (and not at all along the 
northern border mentioned above), is expensive to transport overland because 
of its weight, and is subject to rotting if not properly stored. Thus, some kind of 
conversion, if only into other grains or beans, had always been in place. By the 
early fifteenth century, the Ming state began to commute a portion of monthly 
wages into paper currency. Thus for example, a garrison commander who drew 
a monthly salary of 10 shi might receive 80 per cent in rice; the state would then 
convert the value of the remaining 2 shi of rice into paper money. During the 
Ming (unlike the Yuan period), however, paper money never really caught on. 
In fact, it rapidly and consistently lost value. Hence, even partial commutation 
of wages into paper currency was not popular among military families for 
obvious reasons. During the 1430s, one source of resentment against Mongol 
officers stationed in Beijing was that they received their entire salary in rice.
In response to these complaints, by the mid-f ifteenth century, the Ming 
state often commuted a portion of military salaries into items such as cotton 
textiles, black pepper, and other spices. By the mid-sixteenth century, the 
commutation of salaries into silver became increasingly common.
Shifting military challenges shaped wages. Okuyama Norio has shown 
that the Ming state’s deployment of large numbers of troops to the northern 
border for an extended period of time in the wake of the Tumu defeat of 1449 
deeply influenced soldiers’ wages. As noted above, soldiers normally received 
their salaries, whether in grain, cash, or otherwise, from the granaries of 
the garrisons in which they served. During short-term deployments, to the 
northern border for instance, local border garrisons would pay them “travel 
wages” until they returned home. Dependants, who did not accompany 
62 Kawagoe Yasuhiro, “Dai Min kai ten ni mieru Mindai eijokan no getsuryōgaku o megutte”, 
pp. 39-40. 
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soldiers on such tours, continued to draw the monthly salary at the home 
garrison granaries. When, in an effort to meet the Mongol challenge, the 
Ming state deployed tens of thousands of soldiers from hinterland garrisons 
to the north for years at a time, several problems emerged.
Particularly serious was the question of dependants. Soldiers often 
returned home to visit their families, with or without permission. To 
ameliorate such a problem, the state experimented with having family 
dependants accompany soldiers and off icers to their new posts rather than 
remain in their original garrison unit. Another problem was that the men’s 
regular salaries were still disbursed at their original garrisons. Traveling 
back and forth to pick up their wages was time-consuming and expensive. 
Some who returned home to pick up their wages did not return to their 
new assignments. Commanders along the northern border (and in the 
southern theater where Ming armies were periodically deployed to suppress 
aboriginal uprisings) successfully petitioned the throne to allow men to 
receive their monthly wages from granaries wherever they were currently 
deployed. For this measure to work, border garrisons (and smaller forts) 
needed to build and then f ill new granaries. The construction of granaries 
was the easy part; securing suff icient grain on an ongoing basis proved 
more challenging. Administrative measures were also needed to ensure 
that wages were not paid twice.
As noted above, transporting grain overland was expensive and time-
consuming, so garrisons experimented with a number of alternate strategies. 
One was more extensive use of commutation into items that could be easily 
transported – yet families still needed to eat. Another was for garrisons to 
dispatch off icers to travel to the major granaries and storehouses of the 
capital and elsewhere to pick up grain on behalf of the entire garrison; 
sell it locally in order to purchase things like salt, pepper, etc.; and f inally 
transport these goods back to the local garrison. There, soldiers would 
receive the goods as salary and sell them in order to purchase the goods 
they needed. For most soldiers, the various commutations undermined their 
economic positions. In still other cases, a mixed approach was adopted. For 
instance, soldiers from one garrison on the border received 80 per cent of 
their salaries in grain. The remaining 20 per cent was commuted to cash, 
which during the f irst six months of the year, they could pick up at local 
government off ices. During the second half of the year, 20 per cent of their 
salary was commuted to pepper and other spices, which they had to get in 
specialized storehouses in the capital.63
63 This section is drawn from Okuyama, “Mingun no kyūyo shikyū ni tsuite”, pp. 133-143. 
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At the same time that the Ming military responded to shifting economic, 
demographic, and administrative needs, it also transformed China. Econom-
ic historians have pointed out that the network required to supply northern 
frontier garrisons with goods from the south was one of the central factors 
shaping the entire Ming economy, including its banking and monetization.
Sixteenth-century off icials were acutely aware that commuting soldiers’ 
salaries into silver subjected them to f luctuations in the price of grain. 
Many reported to the throne that 1 shi of grain was commonly converted 
into 0.7 taels of silver, suff icient to purchase only 0.6 or 0.7 shi of rice on the 
market. In some cases, the rate was as low as 0.2 shi, a loss of 80 per cent 
of the nominative value of soldiers’ salaries. Off icials debated how to best 
address this vulnerability to price variation and impoverishment of military 
families. In 1538, the court approved plans to adjust rates of commutation 
according to grain prices. However, throughout the rest of the sixteenth 
century, the problem persisted. Either adjustments lagged too far behind 
market changes or local off icials were reluctant to break from established 
conversion rates. Another solution was a partial return to payment in kind, 
most commonly with soldiers receiving rice for three months of the year 
and silver for the remaining nine months.64
Local off icials, individual military commanders and court ministers 
worked to address questions as they arose and showed considerable flex-
ibility in their approach to the economic and military challenges posed 
by changes in determining, funding, and distributing soldiers’ wages. As 
one might expect given the larger socioeconomic changes transforming 
China, however, there was no simple solution that perfectly matched the 
demands of the state with the needs of its military personnel. Throughout 
the sixteenth century, soldiers (and their off icers) periodically organized 
protests, especially in garrisons along the northern border, almost always 
in response to state actions that undercut their economic interests. These 
ranged from short-term and poorly coordinated cases, where violence 
was limited to screaming in the night and the threat of more, to military 
uprisings that lasted for months and required large-scale responses from 
the central government.65
64 Okuyama, “Mindai no hokuhen ni okeru gunji no getsuryō ni tsuite”, pp. 155-162.
65 In 1509-1510, riots and at least one mutiny greeted the court’s efforts to reassess tax rates on 
military farmlands (Robinson, “Princely Revolts and the Ming Polity”). For discussion of mutinies 
in Liaodong in 1535, see Morohoshi, “Mindai Ryōtō no gunton ni kansuru ichi kōsatsu”, “Ryōtō 
heihen to Ro Kei”. On the mid-century mutinies in Datong, see Hagiwara, “Mindai Kaseiki no 
Daitō hanran to Mongoria”. On the 1592-1593 Ningxia mutiny, see Okano, “Banreki nijūnen Neiha 
heihen”; Swope, “All Men Are Not Brothers”.
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Variables, axes, taxonomies, and hypothesis
Zhao Zhongnan has been among the few scholars to discuss the legal status 
of housemen. He argues that although they may have enjoyed a superior 
social status as measured in terms of their salaries and privileges granted 
by their patrons, they possessed the same legal status as garrison troops. 
The Ming Code, the imperial legal code of the Ming dynasty, distinguished 
between those registered in civilian households and men registered in 
hereditary military households, most especially active-service soldiers. 
Zhao points to a regulation in the Collected Administrative Statutes of the 
Great Ming Dynasty, which stipulates that housemen were subject to the 
same Grand Reviews conducted by senior off icials in the Chief Military 
Commission and Ministry of War that tested skills in riding and archery. 
He also notes that when their patrons were demoted, exiled, or suffered 
punitive beatings, housemen were subject to similar punishments.66 This is 
a promising line of inquiry but Zhao’s evidence here is far from compelling 
in terms of legal status. The Great Ming Code did not make garrison soldiers 
culpable for the transgressions of their commanding off icers. Nor did it 
demand troops to follow their commander into exile.
The legal status of those registered in hereditary military households, 
in contrast, was clearer. They had an obligation to provide lifetime (or at 
least from the mid- to late teens to around 60) military service to the state, 
which in turn entitled them to regular wages (however inadequate), the use 
of government lands for farming for their own or accompanying families 
(though the probability of securing such lands diminished over the course 
of the dynasty), some tax and corvée breaks, and the possibility of medical 
care and economic assistance if they fell ill or were injured.67 Maintaining 
the massive garrison system, including its aff iliated operations such as 
garrison schools, military examinations, training, benef its for widowed 
wives and/or orphaned children, etc., registration, and the voluminous 
paperwork required to keep things functioning, was diff icult and costly.
The Ming state, like the previous Yuan dynasty, consciously followed a 
policy that kept large numbers of men formally registered in military house-
66 Zhao, “Lun Mingdai jundui zhong jiading de tidian yu diwei”, p. 148.
67 Regional variation marked the availability of medicine and quality of doctors for garrisons, 
as an off icial from the northwestern frontier of the empire complained in 1438 (Ming Yingzong 
shilu, 37.8a). Nonetheless, the state was expected to provide such resources even for distant 
border units.
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holds.68 As noted above, this was done to maintain a broad and stable labor 
pool that could be used not only for defending the dynasty (e.g., guarding 
frontier borders, maintaining internal security, and suppressing revolts) but 
also for maintaining its infrastructure (e.g., transporting tax grain, construct-
ing city walls, repairing dikes and other water works, etc.). This vast dynastic 
labor reservoir also served a prophylactic function; it absorbed men who 
might otherwise contribute to rival labor pools, such as criminal bands, rebel 
groups, or transnational communities, which challenged the Ming state.
Few contemporary observers, however, viewed these arrangements as 
either foolproof or static. In their discussions of the military, Ming com-
mentators regularly invoked the phrase “In terms of soldiers, quality is more 
precious than quantity.” Writing in the late sixteenth century, the historian 
Lang Ying complained:
Today the military is no fewer than 1 million men and there are more 
than 200,000 in the capital. This can be said to be ample. Yet, when a 
region has a crisis, then troops are deployed from the Capital Gar-
risons, Datong, and Yulin [border regions]. Each time they are killed in 
great numbers. High ministers devote themselves to papering things 
over. When compared to the ancients who with several thousand men 
would decimate the enemy and with several tens of thousands were 
unbeatable wherever they turned, they were really no match. Today we 
can say that we have no military.69
Elsewhere, Lang turned his attention to the comparative eff icacy of hired 
soldiers and imperial regulars. He wrote that in antiquity the establishment 
of an army was to prevent disaster, but that in his day the establishment of 
the army was a disaster. He argued that garrison troops contributed nothing 
to the defense of the dynasty or the people. In cases of conflict, those who 
actually engaged the enemy were either local commoners or hired soldiers 
from other provinces. Similarly, those who died at the hands of the enemy 
were either male and female subjects from the area or those recruited 
68 Although the even earlier Song dynasty (960-1279) did not employ the hereditary military 
household system, it did maintain extremely large armies at great expense in an effort to impose 
effective control over portions of the population that might otherwise challenge state authority 
or at least local government. The state also frequently turned to its armies as a general source 
of labor for infrastructure projects.
69 Lang, “San wu”, p. 154; Ming edn held at Zhongshan Library, 13.10b-11a; reprinted in Si ku 
quan shu cun mu cong shu, zi 102, p. 545. The entry was entitled “Three Nones”, referring to no 
music, no history, and no military.
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from elsewhere. Thus, the dynasty shouldered the burden of supporting 
garrison troops without gaining any defense for the people. Lang proposed 
that the state hold Grand Reviews, where garrison troops would compete 
with hired soldiers in archery and other events. If the garrison troops won, 
they would receive half the money used to pay hired soldiers. If the hired 
soldiers won, half the grain used to pay garrison troops would be used to 
hire more soldiers.70 Lang’s views suggest that in addition to socioeconomic 
changes, shifting elite attitudes toward the worth of the hereditary military 
household system may have facilitated the growing use of hired soldiers.
Taxonomy of armies
The Ming military does not f it easily into our taxonomy of feudal army, 
aggregate contract army, state commission army, conscript army, and mod-
ern volunteer army (or John Lynn’s slightly wider taxonomy from which I 
draw). Some elements of the Ming case resemble the state commission army. 
These include raising the army from among the ruler’s subjects and in the 
case of hired troops, the role of off icers in recruiting troops, and enlisting 
voluntarily as individuals.71 Yet, the core of the Ming army at least through 
1500 was the hereditary military households and its garrisons. These units 
were not recruited by off icers but served on a compulsory basis by specially 
designated households that legally owed the state military labor.
In other ways, the garrison system might be seen as a sort of mass reserve 
army in that most of the time most soldiers spent their time farming rather 
than drilling or f ighting. During a time of war, armies were assembled from 
the ranks of garrison troops and augmented through hired soldiers and/
or aboriginal forces. Yet, garrison troops generally lived in or near garrison 
forts and cities, received wages and benef its from the imperial govern-
ment, and were subject to bureaucratic and legal treatment distinctive to 
hereditary military households.
At the risk of sounding a discordant note in our common enterprise, I 
would suggest that assigning the Ming a place within a taxonomy explicitly 
derived from the historical particulars of western Europe (and its projec-
tions) probably obscures more than it illuminates. Large central states 
emerged early in China: they developed fully articulated bureaucracies, 
demonstrated the ability to extract considerable resources (labor, material, 
70 Lang, Jin ri jun, II, pp. 660-661. 
71 Lynn, “The Evolution of Army Style in the Modern West”, p. 518.
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and money) from enormous populations that pursued diversif ied economic 
and social strategies, and possessed advanced technological and logistical 
(including military) capabilities. They predated the rise of “nation-states” 
in Europe by many centuries. The lack of anything comparable to the 
European aristocracy (after the tenth century), the early and sustained 
dominance of the imperial throne in the political and ideological realms, 
and the lack of contending paradigmatic armies (which is not the same 
as the disinclination or inability to adapt new technologies or methods) 
meant that many of the critical causal factors implicit in our taxonomy 
are less germane than they are in the case of western Europe. This is not 
to argue for a distinctive Oriental warfare per se but to acknowledge that 
the development of the Chinese military followed a different trajectory or 
at least a different chronology (certainly prior to 1800) than the one Lynn 
identified (and which he explicitly described as “a cultural and geographical 
pattern unique to the West”).72 Given that we are attempting to provide a 
global perspective on military labor, we should not reduce the rich diversity 
of historical experience of places such as China, Russia, or India to schemata 
derived from the recent “West”. The more pressing task would seem to be 
to reformulate our ideas in the light of new research and a wider body of 
empirical information.73 Even allowing for such caveats, some of our other 
terms of comparison have clear applicability for the Chinese case.
Free/unfree labor
On f irst blush, soldiers registered in hereditary military households would 
seem in most ways to fall into the category of unfree labor. They spent the 
vast majority of their time as tenant farmers on government-allocated lands 
and were subject to life service in the ranks of the imperial military. They 
did not enter into this service voluntarily; it was a hereditary responsibil-
ity of the household into which they were born. To abandon their lands, 
leave their posts, or avoid their burdens was to invite harsh disciplinary 
retribution by the Ming state.
72 Ibid., p. 506. Different trajectories do not preclude comparisons. For a systematic compara-
tive study of the “military revolution” in Asia, see Lorge, The Asian Military Revolution. Lorge 
argues that European military systems and possibly governmental institutions needed “to 
become more Chinese before they could take full advantage of guns” (p. 21).
73 For calls to integrate greater historical depth and geographical variety into understandings 
of labor and migration, see Van der Linden, Workers of the World, pp. 1-6; Hoerder, Cultures in 
Contact, pp. 8-14; Lucassen, et al., Migration History in World History, pp. 7-17.
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However, when we use terms such as “free” and “unfree” labor, we must 
remember that from its earliest days, the hereditary household system was 
porous. Escape was possible through illegal means such as bribes, false 
registration, self-maiming, and desertion. More importantly, the natural 
growth in the size of families meant that, over time, the relative burden of 
military service for the entire family diminished. It might pose a debilitat-
ing burden for an individual man or even his immediate family, but most 
members of the extended family would not feel the pinch at all, especially 
if they were located hundreds of miles apart. In fact, through success in 
business, the civil service examination, or crime, they could put substantial 
distance between themselves and relatives who served in military garrisons 
or in military agricultural colonies. Further complicating the situation was 
the fact that many soldiers simultaneously pursued other forms of employ-
ment, which ranged from the sale of their military skills and equipment to 
private patrons, to menial labor in roadside eateries. It is tempting then to 
see them as what Marcel van der Linden has termed “subaltern workers”. 74
Hired soldiers during the Ming should be considered free labor. These 
included both men who served in militias organized by county magistrates 
or local elites and those who offered their services as military retainers or 
housemen for imperial generals or civil off icials. Men who fought for illicit 
groups such as bandits, pirates, and rebels might include both free and 
unfree labor, depending on the degree and variety of coercion involved in 
recruitment and retention.
Commodified/noncommodified labor
As many scholars have shown, conceptions of labor and wages have varied 
signif icantly according to time and place. Although at one level, commodi-
fied labor may be understood as a purely f inancial transaction whereby one 
party remunerates another party for his or her time, skill, and productive 
labor, such relations are embedded in larger social, cultural, and religious 
structures. Thus, it is not surprising to read in contemporary Ming sources 
that the imperial throne periodically “bestowed gifts” of gold, silver, paper 
74 For insightful comments on the assumptions implicit in common notions of social classes, 
see Van der Linden, Workers of the World, pp. 28-32. Van der Linden stresses the grey areas 
between social classes, that most subaltern worker households combined several modes of 
labor, and that individual subaltern workers often “combined different modes of labor, both 
synchronically and diachronically” (p. 32).
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currency, bolts of cotton, winter gowns, shoes, or even pepper upon its sol-
diers. The scale of the payments was frequently enormous and represented 
a sizeable if to date poorly analyzed portion of soldiers’ remuneration from 
the state. As an illustrative if randomly selected example, let us consider 
the summer of 1388 during the early days of the dynasty. In June the em-
peror gave more than 209,300 soldiers and off icers from Suzhou and other 
southern garrisons in excess of 109,900 taels of gold and silver, 30,000 taels 
in paper currency, and 307,600 bolts of cloth.75 Little more than two weeks 
later, the court announced rewards of 46,000 in cash, 255,000 bolts of cot-
ton textiles, and 174,300 pounds of cotton fabric for approximately 153,000 
troops from the northern garrisons of Beiping, Jizhou, and elsewhere.76 In 
July, the throne again announced gifts for nearly 200,000 soldiers in the 
Fuzhou garrisons and almost 160,000 troops in the Fujian garrisons.77
Such gifts from the throne represented a considerable transfer of wealth 
to military personnel. One study has calculated that between 1369 and 1374 
the throne issued 1 million taels of silver in gifts. Between 1368 and 1391, 
Hongwu ordered the distribution of more than 12 million bolts of cotton 
textiles, 3 million pounds of cotton, and 1.7 million sets of clothing as gifts. 
Approximately 80 per cent of such gifts went to the military.78
This rhetoric of imperial munif icence owed something to Hongwu’s 
consistent efforts to establish authority and control in all facets of Ming 
life. He adopted the pose of a generous patriarch who cared for his people, 
including his warriors. Imperial mercy and munif icence were to be recip-
rocated with gratitude, loyalty, and the desire to “repay the dynasty” (bao 
guo, bao xiao). The rhetoric of reciprocal obligations was not restricted to 
the ruler and his military but formed a pervasive element of contempo-
rary conceptions of social life, religious practice, and political behavior. 
It is worth remembering that the army was of crucial importance to the 
fledgling regime. To the degree that we are interested in Van der Linden’s 
question of “which perceptions do the actors on the stage of history have 
of the reality that surrounds them, of themselves, and [of] each other”, it 
is important not to dismiss gifts from our consideration of military labor 
relations.79 Occasional gifts from the emperor, in contrast to regular wages 
in cash and kind distributed by garrison authorities, were intended to forge 
75 Ming Taizu shilu, 190.4a.
76 Ibid., 190.5b.
77 Ibid., 191.3b.
78 Okuyama, “Kōbuchō no men ma no shikyū ni tsuite”, pp. 1-3. 
79 Van der Linden, Workers of the World, p. 371.
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a direct tie between the Son of Heaven and humble soldiers, regardless of 
how tenuous that bond may have been in reality.
At the same time, Hongwu was fully aware that many off icers treated 
their troops poorly and repeatedly reminded his commanders that they 
owed their success to the efforts of the common soldier.80 Battles were won 
not through the individual heroics of generals but through soldiers’ loyalty 
to their commanders and their willingness to risk their lives in combat. To 
win such loyalty, commanders had to care for the material needs of their 
men on a regular basis.81 Even in a political system as eff icient and central-
ized as Ming China, and even with his exceptional power, Hongwu had no 
choice but to rely on many intermediate levels of administration to collect 
and distribute wages, supplies, and even his gifts to the dynasty’s soldiers. 
For this reason, he tried again and again to convince the off icer corps that 
good treatment of the troops, including the fair and timely distribution of 
wages, was integral to advancing their own self-interest.82
For later Ming rulers who lacked the charisma of the dynastic founder, 
such demonstrations of imperial munif icence could be even more critical. 
Midway through the dynasty in 1521, the newly enthroned Jiajing emperor, 
eager to secure the loyalty of his military, announced his intention to bestow 
2 taels of silver on each border soldier in recognition of their hardships. After 
consultation with the Ministry of War and commanding off icers from the 
border, the court disbursed 743,812 taels of silver to 371,906 men.83 In April 
1521, his cousin and predecessor the Zhengde emperor had died without 
an heir or a designated successor. Desperate consultations between senior 
court ministers and the Empress Dowager led to the choice of Jiajing, a 
complete outsider to the capital and court politics. The new emperor and 
his advisors purged the court of many prominent military generals who 
had enjoyed privileged access to the late emperor. Some of these military 
men had originally hailed from border garrisons such as Liaodong, Datong, 
and Xuanfu. Thus, Jiajing no doubt considered the massive sum of nearly 
750,000 taels of silver a smart investment in his future.
Remuneration as gift-giving was not restricted to emperors. As Arthur 
Waldron has noted, nearly one-third of one early sixteenth-century official’s 
80 Two of eight injunctions issued on one occasion in August 1388 by Hongwu to his military 
commanders related directly to treating their men with benevolence and not inflicting injury 
on them (Ming Taizu shilu, 193.5a).
81 Ibid., 191.3b-4b.
82 Ibid., 192.2b-3a.
83 Ming Shizong shilu, 3.2a-b.
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budget for wall-building was dedicated to gifts for troops.84 Magistrates and 
men of local standing similarly appealed to the rhetoric of gift-giving in 
the context of securing military labor. In times of crisis when men of either 
governmental or social authority needed to quickly raise levies of men for 
local militias, they held large banquets for which they would slaughter cows 
and provide liquor to recruits. The hope was that by showing their social 
inferiors such honor and respect, elites would secure the men’s gratitude 
and obedience, at least long enough to ride out the crisis. Accounts of 
banquet-giving are often accompanied by efforts to raise funds to pay for 
the recruits. Scattered accounts indicate that the magistrate or man of local 
standing might sell off a portion of his personal assets to generate cash to 
be used as wages. The nitty-gritty details of exactly how the men arranged 
such transactions and with whom are rarely available.
The use of banquets to secure the allegiance of men able and willing 
to provide military service was not restricted to men employed by or sup-
porting the state. Rebels, brigands, and other men of violence used exactly 
the same methods to create bonds of patron and client or, in terms more 
recognizable to men of the day, older and younger brother, lord and follower. 
The enormously popular sixteenth-century vernacular novel Heroes of the 
Water Marsh (Shui hu zhuan) describes scores of greater and lesser such 
banquets. In addition to the obvious social dimensions of these banquets, 
they also served as an economic marker. Only a patron of some economic 
resources could hold a suff iciently generous banquet that would allow 
conspicuous consumption of meat and drink. It was also understood that 
the host, whether magistrate, man of local standing, or aspiring brigand 
chief, would retain the services of his men only so long as he continued to 
pay them.
In addition to regular wages paid in money and/or grain and periodic 
gifts of cash, clothing, or food items, soldiers received special rewards for 
their exploits on the battlef ield. Ming troops who killed enemy soldiers 
were eligible for rewards in silver or promotion. To prove their claims, Ming 
troops were required to present the decapitated head of the enemy to civil 
off icials, who were responsible both for verifying that the head belonged 
to an enemy combatant rather than, say, a civilian and for submitting the 
paperwork. Early in the sixteenth century, the posted reward for an enemy 
head along the northern border was 50 taels of silver. Private markets in 
places such as Liaodong, however, sold decapitated enemy heads, a practice 
84 Waldron, The Great Wall of China, p. 133.
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that the imperial government tried without success to eliminate.85 Rates 
for decapitated heads taken from the hinterlands or from the southern 
border were generally lower. The thinking was that they were taken from 
less fearsome foes.
To summarize, the Ming military labor market might be characterized 
as flexible and segmented. A portion of military labor, those registered in 
hereditary military households, was unfree insofar as such men were legally 
bound to offer military service to the state for their entire adult life, barring 
incapacitating injury, premature death, or dismissal for misbehavior or 
incompetence. However, it should be remembered that, even within heredi-
tary military households, only a small proportion of men were called upon 
to render military (or other) labor to the state. Furthermore, in exchange 
for their labor, they received wages in goods and cash.
Hired soldiers, whether engaged for short or long terms, should be 
considered free labor and commodif ied labor. They were paid primarily 
in cash by the imperial government, local off icials, or private influential 
elites. However, part of their “compensation package” regularly included 
additional “gifts” such as food, wine, and/or clothing. These gifts were es-
sential in the formation of bonds of loyalty and reciprocal obligation. As 
incentives, the state also offered cash bonuses and promotions to both 
garrison regulars and hired soldiers.
Remuneration for the third variety of Ming military labor, aboriginal 
troops, is less clear but perhaps best understood as a variant of Lynn’s feudal 
or aggregate contract army in the following sense. Aboriginal warriors 
might owe military service to tribal leaders, who in turn owed military 
service to the Ming state. Thus, the Ming state in effect contracted en-
tire contingents of aboriginal warriors rather than recruiting individual 
members. Aboriginal leaders, of course, expected remuneration from the 
Ming state. Higher titles, gifts (in cash and kind) from the throne, and f ield 
provisions were clearly part of the arrangement between the Ming state 
and aboriginal leaders. Scattered evidence suggests that aboriginal forces 
too were subject to the trend to commute supplies and wages to silver. In 
the mid-sixteenth century, aboriginal troops from the southwest deployed 
to f ight piracy along the affluent eastern coastal regions received 80 per 
cent of the value of their allocation of rice, fresh vegetables, and fuel for 
cooking in silver.86 Far less clear is whether the Ming state offered additional 
85 Ming Shizong shilu, 3.11a.
86 Xu Jie, “Bi jian shi yi tiao”, in Xu, Shi jing tang ji, 23.23b (Wanli edn held at Beijing University 
Library; reprinted in Si ku quan shu cun mu cong shu, ji bu, LXXX, p. 103). 
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cash payments. The nature of labor relations and compensation between 
tribal leaders and aboriginal warriors is perhaps the most opaque part of 
the equation. Thus, on the questions of free/unfree and commodif ied/
noncommodif ied labor, further research is needed.
Deciding factors in Ming military labor relations
With the exceptions of Suzuki Tadashi and Zhao Zhongnan, scholars 
have shown limited interest in relating the rise of housemen (or any other 
developments in the military) to wider socioeconomic developments.87 By 
the mid-f ifteenth century, the Ming economy, including the assessment 
and collection of taxes, had become partially monetized. Labor obligations 
to the state could often be met through the payment of silver.88 Changes 
within the garrison system ultimately resulted from wider social develop-
ments. Although Wu Han, Xiao Xu, and others were no doubt correct to 
draw attention to widespread corruption within the garrison system, the 
entire hereditary household system – whether military, saltern, mining, 
craftsmen, etc. – came to exercise a less direct influence on individual 
families. People moved, families diversif ied their economic activities and 
raised their social aspirations. This was less dynastic decline than a natural 
sloughing off of administrative institutions inherited from the Mongol 
empire, institutions that better reflected the interests and perspectives 
of the Mongol elite than the realities of China’s society or economy. The 
growth of housemen and mercenaries of all kinds should be seen as part 
and parcel of the overall trend toward the monetization of the economy, 
particularly service and labor.89
However, obligations imposed by the Ming state never vanished alto-
gether. Indeed, hereditary obligations linked to household registration 
during the early Ming could exercise a profound influence on household and 
lineage strategies. In an excellent case study based on the particulars of the 
southeastern province of Fujian, Michael Szonyi has observed, “informally, 
87 For another exception, see Qiu, “Mingdai zhongqianqi junfei gongji tedian de xingcheng 
yu yanbian”.
88 Heijdra, “The Socio-Economic Development of Rural China during the Ming”.
89 Of course, private retainers and mercenaries were a longstanding feature of Chinese history, 
dating back to the earliest imperial dynasties of the classical period (second century BC). See 
Ma, “Mingdai de jiading”, pp. 193-194. Monetization frequently undermined accepted social 
hierarchies, which produced considerable unease among some Ming elite men. For a broad 
treatment, see Brook, The Confusions of Pleasure.
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military-registered households hired mercenaries themselves to fulfill their 
obligations”. He argues that “the Ming state’s military and taxation systems 
drove groups of kin to organize themselves”. 90
Contemporary observers were fully aware that the dynastic military 
system was inextricably tied to wider socioeconomic developments. Propos-
als were floated to monetize elements of military obligation to the state. 
For instance, the “purif ication of troops”, that is, tracking down and/or 
replacement of missing soldiers, was laborious, expensive, and ineff icient. 
Some officials argued that a more effective policy would be to collect a fee in 
silver from households who “owed” an active-service soldier to the state – in 
the same way that households or communities that owed labor to the state 
could commute the responsibility into silver payments (a transformation 
nearly complete by the 1460s for some categories of service).91 Deep concern 
about the importance of the hereditary garrison system to the political, 
economic, and military foundations of the dynasty, however, stymied any 
fundamental reform.
This monetization did occur with some forms of military service. The 
most obvious example was the decision to hire hundreds of thousands 
of soldiers to augment hereditary garrison forces discussed in the f irst 
section of the paper as a response to the battle of Tumu in 1449. The people’s 
stalwarts also witnessed a high degree of monetization. During the 1430s, 
local administrators in various parts of the dynasty had begun to draft men 
into local constabularies called people’s stalwarts, that is, they were not 
members of military households. Following the debacle at Tumu, people’s 
stalwarts were recruited in far larger numbers and their duties expanded to 
include military functions, which in some cases meant incorporation into 
garrison units.92 By the end of the f ifteenth century, the court formalized 
the policy and issued orders for its empire-wide implementation.93 After 
experimenting with both conscription and hiring, many local magistrates 
concluded that hiring military labor yielded better results than did coercive 
recruiting.94 The result was that the service levy appeared as a line item in 
90 Szonyi, Practicing Kinship, pp. 61 and 23.
91 For a brief discussion and citations to relevant scholarship, see Wu (Go), Min Shin jidai no 
yōeki seido to chihō gyōsei, pp. 187-192.
92 Kawagoe, “Sōkōki no minsōsei ni tsuite”.
93 Scholars debate the precise year. Saeki Tomi dates the national policy to 1489. See Saeki, 
“Min Shin jidai no minsō ni tsuite”, p. 35. Ray Huang sees 1494 as the year it became dynastic 
policy. See Huang, Taxation and Governmental Finance in Sixteenth-Century China, p. 111.
94 Kawagoe stresses the importance of conscription during the 1450s-1480s (“Sōkōki no 
minsōsei ni tsuite”, pp. 26-27).
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local budgets, as say, forty people’s stalwarts, with between 2 and 10 taels 
of silver designated for each man’s pay.95 By 1500 or so, the silver to hire 
militiamen was regularly apportioned across the local population, in the 
form of either a land or a poll tax.96 Estimates of how many people’s stalwarts 
were hired vary, but the scale was considerable – somewhere between 
200,000 and 300,000 during the sixteenth century.97 One consequence of 
this policy was to increase the variability or elasticity of local budgets. In 
times of military crisis, county and prefectural governments needed to hire 
more militiamen quickly, which in turn necessitated a hike in local taxes 
that were paid in silver.98
Similarly, the military grain-transport system was subject to larger 
changes within the Ming economy. The late f ifteenth-century reforms rep-
resented a form of monetization. Prior to this time, some farmers had been 
responsible for transporting tax grain to the capital, a duty that became far 
more onerous when the capital was moved to the north. Now, they instead 
paid a fee to local authorities and the military moved the grain.99 During 
the sixteenth century, the grain-transport soldiers ceased to serve much if 
any military function. During the early f ifteenth century, personnel had 
been drawn from the pool of active-service garrison soldiers; by the 1430s, 
“supernumerary soldiers”, the men whose function was to aid active-service 
soldiers, were used in large numbers; by 1500, men completely outside the 
hereditary military households were increasingly hired as replacements. 
This last group of men often comprised men who were sailors and trans-
port workers by trade. Men in the military grain-transport corps were not 
expected to drill, nor were they expected to be proficient with arms.100
Finally, the monetization of the economy, including many different kinds 
of corvée labor due to the state, on this scale in turn was sustainable only 
through Ming China’s integration into the global economy, most particularly 
the steady flow of silver from Spanish mines in the New World.101
95 Estimates for wages are from Saeki, “Min Shin jidai no minsō ni tsuite”, pp. 53-59. People’s 
stalwarts might win additional bonuses for noteworthy service or be subject to f ines for failing 
to meet their quotas of, for instance, smugglers.
96 Ibid., p. 48.
97 Saeki Tomi (ibid.) suggests 300,000, while Liang Fangzhong prefers 200,000. See Liang, 
“Mingdai de minbing”, Zhongguo shehui jingjishi jikan, 5.2 (1937), pp. 200-234; reprinted in Wu, 
Mingshi yanjiu luncong, I, p. 266.
98 Huang, Taxation and Governmental Finance in Sixteenth-Century China, pp. 111-112, 126.
99 Lin, “Mingdai caojunzhi chutan”, p. 187.
100 Ibid., pp. 191-192.
101 The literature on silver and the Ming economy is voluminous. For a convenient point of 
entry, see Atwell, “Ming China and the Emerging World Economy”.
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If changes in the Ming economy, particularly a trend toward monetiza-
tion, deeply shaped military labor relations, the highly fluid Chinese military 
labor market also explains much. Nearly all commentators, whether capital 
ministers, provincial authorities, county magistrates, or local elites, took 
for granted that substantial numbers of men could be mobilized quickly for 
military service. When a dangerous princely revolt occurred in 1519, rather 
than depend on garrison forces, the well-known literatus Wang Yangming 
(1472-1529) sought his troops locally, recruiting 2,000 to 3,000 men from 
small counties and 4,000 to 5,000 men from large counties as a way to raise 
an army quickly. The state provided provisions but the recruits supplied 
their own weapons.102 During the piracy crisis of the mid-sixteenth century, 
one off icial, Zheng Xiao, offered the following proposal: “We should search 
out and recruit ten men who are adept in martial arts. Each of them shall 
instruct one hundred men. After one month, again have each one teach ten 
men. Thus we will able to secure ten thousand men.” 103 Although the official 
expected that training would be necessary, he had no doubt about the pool 
of men available. The initial training in this case, it should be noted, was 
to be provided neither by the state nor by military instructors but by hired 
soldiers already possessed of skills in the martial arts.
Similarly, well-informed off icials assumed that arms of the day, includ-
ing bows and arrows, metal-linked whips, spears, cudgels, and swords, 
circulated widely among the subject population. Writing in the midst of 
a large-scale rebellion in 1510, the senior minister Yang Yiqing (1454-1530) 
recommended that each household in regions affected by the rebellion 
keep these weapons at hand. Strong young men and hired laborers fulf illing 
their labor obligations toward the state were to drill with these weapons. 
Likewise in the late sixteenth century, the famed off icial Lü Kun (1536-1618) 
advocated regular drill, this time under the instruction of professional 
instructors, in the use of “spears, swords, bows and arrows, short cudgels, 
rope whips and other such weapons” during agricultural slack periods.104
Implicit in these various proposals was the idea that the state or its 
local representatives could shed excess military personnel once a crisis 
had passed. Although some advocated registering new recruits into the 
hereditary military system, others explicitly rejected such a policy. Their 
most common argument was that permanent registration would undermine 
102 Okuyama, “Shōtoku Chinkō no ran ni tsuite”, p. 108.
103 Zheng Lüzhun, Zheng Duan jian gong nian pu, 3.22b (Wanli edn held at Shanghai Library; 
reprinted in Si ku quan shu cun mu cong shu, shi 83, p. 558).
104 Robinson, Bandits, Eunuchs, and the Son of Heaven, p. 95.
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recruiting efforts. Men were attracted by the promise of cash and repelled 
by permanent obligation, they insisted.105
Ad hoc recruiting held appeal for several reasons. For local off icials, it 
provided a relatively high degree of autonomy. They could mobilize local 
men without incurring long-term f iscal responsibilities, responsibilities 
that would have required substantial modif ication of tax regimes, which 
in turn would have meant negotiation not only with higher-ups but also 
with local populations. Similarly for the central government, local ad hoc 
recruiting offered several advantages. It was one way to mitigate the chal-
lenges that great distances and enormous regional variation posed in the 
age before telegraphs and steam-powered travel. Local off icials (or at least 
their staffs) had a surer sense of how and where to recruit quickly. Increasing 
the number of hereditary military households would have expanded an 
already overstretched bureaucratic structure and, in principle, put garrison 
authorities on the hook for expenses related to medical care, assistance to 
widows and orphans of fallen soldiers, and stipends to the lame.106 For better 
or for worse, the flexible military labor market saved the central government 
from the need to push through large-scale fundamental reforms.
Critics of recruiting focused on concerns of f inance, security, and govern-
ance. Officials frequently expressed frustration that the state’s vast f inancial 
commitment to the hereditary military household system was essentially 
money down the drain. Hiring mercenaries required additional funds on 
top of standing obligations. These costs could add up quickly. Less than one 
year after advocating hiring martial artists as troops and trainers as part 
of an effort to organize a force of 10,000 men, Zheng Xiao expressed some 
surprise that “within a week’s time of the pirates entering our jurisdiction, 
we have already used more than 9,000 taels of silver for recruiting soldiers, 
feeding them, paying out on bonuses, and providing rewards”.107
The ability of the central government, county magistrates, military 
commanders, and even private subjects with suff icient social status and 
105 In 1431, a military off icer from the border region of Shaanxi suggested that men who had 
served in earlier military expeditions in the steppe be kept as a kind of reserve force that would 
report monthly for drill. The court rejected his proposal. Implicit in its reasoning was that, once 
men had completed their tour, the soldiers would return to their original units and civilians 
would return to their farms or herds (Ming Xuanzong shilu, 76.8b).
106 Sometimes wages continued to be issued to soldiers even after their death on distant 
battlef ields, usually because it took some time before garrison authorities received notif ication 
of death. Occasionally they tried (usually unsuccessfully) to make bereaved family members 
repay such wages (Ming Yingzong shilu, 36.5a-b).
107 Zheng Lüzhun, Zheng Duan jian gong nian pu, 3.35a (Si ku quan shu cun mu cong shu, shi 83, 
p. 565).
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economic means to recruit hundreds or even thousands of men quickly (in 
the space of days or weeks) strongly suggests the existence of a large pool 
of young men whose labor could be temporarily removed from agricultural 
production, animal husbandry, artisanal occupations, and other economic 
activities. This situation is perhaps most profitably viewed from the per-
spective of family units rather than individuals. Many families pursued 
sophisticated economic strategies of diversif ication designed to hedge 
against risks. Thus, although agricultural production might comprise the 
core economic activity of the family, individuals within the family would 
commonly engage in other activities, either full- or part-time. Adult females 
might contribute to family production through weaving, peddling jewelry, 
selling food as small vendors, etc. Adult males might work for part of the 
year on other people’s farms, engage in commerce, f ish, hunt, etc. Children 
could serve as herders for cows and sheep or help with simple tasks on the 
farm. Thus, many households pursued diverse economic activities in a way 
that allowed for variable but relatively predictable factors, such as season, 
natural resources, and age, and for other less predictable factors, such as 
epidemic, drought, warfare, or dramatic changes in the composition of the 
household.
Thus short-time service in the military was one element of a larger 
strategy of economic diversif ication pursued at the level of individual 
households or groups of households linked through kinship and or marriage. 
Young men might serve for a single “tour” of several months or might serve 
periodically over a more extended period of time depending on demand 
within the military labor market.
The dynamic for men who served as mercenaries for longer periods 
of time differed in several important ways. Although such men, too, are 
best understood in the context of larger family economic strategies, their 
absence was generally more enduring. Detailed documentary material 
related to their contributions to larger family units is limited, but evidence 
from men serving in hereditary military households would suggest that time 
and distance often weakened economic ties to larger family units. To the 
degree that “housemen” became long-term retainers, it seems likely (but 
far from certain) that regular, substantial contributions to their original 
household may have diminished. An initial study of one region famed in the 
sixteenth century as a source of military labor, Yiwu County, indicates that 
military service dramatically influenced local demographics. “Most young 
men in Yiwu”, wrote one sixteenth-century observer, “have given up their 
original trade, responded to recruiting drives, and joined the army”. Local 
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off icials complained that the resultant dearth of young men impinged on 
their ability to secure suff icient labor for government needs.108
As noted above, the conditions of service of “household men” varied 
significantly, from fairly straightforward short-term arrangements whereby 
they received cash for military labor, to long-term arrangements that 
involved accompanying their employer to new assignments or even into 
retirement. Presumably long-term arrangements involved more than a 
simple economic transaction: feelings of personal loyalty, an identif ication 
with other men serving under the patron, and perhaps the adoption of f ic-
tive kinship or oaths of brotherhood. Such behaviors no doubt also shaped 
the identity of those soldiers serving in regular garrison forces.
In addition to (a) economic changes and (b) supply and demand in the 
labor market, ideological or political considerations also shaped military 
labor relations during the Ming. More specifically, the Ming state considered 
the hereditary military household system and imperial garrisons essential 
to the maintenance of the empire. The great physical size, geographic 
variation, ethnic complexity, and economic diversity of China generated 
considerable centrifugal force. Given such centrifugal pressure, the Ming 
state went to considerable lengths to ensure the viability of the dynasty by 
strengthening the centre. Thorough control of the military and the many 
functions built into the hereditary military household system were essential 
to such efforts.
The Ming founder used various methods to prevent his generals from 
gaining suff icient power to challenge the court. Generals were assigned 
command of garrison units for specif ic campaigns. Once the f ighting was 
concluded, the generals were to be recalled to the capital or to their positions 
on the border.109 The founder divided the highest level of military command 
into f ive military commissions to prevent an undue concentration of power 
in the hands of single man or institution. He also killed many of his leading 
generals during sanguinary purges that left tens of thousands dead.
The hereditary garrison system, too, was a critical instrument of central 
control. Ultimate responsibility for household registration of military 
families was in the hands of the central government. The court dispatched 
off icials to local garrisons to track down or replace deserting (or deceased) 
soldiers. Enormous swathes of territory were turned over to the garrisons 
108 Nimick, “Ch’i Chi-kuang and I-wu County”, p. 24.
109 The prominent off icial He Qiaoxin considered this as one of the founder’s six greatest 
accomplishments as a ruler (“Di wang gong de”, in He, He Wen su gong wen ji, 2.24a, 1694 edn; 
reprinted in Taibei: Weiwen tushu chubanshe, 1976, 1, p. 109).
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for farming. The central government retained control over the lands, the 
men who farmed them, their harvests, and granaries. The central govern-
ment exiled criminals to serve as soldiers in garrisons, especially along the 
borders. During the early decades of the dynasty, the garrison system was 
the mechanism through which the central government forcibly relocated 
hundreds of thousands of men, women, and children from one part of the 
empire to others (as part of economic reconstruction). Further, it was the 
tool through which the court tried to keep them there on a permanent basis. 
When the state f irst approved measures to hire soldiers from within and 
beyond hereditary military households, it initially tried to limit the pool 
to men who could demonstrate evidence of proper household registration.110
Thus, although officials in the central government were fully aware of the 
monetization of parts of the economy, the flexibility of the military labor 
market, and the viability of hiring soldiers to defend the dynasty, there is 
little evidence that abolition of the hereditary military household system 
or the imperial garrisons was ever given serious consideration. In the case 
of the Ming dynasty, maintenance of the hereditary military household 
system was integral to imperial power and legitimacy. This involved a 
measure of irony. The Ming court had adopted the hereditary military 
household system from the Mongol Yuan dynasty, a regime that the early 
Ming emperors spent considerable time decrying as abusive, corrupt, and 
fundamentally incompatible with the enduring values and customs of 
Chinese civilization.
Thus, several factors shaped the particular conf iguration of military 
labor relations under the Ming. Insofar as dynastic legitimacy became 
entwined with strong control over military resources and the Ming wished 
to be considered a successor to the Yuan, the hereditary military household 
system and its vast array of garrisons owed much to ideological factors.111 
One might argue that the Ming state’s use of Mongol, Jurchen, Yao, and 
other non-Chinese warriors could be explained in similar terms. The initial 
emergence of hired soldiers in the f ifteenth century and more especially 
their proliferation during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries must be 
understood in the wider context of socioeconomic changes transforming 
China. The growing, if still uneven, use of silver as a medium of exchange, 
110 Li Du (Mingdai huangquan zhengzhi yanjiu, pp. 152-226) stresses the central government’s 
high level of control. Li notes the initial efforts to recruit only from among properly registered 
men in “Mingdai mubingzhi jianlun”, p. 66.
111 For the Ming court as a successor to the Yuan, see Robinson, “The Ming Imperial Family 
and the Yuan Legacy”.
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the monetization of labor and material obligations to the state, and the 
decline of the hereditary occupation household system all contributed to 
conditions favoring hired soldiers. Finally, the large and flexible military 
labor market must be mentioned. It arose as a result of the socioeconomic 
conditions enumerated above, a steadily growing population (including 
the population of young, often single men), diversif ied economic strategies 
pursued by individual families and lineages, and competition for military 
labor by the imperial state, local authorities, private elites, and other groups 
ranging from mutual-aid societies among farmers, men of force, bandits, 
pirates, and rebels. This competition for military labor almost certainly 
contributed to its commodif ication.
 From the mamluks to the mansabdars




By the f irst decade of the sixteenth century, the Delhi Sultanate (1206-1526), 
the dominant power in north India, was breaking up. Several autonomous 
states emerged to challenge the political supremacy of the Delhi Sultanate 
in the Ganga-Jamuna doab (the fertile tract of land between the rivers 
Ganga and Jamuna in north India). Deccan (the region between the rivers 
Godavari and Krishna) and south India had become independent of the 
Delhi Sultanate’s control earlier during the mid-fourteenth century. The 
invasion of India by the Turkish warlord Zahir-ud-din Muhammad Babur 
in 1526 resulted in the replacement of the Lodi dynasty ruling the Delhi 
Sultanate with the Mogul Empire. The Moguls (Mughals; the nineteenth-
century British off icials and historians called them Moghuls) referred to 
themselves as Chagatai Turks or Timurids even though their family links 
with the Chagatai branch of the Chingizids were weak. The Moguls claimed 
that from their father’s side they descended from Amir Timur and from their 
mother’s side from the Chagatai Mongol branch. The newly born Mogul 
Empire was overthrown in 1540 by the Afghan warlord from east India 
named Sher Shah Suri. Babur’s son Humayun staged a comeback in 1555.
The “real” founder of the Mogul Empire was indeed Akbar (Padshah, i.e. 
emperor, from 1556 to 1605). Akbar put an end to the political chaos in north 
India by subduing the Afghans and the Rajputs. Further, he reorganized the 
administration. By the time of Akbar’s death in 1605, the Mogul Empire had 
established a stable administrative machinery in north and central India 
and was in the process of moving slowly into Deccan. Until the fourteenth 
century, the dominant mode of military recruitment in India was the 
mamluk system. The mamluks were slave soldiers of the Muslim world. 
However, by the end of the sixteenth century, due to Akbari reorganization, 
a sort of quasi-mercenary-cum-quasi-professional military employment 
1 I am indebted to Suhrita and Prof. Erik-Jan Zürcher for their comments on an earlier version 
of this paper.
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known as the mansabdari system became dominant. The beginning of the 
seventeenth century witnessed the gradual expansion of Mogul power into 
Deccan under Akbar’s son and grandson, named Jahangir (r. 1605-1627) and 
Shah Jahan (r. 1628-1658) respectively. They continued to operate within the 
administrative fabric established by their illustrious predecessor. By the 
mid-seventeenth century, two contradictory processes were unfolding in 
the subcontinent. While the Mogul Empire under the dynamic leadership 
of Emperor Aurangzeb (1658-1707) was poised for expansion, simultaneously 
the administrative institutions established by Akbar were slowly becoming 
dysfunctional. This was partly because the Mogul economy was in the grip 
of what is known as the “agrarian crisis” 2 and partly due to the new forms 
of warfare introduced by the Marathas and the Persians.
Research design
The focus in this chapter is on the combatants of the Mogul army. I will show 
how the mamluk system became dominant and explain the reasons which 
led to its demise in South Asia. The various factors that resulted in the transi-
tion to the mansabdari system and the existence of other mini-systems 
will be laid out. Since the Mogul army was not frozen in time but evolved 
over two centuries, the transition to different forms of military labour is 
portrayed chronologically. This chapter combines original research with a 
synthesis of the existing materials and has a comparative focus. I will com-
pare the mamluk and mansabdari systems alongside other forms of military 
profession which were in vogue in the subcontinent between 1500 and 1650. 
2 The agrarian crisis was an amalgam of structural and managerial factors. Long-term 
agricultural decline, price rises, etc. resulted in a decrease in income from jagirs (agricultural 
land assigned to the Mogul off icials) from the late seventeenth century onwards. The def icit 
budget of the Mogul central government – due to continuous warfare in Deccan against the 
Marathas as well as to the rising cost of warfare – forced Aurangzeb to requisition jagirs from 
the Mogul nobles (off icials), which were then transferred into the khalisa (land under direct 
crown management). In addition, newly conquered land was not assigned as jagirs among 
the nobility but put under khalisa. Aurangzeb hoped, through this measure, that the central 
government would be able to exercise greater f inancial control over the agrarian economy. A 
lack of jagirs for assignment to the Mogul nobles caused be-jagiri or a paibaqi crisis among the 
Mogul nobility. This scenario resulted in increasing factional f ighting among the nobility trying 
to acquire the available jagirs in the Mogul Empire. After the death of Aurangzeb in 1707, the 
powerful nobles, in a bid to get hold of the jagirs, became independent of the Mogul centre and 
carved out semi-autonomous principalities for themselves and their followers. In the long run 
this resulted in the dismemberment of the Mogul Empire. See Habib, The Agrarian System of 
Mughal India; and Chandra, Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court. 
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This is necessary because both the mamluk and the mansabdari systems 
emerged in interaction with various local/regional forms of military labour 
service in medieval South Asia. Again the timeline is not rigid because, to 
explain the rise and fall of the various forms of military recruitment at 
different times, we have to consider the years both before 1500 and after 
1650. In order to assess the uniqueness or lack thereof as regards the social 
history of South Asian military labourers, some comparisons will be made 
with the military systems that were operational in other parts of the world. 
Let us now explore the existing modern works on the subject.
Historiography of military labour history of medieval South Asia
Military history is neglected in the South Asian academic f ield due to the 
dominance of Marxism and, more recently, post-modernism. We have a few 
books on the military history of medieval India. The earliest modern work 
on the Mogul army is by the British historian of colonial India, William 
Irvine. He argues that Indian “racial inferiority” resulted in continuous 
treachery, inf ighting, and backbiting, and that this racial/cultural trait 
prevented the Moguls from constructing a bureaucratic professional stand-
ing army capable of waging decisive battles and sieges.3 The latest work on 
the Mogul army by a Dutch historian, Jos Gommans, asserts that the Mogul 
army was not geared for decisive confrontations aimed at destroying the 
enemy. Rather, the Mogul grand strategy was to absorb potential enemies 
within the loose structure of the Mogul Empire. The Mogul army functioned 
as an instrument to frighten, coerce, and deter enemies.4
We have a crop of biographies of medieval warlords, rulers, and nobles, 
which deal with their administrative and military activities. The decline of 
the Delhi Sultanate started under Sultan Firoz Shah Tughluq. R.C. Jauhri’s 
biography of Firoz is still useful.5 The best biography of Babur for political 
and military affairs remains that by the British historian Stanley Lane-Poole, 
who wrote in the last year of the nineteenth century.6 The most recent biog-
raphy of Babur by Stephen F. Dale concentrates mostly on political culture.7 
The standard biography of Akbar remains the one written by Vincent Smith, 
3 Irvine, The Army of the Indian Moghuls.
4 Gommans, Mughal Warfare. 
5 Jauhri, Firoz Tughluq.
6 Lane-Poole, The Emperor Babar.
7 Dale, The Garden of the Eight Paradises. 
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a British civil servant in colonial India.8 The best biographer of Aurangzeb, 
the last great Mogul, is Jadunath Sarkar.9 On Sher Shah Suri, the founder of 
the short-lived Afghan Suri Sultanate, there are two good biographies.10 As 
regards the biographies of the warlords, one example is Radhey Shyam’s 
biography of the Ahmadnagar Sultanate’s slave-turned-warlord, Malik 
Ambar, who later fought against the Moguls.11 We have a good biography 
of Mir Jumla, the famous noble of Aurangzeb.12 Most of these biographies 
follow the “history-from-the-top-down” approach and give detailed narrative 
accounts of the “great men”. However, some data regarding the social aspects 
of military employments can be gathered from these biographies.
The principal debate in the f ield is about weak states and flower/ritual 
warfare13 versus strong states, standing armies, and decisive battles. Most 
modern non-Indian scholars (Dirk Kolff, Gommans, Andre Wink, Doug-
las Streusand, Burton Stein, Lorne Adamson, Stephen Peter Rosen, etc.) 
argue that the Mogul state was a shadowy structure. The imperial fabric 
comprised innumerable semi-autonomous principalities held together by 
the personality of the emperor and the pomp and splendour of the Mogul 
durbar (court). The emperor did not enjoy a monopoly of violence in the 
public sphere. The Moguls lacked a drilled and disciplined standing army for 
crushing opponents on the battlefields. Treachery, diplomacy, bribery, and a 
show of force resulted in the absorption and assimilation of enemies.14 What 
Irvine has categorized as Indian racial inferiority had been transformed 
as the unique culture of the “Orientals” in the paradigm of these modern 
scholars.
In contrast, John F. Richards15 and many of the Indian Muslim historians 
who are influenced by Marxism and belong to a group which can be labelled 
the Aligarh School, assert that the Mogul Empire was a centralized agrarian 
8 Smith, Akbar.
9 Sarkar wrote a f ive-volume biography of Aurangzeb, and an abridged version in one volume 
was later published (A Short History of Aurangzib). 
10 Aquil, Sufism, Culture, and Politics; Matta, Sher Shah Suri. 
11 Shyam, Life and Times of Malik Ambar.
12 Sarkar, The Life of Mir Jumla.
13 Flower/ritual warfare means indecisive skirmishing, pillaging, and plundering, etc. The 
objective of such warfare is not destruction of the enemy but to cause harm so that the defeated 
enemy, with its militia, could be co-opted into the victor’s camp.
14 Adamson, “The Mughal Armies”; Gommans, Mughal Warfare; Streusand, The Formation 
of the Mughal Empire; Wink, Al-Hind: The Making of the Indo-Islamic World, II, The Slave Kings 
and the Islamic Conquest; Rosen, Societies and Military Power; Kolff, Naukar, Rajput & Sepoy, “A 
Millennium of Stateless Indian History?”
15 Richards, The Mughal Empire, p. xv.
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bureaucratic polity. The Aligarh School turns the limelight on the agrarian 
economy; focusing on the revenue documents, they argue that the Moguls’ 
ability to claim about 50 per cent of the gross produce from the land proves 
that they had a strong presence at the regional/local level. The sucking of 
economic surplus from the countryside was aided by the military supremacy 
of the Moguls, exemplif ied by the use of cavalry and gunpowder weapons.16 
However, M. Athar Ali notes that, unlike the Tudor state, the Mogul state 
lacked the capability and the intention to legislate.17 Probably the nature 
of the Mogul state and Mogul warfare lies somewhere in between the two 
extreme viewpoints discussed above. Now, let us review the primary sources 
which are our raw materials for piecing together the social history of the 
various forms of military employment in Mogul South Asia.
Review of the primary sources
Most of the sources generated by the Mogul chroniclers are in Persian. 
Very few people in the world can read Persian calligraphy of the medieval 
manuscripts which are scattered in the various museums and libraries of the 
world. Luckily most of these works have been translated into English. Various 
regional courts in the Mogul Empire generated chronicles and poems in ver-
nacular languages such as Hindi, Rajasthani, Marathi (modi script), Punjabi 
(Gurmukhi script), and Bengali (charjapada). These scripts vary from the 
present-day scripts, and not all the vernacular sources have been translated. 
For reconstructing the cultural ethos of the Rajputs, who fought the Islamic 
armies and at times also joined them, Prithvirajvijayamahakavya is of some 
help. This poem, composed by Jayanak, comprises 1,067 slokas (stanzas).18 
Somadeva Bhatta’s collection of poems, known as Kathasaritsagara,19 com-
posed around 500 CE, offers a glimpse of the warrior ethos of the Hindu 
mercenaries. In this regard, the various Sanskrit niti sastras (legal literature 
such as Arthasastra, Nitiprakasika, Sukraniti) are of some use.
One of the principal sources for our purposes is the memoir of the f irst 
Mogul emperor, Babur. Babur wrote his autobiography in Turkish with the 
title Tuzuk-i-Baburi, which was translated into Persian as Babur-Nama. A.S. 
16 Habib, Akbar and His India; Ali, Mughal India; Hasan, Religion, State, and Society in Medieval 
India.
17 Ali, “Political Structures of the Islamic Orient in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries”, 
p. 95.
18 Subsequent translations are by the author.
19 All translations are by the author. 
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Beveridge translated it into English in two volumes. While the f irst volume 
deals with Babur’s adventures in Central Asia, the second volume narrates 
Babur’s activities in Hindustan (north India). Babur’s great-grandson Jahan-
gir (r. 1605-1628) also wrote an autobiography.20 An intimate biographical 
account of Babur’s son Humayun is available in a narrative written by the 
latter’s domestic attendant, Jouher.21 The Maathir-ul-Umara, a collective 
biography of 730 Mogul nobles by Nawab Samsam-ud-Daulah Shah Nawaz 
Khan and written between 1768 and 1780, is an important source. This work 
has been translated by H. Beveridge into English into two volumes.22 Shah 
Nawaz Khan’s objective is to give “an account, in alphabetical order, of the 
lives of the great amirs and exalted nobles – some of whom had, at the time 
of their glory, by dint of fortune and good conduct, been the authors of great 
deeds […] while others had, by the wind of their arrogance and presumption, 
heaped up f inal ruin for themselves”.23 In Akbar’s reign, the highest rank 
to which an amir (noble) could aspire was that of 5,000 sawars, meaning 
that he was supposed to maintain 5,000 cavalry. However, a few people 
attained the rank of 7,000 sawars. These higher ranks were held mostly 
by the royal princes. Under Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb, mansabdars24 of 
3,000 possessed their own drums and flags. A noble holding the rank of 500 
was of considerable importance. Hence, Shah Nawaz Khan writes, he has 
included the biographies of nobles who held the mansab of the rank of 500 
and upwards.25 For details of Akbar’s reign, the best source is Akbar-Nama 
by Akbar’s courtier Abul Fazl.26 Abul Fazl’s Ain-i-Akbari is a statistical and 
ethnographic study of the Mogul Empire. For Shah Jahan’s reign, we have 
Inayat Khan’s Shah Jahan Nama.27 For abridged translations of the various 
medieval Persian works dealing with India, the eight volumes of H.M. Elliot 
and John Dawson’s History of India remain useful.28
The problem with the Persian sources is that they were written by the 
elites for the elites, i.e. mostly the relatives of mansabdars for the mansab-
20 The Jahangirnama.
21 The Tezkereh al Vakiat. 
22 The Maathir-ul-Umara. See also I, p. 32.
23 Ibid., I, p. 7.
24 A Mogul off icial who held a mansab (rank) in lieu of jagirs was known as a mansabdar. In 
accordance with his rank, he had to maintain a military contingent, which he did out of the 
revenues of the jagirs assigned to him.
25 The Maathir-ul-Umara, I, p. 8.
26 The Akbar-Nama was f irst completed in 1596.
27 Shah Jahan Nama of Inayat Khan, ed. by Begley and Desai.
28 The History of India as told by its own Historians.
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dars.29 The court chroniclers and the nobles who wrote while enjoying the 
patronage of the rulers concentrated mostly on the doings of the durbar 
and not on those lower placed. Hence, we can recreate the picture about the 
off icer corps (especially the senior ranks) of the Mogul army but we know 
very little about the rank and file. And the common soldiers have left us with 
no written materials. Let us now look at the forms of military employment 
which were in vogue in the subcontinent when the Moguls arrived.
The rise and fall of the mamluk system, c. 1200-1399
The Delhi Sultanate depended on irregular troops (mercenaries and retain-
ers of the tributary chieftains) and regular soldiers (ghulams, i.e., slaves plus 
soldiers raised and maintained by the iqtadars).30 The irregular troops were 
assembled during campaigns and other emergencies (civil wars, invasion by 
foreign powers, etc.) and the regular troops were maintained throughout 
the year as a sort of standing army.
The early rulers of the Delhi Sultanate, such as Muhammad Ghori, 
Qutub-ud-din Aibak and Iltutmish (or Altamash, sultan from 1211 to 1236), 
were influenced by the ghulam/mamluk system which was prevalent in 
the Middle East. For inspiration and a model to follow, these three sultans 
looked at the political and military system prevalent in the Caliphate and 
in the other Muslim polities of the Middle East. The mamluk institution 
f irst came into existence during the f irst half of the ninth century, under 
the Abbasid Caliphate.31 Peter Jackson writes that by the eleventh century 
Turkish slave regiments were prevalent in the polities of Transoxiana, 
Turkestan, Persia (Iran), and the Near East.32 The shock troops and the 
core of the Delhi Sultanate’s army comprised mounted Turkish ghulams. 
Many of the sultans, such as Aibak, Iltutmish, Balban (r. 1266-1287), and 
so forth, started their careers as ghulams. Firoz Shah Tughluq (r. 1351-1388) 
maintained 180,000 slaves, of whom 40,000 served in the army. Some slaves 
29 Abul Fazl himself was a mansabdar holding the rank of 4,000: The History of India, Elliot 
and Dawson, VI, Akbar-Nama of Abul Fazl, p. 2.
30 An iqtadar was the holder of an iqta (a piece of land). The revenue of the iqta went to support 
the cavalry force of the iqtadar. 
31 Jackson, “The Mamluk Institution in Early Muslim India”, p. 340. 
32 Jackson, “Turkish Slaves on Islam’s Indian Frontier”, pp. 64-65.
88 k aushik roy 
specialized in archery, others in swordsmanship, and so on. The slaves were 
occasionally paid in cash, but usually through jagirs.33
Next in importance were the contingents of the iqtadars. The nobles were 
granted land, i.e., iqtas (the equivalent of jagirs), for maintaining cavalry 
troopers. The iqtadars (holder of iqtas) paid the soldiers under their com-
mand out of the revenues collected from their iqtas.34 Initially, the iqtas were 
granted not to the Hindu chieftains but to the Turkish nobles. The iqtadars 
and their soldiers (who were their kinsmen)35 joined military service for 
material gain. However, it would be wrong to categorize them as mercenar-
ies, because their military employment depended on the political fortunes 
of the sultan. If a particular sultan was overthrown, his favourite iqtadars 
were replaced by nobles who supported the cause of the victor. The iqtadari 
system was not professional because the iqtas were given for life; when the 
regular soldiers grew old, they remained in the ranks, and after their death 
their male relations inherited their posts.36 The iqta system was a technique 
of rewarding the free-born Turkish nobles who constituted the support 
base of the Delhi sultans. In the absence of a bureaucracy, the nobles were 
installed as iqtadars directly into the countryside, where their function was 
to collect any agricultural surplus. With the passage of time, especially under 
the Khaljis and the Lodis, iqtas were granted to the non-Turkish Muslims 
for broadening the support base of the Delhi Sultanate. To an extent, the 
iqtas were somewhat equivalent to timars and the iqtadari cavaliers were 
somewhat similar to timariots (sipahis) of the Ottoman Army.37
However, shifts in the international balance of power, as well as the 
enormous demographic resources of the subcontinent, encouraged the Delhi 
Sultanate to change the ethnic composition of the ghulams and to depend on 
the free-floating armed mercenaries of Hindustan. Initially, the Delhi Sul-
tanate relied on Turkish slaves to fill the ghulam units. The Mongol invasions 
of Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Iran resulted in the Delhi Sultanate being 
completely cut off from the manpower supplies of the extra-Indian Islamic 
world. The cessation of the flow of Turkish and Afghan manpower forced the 
Delhi sultans to enslave Hindu boys and convert them to Islam; they were 
then inducted into the ranks of ghulams. This process was somewhat similar 
to the Ottoman practice of capturing young Christian boys in the Balkans 
33 Jauhri, Firoz Tughluq, pp. 126-128; Jackson, “The Mamluk Institution in Early Muslim India”, 
pp. 341, 357.
34 Jauhri, Firoz Tughluq, pp. 86, 118.
35 Hasan, “Aspects of State and Religion in Medieval India”, p. 65.
36 Jauhri, Firoz Tughluq, p. 120.
37 Aksan, “Ottoman War and Warfare”, p. 150.
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who were, after their forcible conversion into Islam, inducted as janissaries. 
The Delhi Sultanate was faced simultaneously with Mongol challenges in 
Sind and Punjab;38 within South Asia, the Rajput chieftains started to nibble 
away at the internal frontiers of the Sultanate.39 One way to maintain and 
expand the size of the army was to hire indigenous mercenaries as well as 
to utilize the forces of the defeated chiefs. The free-floating mercenaries 
had their own horses, armour, and equipment. They were paid in cash and 
they also had a right to the loot taken from the defeated enemies. Unlike the 
ghulams and the iqtadari soldiers, the mercenaries were employed either 
for a single season only or during emergencies.
In 1353, when Firoz Tughluq marched from Delhi towards Bengal with 
70,000 soldiers, many Hindu chieftains who had stopped paying tribute 
joined him with their war bands.40 These chieftains with their warriors 
(who belonged to the same religion and mobilized through the territorial 
clan network) were forced to join the sultanate’s expeditionary armies and 
were not remunerated in any way. It was a sort of begari (forced unpaid 
labour) and could be categorized as a case of an ethnic tributary form of 
military employment.
During the 1365 Thatta (Sind) campaign, Firoz, as well as depending on 
the ghulams and iqtadari troops, also recruited the free-floating mercenar-
ies. They were paid 40 per cent of their salaries in advance. After Firoz was 
repulsed in Sind, he prepared another army for a second campaign against 
Sind during 1366-1367. In addition to mobilizing the soldiers of the iqtadars, 
Firoz hired mercenaries. The mercenaries were paid three-f ifths of their 
salaries in advance so that they could equip themselves. The personnel of 
the standing army during this campaign also received payment in cash. 
This was possible as there were various types of gold and silver coins in 
circulation in Firoz’s time. In fact, the whole revenue of Gujarat, which 
amounted to 20 million tankas (coins) was used in paying the army. To 
prevent desertion of the troops during the second Sind campaign, sentinels 
were appointed. Deserters were disgraced publicly if caught.41 Timur’s 
invasion of India during 1398-1399 with 84,000 cavalry dealt a deathblow 
to the Delhi Sultanate.42 Further, it encouraged many other Central Asian 
adventurers such as Babur to invade the weakening Delhi Sultanate.
38 Jackson, “The Mongols and the Delhi Sultanate in the Reign of Muhammad Tughluq”. 
39 Habibullah, The Foundation of Muslim Rule in India.
40 Jauhri, Firoz Tughluq, pp. 46-47.
41 Ibid., pp. 81, 84-85, 118, 131.
42 The Akbar-Nama, I, p. 244.
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The armies of the early Moguls and their opponents, 1494-1556
In 1494, Zahir-ud-din Muhammad Babur inherited the Kingdom of Fer-
ghana from his father Omar Shaikh, son of Abu Shaikh, the great-grandson 
of Timur.43 Babur relied on different types of military labour. During the 
Battle of Sar-i-Pul, fought in 1501 with the Uzbek chief Shaibani Khan, 
Babur deployed household troops.44 Virginia Aksan writes that the Otto-
man sultan’s court was organized as a household and that the state was 
regarded as patrimony. The household comprised the sultan’s army and 
his military headquarters.45 The household troops46 constituted the core 
group of Babur’s army. They provided the “braves”, the crack soldiers who 
carried out daredevil manoeuvres on the battlef ield. They joined Babur’s 
side due to family and clan connections. And, being attached to Babur by 
personal relations, unlike the tribal mercenaries, they did not change sides 
in accordance with the fluctuating political circumstances. By profession, 
they were warriors and fought bravely for Babur, like a band of brothers. 
And they got the best rewards after a successful campaign. In 1497, Babur 
occupied Samarkhand. In 1498-1499, Babur commanded some 2,000 Mongol 
soldiers from one tribe. He said that these soldiers had come to him from 
his mother’s side. Babur’s mother was the daughter of Yunus Khan, who 
was a distant descendant of the Mongol leader Chingiz Khan.47 The Mongol 
horse archers carried out flank attacks (known as taulqama charges), which 
required special skills. They played an important role in routing the Lodi 
forces at the First Battle of Panipat (21 April 1526).48
Babur mentions that the Mongol settlers in Central Asia were organized 
in various tribes. Many Mongol tribes who had no blood relation to Babur 
joined him. Each Mongol tribe at that time comprised 3,000-4,000 families. 
Most of these tribes were mobile but some had a particular territorial desig-
nation. In 1504-1505, Rusta-Hazara, a Mongol tribe from Badakshan, joined 
Babur. At different times, several tribal leaders with their retainers joined 
Babur in search of loot and plunder. Babur had not defeated these tribal 
chieftains and forced them to join his army with their retainers; instead, the 
43 Lane-Poole, The Emperor Babar, p. 17.
44 Babur-Nama, I, pp. 138-139.
45 Aksan, “Ottoman War and Warfare”, p. 150. 
46 Abul Fazl uses the term diwanian to designate the household troops who were considered 
the most loyal and courageous: The Akbar-Nama, I, pp. 263-264.
47 Babur-Nama, I, pp. 19, 21, 105, 164. Beveridge uses the term “Mughals” to designate the 
descendants of Chingiz Khan who were settled in Central Asia.
48 Ibid., II, pp. 472-473. 
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soldiers belonging to a particular tribe fought under their tribal leader, who 
acknowledged the supremacy of Babur. The tribal chiefs changed sides in 
accordance with the fortunes of war. They joined a successful charismatic 
warlord who provided them with loot and plunder. For example, in 1504, 
after the defeat of Wali (a brother of Khusrau Shah) by Shaibani Khan, the 
former joined Babur with his Mongol kinsmen.49 It was a case of an ethnic 
(reciprocal) mercenary sort of military employment. However, at certain 
junctures, the Mongol tribes proved unreliable. Their loyalty to Babur was 
conditional and pragmatic. In general, the Mongol tribes were more willing 
to serve a Chingizid prince rather than a Timurid mirza (royal prince) such 
as Babur.50 While wandering in Central Asia, Babur mentioned that some 
rulers maintained ghulams,51 though he himself never utilized them. The 
army of about 10,000-12,000 men with which Babur attacked the Delhi 
Sultanate comprised household troops, various Mongol and Turkish tribes, 
and a few Ottoman mercenaries. Abul Fazl uses the terms “Turks” and 
“Tajiks” to describe the ethnic composition of Babur’s force.52
Babur’s opponent at the First Battle of Panipat, Sultan Ibrahim Lodi (r. 
1517-1526) depended on the indigenous mercenaries. Ibrahim Lodi, being an 
Afghan, preferred Afghan soldiers. Abul Fazl deliberately inflates the size 
of Ibrahim’s army to highlight the courage of the Mogul soldiers and the 
leadership ability of Babur. Fazl claimed that Ibrahim commanded 100,000 
cavalry and 1,000 elephants. When Timur invaded India, the Delhi Sultanate 
commanded a bigger region than the area controlled by Ibrahim. However, 
the Sultanate could only scrape up 10,000 cavalry and 120 elephants to 
oppose Timur.53
After being victorious at First Panipat, many Afghan chieftains in India 
(who were either semi-autonomous or in Lodi service) joined Babur as 
tributaries with their retainers (some of the bands numbering up to 3,000-
4,000 men each).54 In many cases, they were forced to join Babur after being 
defeated in battle. Again, many important chieftains who submitted to 
Babur were rewarded with land grants. Fath Khan Sherwani was one of 
Ibrahim Lodi’s nobles. When Fath Khan submitted to Babur, the former was 
given 1 crore 6 lakhs (1 lakh is 100,000; 1 crore is 100 lakhs or 10 million) as a 
49 Ibid., I, pp. 188-189, 192, 196, 253.
50 Dale, The Garden of the Eight Paradises, pp. 187-246.
51 Babur-Nama, I, p. 102.
52 The Akbar-Nama, I, p. 240.
53 Hasan, “Aspects of State and Religion in Medieval India”, p. 68; The Akbar-Nama, I, pp. 241, 
243-245.
54 Lane-Poole, The Emperor Babar, p. 172.
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reward, and his son Mahmud Khan was taken in the Mogul army.55 Shaikh 
Guhran entered Babur’s service with 3,000 bowmen from the Ganga-Jamuna 
doab. Firuz Khan, an Afghan noble of the Lodis who submitted to Babur, 
received a jagir worth one crore tankas in Jaunpur, and Mahmud Khan 
received a jagir worth 90 lakhs in Ghazipur.56
However, not all the Afghan chiefs submitted to Babur. Many of them 
allied with Rajput chieftain Rana Sangram Singh (also known as Rana 
Sangha), the ruler of Chitor (Udaipur) and confronted the Moguls at the 
Battle of Khanwa (16 March 1527). The combined Rajput-Afghan force, writes 
Abul Fazl, numbered 201,000 cavalry.57 Superior f irepower and horse archery 
again gave victory to the Moguls.
After the death of Babur (26 December 1530), his eldest son Humayun 
ascended the Mogul throne. Gujarat and east India were the two trouble spots 
for Humayun. In 1533, Bahadur Shah, the sultan of Gujarat, depended on 6,000 
Abyssinian volunteers. Some of Bahadur Shah’s infantry were mercenaries 
from the Bhil and Koli tribes.58 Bahadur Shah provided 20 crore of Gujarati 
coins to one of his nobles, Tatar Khan, who with this money hired 40,000 
Afghan mercenary cavalry.59 Some Muslims of Gujarat also joined his artillery 
branch as mercenaries. Bahadur Shah also relied on some tributary Rajput 
chieftains who joined his standard with their cavalry retainers.60 Humayun 
moved into Gujarat with 30,000 cavalry. By 1535, Gujarat was conquered.61 In 
1531, Humayun moved into east India and defeated several Afghan chieftains. 
They were ordered to join the Mogul service with their retainers.62 However, 
such tributary soldiers proved disloyal, deserting and joining Farid (who 
became Sher Khan and then Sher Shah) who challenged Humayun.
Sher Shah was from the Afghan tribe of Sur. His grandfather was a horse 
merchant in Agra.63 Sher recruited Afghans from Bihar, and many Rajput 
chieftains with their clansmen also joined his banner. While the Rajputs in 
his army were mercenaries, the Afghans were mobilized through tribal/clan 
networks. Sher called the Afghan qaum (community) to mobilize against 
55 The Akbar-Nama, I, pp. 256-257.
56 Ibid., I, p. 253.
57 Ibid., I, pp. 260-261. Fazl no doubt gives an exaggerated f igure of the enemy force, as main-
taining such a large force was logistically impossible.
58 The Tezkereh al Vakiat, p. 7; The Akbar-Nama, I, p. 309.
59 The History of India, Elliot and Dawson, VI, Akbar-Nama, pp. 11-12.
60 Ibid., p. 14. 
61 The Akbar-Nama, I, pp. 306-307.
62 The Tezkereh al Vakiat, p. 3.
63 The Akbar-Nama, I, pp. 326-327.
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the alien Moguls.64 Before f ighting Humayun, Sher conscripted the Afghans 
of Bihar to join his army.65 This was a rare case of conscription in Indian 
history. For the Afghans in Sher’s army, it was a case of ethnic conscription. 
Some of Sher’s off icers were ghulams but they were in a minority. By 1540, 
Sher commanded 150,000 cavalry and 25,000 foot soldiers.66
According to one estimate, in 1540, Humayun mobilized 90,000 cavalry 
against Sher Shah.67 When Humayun fought Sher in the two battles of 
Chausa (27 June 1539) and Kanauj (17 May 1540), the household troops of 
Babur did not prove loyal to Humayun. Many household troops joined 
Humayun’s half-brothers, Kamran in particular. Kamran provided only 
3,000 of his 20,000 cavalry to Humayun.68 Babur’s nobles were also divided 
as regards their loyalty to Humayun.69 After being defeated by Sher, Hum-
ayun reached Persia through Sind, which was under the Safavid Dynasty. 
During 1544, with the help of 14,000 Persian cavalry, Humayun was able to 
capture Kandahar, which was then handed over to a Persian garrison. In 
1545, Humayun recaptured Kandahar from the Persians in a surprise attack 
with the aid of mercenary Afghan soldiers. In 1551, Humayun captured 
Kabul from his brother Mirza Kamran.70 In 1553, Humayun moved towards 
Peshawar. At that time, several Uzbek chiefs joined his standard. There is 
no evidence of any Uzbek tribes joining Babur. Some of the Uzbeks served 
Humayun’s son Akbar.71 Sher Shah died on 23 May 1545 and was succeeded 
by his son Islam Shah. On his death in 1553, the Suri Empire broke up into 
four parts. In 1554, Humayun invaded India and defeated the Afghan ruler 
of Punjab Sikander Suri at Sirhind.72 The prospect of plunder attracted 
many mercenaries from Central Asia to Humayun’s standard. They were 
employed as temporary volunteers. Jouher writes:
About this time nearly 500 Moghul soldiers came from beyond the 
river Oxus to seek for employment; but as very few of them were 
armed, the general consulted me what he should do with them; I said, 
64 Aquil, Sufism, Culture, and Politics, pp. 65-66, 112.
65 Matta, Sher Shah Suri, p. 89.
66 Aquil, Sufism, Culture, and Politics, p. 108; The Akbar-Nama, I, p. 615.
67 The Tezkereh al Vakiat, p. 20.
68 The Akbar-Nama, I, pp. 346, 348.
69 Hasan, “New Light on the Relations of the Early Mughal Rulers with Their Nobility”, 
pp. 114-115.
70 The Tezkereh al Vakiat, pp. 77, 80-82.
71 Ibid., p. 108; The Akbar Nama, II, pp. 48, 54.
72 The Tezkereh al Vakiat, pp. 113-115; Richards, The Mughal Empire, p. 12.
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“give each of them a bow and a quiver of arrows, and advance them a 
small sum of money to support them for a month, by which time the 
business with the Afghans will be settled”. He took my advice, and 
having advanced the money to the Moghuls, they joined the army as 
volunteers.73
When Humayun recaptured the Mogul throne, Persian Shias began joining 
the Mogul service in large numbers.74
After Humayun’s death on 21 January 1556, Akbar ascended the Mogul 
throne at Kalanaur in Punjab.75 A Hindu general of the Suri dynasty named 
Hemu declared his independence and captured Delhi. Abul Fazl notes that 
Hemu’s tribe, the Dhusar, was engaged in making and selling saltpetre in 
Gurgaon district.76 Hemu’s army numbered 50,000 cavalry, comprising Af-
ghans, Rajputs, and some Brahman mercenaries. Some of the Rajputs were 
from the Jhansi district of north India. Most of the senior officers of Hemu’s 
army were his relatives from the Brahman caste. Hemu won over the Afghan 
chiefs by distributing land grants and treasure.77 At Panipat, Hemu deployed 
30,000 cavalry. The Mogul army, 10,000 strong, under the nominal leadership 
of Akbar but actually under the noble Bairam Khan (a Turk), advanced from 
Kalanaur in Punjab to confront Hemu, again at the historical field of Panipat.78
The emergence of the mansabdari system, 1556-1650
After achieving victory in the Second Battle of Panipat (5 November 1556), 
Akbar faced challenges from some of the Muslim nobles of Humayun as well 
as from the Afghans of east India. Unlike Babur, under Akbar the base of the 
Mogul Empire was no longer Afghanistan, but north India proper. So, unlike 
Babur and Humayun, Akbar could not tap the Turkish tribes settled around 
the Oxus River. Moreover, by this time, the Uzbek Khanate, the sworn enemy 
of the Mogul Empire, had been resurrected in Central Asia. Akbar realized 
that he needed to broaden the basis of his rule by integrating the Hindu 
chieftains within his regime, and one way to ensure loyalty among the various 
73 The Tezkereh al Vakiat, p. 118. Here “Moghul” refers to Mongols.
74 Khan, “Akbar’s Personality Traits and World Outlook”, p. 82. 
75 The Tezkereh al Vakiat, pp. 120-121.
76 The Akbar-Nama, I, p. 617.
77 Ibid., II, pp. 47-48, 59; Bhargava, Hemu and His Times; see esp. pp. 13, 90, 100. Richards claims 
that Hemu was of the Vaisya (trader) caste: Mughal Empire, p. 13. 
78 The Akbar-Nama, II, pp. 59-61.
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groups of Muslim nobles and Hindu chieftains was to establish a personalized 
and semi-bureaucratic relationship with them. Such a relationship, reasoned 
Akbar, would generate a more cohesive and loyal force than would depend-
ence on the tribal retainers. By trial and error, Akbar evolved the mansabdari 
system. The mansabdars of Akbar comprised Persians, Turanis, Muslims born 
in India, and the Rajput chieftains.79 Many Turani and Afghan chieftains 
realized that the institution of the mansabdari system was an attempt to curb 
their independence, so they revolted. However, Akbar was able to quash the 
rebellions with the aid of his loyal mansabdars. One example will suffice. 
In 1572, the mirzas in collusion with the Afghan chieftains revolted against 
Akbar. The forces under the mirzas comprised Abyssinians, and men from 
Badakshan and Transoxiana. The rebellion was crushed in 1573.80
Mansab technically meant rank, and the holder of the mansab was 
known as mansabdar (an imperial off icial) and was granted a jagir. The 
lowest-ranking mansabdar commanded 10 cavalry and the highest-ranking 
mansabdar 10,000. In Akbar’s time, most of the mansabdars above the 
rank of 5,000 were his sons.81 Under Akbar’s successor, a mansabdar held 
two ranks: zat and sawar ranks. The zat rank denoted the personal rank of 
the Mogul noble in the mansabdari system while the sawar rank denoted 
the number of cavalry which the mansabdar had to maintain for imperial 
service.82 In a contingent of a mansabdar of 10,000, other mansabdars as high 
as hazaris (commanders of 1,000) served. In the contingent of a mansabdar 
of 8,000, mansabdars who were commanders of 800 sawar served; for a 
mansabdar of 7,000, mansabdars up to the rank of 700 served.83 Abdul 
Kadir Badauni (a chronicler who lived in Akbar’s time) had written that the 
contingent of a mansabdar comprised khas-khailan (his personal depend-
ants which included friends, relatives, and clan members, etc.) as well as 
bargirs who were mercenaries.84 To borrow John Lynn’s army style model, 
the Mogul army, mainly centred around the mansabdari system, was not a 
state commission army85 but an agglomeration of quasi-bureaucratic units.
79 Zaidi, “Akbar and the Rajput Principalities”, p. 15.
80 The Akbar Nama, III, p. 76. 
81 The Ain-i-Akbari, I, Book Second, p. 248.
82 M. Athar Ali claims that sawar rank represented the number of horses and half the number 
of troopers, a mansabdar had to maintain. This means that a mansabdar of 100 sawar rank 
maintained 100 horses and 50 troopers. See Ali, “Organization of the Nobility”, p. 250. 
83 The Ain-i-Akbari, I, Book Second, pp. 241-242. 
84 The History of India, Elliot and Dawson, V, Tarikh-i-Badauni, of Abdul Kadir Badauni, p. 515. 
A bargir was a trooper without a horse. His employer provided him with a horse when he joined 
the contingent.
85 Lynn, “The Evolution of Army Style in the Modern West”.
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J.S. Grewal says that the mansabdari system represented a suzerain/
vassal relationship.86 The mansabdari system was also partly a case of the 
tributary form of military employment. After being defeated, the chieftains 
belonging to different principalities were encouraged and at times coerced 
to serve in the Mogul army and in return were rewarded with jagirs. When 
Akbar established himself at Agra, a large number of principalities were 
under the control of autonomous and semi-autonomous hereditary chief-
tains. The latter were known as rajas, ranas, rawats, or rais. They were also 
known as Rajputs, and the Mogul chroniclers called them zamindars. Some 
of the Rajput chieftains maintained large numbers of cavalry. Those who 
joined the Mogul service were granted mansabs.87 During Shah Jahan’s 
reign, large numbers of mansabs were granted to the Muslim nobles of the 
Deccani sultanates in order to win them over to Mogul service.88
Throughout the territories under their control, the Moguls collected taxes 
from the peasants through the zamindars who were allowed a certain com-
mission for discharging this duty.89 The military retainers of the zamindars, 
claims Douglas E. Streusand, comprised a nucleus of retainers from their 
own caste supplemented by the peasants.90 Many zamindars who were loyal 
to the Mogul Empire and were in the good books of the Mogul provincial 
governors (subadars) were inducted in the mansabdari service. By joining 
the mansabdari service they received additional land grants which enabled 
them to maintain larger number of cavalry with which they could defeat 
local opposition to their rule. One example will suff ice. In the thirtieth 
regnal year of Shah Jahan (r. 1628-1658), Salabat Khan, the governor of the 
suba (province) of Allahabad, introduced Anup Singh, the zamindar of 
Bandhu in the durbar. Shah Jahan awarded Anup Singh a mansab of 3,000 
and granted him a jagir for maintaining the troopers in accordance with 
the number stipulated in his mansab.91
Many Persian and Turani adventurers who came to India in search 
of employment were also appointed as mansabdars. In 1595, there were 
279 mansabdars, of whom 47 were Rajputs (Hindus) and 75 were Persians 
(Shias).92 Many Indian Muslims were also given mansab ranks. For instance, 
86 Grewal, “The Sikh Movement during the Reign of Akbar”, pp. 252-253.
87 Khan, “Akbar’s Initial Encounters with the Chiefs”, pp. 1, 6. 
88 Moosvi, “The Mughal Empire and Deccan”, p. 221.
89 Hasan, “Zamindars under the Mughals”, p. 137.
90 Streusand, The Formation of the Mughal Empire, p. 43.
91 Shah Jahan Nama of Inayat Khan, ed. by Begley and Desai, pp. 529-530. 
92 Ali, “Sulh-i Kul and the Religious Ideas of Akbar”, p. 165. Ali does not consider here the 
mansabdars whose ranks were below 200. 
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one shaikhzada from Lucknow was granted a mansab of 700 by Akbar. In 
the eleventh year of Shah Jahan’s reign, the son of Nazar Muhammad, the 
ruler of Balkh came to India and joined Mogul service. He was granted 
ranks of 1,500 zat and 800 sawar and given a jagir in Bihar.93
The mansabdari system was a quasi-professional and partly bureaucratic 
system as there were thirty-three to sixty-six grades. On the basis of their 
performance, the mansabdars were either promoted to higher ranks or 
demoted to lower ones. Besides possessing a hierarchy, the mansabdars 
were also transferred to different regions in their service life and were oc-
casionally suspended from service. Athar Ali asserts that the mansabdars in 
general were transferred every two to three years.94 Generally, mansabdars 
were given lifelong employment by the Mogul durbar. Unlike the mercenar-
ies, the mansabdars’ freedom in leaving the service was limited. Khwaja 
Abdullah, a mansabdar in 1611 under Jahangir’s reign, was ordered to move 
into Deccan. However, he left Deccan without imperial permission and, in 
retaliation, his jagir was sequestered by the imperial government. For some 
time, he was imprisoned in the fort of Asir. When Shah Jahan ascended the 
throne, Abdullah was reinstated in service and given ranks of 5,000 zat and 
5,000 sawar. Again Raja Pratap of Ujjain, a Hindu chieftain of Bihar, who 
held ranks of 1,500 zat and 1,000 sawar, withdrew from service in the tenth 
year of Shah Jahan’s reign. An army was sent against him and, after being 
defeated in battle, he was executed. In the twentieth year of Shah Jahan’s 
reign, Abdul Haji Khwaja held the zat rank of 900 and sawar rank of 600. In 
the next year, he was promoted to the zat rank of 1,500 and sawar rank of 800. 
In the twenty-third year of Shah Jahan’s reign, his sawar rank was increased 
to 1,000. During the fourth year of Shah Jahan’s reign, Khwaja was deployed 
in Deccan and then in Malwa. In the twenty-sixth year of Shah Jahan’s 
reign, Khwaja was sent with Prince Dara Shikoh (Shah Jahan’s eldest son) to 
Kandahar to f ight the Safavids. At that time, his sawar rank remained 1,000, 
but his zat rank was raised from 1,500 to 2,000. In the twenty-seventh year 
of Shah Jahan’s reign, Khwaja was given the honour of possessing a flag.95 
Again, Akbar introduced the descriptive roll system and the issue of pay 
was dependent on the inspection of these rolls by the imperial inspectors. 
To prevent borrowing of horses between the mansabdars, Akbar made the 
system of branding horses compulsory.96 The punishment in the Mogul 
93 The Maathir-ul-Umara, I, pp. 48-49.
94 Ali, “Political Structures of the Islamic Orient”, pp. 99-100.
95 The Maathir-ul-Umara, I, pp. 36, 98-101, 103. 
96 The Ain-i-Akbari, I, Book Second, p. 242.
98 k aushik roy 
army for looting civilians was physical mutilation, cutting off the nose of 
the offender.97
The mansabdari system was quasi-professional because there was no 
training academy for the mansabdars. Unlike the European monarchs and 
princes, the Mogul emperors did not set up any institution for teaching 
military arts to the nobles. For instance, in 1606, an academy was founded 
at Sedan by the duc de Bouillon, brother-in-law of Prince Maurice of Orange. 
Between 1608 and 1610, the Venetian Republic established four academies 
(at Padua, Treviso, Udine, and Verona) to train skilled cavalrymen. Similar 
institutions were opened by Landgrave Maurice of Hesse-Cassel (1618), by 
Denmark’s Christian IV at Soro in 1623, and by the military entrepreneur 
Count Albrecht von Wallenstein at Gitschin in 1624. Don Gaspar de Guzman 
Olivares (1587-1645, count-duke and chief minister of Philip IV of Spain) 
pushed for the opening of the Colegio Imperial (a military academy for 
the nobles) at Madrid in 1625.98 The Delhi Sultanate held periodic furusiya 
exercises for training mounted archers. In addition, the cavaliers were 
trained in playing chaugan (polo) and swordsmanship.99 We are not sure 
whether these practices continued in Mogul India or not. Probably, most of 
the mansabdars and their contingents got on-the-job training on the bat-
tlefield. However, hunting as military training continued under the Moguls. 
The mansabdari system was not hereditary. Nevertheless, mansabdars who 
displayed bravery and loyalty in imperial service had their male heirs’ and 
relatives’ cases assessed favourably by the durbar. When a son was allowed 
to succeed his father, his mansab was generally lower than that of his father. 
The son had to prove himself to achieve a rank similar to or higher than his 
father’s. To give an example, Mir Kamal-ud-Din came to India and served 
Akbar. Kamal-ud-Din’s son Mirak Husain served Jahangir and Husain’s 
son Muin-ud-Din served Shah Jahan. Under Aurangzeb, Muin-ud-Din 
became the diwan (off icer in charge of f inance) of Lahore, Multan, Kabul, 
and Kashmir. When Abdul Hadi Khwaja, the mansabdar of Shah Jahan 
and holding zat rank of 2,000 and sawar rank of 1,000 died in 1656, his son, 
Khawaja Jah, was given the zat rank of 1,000 and sawar rank of 400. For the 
mansabdars, there was no clear separation of civilian and military posts. 
Khwaja Abdul Majid, who came from Central Asia, joined Humayun and 
became a diwan. In Akbar’s reign, he became the governor of Delhi and held 
97 Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire, II, 1754-71, p. 18.
98 Storrs and Scott, “The Military Revolution and the European Nobility”, p. 26.
99 Ali, Military Technology and Warfare in the Sultanate of Delhi, pp. 33, 35.
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a mansab of 3,000,100 and in his time most of the higher-ranking mansabdars 
were governors of subas.101
Technical skills and foreign mercenaries
For manufacturing and manning gunpowder weapons, Mogul depend-
ence on foreign professionals continued from Babur to Akbar. During the 
First Battle of Panipat, Ustad Ali Quli Khan was in charge of positioning 
the matchlock men behind the chained baggage carts and the f ield guns 
deployed in the centre of Babur’s army at Panipat. In addition, Ustad Quli 
Khan was also in charge of manufacturing stone-throwing mortars of vari-
ous sizes required for deployment on the battlefield as well as for taking the 
forts. He was present in the Battle of Chaldiran,102 fought in 1514 between 
the Ottomans and the Persians, where the Ottomans deployed chained 
baggage carts behind which they placed their f ield guns and matchlock 
men.103 Another Rumi (Ottoman) mercenary of Babur was Mustafa, who 
commanded the culverins in the Battle of Khanwa and was in charge of 
arranging the chained carts in the Rumi way during the battle. In this 
battle, Ustad Quli deployed the matchlock men behind mobile wooden 
tripods.104 The technical skill of the Ottoman mercenaries in manufacturing 
and manning gunpowder weapons made Ustad Quli Khan and Mustafa 
valuable for Babur. They could be categorized as professional mercenaries.
Babur’s son Humayun continued to depend on them; some of these 
mercenaries were actually deserters who joined the Mogul service probably 
due to the greater prospect of loot and plunder. Some of the technical/
professional mercenaries’ children also followed the profession of their 
fathers. Ustad Ali Quli’s son, M.K. Rumi, was in charge of the Mogul gun 
carriages and mortars during the Battle of Kanauj.105 Rumi Khan, the 
commandant of the Gujarat Sultanate’s artillery department, deserted 
Sultan Bahadur Shah and joined Humayun in 1533. Rumi Khan was a 
military engineer and was considered an expert in siege warfare. In 1537, 
he advised Humayun in conducting the siege of Chunar Fort held by Sher 
Shah. Mining, sapping, and the construction of batteries were done under 
100 The Maathir-ul-Umara, I, pp. 12, 36-37.
101 The Ain-i-Akbari, I, Book Second, p. 252.
102 The Babur-Nama, II, pp. 466, 468-469, 473, 536, 599-600, 667.
103 Lane-Poole, The Emperor Babar, p. 162.
104 Babur-Nama, II, pp. 550, 557-558; The Akbar-Nama, I, p. 263.
105 The Akbar-Nama, I, p. 351.
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the advice of Rumi Khan.106 Under Humayun, Rumi Khan became Mir Atish 
(director-general of artillery).107 In 1555, Ustad Aziz Sistani from Aleppo 
was taken into the Mogul army for his expertise in pyrotechnics.108 In 1591, 
while campaigning in Sind, the siege operation against Unarpur Fort was 
directed by Ustad Yar Muhammad Khan. He was considered an expert in 
the Ottoman technique of raising mounds of sand on which the Mogul 
batteries were placed during the siege. Yar Muhammad Khan had come 
from Persia.109 Certain Ottoman military techniques had seeped into Iran 
due to Ottoman-Safavid military confrontations. So, we could speculate 
that he was adept at Ottoman techniques of siege warfare.
Besides the Moguls, the other Islamic polities in South Asia also depended 
on foreign mercenaries for harnessing gunpowder technology. The largest 
bronze cannon at Bijapur, Malik Maidan, was cast by a Turkish engineer 
named Muhammad bin Hasan Rumi in 1548.110 In addition to the Turks, the 
subcontinent’s rulers also hired West Europeans in the artillery department. 
Bahadur Shah of Gujarat had many Portuguese gunners in his army.111 From 
the second half of the seventeenth century, the Mogul artillery was manned 
by Portuguese, British, Dutch, German, and French mercenaries. These 
foreigners were deserters from European ships and entered Mogul dominion 
through Goa for higher pay. They were paid Rs 200 per month.112
Regional levies
The Moguls, like the Delhi Sultanate, also depended on the indigenous 
regional levies. For foot musketeers, who were especially important during 
siege operations, the Mogul Empire hired Hindu mercenaries through the 
zamindars. Jahangir noted in his autobiography that in 1609: “I ordered the 
nephew of Bihari Chand, the qanungo [magistrate] of the Agra sarkar, to 
muster a thousand foot soldiers from the zamindars of Agra, f ix a monthly 
stipend for them, and take them to Pervez in the Deccan.” 113 Most of the foot 
106 The Tezkereh al Vakiat, pp. 4-5, 9-10.
107 The Akbar-Nama, I, p. 331.
108 Ibid., I, p. 640.
109 Bilgrami, “The Mughal Annexation of Sind”, p. 48.
110 Balasubramaniam, “A Catalogue of Massive Forge-Welded Iron Cannon in India: Part 1”, 
p. 77. 
111 Richards, The Mughal Empire, p. 10.
112 The History of India, Elliot and Dawson, VI, Appendix, p. 469.
113 The Jahangirnama, p. 104. 
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soldiers came from Allahabad, Buxar, and Bhojpur in the Shahabad District, 
south of Ganga and west of the Son River. These people belonged to the Uj-
jayina branch of Rajputs. Another locality which provided the foot soldiers 
was Baiswara in Awadh which was inhabited by Baiswara Rajputs. The 
Unao and Rae Bareilly districts, which covered about 2,000 square miles, 
were inhabited by Baiswara Rajputs.114 Incidentally, these groups joined the 
infantry of Sher Shah and Hemu.115 And after the Moguls, the Rajputs of Bihar 
served in the infantry of Maratha Confederacy and the East India Company 
during the eighteenth and the f irst half of the nineteenth centuries. The 
Ain-i-Akbari notes some regions where matchlock men were available in 
large numbers, Bhograi and Kasijora mahals (districts) in Jaleswar Sarkar 
(division, which means a collection of districts) of Orissa.116 The Moguls 
probably also tapped these sources. The musketeers of the Mogul army 
also came from Bundelkhand and Karnatak. The Karnatakis served in the 
army of the Bijapur Sultanate as well.117 In addition to musketeers, the Mogul 
army hired men equipped with bans (rockets). The Afghans of Bengal were 
considered experts in this branch of warfare.118
Miscellaneous mini-systems
Towards the end of the sixteenth century, in the regions outside the Mogul 
Empire, various other forms of military employment were operational. In 
the Ahmadnagar Sultanate in western Deccan, Abyssinian military slaves 
and Abyssinian mercenaries played an important role.119 The Abyssinians 
(also known as Habshis in India) were African Muslims from Ethiopia who 
either came to India as free-born adventurers or were imported as slaves. 
Most of the slaves originated in the Kambata region of southern Ethiopia. 
The Deccani sultanates exported cotton textiles and ivory, and imported 
Abyssinian slaves plus Arabian war horses.120 According to one estimate, 
114 Bhattasali, “Bengal Chiefs’ Struggle for Independence”, pp. 19, 32.
115 The Akbar-Nama, II, p. 60.
116 The Ain-i-Akbari, II, pp. 155-156.
117 Sarkar, Nadir Shah in India, p. 54.
118 The Akbar-Nama, I, p. 358.
119 Shyam, The Life and Times of Malik Ambar, p. 12; The Maathir-ul-Umara, by Beveridge, I, 
p. 54.
120 Eaton, A Social History of Deccan, pp. 105-109.
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during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, about 10,000-12,000 slaves were 
exported annually from Ethiopia for the Deccani sultanates.121
One of the most famous Habshi slaves was Malik Ambar. Malik Ambar 
was born at Harare in Ethiopia in 1548-1549. His parents sold him in the 
slave market of Baghdad where he was bought by the slave merchant Mir 
Qasim. Then, he was sold to Changiz Khan, who had 1,000 slaves and was an 
important noble of the Ahmadnagar Sultanate. When Changiz Khan died, 
Malik Ambar enrolled himself as an ordinary soldier in the Ahmadnagar 
army. We do not know whether Malik Ambar was ever manumitted or not. 
His rise to power started when he was made a commander of 150 horse-
men of Ahmadnagar.122 This time, Ambar’s status was that of a military 
entrepreneur. Within a few years, Malik Ambar became the “sultan maker” 
and principal noble of the Ahmadnagar Sultanate until his death in 1626. 
During the eighteenth century, the Abyssinian (also referred to as Arab) 
mercenaries continued in the service of the Maratha Confederacy.
In addition to the Abyssinian mercenaries and the slaves, the Ahmadnagar 
Sultanate also depended upon the semi-autonomous Koli chiefs who provided 
cavalry and infantry and occasionally changed sides in accordance with 
the shifting political circumstances. The Kolis joined the Maratha warlord 
Shivaji’s infantry during the second half of the seventeenth century. In 1625, to 
f ight the Portuguese, who fielded mainly infantry equipped with handguns, 
Malik Ambar requisitioned foot soldiers (known as hasham) from the karkuns 
(district off icials) of Chaul in western Maharashtra. They were experts in 
the use of f irearms, like the Rajputs of Awadh and Bihar who joined the 
Mogul infantry.123 The employment of musketeers spread in response to the 
firepower-heavy infantry of the Portuguese. As the Mogul Empire spread into 
Deccan during the second half of the seventeenth century, the mansabdari 
system more or less eclipsed the other mini-systems of military employment.
Demography, economy, and military labourers
At the end of the sixteenth century, the population of England was 4 mil-
lion, Spain’s was 7 million, and France’s was 14 million.124 Between 1450 
121 Ibid., pp. 109-111.
122 Shyam, The Life and Times of Malik Ambar, pp. 34-37.
123 Ibid., pp. 22, 147.
124 Nolan, “The Militarization of the Elizabethan State”, p. 271.
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and 1700, the population of Europe rose from 50 million to 120 million.125 
During the eighteenth century, while Iran’s population was 9 million, the 
population of the Ottoman Empire was 30 million.126 In 1601, the population 
of the subcontinent (3.2 million km2) was 145 million.127 In the seventeenth 
century, the rate of increase of population was roughly 0.21 per cent per 
annum.128 The vast demographic resources of South Asia resulted in the 
absence of conscription in the subcontinent.
The very existence of an extensive potential military labour pool did 
not encourage the Mogul emperors to maintain a select standing army 
comprising drilled and disciplined infantry and cavalry troopers. Since 
supply exceeded demand, there was no point in maintaining a big standing 
army year after year. Rather, during emergencies, infantry and cavalry were 
raised at short notice and sent to the trouble spots. And after the crisis was 
over, the soldiers hired from the zamindars for a particular campaign were 
disbanded. Abul Fazl tells us that in Akbar’s empire (which excluded Deccan 
and south India), the zamindars were able to furnish 4 million and 4 lakh 
armed men.129 The Ain-i-Akbari further informs us that the forces under the 
zamindars of Bengal Suba comprised 23,330 cavalry and 801,150 infantry.130
Politics and the culture of military remuneration, and not the economy 
of South Asia, payment of the military entrepreneurs and their retainers 
through land grants rather than cash. Instead of economic forces, the nature 
of politics determined the form of remuneration to the military labourers. 
The centralized Turkish state built by Sultan Alauddin Khalji (r. 1296-1316), 
who had a standing cavalry force paid in tankas, had disintegrated by the 
time of the establishment of the Lodi dynasty under Bahlul (r. 1451-1489). 
John F. Richards writes that there was no shortage of precious metal in 
north India, and trade and commerce were flourishing in the f irst half of 
the sixteenth century there. However, due to the decentralized tribal nature 
of Lodi polity, Bahlul was forced to assign land grants permanently to the 
various Afghan tribal chiefs (Lodi, Lohani, Farmuli, and Sharwani clans, all 
of which belonged to the Ghilzai tribe) who maintained troopers from the 
revenues extracted from the grants. Bahlul had no control over the revenues 
of these grants. These tribal chiefs were semi-autonomous. Bahlul had to 
depend on clan ties and blood relationships with the Afghan chiefs while 
125 Ali, “The Passing of the Empire”, p. 339.
126 Axworthy, The Sword of Persia, p. 29.
127 Richards, The Mughal Empire, p. 1.
128 Moosvi, “The Indian Economic Experience 1600-1900”, pp. 4-5.
129 The Ain-i-Akbari, I, Book Second, p. 241. 
130 Ibid., II, p. 141.
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mobilizing their forces. In fact, Bahlul lacked a standing army under his 
direct control. Bahlul’s successor, Sikander Lodi (r. 1489-1517), amassed loot 
by plundering the Rajput principalities.131 Ibrahim Lodi, son of Sikander, 
raised the mercenaries just before the battle from the bazaars (markets) of 
Delhi by distributing cash from the wealth stored by his predecessors.132 In 
Ibrahim’s reign, the monthly wage of a footman was 5 Sikandari tankas and 
that of a sawar varied between 20 and 30 Sikandari tankas.133
Even the Rajput principalities maintained troops by granting jagirs to 
their chiefs. Abul Fazl writes that among the Rajputs the custom was that a 
jagirdar holding a jagir worth 100,000 maintained 100 horses, and a jagirdar 
holding a jagir worth one crore was able to maintain 10,000 horses.134
Sher Shah acquired 900,000 silver tankas after defeating Sultan Ghiyas-
uddin Mahmud of Bengal in 1535.135 Between 1535 and 1537, Sher’s army 
increased from 6,000 to 70,000 horsemen and the latter’s salary bill came 
to about 12 crore tankas per month. Raziuddin Aquil asserts that Sher paid 
his soldiers a f ixed sum every month in cash and that they were not allowed 
to engage in pillage and plundering while campaigning.136 Sher Shah issued 
coins from his mints at Shergarh in Rohtas and Hajipur near Patna.137 In 1537, 
Sher, controlling Bihar and Bengal, had an annual income of 16 crore tankas.138
In October 1504, Babur occupied Kabul and Ghazni. Then, he distributed 
tuyuls (f iefs) to some of his begs (nobles with armed retainers) who had 
served him from the earliest times.139 They were probably the chiefs of his 
loyal household troops. Babur could afford to do this because by that time 
he was a territorial prince with a kingdom comprising Afghanistan. This was 
the first instance of regular payment in kind that Babur made to his military 
officers. After conquering Punjab, Babur bestowed various regions on his dif-
ferent commanders. For example, Dipalpur was given to Baqi Shaghawal.140 
In addition, Babur also depended on pillage and plunder to sustain and 
reward his troops after victories. To give an example, in 1519, Babur levied 
131 Richards, “The Economic History of the Lodi Period”.
132 Babur-Nama, II, p. 470.
133 Roy, Niamatullah’s History of the Afghans, pp. 187-188; 20 Sikandari tankas are equal to 1 
silver tanka.
134 The Akbar-Nama, I, p. 260. Abul Fazl does not specify whether the annual revenue was 
calculated in tankas or dams.
135 Hussain, “Glimpses of Silver Coins of the Patna Mint”, p. 185.
136 Aquil, Sufism, Culture, and Politics, pp. 76, 105-106, 108.
137 Hussain, “Glimpses of Silver Coins of the Patna Mint”, pp. 184-185. 
138 Aquil, Sufism, Culture, and Politics, pp. 107-108.
139 Babur-Nama, I, pp. 199, 227.
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FroM thE MaMLuks to thE Mansabdars 105
400,000 shahrukhis (20,000 pounds sterling) as protection money from Bhira 
on the left bank of Jhelum. After victory in the First Battle of Panipat, the 
Moguls captured Delhi and Agra and acquired a large amount of coined and 
non-coin treasure that had been accumulated by the Delhi Sultanate. Babur 
divided a portion of the spoils (jewels, gold and silver money) among his 
troops. The amirs got between 5 to 10 lakh tankas each and the soldiers got 
cash.141 Babur’s son Humayun also followed the policy of parcelling out his 
realm among his nobles so that the latter could maintain their contingents 
from the revenues of the tracts assigned to them.142 After a victory, Humayun 
would distribute the loot among his nobles and their retainers. For instance 
in 1533 after capturing Champanir, the capital of Gujarat, the treasure found 
in the fort was distributed among his army personnel.143
The principal income of the Mogul Empire came from land tax, and 
agriculture was expanding in the Mogul Empire. For example, by c. 1600, 
the extensive forest in the western part of the Ganga-Jamuna doab was 
cleared and the region was intensely cultivated and densely populated.144 
The peasants sold the grain to pay revenue in cash. Abul Fazl writes that the 
peasants in Bengal paid their taxes in mohurs (golden coins) and rupees.145 
Sonargaon in Bengal produced world-famous muslin.146 India exported 
cotton textiles, indigo, and pepper to South-East Asia, East Africa, and the 
Middle East.147 Economically, Mogul India was in a favourable position 
vis-à-vis Persia. Silk from Bengal pushed silk manufactured in Persia out of 
the European markets, and Indian cotton was also imported into Persia. The 
balance of trade was therefore more favourable to India than to Persia.148 
Prasannan Parthasarathi claims that Indian calicoes and muslins captured 
the European markets. Due to a loss of bullion, the Europeans raised tariff 
barriers against the entry of Indian textiles.149 Parthasarathi and Richards 
write that the Mogul Empire was self-f inancing from its own resources. 
The emperors did not have to depend on loans from the private f inanciers. 
State f inance depended on a robust monetary system, which in turn relied 
141 The Akbar-Nama, I, pp. 238, 248.
142 Matta, Sher Shah Suri, pp. 92-93.
143 The Tezkereh al Vakiat, p. 6.
144 Moosvi, “Ecology, Population Distribution, and Settlement Pattern in Mughal India”, 
pp. 92, 100.
145 The Ain-i-Akbari, II, p. 134.
146 Ibid., II, p. 136.
147 Moosvi, “Urban Population in Pre-Colonial India”, p. 126; Richards, The Mughal Empire, p. 4.
148 Axworthy, The Sword of Persia, p. 28.
149 Parthasarati, “Was There Capitalism in Early Modern India?”, p. 353.
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upon the regular inflow of gold, silver, and copper. India produced inad-
equate quantities of these precious metals, but its export surplus enabled 
the country to import large amounts that had been produced in the New 
World and Japan. Akbar established a tripartite currency system based 
on gold, silver, and copper coins issued from the centrally administered 
imperial mints.150 The important mints of Mogul Empire were at Cambay, 
Lahore, Multan, Kabul, Patna, Rajmahal, and so forth.151 In Akbar’s reign, 
the mints at Ajmir, Delhi, Fatehpur Sikri, and Lahore produced silver coins. 
The two great cities of Agra and Fatehpur Sikri were bigger than London and 
Amsterdam.152 The coins were used to pay the merchants who imported war 
horses from Central Asia and Persia.153 Shireen Moosvi speculates that from 
1576 onwards the silver currency output of the Mogul Empire was 151.69 
metric tonnes annually.154 Towards the end of Akbar’s period, the Mogul 
Empire retained an annual surplus of income over expenditure of between 
3.9 million and 4.7 million silver rupees equivalent in cash.155 Streusand is 
wrong in saying that incomplete monetization of the economy, rudimentary 
banking institutions, and the diff iculty of transporting large amount of 
cash made the central collection of revenue and distribution of cash salaries 
impractical, and that therefore the Moguls used the jagir system.156
Despite the presence of a monetized economy in the subcontinent, the 
culture of remuneration was to pay the soldiers (especially the higher ranks, 
i.e., off icers) by issuing land grants, and the ultimate objective of these 
off icers was to establish themselves as landed aristocracy with territorial 
bases.157 Only the mercenaries were paid in cash. The pay of the matchlock 
men varied between 2.5 to 6.25 rupees (henceforth Rs) per month. The pay 
of a mirdaha (non-commissioned off icer of the matchlock men) varied 
between 6.5 and 7.5 Rs per month.158 During the f irst half of the sixteenth 
century, the level of monetization was low in Deccan. However, in the 
seventeenth century, west India experienced a high level of monetization 
150 Richards, “The Seventeenth Century Crisis in South Asia”, pp. 628-629.
151 Moosvi, “The Silver Influx, Money Supply, Prices and Revenue-Extraction in Mughal India”, 
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154 Moosvi, “The Silver Influx, Money Supply, Prices and Revenue-Extraction in Mughal India”, 
p. 45.
155 Richards, “The Seventeenth Century Crisis in South Asia”, p. 627.
156 Streusand, The Formation of the Mughal Empire, pp. 67-68.
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due to the export of cotton textiles from Surat. Still, the Maratha chieftains 
wanted to be paid through land grants (saranjams, non-hereditary land 
grants for military service, and imams, hereditary land grants for special 
service and merit).159
The mansabdars were not paid in cash. For example, Abdullah Khan, one 
of the principal officers of Humayun, was granted the rank of 5,000 by Akbar 
during the seventh year of his reign and was granted Kalpi as a jagir.160 For 
conducting campaigns on behalf of the Moguls, the emperors gave jagirs to 
those Hindu chieftains who held mansabs. In an attempt to control these 
chieftains and also to prevent the expansion of their territorial bases, the 
imperial court granted jagirs in regions far away from their principalities.161 
In case of disloyalty, these jagirs were sequestered by the imperial court. 
The jama-dami (estimated income from the jagir) was equivalent to the 
talab (salary) of the mansabdar.162 Moosvi asserts that the price rise in the 
seventeenth century was about 30 per cent. Between 1595 and 1700, the jama 
(assessed revenue) of the Mogul Empire (excluding Deccan) registered an 
increase of about 44 per cent.163 By the mid-seventeenth century, due to 
the onset of the agrarian crisis, the mansabdars holding ranks of 4,000 and 
5,000 were able to extract only three to four months’ pay in a year from their 
jagirs.164 This was the case during the f irst half of the sixteenth century for 
those mansabdars whose jagirs were assigned in Deccan.165 This was due 
to the gap between jama and hal-i-hasil (the amount which actually could 
be realized from the jagir). Continuous warfare in Deccan and the failure 
of the monsoon resulted in famine; these three causes led to the collapse 
of agriculture, which in turn triggered the agrarian crisis.166 The crisis in 
the mansabdari system was related to the agrarian crisis,167 an issue which 
is not relevant for my limited purpose in this chapter.
Most of the land in the Mogul Empire was granted as jagirs to the 
mansabdars. Only a small portion, known as khalisa (crown land), was 
administered directly by the emperor’s bureaucrats. The revenue from the 
159 Gordon, The Marathas: 1600-1818, pp. 21-22.
160 The Maathir-ul-Umara, by Beveridge, I, p. 82.
161 Zaidi, “Akbar and the Rajput Principalities”, p. 16.
162 Ali, “Towards an Interpretation of the Mughal Empire”, p. 62.
163 Moosvi, “An Estimate of Revenues of the Deccan Kingdoms”, p. 293. 
164 The Maathir-ul-Umara, by Beveridge, I, p. 104.
165 Moosvi, “The Mughal Empire and the Deccan”, pp. 219-220.
166 Moosvi, “Scarcities, Prices, and Exploitation”, pp. 230-231.
167 The literature on the agrarian crisis and its adverse effect on the loyalty of the mansabdars 
and the eff iciency of their contingents is vast. S. Nurul Hasan states that the crisis began in the 
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khalisa was utilized for meeting the emperor’s personal expenses and those 
of his own small standing army, known as the ahadis.168 Around 1600, the 
Mogul nobility (mansabdars) absorbed about 82 per cent of the Mogul Em-
pire’s total revenue.169 Abul Fazl tells us that the annual revenue of the Mogul 
Empire in 1594 amounted to 62 crores 97 lakhs 55,246 dams (Rs 90,743,881).170 
In 1648, according to one estimate, the net revenue income of the Mogul 
Empire was 880 crore dams.171 Under Akbar, there were 1,600 mansabdars 
(1,350 mansabdars with ranks of 150 and below and 250 mansabdars with 
ranks higher than 150). In Shah Jahan’s time, there were 8,000 mansabdars.172 
In contrast to the large number of retainers of the mansabdars, Akbar 
maintained only 12,000 cavalry and 12,000 matchlock men under his direct 
control. These 24,000 soldiers were known as ahadis. Under Shah Jahan, 
there were only 7,000 ahadis.173 As a point of comparison, in 1550, Ivan IV 
of Russia maintained a standing force of 3,000 select musketeers, each 
of whom was paid 4 rubles a year.174 In 1648, the force recruited and paid 
directly by the Mogul imperial establishment amounted to only 47,000 
soldiers.175
Most of the Mogul army personnel were under the mansabdars. The theo-
retical potential strength of the forces under the Moguls in 1647 numbered 
911,400 cavalry and infantry. The revenues of the Mogul Empire amounted 
to 12,071,876,840 dams (320 dams was equivalent to £1 sterling).176 Streusand 
interprets Abul Fazl’s f igure by saying that the Mogul Empire supported 
342,696 cavalry and 4,039,097 infantry. The total number of cavalry and 
infantry comprised roughly 10 per cent of the male population.177 Accord-
ing to another author, Shah Jahan maintained 200,000 cavalry and 40,000 
infantry (musketeers, artillerymen, rocket men, etc.). This was exclusive 
of the soldiers maintained by the faujdars (Mogul off icials in charge of 
maintaining law and order in a district) and district off icials concerned 
with the administration of revenue. The breakdown of the 200,000 cavalry 
was as follows: 185,000 troopers of the mansabdars, 8,000 mansabdars, and 
168 The Ain-i-Akbari, I, Book Second, pp. 252, 259-260.
169 Trivedi, “The Share of the Mansabdars in State Revenue Resources”, p. 411. 
170 The Ain-i-Akbari, II, p. 129.
171 Moosvi, “Expenditure on Buildings on under Shah Jahan”, p. 199.
172 The Ain-i-Akbari, I, Book Second, Note by the translator, pp. 257-258.
173 Ibid., I, Book Second, Note by the translator, p. 256; Akbar-Nama, I, p. 642.
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7,000 mounted ahadis.178 A Mogul f ield army at that time numbered about 
50,000 cavalry and 10,000 infantry.179
Culture and combat motivation
Greed, asserts Sukraniti, motivated the mercenaries to join battle.180 The 
Nitiprakasika highlights the importance of regular pay in motivating the 
soldiers.181 Nevertheless, men do not f ight for pecuniary rewards alone. 
Mentality is an important constituent of pre-combat and in-combat ethos. 
And at times military service def ined the identity of various communities. 
Despite the rise and fall of polities due to fluctuations in politics and the 
changing nature of technologies, the culture of the various communities 
changes very slowly. So the Hindu texts generated during pre-Mogul era 
offer a window into the mentality of the Hindu warrior ethos.
The cultural ethos of the Rajputs (the landowning aristocracy also known 
as thakurs), who resisted the Turks and became an important segment of the 
Mogul army from Akbar onwards, needs to be evaluated. The term “Rajput” 
is derived from the word rajaputra meaning sons of the king. Military 
service, especially mounted service, was very popular among the Rajputs.182 
The Rajputs’ military ethic was guided by kshatradharma, which had some 
parallel with chivalry of the medieval west European knights.183 Loyalty and 
bravery were the two core values of kshatradharma. The ideology of combat 
centred on duty to one’s master and the display of individual prowess in 
the battlef ield.184 The Rajput concept of namak halali (loyalty to the salt-
giver) means that they should remain loyal to the person whose salt they 
178 The Ain-i-Akbari, I, Book Second, Note by the translator, p. 254.
179 This was the size of the army sent against Safavid Kandahar in 1650: The History of India, 
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180 Oppert, On the Weapons, Army Organization, and Political Maxims of the Ancient Hindus, 
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have eaten, in other words, to their employer.185 The Rajput heroic ballads 
emphasized that seva (duty and loyalty) to the lord was more important than 
duty and loyalty towards one’s family.186 The bravery of the Rajputs revolved 
around the concept of paurusha (manliness), which means sacrif icing one’s 
life in the battlef ield. The Prithvirajvijayamahakavya tells us that for the 
Chauhans (a Rajput clan) f ighting was a way of life. The Rajputs considered 
themselves as Kshatriyas, and soldiering was regarded as their caste duty. 
They believed that tactical retreat in the battlef ield was inglorious, and 
they considered that sacrif icing their lives on the battlef ield, rather than 
becoming prisoners-of-war, was the highest possible achievement.187 The 
medieval Hindu text Sukraniti emphasizes that it is a sin for a Kshatriya to 
die peacefully at home. Rather, the Kshatriya earns a noble death by dying 
in the battlef ield while slaying enemies. Those Kshatriyas who die in the 
battlefield achieve viragati (they become heroes and ascend to heaven). Such 
a reward is acquired by the rishis (sages) only after long ascetic practices.188 
The Arthasastra also notes that soldiering is the caste duty of the Kshatri-
yas.189 When the Islamic threat was absent, the various Rajput clans fought 
among themselves for glory.190 The contingents of the Rajput mansabdars 
maintained charans (bards) whose duty was to encourage the soldiers by 
playing martial music and reciting Rajput heroic ballads.191
The Mogul military system also utilized caste and clan feelings to build 
up primary group solidarity and camaraderie. The mansabdars’ contingents 
were not mono-ethnic units. The contingents of Rajput mansabdars did 
not comprise solely Rajput troopers but also included Muslim sowars.192 
Generally, the Rajput mansabdars had one-sixth of their contingents from 
the non-Rajput groups. However, Rajput troopers preferred to serve under 
Rajput chiefs. Several generations served simultaneously in a contingent 
of a mansabdar. For instance, fathers, sons, uncles, nephews, cousins, 
and brothers all served simultaneously in the contingent of a particular 
mansabdar.193 The clan members were led on the battlef ield by the clan 
185 Stewart Gordon erroneously translates namak halali as lun. See Gordon, “Zones of Military 
Entrepreneurship in India”, pp. 186-187. 
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192 Ibid., pp. 62-63. 
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leaders.194 The different Rajput clans who joined the Mogul service were the 
Rathors, Sisodias, Kachawahas, Haras, Bhatis, and others.195
Stewart Gordon asserts that the process of the rise of the Marathas in 
medieval west India was somewhat similar to the emergence of Rajputs in 
north India. Through service in the army and subsequently acquiring rights 
over the land, and then consolidating such rights and following certain 
rituals and customs, many became hereditary warrior elites.196 Basically, the 
warrior ethos of the Rajputs and the Marathas emphasized winning glory 
and money and acquiring power. Social mobility was achieved by f ighting 
on horseback. They had a disdain for those who practised agriculture.197 
Those families in west India who followed the profession of soldiering and 
acquired land were known as Marathas, in contrast to the lowly kunbis 
(ordinary cultivators and artisans). The Marathas served as mercenaries in 
the Muslim sultanates of pre-Mogul India. Gradually, the Maratha families 
established themselves in particular regions and became semi-autonomous. 
Thus, they could not be categorized as service elites.198
The ethos of mercenary soldiering existed in pre-Mogul India. The Hindu 
mercenaries are known as bhrata balas (literally “hired soldiers”) in Sanskrit 
literature. Several of them belonged to families whose hereditary trade 
was soldiering.199 The Panchantantra says that the mercenaries should 
pursue the profession of soldiering without thinking about the reasons 
behind warfare.200 In the villages, akharas (gymnasiums) existed in which 
the mercenaries engaged in wrestling to keep themselves physically f it.201
Many of them were worshippers of the Hindu war gods Kartik and 
Vishnu.202 William Pinch writes that the armed ascetics, especially those 
who were worshippers of Lord Shiva (the Hindu god of destruction), known 
as Saivaites, played an important role in the military labour market of 
Hindustan. Pinch continues that the tradition of armed ascetics functioning 
as mercenaries went back to ancient times. Saiva asceticism did not preach 
world denial. The yogis (those who engage in yoga, i.e., in ascetic practices 
194 Sharma, “The Military System of the Mewar (Udaipur) State”, p. 121.
195 Ali, “Causes of the Rathor Rebellion of 1679”, p. 259.
196 Gordon, The Marathas: 1600-1818, p. 16.
197 Gordon, “Zones of Military Entrepreneurship in India”, p. 184.
198 Gordon, The Marathas: 1600-1818, pp. 15, 17.
199 Arthasastra, Part II, Kangle, p. 316.
200 Quoted in Oppert, On the Weapons, Army Organization, and Political Maxims of the Ancient 
Hindus, p. 32. 
201 Ibid., p. 85.
202 Kathasaritsagara, I, pp. 42, 156.
112 k aushik roy 
to gain spiritual power) did not aim to become saints in the conventional 
sense of the term. They were not noted for an intense love of God. Rather, 
they aspired to become a second Shiva on earth. One of the bonds that held 
the armed ascetic warrior bands together was the concept of chela, a faithful 
disciple. Most of the chelas were originally slave boys who were sold by their 
poor parents to the yogis in the asrams (Hindu religious institutions).203 The 
armed Hindu devotees of the god Vishnu were known as bairagis. They 
were led by mahants (heads of the religious order). The armed ascetics 
consumed bhang, opium, and other intoxicants before joining battle in 
order to increase their enthusiasm for f ighting.204
Finally, let us turn our focus to the motivation of the Muslim soldiery. If 
we believe Simon Digby, then the Turani soldiers of the Mogul army were 
devotees of the Sufi saints.205 The idea of Sufis being peace-loving saints 
engaged in building bridges between the two antagonistic communities, 
Hindus and Muslims, is now rightly discredited.206 Digby asserts that even 
the Afghan soldiers of Sher Shah believed that the Sufi pirs could make the 
difference between victory and defeat on the battlef ield.207 Many of the 
Mogul troopers had Naqshbandi aff iliations. The Sufi saints traveled to and 
fro between Transoxiana and Deccan. While some shaikhs functioned as 
traveling pirs catering to the spiritual needs of the soldiers, other shaikhs 
established khanqas at the capitals of the subas.208 Some of the dervishes 
were also expert bow-makers.209 The soldiers and their off icers believed 
that the pirs’ spiritual power would protect them against enemy arrows 
and shots. In return for spiritual support, many soldiers and their off icers 
donated money for the construction of mosques.210 Abul Fazl notes that, 
when the Muslim troops loyal to the Mogul sovereign died while f ighting 
rebellious Muslims, then the former achieved martyrdom.211 How far this 
assertion represented the actual combat ethos of the loyal Mogul soldiery 
remains an open question. In recent times, Rosalind O’Hanlon has asserted 
that Mogul manliness was shaped by a modif ied version of the Persian 
concept of javanmardi, which meant displaying courage and bravery in 
203 Pinch, Warrior Ascetics and Indian Empires, pp. 5, 26-27, 46, 59, 65-66, 81, 185.
204 Orr, “Armed Religious Ascetics in Northern India”, pp. 189, 192, 197. 
205 Sufis and Soldiers in Aurangzeb’s Decca, p. xxvii.
206 Kumar, “Politics, the Muslim Community and Hindu-Muslim Relations Reconsidered”.
207 Digby, “Dreams and Reminiscences of Dattu Sarvani”, pp. 53, 56. 
208 Sufis and Soldiers in Aurangzeb’s Deccan, pp. 3-4.
209 The Akbar-Nama, I, p. 611.
210 Digby, Sufis and Soldiers in Aurangzeb’s Deccan, pp. 10-11.
211 The Akbar-Nama, I, pp. 604-605.
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imperial service. For the mounted musketeers, the skill of shooting from 
horseback constituted the concept of being a “true” mirza.212
With the passage of time, we see a subtle change in the cultural motiva-
tions of both the Muslim and Rajput soldiery. The transformation of the 
cultural ethos was related to the changes in the power politics of the real 
world. Nothwithstanding the many syncretic and inclusionist dimensions of 
medieval Islamic culture, asserts Rajat Datta, for the Islamic conquerors and 
their ideologues, Hindustan was a land of kufr or infidels.213 During the thir-
teenth century, the discourse among at least a powerful section of the Muslim 
intellectuals was that jihad on part of the righteous sultan was necessary. The 
jihad was directed towards despoiling the riches of the temples, killing the 
Brahmans, and theoretically giving the Hindus the option of death or Islam.214 
And those ghazis (religious soldiers) who fell while conducting jihad became 
shahids (martyrs). When Babur fought the Rajputs at Khanwa, by giving 
the call of jihad, the former tried to rouse the combat spirit of his Muslim 
soldiery. However, when the multi-ethnic Mogul army comprising Muslim 
and Hindu (Rajput and Maratha) soldiers fought the Shia Muslim sultanates 
of Deccan (Bijapur and Golkunda), the policy was not to give the cry of jihad 
but to rouse the Muslim soldiery by utilizing the power of the Sufi shaikhs. 
Similarly, when the Rajputs fought the Muslims then the former relied on the 
concept of dharmayuddha, but when the Rajputs fought in the Mogul army 
they strengthened their combat ethos by harking back to their caste pride 
as soldiers. In such circumstances, the Mogul Padshah was equated with 
Ram, the Kshatriya hero of the epic Ramayana who waged dharmayuddha.215
Conclusion
Due to the vast demographic resources of South Asia (if one wants, then one 
can use Dirk Kolff’s term “military labour market”), military conscription 
was neither necessary nor practised in Mogul times. Though the size of the 
Mogul army in the f irst half of the sixteenth century was quite big, if we 
take into account the vast population of the subcontinent, then the military 
participation ratio was quite small. Again, military service in South Asia 
during the Mogul and British eras, unlike in western Europe, remained a 
212 O’Hanlon, “Manliness and Imperial Service in Mughal North India”.
213 Datta, “Introduction”, p. 4.
214 Aquil, “On Islam and Kufr in the Delhi Sultanate”.
215 Datta, “Introduction”, p. 6.
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honourable profession. Small farmers, marginal peasants, and share-croppers 
earned more by joining the army, and low castes acquired Kshatriya status. 
In certain cases, many small farmers became zamindars after a successful 
military career, and ambitious zamindars became rajas after participating 
in a successful campaign. So service in the army was a channel for upward 
mobility. The Mogul army was not a rigid structure frozen in time, but a 
multi-dimensional organization that evolved with age. However, certain 
fundamental characteristics of the Mogul army can be elaborated. The Mogul 
army was not a state commission force but a coalition of forces raised and 
maintained by the different mansabdars (Persian and Turani adventurers, 
Hindu chieftains, etc.) operating under the overall control of the emperor. 
The Mogul army was not a national or Indian (if such a term could be used 
at all) army. The army did not recruit just from the territories under its 
control. The Mogul army was a multi-ethnic and multi-faith entity which 
drew a considerable number of personnel from outside its territory. From the 
religious perspective, the Mogul army comprised Muslims, Hindus, and some 
Christians. As regards the Muslims, the Mogul nobility consisted of both 
Shias from Persia and Sunnis from Turan (Central Asia). Both Hindus (Rajputs 
from Rajasthan and north India under Akbar and the Marathas from west 
India from Shah Jahan’s reign onwards) and Muslims (mostly Afghans who 
settled in the subcontinent, i.e., Bihar during the Delhi Sultanate) from India 
were recruited in the army. Rather than the region’s level of monetization, it 
was politics and the cultural ethos that dominated payment of the soldiery 
(especially the higher ranks). Military service was regarded as a means of 
becoming a landholder or to expand one’s patrimony. Hence, payment in 
kind, i.e., land (except in the case of Sher Shah, an aberration in medieval 
India), remained dominant in the period under review.
However, foreign and indigenous mercenaries and especially footmen 
were paid in cash for most of the time. Even in the heyday of the mansabdari 
system, the professional mercenary form of military employment continued. 
The Mogul army from Babur to Aurangzeb was dependent on the foreign pro-
fessional mercenaries for manufacturing and manning gunpowder weapons 
during both battles and sieges. From Babur to Akbar, the dependence was 
on the Ottomans and Persians, and under Aurangzeb the Moguls relied on 
west European Christians. The latter development was due to a global shift 
in the eighteenth century, when western Europe became most advanced in 
the production and deployment of cannons, howitzers, and mortars. In the 
eighteenth century, the mansabdari system was replaced by the regimental 
system, the latter being characterized by regular cash payment, written 
regulations, and strict discipline. That, however, is a different story.
 On the Ottoman janissaries 
(fourteenth-nineteenth centuries)
Gilles Veinstein
The janissaries are probably one of the most famous military corps in world 
history. Nevertheless, they were only a part of the Ottoman army and not 
even the most numerous one. At any period in the Ottoman history, they 
coexisted with a series of other military units, some of them created earlier 
(hence the name of yeni çeri, meaning “new troops”), others emerging in 
later times. All of these corps were of different natures as regards their 
modes of recruitment, the status of their members, their specif ic role in 
war, their method of remuneration, and so on. I shall concentrate on the 
corps (ocak) of the janissaries.1 Over several centuries, they were both a 
cause of terror and a source of admiration for the West, but they were also 
a danger for the Ottoman rulers themselves, due to their tendency to rebel. 
Beyond these stereotypes, one has to keep in mind that they did not offer 
only one face during all their long history. On the contrary, they were in a 
process of constant change, especially as far as their recruitment sources 
and military value were concerned.
Origins
The janissaries were established in the second half of the fourteenth cen-
tury, probably under the reign of Sultan Murad I (there is some discussion 
on this point as well as on the origins of the corps in general, which remain 
somewhat obscure).2
1 General works on this corps include: Weissman, Les janissaires; Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı devleti 
teşkilâtından kapu kulu ocakları; Murphey, Ottoman Warfare, 1500-1700, pp. 43-49, “Yeni çeri”; 
Veinstein, “Le janissaire et l’islamologue”. Among the main sources that I shall refer to, I would 
also like to mention Petrosian, Mebde-i kanun-i yeniçeri ocagı tarihi; Petrosian gives the Russian 
translation and the facsimile of the manuscript of St Petersburg, cited below as Kavânîn; for the 
Turkish edition of another copy of this work, see Akgündüz, “Kavânîn-i yeniçeriyân-i dergâh-i 
âli”. On this work, see Fodor, “Bir Nasihatname olarak ‘kavanin-i yeniçeriyan’”.
2 Palmer, “The Origin of the Janissary”; Papoulia, Ursprung und Wesen der Knabenlese im 
osmanischen Reich, pp. 74ff. (reviewed by I. Beldiceanu-Steinherr in Revue des études islamiques, 
36, 1 (1968), pp. 172-176); Beldiceanu-Steinherr, “La conquête d’Andrinople par les turcs”; Kaldy-
Nagy, “The First Centuries of the Ottoman Military Organization”.
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From the beginning, the janissary corps was an infantry unit and a standing 
army (which not all the infantry components of the Ottoman army were). 
Furthermore, its members were not free men. They were slaves, even if of 
a particular kind: they were slaves of the sultan (kapı kulu, hünkâr kulu). I 
shall return to the origins of these slaves. Initially, they were not allowed 
to get married.3 Later, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, this ban 
would be abolished by Sultan Selim I. From then on, there would be two 
kinds of janissaries, married ones and bachelors. Only the latter would 
continue to live in the rooms (oda) of the barracks. There is no doubt that 
this change was of great consequence for the nature of this army. In any 
case, it remained common for the janissaries to be attracted to young boys 
and, more particularly, according to certain sources to young Jewish boys.4 
Of course, it is always better not to generalize in such matters.
Evolution
If we try to define their military role more precisely, we must underline the 
fact that it evolved signif icantly over time. The janissaries were not, at the 
beginning, the most eff icient part of the army nor the true instrument of 
the Ottoman conquest that they would become later on. Initially, they were 
mostly imperial bodyguards who aimed to protect the sovereign and to give 
a public image of his power and wealth during ceremonies, very much in the 
ancient tradition of the slave guards of the Muslim princes.5 The janissaries 
never lost this part of their duties. Testimonies from different periods are 
available showing that they made a strong impression on ambassadors and 
other foreign visitors with their splendid, brightly coloured uniforms and 
their perfect discipline when they entered the second yard of the Topkapı 
Palace for off icial receptions.6
They continued to be bound by a close personal tie to the sultan, under 
whose direct patronage they always remained. One small manuscript in 
the Vienna Library is interesting in painting a vivid picture of the close 
relationship between the sultan, in this case Suleyman the Magnif icent, 
and his janissaries: on the janissaries’ side, they hold the deepest reverence 
which did not prevent them from making repeated and excessive f inancial 
3 According to a proverb, a married man is not a kul for the sultan: Kavânîn, fol. 10v.
4 See, for instance, Capsali, Seder Elyahu Zuta, I, p. 82.
5 Bosworth, “Ghulâm”, parts I, “The Caliphate” and II, “Persia”.
6 See, among many examples, Fresne-Canaye, Le voyage du Levant, p. 62.
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demands; on the sultan’s side, there is an authority which, under certain 
circumstances, may become unyielding, but which also gives rise, at other 
times, to a smiling humour, almost friendly, and even at times indulging 
in jokes.7
The importance of the janissaries in the military f ield would increase 
dramatically, in connection with two factors: f irst, they became a decisive 
tool in siege warfare, thanks to their specif ic ability to act as a monolithic 
and compact block in the f inal assault. The second and probably even 
more decisive factor was, following the example of the Balkan armies, 
the progressive adoption of f irearms, more precisely the musket (tüfeng), 
instead of traditional weapons, in particular bows and arrows, starting 
from the beginning of the f ifteenth century. In the Ottoman rulers’ mind, 
the use of this new and revolutionary weapon was intended to remain the 
monopoly of the janissaries, in connection – one can imagine – with their 
status as a standing army under the direct supervision of the sovereign, 
which gave better opportunities for both training and control. An instruc-
tor in chief (ta’limhânecibaşı) was appointed by the sultan. In fact this 
monopoly quickly became obsolete, and f irearms circulated among much 
larger sections of the population, partly because of quarrels between the 
various members of the Ottoman dynasty.8
The number of janissaries equipped with firearms (tüfenkli, tüfenk-endâz) 
began to increase under the reign of Mehmed II, and this continued under 
the subsequent reigns. As for the reign of Suleyman the Magnificent, it is not 
clear whether the tüfenk-endâz were more numerous or even whether the 
use of tüfenk was generalized among the janissaries. The same sultan was 
also famous for having expanded the state arms factories. In any case, the 
adoption of f irearms was the Ottoman response to the military evolution 
of its enemies, especially the Habsburg troops, who proved to be terribly 
eff icient with their excellent guns made in Germany.
We have no details on the process of the adoption of f irearms and we 
know nothing about the reception of this innovation by the troops, who 
had already demonstrated their corporatist mind as well as their propensity 
to mutiny.9 It remains striking in this respect that, as late as the year 1551, 
Suleyman considered it necessary to request the aga, the head of the janis-
7 Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Turkish Manuscripts, no. 1815, Kânûnâme-i 
Sultân Süleymân (Flügel, III, p. 250) [henceforth, Kânûnnâme].
8 Turan, Sehzâde Bayezid Vak‘ası, pp. 83-96; İnalcık, “The Socio-Political Effects of the Dif-
fusion of Fire-Arms in the Middle East”.
9 We cannot consider the success of this change of arms as obvious if we bear in mind what 
the Habsburg ambassador, Busbecq, wrote about the failure of the vizier Rustem Pasha when 
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saries, to train his men, so that – the sultan says – “they will become experts 
in the use of the musket”.10 Equally striking is the fact that the sultan is said 
to have been anxious, at each of his visits to the barracks of the janissaries, 
to see all the off icers shooting, according to their hierarchical order, in the 
training area, luxuriously laid out by the same sultan.11 In this context, the 
act of shooting appears both as a game and as a kind of rite, expressing the 
close relationship between the sultan and his slaves.
At this stage of their evolution, the janissaries were no longer only the 
personal escort of the sultan. They also became the main factor in the 
Ottomans’ military superiority. They took part in all the main campaigns, 
both on land and at sea, even in the absence of their patron, the sultan. 
In the same way, they were the elite of the fortress garrisons, scattered 
throughout the empire.
To this evolution corresponds a spectacular increase in their numbers. 
Let me give some f igures to give an idea of the corps’ size.
Figures
However hypothetical they may be, the oldest f igures remained low: 
2,000 men in 1389, at the Battle of Kosovo; 3,000 under the reign of Murad II, 
in the f irst half of the f ifteenth century. Later, they would increase from 
5,000 to 10,000 men, during the reign of Mehmed II, the Conqueror ( fâtih), 
in the second half of the f ifteenth century. This increase would have taken 
place in particular during Mehmed’s wars with the Akkoyunlu sultan Uzun 
Hasan in the 1470s. The result was reached partly by the incorporation 
into the initial janissary corps of two new components that had existed 
independently until then, and that were devoted to the sultan’s hunting 
activity: the sekban or seymen and the zagarcı, all men in charge of the 
royal hounds. This explains the puzzling fact that several of the highest 
off icers of the ocak retained designations in connection with hounds: such 
were the sekban başı, the zagarcı başı, the turnacı başı, the samsuncu başı.
Still later, under Mehmed’s son, Bayezid II, the number of the janissaries 
would reach 13,000. To this end, Bayezid created a new section of the ocak: 
he tried in 1548 to arm with pistols 200 horsemen who were his own kuls; see Turkish Letters, 
pp. 123-124.
10 “Yeniçerim kullarım tüfenk atmaga idman eylemelerin emr edüb…”: Tokapı Sarayı Müzesi 
Kütüphanesi, Manuscript KK 888, doc. no. 30.
11 Kânûnnâme, fols 13-16.
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the so-called companies of the aga (aga bölükleri). Nevertheless, this peak 
was followed by a marked decrease just before Suleyman’s reign, but things 
would change signif icantly during his long tenure (1520-1566), at the end of 
which their numbers stabilized at some 13,000 men,12 a very high level for a 
standing army of the time. Nevertheless, one of the most recent historians 
of Ottoman warfare, Rhoads Murphey, has dwelt on the fact that, at any 
one time, only a portion of the total ranks were actually deployed at the 
front, the rest being confined to barracks in Istanbul or dispatched among 
the provincial garrisons.13
General organization and command
Before going further, let us have a glimpse at the general organization of 
the janissary corps and its terminology: its structures reflect its complex 
formation. It consists of three main components: the so-called cemâ’at, 
which is composed of 101 regiments of sekban or seymen. Consequently the 
total number of the orta (also called bölük) amounted to 196 (which became 
195, when Murad IV decided to disband the sixty-f ifth orta, considered to 
be responsible for Osman II’s assassination). At the head of each orta was 
a çorbacı (literally a “soup maker”). Another name for the chiefs of the 
regiments of the cemâ’at was yayabaşı or serpiyâde (“chief of the infantry-
men”). Each çorbacı had a lieutenant (oda kethüdâsı or başodabaşı) under 
his orders, as well as a set of odabaşı (“chiefs of barrack-rooms”). An imam 
and a scribe were also available in each regiment.
At the head of the ocak in its entirety was the “aga of the janissaries” 
(yeniçeri agası). Originally, he was chosen from among the members of 
the corps, but after Selim I’s reforms he was one of the high dignitaries of 
the Palace and, once appointed, he became the f irst of the so-called rikâb 
agaları (“agas of the stirrup”). He depended directly on the sultan, with 
whom he had a close relationship. He had his own palace in the vicinity 
of the Süleymaniye mosque; he led his own council, the so-called yeniçeri 
divânı. This council included the f ive highest off icers of the corps, four of 
them mentioned above in connection with hounds and hunting: the aga’s 
lieutenant (kul kethüdâsı); the chief of the sekbân who, at the time, was the 
supreme commander of the corps; the zagarcı başı; the samsuncu başı; and 
the turnacı başı. Each of these high off icers was at the same time chief of a 
12 Murphey, Ottoman Warfare, 1500-1700, p. 45.
13 Ibid., p. 47.
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particular orta. Among the other high officers who were not members of the 
divân, let me mention the muhzir aga (“bailiff aga”), who was the intermedi-
ary between the ocak and the grand vizier; the big and the little hâsseki who 
were dispatched to the provinces to deal with questions concerning the 
corps; the baş çavuş (“chief of the sergeants”) who checked the execution 
of the decisions and supervised the incorporation of new recruits.
Finally, the ocak had its own bureaucracy headed by the yeniçeri efendisi 
(“secretary of the janissaries”). He held the pay rolls (kötük) and was the 
chief of the aga’s chancery.
Increase in membership and subsequent decline
After Suleyman’s era, starting from the reign of his grandson, Murad III, 
the number of janissaries increased dramatically and constantly. At the 
same time, standards of recruitment became more and more slack and 
the origins of the recruits much more diversif ied. The recruitment of new 
janissaries was hence no longer limited to slaves of the sultan nor, according 
to a tradition that had been established quite early on, to sons of janissaries. 
From now on, all kinds of foreigners (ecnebi) and “intruders” (saplama), 
including Turks, got access to the ocak, against the fundamental regulations. 
Thus, the corps lost its former homogeneity, which was, according to several 
of the authors of “books of advice” (nasîhatnâme), a cause of its decline. 
The same authors attributed these transformations – so reprehensible in 
their eyes – to the sovereigns’ slovenliness and blindness. Nevertheless, 
as Murphey underlines, there is another possible interpretation of their 
behaviour: they would have been trying to meet growing military needs 
in the face of more and more powerful adversaries. Be that as it may, the 
burden became heavier and heavier for the Treasury. In 1574, the janissaries 
numbered 13,600; they amounted to 35,000 in 1597, 37,600 in 1609, and 
39,470 in 1670. The numbers reached 53,000 at the beginning of the eight-
eenth century, at a time when the corps had lost all military eff iciency.14 
They remained merely a mighty pressure group in the state and society, 
as well as a terrible drag on the public f inances, all the more so because, 
starting from 1740, Sultan Mahmud I, desperately searching for money, 
legalized the marketing of certif icates (esâme) which gave the bearer the 
right to collect janissary wages. This period is generally considered to be the 
time of decay and corruption of the janissaries. The corps played a central 
14 Aksan, “Whatever Happened to the Janissaries?”
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role in the overthrow of the reforming sultan, Selim III, in 1808. As a result, 
his successor, Sultan Mahmud II, decided to abolish the corps in 1826, as a 
necessary precondition to the introduction of Westernizing reforms in the 
army. When the janissaries rose in revolt against this decision, the sultan 
had his artillery shoot them to pieces in their barracks on 18 June 1826, an 
incident known in Turkish history as the “auspicious event” (vakayi hayriye).
After this general background, let me try to def ine the corps according 
to the criteria to be considered in the framework of our research program.
A sultan’s army
The janissaries were clearly a state commission army or, to be more ac-
curate, a sultan’s army. Since their origin, they were intended for the sultan’s 
exclusive use and put under his direct patronage. Even in the later period, 
when they became a part of the state apparatus and one military institu-
tion among others, although the sovereign no longer took part in military 
campaigns in person, they kept some of their close ties with him. The fact, 
for example, that we come across sultanic orders concerning janissaries or 
janissaries’ cadets (who will be discussed below), including orders deal-
ing with very minor affairs, which are not ordinary fermans but edicts of 
the highest rank (hatt-i hümâyûn, which means that they were issued on 
the basis of a personal note written by the sultan with his own hand on 
the paper of the initial request), is signif icant: it is an expression of the 
exceptional status of these kuls.15
Pencyek and devşirme
At the beginning, starting from the fourteenth century, the members of 
the corps originated from a single source, the pencyek.16 This Persian term 
(Arabic: khums) refers to the fifth part of the booty gathered during the raids 
and the fights against the infidels – the part which, according to Islamic law, 
15 See, for example, an order following a petition concerning the graduation of janissaries’ 
cadets working in the Ibrâhîm Pasha Palace in Istanbul, with the note “hatt-ı hümâyûnumla 
fermânım olmushdur” (“it was ordered with a note of my own majestic writing”): Istanbul, 
Basbakanlık Ottoman Arsivleri, Mühimme Defteri [henceforth, MD], LXIV, p. 42.
16 Beldiceanu-Steinherr, “En marge d’un acte concernant le pengyek et les aqıncı”. The author 
gives an edition of the important regulation, referred to below, extracted from Bibliothèque 
nationale de France, fonds turc ancient 81, fol. 97r-v.
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belongs to the sovereign. This booty includes, among other goods, captives 
who were automatically enslaved by those who took them (unless they 
were intended to be ransomed). In fact, it appears that this pencyek could 
take two different forms, according to the period and the circumstances. 
On the one hand, it could be a simple tax of 25 akçe (silver coins), a sum 
corresponding to the f ifth part of the average value of a slave (i.e., 125 akçe). 
This tax was levied at the frontier, at the point of the slaves’ entrance into 
Ottoman territories. In this form, the pencyek survived, with or without the 
name, until the nineteenth century. On the other hand, the pencyek was 
nothing but the requisition, mainly on behalf of the sultan, of all the young 
male captives, between ten and seventeen years old (occasionally even older, 
but in that case the sultan had to pay for them), who had been enslaved in 
raids and who presented the required features of robustness, soundness, 
and physical integrity. The sources describing this second aspect of the 
pencyek, crucial for the janissaries’ history, are rare. The most developed 
and explicit one is a relatively late edict issued by Sultan Bayezid II in 1493, 
which nevertheless, as the text points out, reformulates older provisions. 
On another side, this edict takes into consideration only those captives who 
were caught during raids launched in the enemy territory. Nevertheless, 
we know that the same kind of young captives were also taken in other 
contexts as well: successful sieges or pitched battles; likewise a portion of 
these captives – and, indeed, the best portion – was the sultan’s own loot.
As a consequence of the nature of the pencyek, the janissaries were 
initially recruited among foreign, non-Muslim young boys (it was forbidden 
by shari’a to enslave Muslims, except in extraordinary cases of judiciary 
punishment). It corresponded exactly to the so-called mamluk paradigm as 
it had been in force in the Muslim world since the Abbasid era.17 According 
to this paradigm, which corresponds to a specif ic kind of military slavery, 
the aim was not to enslave already mature and experienced soldiers, but to 
search for untrained and inexperienced young boys who would not only be 
enslaved and forcibly converted but also systematically trained in special-
ized schools. Some historians, such as D. Ayalon and E. de la Vaissière, 
assumed, more or less explicitly, that such schools may have originated 
from Central Asian models. It is worth noting that in the account of the 
origins of the janissaries by the earliest Ottoman chroniclers, in the second 
17 Ayalon, “Preliminary Remarks on the Mamlûk Military Institution in Islam”; Crone, Slaves on 
Horses; Pipes, Slaves, Soldiers and Islam. For a critical discussion, see La Vaissière, Samarcande 
et Samarra.
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half of the f ifteenth century,18 this new unit appears as nothing more than 
the byproduct of the establishment of the pencyek levies a century before.
Much more specific to the Ottoman case was the other method of acquir-
ing new janissaries, which apparently was inaugurated a few decades after 
the institution of the pencyek. This second method partly replaced the f irst 
one after a time of coexistence in the f ifteenth and sixteenth centuries. It 
was called devşirme, a Turkish term meaning “collecting” or “gathering”, by 
reference to the levy of young boys, who were no longer foreign captives 
caught in the raids, but Christian subjects of the sultan. They were dhimmî, 
non-Muslim protégés of the sultan, who had lived in his European provinces. 
Later on, the same practice was also put in force in Anatolia. Young Muslims, 
especially Turks, were categorically excluded from the devşirme, with the 
exception of Muslim Bosnians who, for reasons that are not totally clear, 
were eligible for the system.19
The earliest mentions of devşirme operations go as far back as the very end 
of the fourteenth century.20 Nevertheless, the practice seems to have become 
more regular starting from the second quarter of the f ifteenth century, 
under the reign of Murad II. In spite of attempts to justify this institution 
from a legal and religious point of view,21 it was an obvious violation of 
two fundamental provisions of shari’a: on the one hand, it implied the 
enslavement of dhimmî subjects; on the other, the levy was followed by 
a forcible conversion, since all these Christian boys entering the sultan’s 
service had to become Muslims.
Volunteers or not?
Under such conditions, it seems at f irst glance completely unnecessary 
to ask whether these future soldiers were volunteers or not. Clearly, the 
young captives, entering the sultan’s service as part of his pencyek, were 
not volunteers. As for the devşirme, records are extant of attempts to escape 
the requisition by flight or concealment of the boys, at the approach of the 
18 Giese, Die altosmanische Chronik des ʿ Āšīkpašazāde, Die altosmanischen anonymen Chroni-
ken Tevārīẖ-i Āl-i ʿOs̱ mān..
19 Ménage, “Devshirme”, and İnalcık, “Ghulam. Ottoman Empire”; Ménage, “Sidelights on the 
Devshirme”; Özcan, “Devşirme”; Papoulia, Ursprung und Wesen der Knabenlese in osmanischen 
Reich; Petrosian, “The Mabda-i Kanuni yeniçeri ocagı Tarihi on the System of Devşirme”.
20 Vryonis, “Isidore Glabas and the Turkish Devshirme”; Demetriades, “Some Thoughts on the 
Origins of the Devşirme”.
21 See Wittek, “Devshirme and Shari‘a”.
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recruiting commissioners, or by corruption of these agents. Again, on the 
way from their homeland to Istanbul, some boys tried to run away; this 
was also the case at their arrival in the capital, where the forced conversion 
and the dispatching of the recruits took place. Later, in the f irst stages of 
the process of formation that I shall describe below, such attempts still 
occurred.22
Nevertheless, the question is more complex. If there is no doubt that the 
devşirme was generally very unpopular, not to say that it was considered 
to be one of the darkest aspects of the Turkish yoke (as is obvious from 
Balkan literature and folklore),23 on the other side, it remains true that 
for poor people, mostly peasants, it was also gateway to a better life, with 
better incomes and a better social position, in spite of the strain and the 
danger. It was true for a simple janissary, and much more so for the cream 
of the kuls, who could reach the highest positions in the state apparatus. 
As a consequence of these realities, some people who, being Muslims, were 
not eligible for the devşirme, made efforts to enter fraudulently, to the great 
displeasure of the authorities. It is also true that when people, after the 
preliminary stages, became full members of the corps, they do not seem 
to have been inclined to desert. In other words, if there was constraint, it 
f inally turned into a form of acceptance. I shall return to possible explana-
tions for this acceptance.
Moreover, with time, and this evolution can be traced as early as the 
beginning of the sixteenth century, not all the janissaries were the products 
of coercion, as in the pencyek or the devşirme institutions. Specif ically, as 
already mentioned, sons of janissaries (kuloglus) started being introduced 
into the corps, and the same was applied for young Muslims adopted by 
janissaries (veledeshes).24 Likewise, the aga, head of the corps, was allowed 
to incorporate a number of protégés. In all these cases, entering the corps 
became a voluntary act.
In the same way, for the people who, according to Mustafa Ali, were 
admitted in the corps, by the will of Murad III in 1582 on the occasion of the 
great circumcision feasts of his son Mehmed, this admission was a favour 
and by no means a requirement. With all these changes in the recruitment 
methods, janissaries passed progressively from forced recruits to volunteers.
22 See, for instance, Istanbul, Başbakanlık Ottoman Arşivleri, MD, III, p. 509, no. 1514; VI, p. 135, 
no. 284; IX, p. 14; XXI, p. 145; XXX, p. 108.
23 See, for example, Georgieva, “Le rôle des janissaires dans la politique ottomane en les terres 
bulgares”.
24 Kaldy-Nagy, “The Strangers (ecnebiler) in the 16th Century Ottoman Military Organization”.
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Searching for the janissaries’ identity
However, it remains true that, during the most glorious period of the 
empire’s history, mainly during the f ifteenth and the f irst part of the 
sixteenth centuries, the Ottoman conquest, so loudly praised as a triumph 
of Islam, was in fact largely operated by men of Christian origin. If this 
paradox was already encapsulated in the “mamluk paradigm”, it takes a 
particularly striking shape in the janissaries’ case, since a major part of 
the conquests concerned were to the detriment of Christian lands. When 
historians look for an explanation of this paradox, it seems that they have 
to address the various components of the specif ic culture of the ocak. All 
of them converge into the making of a new identity, strong and satisfying 
enough to substitute for the old one (without erasing it altogether).25 At the 
root of this identity was an esprit de corps, which is certainly shared by all 
corps but which, in this case, reached the highest degree for three reasons 
at least: a sharp consciousness of being part of a military elite in a close 
relationship with the sovereign and responsible for the empire’s greatness; 
a common initiation into a rich corpus of symbols (for example, each orta 
had its own emblem) at work, in a series of rites, ceremonies, and feasts; and 
the prominent influence of Bektashism, a syncretic form of Islam. The close 
tie, even the symbiotic connection, between the ocak and this Ottoman 
Sufi order (tarikat) is well known, even if the exact chronology, causes, and 
conditions of the interface between the two communities are not altogether 
clear. Obviously, for chronological reasons, the tradition of the creation of 
the ocak by the “saint”, Hâci Bektash Veli, founder of the order, cannot be 
anything but a legitimizing legend. As a matter of fact, it is not even certain 
that the Bektashi impact moulded the corps from its very origin. The official 
aff iliation came relatively late, not before the year 1591, during the reign 
of Murad III. Starting from that time, the great master of the order (baba) 
became the çorbacı of the ninety-ninth orta, and Bektashi dervishes were 
incorporated into the ocak where they became highly influential in every 
f ield, offering spiritual guidance to the soldiers.26
Nevertheless, there is no doubt that syncretic beliefs existed in the reli-
gion of the janissaries a long time before the end of the sixteenth century, 
as it existed in the early stages of Ottoman history in general. Perhaps we 
have an echo of these beliefs, as they were in force in the second half of the 
25 Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı devleti teşkilâtından kapu kulu ocakları , I, pp.  26-28; Vatin and 
Veinstein, “Paroles d’oglan, jeunes esclaves de la Porte”.
26 Küçükyalçın, Turna’nın Kalbi, pp. 111-120.
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f ifteenth century, in the puzzling description of Islam which is to be found 
in the f irst pages of the “memoirs of the Serbian janissary”, Konstantin 
Mihailović.27 A prominent place is given to ‘Ali, the Prophet’s cousin and 
son-in-law, whom he would have explicitly designated as his successor 
(in fact, he is always mentioned in the gülbank, the specif ic prayers of the 
janissaries). These Shiite features would be confirmed later by a special 
reverence, not only for ‘Ali and his holy sword, called Zulf ikar, but also for 
his two martyr sons, Hasan and Hüseyn. At the same time, Konstantin also 
quoted Muslim preachers who combined an expected harshness against 
Christians with a more surprising love for Christ. In their view, Jesus had 
not been crucif ied, a lookalike being killed instead. “Jesus is of God’s spirit 
but Mohammed is God’s emissary”, they say, along with, “What is Moham-
med’s will that is also Jesus’?” This reverence for Christ was interpreted as a 
consequence of the Christian origin of most of the janissaries at that time, 
but a def initive conclusion on the question remains out of reach. Anyway, 
it is not certain that it persisted in the later periods, while Shiite inspiration 
definitely did. How could Ottoman power, having been transformed into a 
champion of Sunnism in the meantime, tolerate this deviation in its military 
elite? It is another paradox of the janissaries. Maybe the fact that this Shiite 
imprint was nevertheless encapsulated in a tarikat, which obviously was a 
heterodox one, but at the same time firmly controlled by the state, by means 
of its centralization and hierarchical structure, made things easier.28 Be that 
as it may, a degree of Shiism remained one of the peculiarities of the ocak’s 
culture as well as a unifying factor for its members.
Slaves paid in silver
As I noted at the beginning, janissaries were not free men. They were slaves 
and remained so all their life. Their patron, the Ottoman sultan, never 
emancipated them (or very exceptionally, as a reward for extraordinary 
acts), in contrast to the mamluk sultans of Egypt who solemnly emancipated 
their own mamluks at the end of their training period in the barracks of 
the citadel of Cairo. At any rate, they were slaves, but slaves of the sultans, 
which made a big difference in comparison to ordinary slaves. As several 
Western travellers noticed, there was not a more honourable position in 
27 Mihailović, Memoirs of a Janissary, pp. 3-27; the French translation is Mihailović, Mémoires 
d’un janissaire.
28 Faroqhi, “Conflict, Accommodation and Long-Time Survival”, pp. 19-20. 
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the empire than to be slave of the sultan. The kul elite (of course, neither 
simple janissaries nor the corps officers but kuls who had become governors 
or viziers) married princesses of the reigning dynasty. They were never sold 
to private persons and were thus not in danger of being used for menial 
tasks. Not only could they exert the highest functions, but they were also in 
a position to accumulate greater or lesser fortunes and, according to their 
status, totally or partly bequeath them to their heirs.
All these slaves were paid in silver money by the Treasury. This point may 
explain – at least in part – the fact that the Ottoman beys took some time to 
adopt a troop of this type, even though it was a piece of their Islamic inherit-
ance: they needed to have reached a suff icient measure of monetization. As 
a matter of fact none of the previously established other troops were paid 
in money. As for the janissaries, the initial pay (‘ulûfe) was 2 akçe per diem. 
But this amount, still very modest indeed, increased with time, through a 
succession of augmentations (terakki), and could reach 12 akçe for a simple 
soldier. The concrete mechanism of these increases is not altogether clear: 
we cannot determine the roles of the military value to be rewarded and 
stimulated, of the length of service, or of favouritism. Off icers’ wages were 
much higher. The aga’s reached the enormous amount of 400 akçe daily. It 
is possible to see how the amounts varied through the numerous payroll 
muster lists (mevâcib defteri) kept in the archives.29
Janissaries were paid in regular quarterly instalments, in solemn cer-
emonies in the second yard of the Topkapı Palace. As for the provincial 
garrisons, their wages were transported across the country with a security 
guard. Nevertheless, this precious load was sometimes attacked by bandits 
– this could happen even at the apogee of the empire, during Suleyman’s 
reign.30 Any shortcoming in these payments (as occurred in the so-called 
sıvış years, the “effaced” years resulting from the gap between the solar 
and the lunar calendars)31 or any adulteration of the distributed money 
led to riots among the troops. Besides these regular wages, they received a 
special bonus (bakhşiş) at every new enthronement. Extraordinary grants 
were also expected during the campaigns, as an incitement or a reward. To 
neglect these traditional grants was a serious risk for the sultan. Selim II 
experienced the consequences when he refused to give the bakhşiş to the 
janissaries at the beginning of his reign, as did Osman II who, among other 
29 Darling, “Ottoman Salary Registers as a Source for Economic and Social History”.
30 Barkan, “H. 974-975 (M. 1567-1568) Malî bir Yılına ait bir Osmanlı Bütçesi”.
31 Sahillioğlu, “Osmanlı Imparatorluğunda Sıvış Yılı Burhanları”.
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foolish mistakes, was not generous enough during the Polish campaign, 
resulting in his being deposed and in the end in his death.32
These off icial allocations were not the only source of income for the 
janissaries. It is well known that they were also involved in craft and com-
mercial activities, mainly in the capital itself and also in the various cities 
where they were sent (as a way of getting rid of them in troubled times). 
Contrary to what has often been put forward, this passage from military to 
economic activities did not occur exclusively during the period of decline. 
It already existed in former centuries. However, in these earlier periods, 
crafts and trades were only occupations during the winter or the intervals 
of peace,33 and not a substitute for military involvement, as it became the 
case later on. From this point on, close ties were created between the ocak 
and the guilds of the capital.
Consequently, janissaries succeeded in accumulating properties that 
they left to their heirs. The countless probate inventories of janissaries, 
which are to be found in the kadi registers of many cities, provide precise 
data on this point. Both soldiers and businessmen – in proportions varying 
according to the period – could join a quite prosperous urban middle class.34
Trainees without much training
Returning to the military activity of the janissaries, the question arises 
as to what extent they have to be considered true professional militaries, 
who are not only endowed with a practical experience of the job but who 
had been systematically trained in a preliminary stage of education, as the 
“mamluk paradigm” postulated it.
According to my sources, at the very beginning, the boys recruited in the 
framework of the pencyek were directly assigned to the janissary corps with 
an initial wage of 2 akçe per diem. In other words, they were immediately 
operational without a preliminary training period.35 However, this situation 
did not last. A few decades later, a new corps was established, the so-called 
‘acemi oglan (literally “the foreign boys”) based in the harbour of Gelibolu 
(Gallipoli) on the Dardanelles. A second branch of this corps, much larger 
32 Vatin and Veinstein, Le sérail ébranlé, pp. 221-224, 338-340.
33 Murphey, “Yeni çeri”. On the relationships between the janissaries and the corporations 
(esnâf ), see Kafadar, “Yeniçeri-Esnaf Relations”.
34 Barkan, “Edirne Askeri Kassamına ait Tereke Defterleri”; Öztürk, Askeri kassama ait 
onyedinci asır Istanbul tereke defterleri.
35 Kavânîn, fol. 4v.
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in number, would be created in Istanbul, following the conquest of the city. 
The ‘acemi oglan was meant to be a preliminary stage in janissary training. 
From now on, it was no longer possible to enter the corps immediately. One 
had to be an ‘acemi oglan f irst.
Before examining what the real function of this cadet corps was, I have 
to mention another preliminary stage, an initial one, which took place 
between the levy as pencyek or devşirme boy and the incorporation into 
the ‘acemi oglan. This f irst stage was carried out in the countryside, among 
Turkish farmers (Türk üzerinde olmak). The principle was to establish the 
young recruits “overseas”, so that no flight to their homelands – a common 
temptation – was possible. That means that Rumelian boys were sent to 
Anatolia. Logically, the reverse (Anatolian boys sent to Rumelia) must have 
been true, but I have not come across evidence for this. This stay in the 
countryside was of quite a long duration: four to eight years, according to 
the sources. Nevertheless, it could be shortened when boys were needed for 
an urgent task in the capital. This rural stage did not exist initially and is 
said to have been established by Mehmed II.36 A f irst aim was to make the 
boys stronger by using them in hard labour, as well as to accustom them to 
obedience and submission, but another important goal, which Mehmed II 
would have had in mind, was to allow them to learn Turkish. Consequently, 
‘acemi oglan and janissaries would speak Turkish (certainly, writing in 
Turkish was another story, and the janissaries’ literacy another question). 
According to some sources, the rural stage was also an opportunity for 
those converted to be initiated into the basis of their new religion (even 
if Anatolian peasantry were not an authority in these matters). It appears 
that this period staying “among the Turks” did not survive as long as the 
devşirme system: it was no longer in force after the devşirme campaigns of 
1622 and 1636.37
Now, if we come back to the ‘acemi oglan, we are naturally inclined 
to consider the period spent in this body of cadets as a time of military 
preparation and training. Consequently, the fate of an ‘acemi oglan would be 
necessarily to become a full janissary. As a matter of fact, they are frequently 
called yeniçeri oglanları (or in Persian gilmân-i yeniçeriyân), which means 
boys who are janissaries-to-be. Consequently, all studies on the janissaries, 
including the most recent ones, consider the ‘acemi oglan to be a cadet corps 
36 Ibid., fol. 7r.
37 Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı devleti teşkilâtından kapu kulu ocakları , p. 24.
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or trainees in connection with the janissaries.38 However, this interpretation 
needs discussion and nuancing.
First, I shall observe that the oldest traditions did not explain the creation 
of the new corps in that way. The sultan took this measure – they say – f irst 
to save money, since the initial wages of the ‘acemi oglan were less than 
those of the janissaries (1 akçe instead of 2); secondly, because he lacked 
a regular corps intended for a specif ic need: transporting troops in ships 
from the Asiatic to the European parts of the state across the Dardanelles.39
Now, taking these two preliminary stages into account, we can try to 
evaluate the number of years coming before the proper entrance into the 
janissary corps: the stay in the Turkish families is said to last possibly seven 
or eight years. Afterwards, the time spent as an ‘acemi oglan is said to be 
about f ive to ten years. Thus, the total time of these preliminary stages 
would be from twelve to eighteen years. According to the “treaties of advice” 
(nasîhatnâme) of the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a period 
of f ifteen to twenty years was an optimum. In one of these works, the 
kitâb-ı mustetâb, the ‘acemi oglan period is presented as even longer and 
divided into two parts: a six to seven-year period properly as an ‘acemi 
oglan, followed by a f ive to ten-year period as gardeners (bostancıs) of the 
imperial palaces.
In any case, all these figures remain highly theoretical. We know through 
orders contained in the “registers of important affairs” (mühimme defteri) 
that these stages could, in fact, be either shortened or extended considerably, 
according to the circumstances.40 On this point as on many others, Ottoman 
authorities were fully pragmatic.
Be that as it may, it remains true that enlistment in the janissary corps 
did not occur very early in a man’s life. Janissaries were not young men. It is 
all the more true that the devşirme recruiters did not take the boys as young 
as it is frequently assumed. According to a specif ic law (kanun) dedicated to 
the institution,41 the ages were between fourteen or f ifteen and seventeen 
or eighteen years (remembering that for the pencyek boys the age was ten 
to seventeen years). In practice, the recruits could be even older; at least 
this was the case in a devşirme register of the beginning of the seventeenth 
38 Still today, in the Turkish army, acemilik means the training period.
39 Kavânîn, fol. 5r.
40 For example, KK 888, no. 1603; MD, VI, p. 223, no. 479; VII, p. 789, no. 2157; IX, pp. 14 and 122; 
XXI, p. 145; LIII, p. 173. It remains true that, when the authorities had to urgently remove the 
boys from the Turkish families, they were ordered to choose the ones who had been there for 
the longest time (eski).
41 Akgündüz, “Kavânîn-i yeniçeriyân-i dergâh-i âli”, II, pp. 123-127.
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century.42 We f ind that, at that time, 80 per cent of the boys were between 
f ifteen and twenty and 50 per cent between eighteen and twenty years 
old. If we take all these f igures into account – however hypothetical they 
may remain – we come to the puzzling conclusion that, when becoming a 
janissary, the man was somewhere between thirty-seven and f ifty years, 
which is hardly believable.
Let us add here that, once a janissary, the man would spend his whole 
career in the corps, unless he was upgraded to a more prestigious corps, i.e., 
one of the standing cavalry sections or one of the Palace corps, or acquired 
f ief (timar) in the province, which, at least in certain cases, was considered 
a punishment and not a promotion. Finally, when a janissary was judged 
too old (ziyâde ihtiyâr), exhausted, and “out of use” (‘amelmande),43 he was 
retired (oturak, korucu, emekdâr) and continued, as such, to belong to the 
corps, being given a pension. Such a pension (oturaklık) was also given to a 
soldier who became ill, disabled, or insane. The marked reverence for the 
old retired soldiers, among the members, can be counted among the signs 
of this esprit de corps that I emphasized above.
If there was a long time between the f irst recruitment and the f inal 
entrance into the janissary corps (kapuya çıkmak), this time does not appear 
to be a time of military training sensu stricto. There was nothing to be 
compared to the several-year, methodically organized training existing 
in the Cairo barracks of the mamluk sultans, according to the historian 
Makrizi.44
A glance at the mamluks’ training
Let us remember that in the f ifteenth century, there were twelve barracks 
(tibâq, pl. tabaqa) in Cairo for the education of the “royal mamluks” (al-
mamalik al-sultâniyya) who had to become f irst-class horsemen. Each 
barrack was capable of accommodating 1,000 mamluks. There was at least 
one religious man ( faqîh) per group of students to teach them the Qur’ân, 
the Arabic script, some basic knowledge of shari’a, and the Muslim prayers. 
When the mamluks who had been bought quite young reached major-
ity, they started their actual military training. Each group had a cavalry 
42 Istanbul, Başbakanlık Ottoman Arşivleri, Maliyeden müdevver, no. 7600.
43 Kânûnnâme, fol. 16r.
44 Ayalon, “Preliminary Remarks on the Mamlûk Military Institution in Islam”, pp. 9-17; Rabie, 
“The Training of the Mamlûk Fâris”.
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( furûsiyya) instructor, a mu‘allim, whose training included equestrianism, 
the lance game, archery, and fencing. Tuition in horsemanship consisted 
of several stages before the young man was able to sit f irmly on a bareback 
horse. At the beginning he practised on horse models made of dry clay, 
stone, or wood. The first exercise was to jump over it correctly. Then a saddle 
was placed on the model and the mamluk practised jumping without, and 
then with, full equipment. In the following stage, the candidate practised 
training on a live horse.
During his whole training, the mamluk was considered a simple student 
(kuttâbiya) without pay or personal goods of any kind. On the other hand, 
when his education was over (disregarding how many years it lasted and 
what age he had reached at this point), he received, as personal property, a 
horse, and clothing, as well as a set of arms (a bow, a quiver and arrows, a 
sabre, and armour). From that moment on, he was a true soldier, eligible for 
a wage, although it was of course the lowest one. In addition, he was given 
a certif icate, called ‘itâqa, which is not only proof that he had become a 
trained horseman but also as a mark of emancipation, since the mamluk 
who at last enters the sultan’s service is no longer his slave. He was a free 
man even if he maintained a close link with his former patron. Thus, two 
important differences with the janissaries are to be noticed: the latter 
remained slaves and did not receive real military training.
Back to the Ottoman trainees
As long as the Rumelian boys lived with Anatolian Turkish families, they 
had to engage in livestock farming and agriculture, both tiresome chores 
(belâ) which certainly made them stronger as well as more docile, giving 
them the opportunity to develop qualities already taken into account by 
the devşirme recruiters upon selection. Such qualities may be necessary 
preconditions of military capacity, but they are not a substitute for military 
technical training. Furthermore, the ‘acemi oglan stage does not seem to 
offer much military training either. As a matter of fact, all these young 
men were employed by the sultan, his family, and other grandees in a great 
variety of tasks that had nothing to do with proper military work.
As we saw above, their initial duty was to work on the ships coming across 
the Dardanelles, as well as to transport heavy material (torba hizmeti). The 
same kind of tasks were ordered for the Istanbul ‘acemi oglan as well, for 
ships coming across the Bosphorus, carrying different sorts of provisions for 
the imperial palace, such as f irewood or snow collected in the mountains 
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around Bursa. Domestic service in several palaces was also partly carried 
out by some contingents of ‘acemi oglan. Another of their major occupations 
was to care for the imperial gardens in Istanbul and the surrounding areas 
as well as in Edirne and its district. For instance, in 1577, some 467 ‘acemi 
oglan were employed as gardeners in Edirne.45 Another possible destina-
tion of the recruits, probably in connection with some inborn gifts quickly 
discovered by the recruiters, was to become apprentices in the workshops 
of the Palace and thus to acquire high-level skills in one of the many crafts 
intended for the sultan’s consumption and use. Thus in a list of 1526, we f ind 
former devşirme or pencyek boys in twenty-six of the forty workshops of the 
Palace.46 Likewise, when the sultan undertook the building of a new monu-
ment, either a civil or a religious one, he naturally resorted to his ‘acemi 
oglan. For instance, we f ind them on the Selimiye mosque construction in 
Edirne.47 In the same way, they contribute to shipbuilding in the shipyards 
of Galata: many boys were mobilized after the destruction of the Ottoman 
fleet in Lepanto.48 The authorities had the same reaction when a big f ire 
devastated the capital.49 In short, the ‘acemi oglan appear to be more slave 
manpower at the disposal of the sultan to meet the various needs of the 
Palace and the state than a cadet corps for a professional army. A famous 
passage of the third of Busbecq’s Turkish Letters has to be interpreted, at 
least partly, as an allusion to the ‘acemî oglan: “If the State requires any work 
of construction, removal, clearance or demolition, slave labour is always 
employed to carry it out.” 50
It is also true that a proportion of ‘acemi oglan will never become janis-
saries. They will spend their entire carrier until their retirement as cadets, 
though not without an increase in their daily wages in time. ‘Acemi oglan 
with grey hair and beards are mentioned, in particular among the garden-
ers.51 Why this inertia in the graduation? Perhaps because they became 
so good in their speciality that it would have been a pity to let them leave 
their job, or simply because they were forgotten, the authorities always 
remaining anxious to limit the number of janissaries, partly at least for 
f inancial reasons.
45 MD, XXX, p. 108.
46 Veinstein, “À propos des ehl-i hiref et du devşirme”.
47 MD, IX, p. 46, no. 122; XXII, p. 206.
48 “Ne kadar dölgerlik ve kalafâtçılık san‘atını bilür ve sa’ir tersâneye müte‘allik san‘at bilür oglan 
var ise…”: MD, X, p. 235.
49 MD, LIII, p. 173.
50 Turkish Letters, pp. 101-102.
51 MD, X, p. 158, no. 240; LVI, p. 66, no. 134: “nicesinin saç ve sakallı ankarib pîr olmuşdur”.
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These assertions, however, may be somewhat too categorical and deserve 
some nuance. I cannot deny that one f inds here and there some hints of 
military training of the ‘acemi oglan. This is the case in an important source 
of the late f ifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, the report of Teodoro 
Spandougino Cantacusino (Spandounes), according to which:
Après qu’ilz les auront osté de ce meschant mestier, ilz leur font 
apprendre à tirer de l’arc et des dards. Aprez, ils les despartent à divers 
capitaines à ce qu’ilz appreignent l’exercice des armes et aulcuns d’eux 
les mectent sur la mer.52
In the same way a later traveller, Gilles Fermanel, wrote in 1630-1632:
Les Azamoglans qui sont en grand nombre, après avoir long-temps 
servy aux jardinages, estant d’aage colmpetent, sont exercez à tirer de 
l’arquebuze, et aprés sont faits Janisiaires.53
Such mentions coming from Western sources are not corroborated, as far 
as I know, by Ottoman sources. Moreover, the picture that they give of the 
facts sounds like an attempt at rationalization, which does not correspond 
to the more complex reality that I have hinted at, with a variety of situations 
and fates for the boys. Be that as it may, even if some training did exist, at 
least for a part of the ‘acemi oglan, it was certainly but a minor part of these 
state slaves’ agenda.
Under these conditions, it was mainly through their experience on the 
f ield, and the lessons given to them by their veterans, that the janissaries 
learned how to f ight. As a consequence, extended periods of peace, like 
during some of the eighteenth century, could not help but have a negative 
impact on their military value.
52 Spandouyn Cantacasin, Petit traicté de l’origine des Turcqz, p. 104.
53 Fermanel, Le voyage d’Italie et du Levant, p. 76.
 Soldiers in Western Europe, c. 1500-17901
Frank Tallett
Particularly after the second half of the seventeenth century, when armed 
forces grew exponentially, armies typically ranked as the largest single 
employers within states. Thus, soldiers constituted the most numerous 
unif ied labour force within Europe. A consideration of troops within the 
framework of labour history is accordingly both appropriate and also long 
overdue, especially since in certain circumstances soldiers acted very 
much like modern workers. For example, it would not be out of line to 
regard military mutinies as among the largest and most effective strikes in 
European history before the emergence of labour militancy associated with 
the Industrial Revolution. However, generalizations about soldier-labour in 
Europe during the early modern period – taken here to encompass those 
decades falling roughly between 1500 and 1790 – have to be advanced cau-
tiously and hedged around with caveats. This is for three principal reasons. 
First, there was considerable variety of practice both within and between 
polities with regard to the employment of soldiers, which makes generaliza-
tion hazardous. Secondly, the period was characterized by considerable 
changes of practice. To be sure, the notion that these changes constituted a 
“military revolution”, at least in the format originally proposed by Michael 
Roberts in the 1950s and subsequently amended by Geoffrey Parker, has 
been challenged and rejected by many specialists. But the debate over 
the “military revolution” has emphasized the extent of the changes that 
were taking place, though these occurred over a much longer timeframe 
than Roberts and Parker envisaged, and lay as much in the areas of state 
development, the economy, and the management of armies, for instance, 
as in the realms of weaponry, drill, and tactics. This chapter will seek to do 
justice to these changes in the space available without misrepresenting the 
reality of complex and uneven developments. Thirdly, precisely because the 
exploration of soldier-labour is so important and almost unprecedented, the 
effort must be undertaken with care so as to avoid distorting categories and 
conclusions by imprudently constructing generalizations about military 
1 I wish to thank Joël Félix and Beatrice Heuser for their comments on an early draft of this 
paper. I am especially grateful to John Lynn for his advice and permission to use some of the 
ideas and material from his “Comments on Mercenary Military Service in Early Modern Europe”, 
paper presented at the IISH Conference in March 2010.
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labour from the study of the civilian workforce or by too freely imposing 
concepts generated by modern labour studies onto an earlier era. As military 
institutions and practices are incorporated within a broader labour history, 
it is important to respect the integrity of the military past. These points 
need to be borne in mind not least of all with regard to the many and varied 
forms of recruitment that were to be found in the early modern period.
Methods of recruitment, c. 1500-1650
To f ill the ranks of their armies, early modern governments made use of a 
variety of methods of recruitment, which stood on a spectrum between the 
involuntary and the voluntary. In different ways, all drafted recruits forcibly 
by making use of the generally accepted – if vague and ill-def ined – notion 
that adult male subjects had some responsibility to bear arms in defence of 
their homeland. Sweden, with its tiny population (1.25 million in 1620), its 
need to raise forces to defend its newly won independence from Denmark 
in the sixteenth century, and its desire to pursue its bellicose ambitions in 
the following century, came closest to constructing a system of universal 
conscription. As a result of initiatives launched by Gustavus Vasa (1523-1560) 
and developed by Gustavus Adolphus (1611-1632), lists of able-bodied males 
aged over eighteen years were drawn up annually and used by conscript 
commissioners to select the required number of men. Nobles, clerics, and 
some peasants, as well as apprentices in the royal gardens and church 
organists, were exempt from the draft. Yet the system was remarkably 
wide-ranging. Almost 50,000 men were conscripted between 1626 and 1630, 
and under Charles XII (1697-1718) levies were taken more than once per year. 
Signif icantly, the conscripts could be required to serve outside their home-
land.2 Other states, including Habsburg Spain and Brandenburg-Prussia, 
considered the use of conscription, but none adopted it in a fully fledged 
form until it was introduced by France in the unprecedented circumstances 
of the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars.
Sweden went furthest in employing conscription, but many other poli-
ties –including towns as well as national governments – made use of the 
obligation to bear arms to forcibly recruit men into militias. True, the local 
nobility in Bavaria and Brandenburg hesitated at the thought of arming their 
2 Glete, War and the State in Early Modern Europe, pp. 179, 189-191, 194-195, 201-206; Tallett, 
War and Society in Early-Modern Europe, pp. 82-83.
soLdiErs in WEstErn EuropE, c. 1500-1790 137
tenants, but elsewhere nobles and rulers had no such compunctions.3 In 
England, for example, the militia system received a new lease of life under 
Henry VIII. All those with £10 in land and the equivalent in goods were 
obliged to keep weapons and armour and be ready to serve the king. The 
enquiry of 1552 revealed the existence of 128,250 available men, though 
their military knowledge and ability to equip themselves was patchy.4 
Venice similarly rostered 20,000 militia to defend the terraferma in 1528 
and a number of German states and towns reorganized their militias for 
local defence in the crisis years of the Reformation and the Thirty Years 
War.5 In practice, militias proved to be of dubious military value. Poorly 
equipped and lacking training, they were unable to confront professional 
forces, and their reluctance to serve away from their immediate locality 
further restricted their usefulness. However, as we shall see, after c. 1650 
they would be reconfigured by inventive rulers who employed militias to 
bulk out their regular forces.
Governments also forcibly drafted men whom they regarded as harmful 
to society or otherwise useless. This was not a novel expedient: up to 12 per 
cent of men serving in English forces between 1339 and 1361 may have been 
criminals.6 On average, the English crown recruited 6,500 men annually for 
overseas service between 1585 and 1602, many of them ne’er-do-wells.7 The 
Tudor administration in Ireland was especially keen to encourage social and 
economic stability by freeing the body politic of undesirables. It periodically 
emptied the prisons of Ulster, leaving the province “in more complete peace 
and obedience than has ever been seen since the Conquest”, according to 
one seventeenth-century English administrator.8 Similarly, the republic of 
Genoa enlisted Corsican bandits, although it did promise a pardon at the 
end of their service.9 However, the impressment of dissolute persons should 
not be exaggerated and probably looms larger in the historiography than 
is warranted.10 Rogues, vagabonds, and criminals made bad soldiers, and 
commanders were reluctant to have too many in their forces. Sir Francis de 
3 Schnitter, Volk und Landesdefension, pp. 123-130.
4 Goring, “The Military Obligations of the English People”, pp. 112-137, “The General Proscrip-
tion of 1552”. See also Fissel, English Warfare, 1511-1642, pp. 61-66.
5 Mallett and Hale, The Military Organization of a Renaissance State, p. 353; Albert, “Staat 
und Gesellschaft, 1500-1745”, pp. 11, 591.
6 Hewitt, The Organization of War under Edward III, pp. 29-30.
7 Hammer, Elizabeth’s Wars, pp. 245-247.
8 Quoted in O’Reilly, “The Irish Mercenary Tradition in the 1600s”, p. 390.
9 Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, II, p. 749.
10 See the exaggerated comment in Motley, A History of the United Netherlands, IV, p. 69, for 
example.
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Vere was accordingly “careful to send them back again” to England from his 
command in the Netherlands when he discovered their origins.11 However, 
governments in the eighteenth century would make increased use of their 
power to draft such men in their efforts to f ind recruits for their burgeoning 
armies.
Standing somewhere between voluntary and involuntary forms of 
recruitment was what might best be termed the quasi-feudal system. The 
socio-cultural identity of the nobility remained bound up with military 
endeavour, and the medieval notion that nobles had a feudal obligation 
to f ight for their ruler retained some vigour. Accordingly, rulers in the 
sixteenth century still resorted to the customary way to raise troops by 
calling upon their nobles to turn out accompanied by their retinues. Thus 
the ban and arrière ban were deployed in France with a degree of success, 
though some individuals chose to make a f inancial contribution rather 
than serve in person.12 Here, the great nobility retained an important role 
in the provision of the cavalry.13 In England, the great nobility were less 
important than in previous decades, and the crown relied more upon the 
lesser gentry, though members of the court nobility still had an important 
if neglected role.14 Nobles assembled their retinues in various ways: they 
recruited volunteers; they established contracts with subordinate officers to 
f ind men; and they called out their dependants, aff inities, and tenants who 
had little choice but to follow their lord. For instance, the Earl of Leicester, 
who was authorized by Elizabeth I to raise 500 infantry in 1585, responded 
by insisting that his tenants, whose leases obliged them to serve “in tyme 
of warre”, should follow him into the f ield.15 Nobles continued to obey their 
ruler’s summons to arms in this way throughout the sixteenth century, 
not least because they used their role as recruiting agents to strengthen 
their position vis-à-vis the crown but also over their own dependants.16 The 
numbers that could be raised in this way were not insignif icant. The Earl 
of Pembroke reportedly brought 2,000 men from his Welsh estates during 
the Western rebellion of 1549 though, as this example suggests, the use of 
11 Quoted in Trim, “Fighting ‘Jacob’s Wars’”, p. 232.
12 Lot, Recherches sur les effectifs des armées françaises, pp. 258-261. 
13 Potter, Renaissance France at War, pp. 177-179.
14 Goring, “The Military Obligations of the English People”, pp. 112-137; Grummit, “The Court, 
War and Noble Power in England”.
15 Adams, “The Gentry of North Wales and the Earl of Leicester’s Expedition to the Nether-
lands”, pp. 133-134, “Military Obligations of Leasehold Tenants in Lancastrian Denbigh”, p. 206.
16 Gunn, Grummit, and Cool, War, State and Society in England and the Netherlands, pp. 51-60, 
138-142, 144-148; Boynton, The Elizabethan Militia, pp. 76-88.
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these semi-feudal retinues was generally restricted to local service within 
the homeland.17 But, as time went on, a declining proportion of the noble 
class proved willing to honour their “feudal” obligations, and the system fell 
into disuse. Nobles nevertheless continued to associate their social status, 
and the privileges it brought, with martial virtues and military service. As 
we shall see, in the eighteenth century rulers played upon this to make use 
of them as recruiting agents.
It was generally agreed that volunteers made better soldiers than pressed 
men. As one captain observed, “it is most sure […] that persuading without 
pressing will carry most and make the best soldiers”.18 This was one reason 
why states preferred to use voluntary methods of recruitment. Three main 
systems for voluntary recruiting can be identified, though they shared some 
important characteristics. The f irst involved the use of commissioned offic-
ers. Typically a captain would be issued by a ruler with letters patent that 
left him free to appoint his junior and non-commissioned off icers (NCOs) 
and that designated the area in which he could recruit. He, together with a 
small party that included veterans whenever possible attracted volunteers by 
broadcasting the need for men and by making soldiering appear as attractive 
as possible through various means of public display – beating a drum, unfurl-
ing the colours, recounting tales of heroic military action – as well as through 
the purchase of copious amounts of alcohol and the payment of a bounty. 
Recruiting by commission was used both to raise new companies and to 
maintain existing ones at something approaching full strength, and was 
employed throughout western Europe. As one veteran commentator noted, 
“The levying of souldiers […] by the sound of the drumme […] is generally 
used over the most partes of Christendome.” 19 It reached a peak of eff iciency 
in sixteenth-century Spain where the monarchy raised an average of 9,000 
men annually with up to 20,000 being recruited in some years, though the 
strains of war eventually took their toll and Philip II’s successors reverted 
to more traditional means, handing over responsibility for recruitment to 
local towns and nobles as administración gave way to asiento.20
The second method of voluntary recruitment involved negotiating an agree-
ment, the Bestallung, with a military contractor for the delivery of a specified 
number of troops at an agreed time and place. The contract also set out the 
17 Dictionary of National Biography, 63 vols (London, 1885-1903), IX, pp. 671-672.
18 Quoted in Trim, “Fighting ‘Jacob’s Wars’”, p. 229.
19 F. Markham, Five Decades of Epistles of Warre (London, 1622), p. 30, quoted in Trim “Fighting 
‘Jacob’s Wars’”, p. 236.
20 Thompson, War and Government in Habsburg Spain, pp. 103-145.
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terms of service, including levels of pay, duration, and the forms of warfare 
in which the troops could be involved. Particularly in demand were German 
Landsknechte, all-arms units noted for their reliability in battle, together with 
specialist forces including Swiss pikemen, German Reiter or pistoleers, and 
Albanian and Savoyard light cavalry. Contract troops developed a reputation 
for being assertive in defence of their rights, refusing to fight if they were not 
paid, for instance, and they were not cheap. However, they comprised a high 
proportion of veterans, came ready trained and equipped, and acquitted 
themselves so well on the battlefield that few states dared do without them.
One disadvantage of contract troops was that money not only had to be 
found “up front” to employ them, but a continuing revenue stream was also 
essential to retain their services. This was always going to be diff icult for 
cash-strapped governments. The situation was just about workable during 
the sixteenth century when wars had lasted for no more than two or three 
campaign seasons, but conflicts began to increase in duration, especially 
after the temporary lull provided by the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis (1559), 
putting increased strain on state f inances. This opened up the potential for 
a novel form of contracting which, following Fritz Redlich, I will designate 
“general contracting”.21 The general contractor differed from the traditional 
mercenary contractor of the late f ifteenth and early sixteenth centuries in 
that he did not merely raise a troop in return for initial costs. Instead, he 
met these initial and some ongoing costs – recruitment, wages, equipment, 
and supplies – well into the campaign, eventually recouping his outlay 
and making a profit by the receipt of tax revenues, lump sum payments, 
Kontributions levied on friendly and enemy territory, and booty. The unit 
was “owned” by the contractor who had raised it and thus proprietorship 
as well as entrepreneurship became signif icant features of warfare in the 
late sixteenth and f irst half of the seventeenth centuries.22
The system of general contracting reached a peak during the Thirty Years 
War (1618-1648). Fought largely within the German theatre, but involving 
almost all the European states, the conflict demanded unprecedented 
numbers of troops. Rulers lacked the necessary native manpower, the 
administrative structures, and the liquid cash to recruit and supply the 
soldiers themselves and turned to the services of general contractors, who 
undertook the provision of whole regiments and even armies. The foremost 
employer was the Holy Roman Emperor who had large potential assets in 
the form of land and tax revenues, but lacked the administrative machinery 
21 Redlich, The German Military Enterpriser and His Workforce, remains the classic study.
22 Parrott, “From Military Enterprise to Standing Armies”, esp. pp. 79-83.
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in his Austrian lands to mobilize these.23 France stood out against the trend, 
but even it was obliged to make limited use of general contractors.24 The 
leading enterpriser was Albrecht von Wallenstein. His army lists recorded 
total paper strengths in 1625 of 61,900, rising to 150,900 f ive years later.25 
To recruit and supply forces on such a huge scale perforce involved the 
contractor in establishing networks with subcontracting colonels and cap-
tains who “beat the drum” and produced the volunteers. Not only that, but 
the contractor made agreements with f inanciers and bankers, merchants, 
munitionnaires, arms manufacturers, and others to supply the army with 
food, munitions, equipment, and pay. Accordingly, regiments or armies such 
as those raised by Ernst von Mansfeld, Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar, Albrecht 
von Wallenstein, Johan Banér, or Lennart Torstensson represented the ac-
cumulation of venture capital on a huge scale, and the commander presided 
over a group of stakeholders who all expected a return on their investment, 
whether that investment be f inancial or purely military, with implications 
for the relationship between soldier and employer, as we shall see.
Methods of recruitment, c. 1650-1790
From the second half of the seventeenth century, methods of recruitment 
changed in a number of signif icant ways. In the f irst major development, 
states made greater use of involuntary recruitment. They continued to draft 
criminals and ne’er-do-wells, but in larger numbers than before. The war 
minister of France, the Comte de St Germain, noted in 1775 that, “As things 
are, the army must inevitably consist of the scum of the people, and of all 
those for whom society has no use.” 26 More importantly, states developed the 
obligation to perform military service to draft men into militias. These could 
be used for special purposes, such as policing Huguenot areas, serving as a 
reserve in time of war, or providing a mechanism for drafting men directly 
into the regular forces. Of the great powers, it was France under Louis XIV 
that led the way. Every parish was obliged to provide a recruit who could 
be taken into the regular army. In this way more than 250,000 men were 
23 He employed twice as many contractors as Sweden: Redlich, The German Military Enterpriser 
and His Workforce, I, p. 206.
24 Parrott, “French Military Organization in the 1630s”, pp. 160-163, Richelieu’s Army.
25 Kollmann, Documenta Bohemica Bellum Tricennale Illustrantia, IV, pp. 414-446. There were 
around 210,000 soldiers employed in Germany in 1648: Parker, The Thirty Years War, p. 191.
26 Quoted in Ducros, French Society in the Eighteenth Century, p. 294. On Prussia, see Wilson, 
“Social Militarization in Eighteenth-Century Germany”, pp. 16-18. 
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raised between 1701 and 1713, representing 46 per cent of the native recruits 
who fought during the War of the Spanish Succession, while some 120,000 
militia were drafted to replace garrisoned veterans in the 1740s.27 Although 
heartily detested, militia service was supportable because the wealthy and 
well-connected were able to buy themselves out. Many German states made 
even greater use of the militia. In Bavaria, Mecklenburg, and Württemberg 
under the regency of Friedrich Karl (1677-1693), militia formations were 
raised and then drafted into the regular army as the need arose. Elsewhere, 
as in Saxony, Mainz, and Würzburg, the intermediate militia stage was 
omitted and men on the militia lists were taken straight into the army. In 
Prussia in 1733, Hesse-Cassel in 1762, and Austria between 1771 and 1780, a 
canton system of recruitment was adopted (Kantonverfassung), with each 
regiment being allocated a district from which it drew regular annual levies, 
the compulsory element of service being supplied by the obligation that had 
existed to enrol in the militia.28
The second major development concerned the system of military con-
tracting. This did not end altogether after 1650, but it changed markedly. The 
general contractors who had figured so prominently in the Thirty Years War 
disappeared from the scene, and military contracting in its classical sense 
was substantially modif ied. Military contracting had always represented a 
standing affront to princes’ sovereignty. This was what Stephen Gardiner had 
been getting at in 1545 when he wrote of the need “to eskape the thrawldom 
to such noughty mennes service”.29 Moreover, some contractors in the Thirty 
Years War had displayed signs of a dangerous autonomy. Cardinal Richelieu 
commented about Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar, “An excellent commander 
but so much for himself that no-one could be sure of him”.30 Accordingly, 
the use of general contractors was phased out and the role of the private 
entrepreneur was diminished. For a while, the market for contract troops 
was left to the younger sons of German princes who had no personal 
patrimony or hope of royal succession.31 But from the late seventeenth 
27 Corvisier, L’armée française de la fin du XVIIe siècle au ministère de Choiseul, I, tables pp. 157, 
248; Lynn, Giant of the Grand Siècle, pp. 369-393. See also Girard, Le service militaire en France 
à la fin du règne de Louis XIV.
28 Summarized in Wilson, War, State and Society in Württemberg, pp. 79-81. See also Ingrao, 
The Hessian Mercenary State; and Duffy, The Army of Frederick the Great, pp. 54-57.
29 Muller, The Letters of Stephen Gardiner, p. 180.
30 Quoted in Wedgwood, The Thirty Years War, p. 366. But see the revisionary comments of 
Parrott on Wallenstein: “From Military Enterprise to Standing Armies”, p. 85. The traditional 
view of his treachery is given in “Wallenstein”, in G. Martel (ed.), Encyclopedia of War, 5 vols 
(Chichester, 2012), V, pp. 2350-2352.
31 Barker, “Military Entrepreneurship and Absolutism”.
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century and throughout the eighteenth, a substantial number of rulers 
began to rent out their armies to foreign employers. The states concerned 
in this “soldier-trade” were principally German but included others such as 
Savoy-Piedmont and Sweden under the regency of Karl XI. In return for the 
hire of its forces, Sweden took “subsidies” from France using the money to 
retain a credible army in Pomerania.32 The eighteenth-century market for 
the hire of soldiers was dominated by states from within the Holy Roman 
Empire, including Hesse-Cassel, Hanover, Württemberg, Bavaria, Saxony, 
the Palatinate, and Würzburg.33 Signif icantly, many of the troops who were 
hired out had been forcibly drafted into the army with implications for 
scholars seeking to construct a taxonomy of army types, as we shall see.
As well as relying on impressed men, militias, and hired forces, states 
also developed their systems for f inding volunteers. Even in Prussia, which 
relied heavily upon impressment, more than half the army continued to 
be volunteers.34 How were these found? As noted above, the quasi-feudal 
system of recruitment was already in terminal decline in the sixteenth 
century. Nobles nevertheless continued to associate their social status with 
martial virtues and military service, and rulers made use of this to engage 
their social and political elites in the recruitment and maintenance of their 
forces.35 Many nobles were prepared to put themselves and their private 
fortunes at the disposal of monarchs in the expectation of gaining prestige 
and because, quite simply, this was what was expected of them. One way 
of encouraging nobles to do so was by formally implementing a system of 
venality under which off icers purchased their commissions, as happened 
most notably in France.36 Although venality theoretically gave off icers 
ownership of their off ice and not of their men, in practice they were still 
expected to recruit their unit. They did so by public appeal to volunteers, 
by using their influence over dependants, and by deploying their private 
retinues in those instances where they still maintained them. Equally, 
32 Storrs, War, Diplomacy and the Rise of Savoy, ch. 2; Upton, Charles XI and Swedish Absolutism, 
pp. 14-15, 94-97.
33 On the soldier-trade, see Hartmann, Geld als Instrument Europäischer Machtpolitik, Karl 
Albrecht-Karl VII, pp. 150-160; Wilson, War, State and Society in Württemberg, ch. 3; Ingrao, The 
Hessian Mercenary State; Atwood, The Hessians; Brauer, Die Hannoversch-Englischen Subsidi-
enverträge.
34 Wilson, “Social Militarization in Eighteenth-Century Germany”, p. 5.
35 Parrott, “From Military Enterprise to Standing Armies”; Glete, War and the State in Early 
Modern Europe, pp. 52-66.
36 Rowlands, The Dynastic State and the Army under Louis XIV, “Louis XIV, Aristocratic Power 
and the Elite Units of the French Army”. On problems with venality in the later eighteenth 
century, see Félix and Tallett, “The French Experience, 1661-1815”, pp. 158-159. 
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nobles were expected to use their own resources to equip, pay, and feed 
their men when state funding ran out, as it invariably did. Venality gave 
off icers an incentive to invest their personal resources in the recruitment 
and maintenance of their units, since they would be more likely to get a 
return on their investment over the longer term. Profits could be made, for 
example, by selling rights of leave, from the supply of food and equipment to 
the men, and from the sale of subordinate off icerships and NCO positions. 
Even where venality was not introduced, nobles could still be lured into 
accepting a commission and acting as a recruiting agent by the expectation 
of making a profit through the Kompaniewirtschaft, the system whereby 
captains made money from administering the f inances of a company of 
soldiers. Austrian colonels expected to earn 10,000 gulden annually.37 Prus-
sia resisted the trend, though here the lack of alternative employment forced 
nobles into the army. Proprietorship and entrepreneurship thus continued 
to be important within armies throughout the early modern period, and 
integral to the process of raising and maintaining forces.
Looking at the period 1500-1790 overall, three points stand out. First, 
governments used a variety of systems to recruit their forces. These systems 
reflected the nature of the early modern state, and in particular the relative 
f iscal and administrative weakness of central authority. This obliged gov-
ernments to rely upon the use of contractors, including general contractors 
for a time, as well as upon their social and political elites to recruit and 
maintain armies. Even when the use of general contractors was phased 
out after c. 1650, states still found it easier to hire troops rather than raise 
them ab initio, and the dependence of rulers upon the co-operation of their 
nobilities, who served as intermediate agents of government, remained 
very considerable.
Secondly, despite the increased use of impressment, volunteers consti-
tuted the majority of recruits before the French revolutionary wars when, 
confronted with an apparently overwhelming coalition of European states, 
the nascent republic introduced the levée en masse in 1793 and further 
ref ined its procedures for conscription through the Jourdan-Delbrel law 
of 1799. The readiness of men to volunteer for military service can be 
chiefly explained by the overcrowded state of the labour market. For most 
volunteers, the army was an employer of last resort, and they signed on 
only because there was nothing better to be had. To be sure, a few may have 
joined to throw off the humdrum workaday world of civilian employment. 
“To bee bound an apprentice, that life I deemed little better than a dog’s 
37 Asch, “War and State-Building”, p. 326; McKay, Prince Eugene of Savoy, p. 11.
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life and base”, wrote Sydnam Poyntz in explanation of his decision to join 
up.38 Others welcomed the chance to see the world, or the opportunity 
to enjoy the unrestrained licentious behaviour that characterized what 
Erasmus termed “the wicked life of the soldier”,39 while for yet others the 
army offered the chance of glory. Francis I, the Holy Roman Emperor (1745-
1765), noted that “what the natives of Ireland even dislike for principle, they 
generally will perform through a desire for glory”.40 Yet most recruits agreed 
to serve for the prosaic reason that they simply had no other way to make 
a living. Hardship and need were the best recruiting sergeants and drove 
men into armies. Even Poyntz confessed his true reason for enlisting: “My 
necessitie forced mee, my Money being growne short, to take the manes 
of a private soldier.” 41 The impoverished recruit created by the playwright 
Caldéron de la Barca summed up the situation for the overwhelming major-
ity of volunteers: “Only great need drives me to the war, I’d never go had 
I money in store.” 42 Recruitment patterns were accordingly closely linked 
to economic cycles. Volunteers were easiest to f ind in the autumn months 
as agricultural labourers were laid off, or in the wake of a slump. Edward 
Coss has demonstrated that enlistment in the British army soared at times 
of economic downturn.43 Of course, one might question whether potential 
recruits faced with a choice between starvation and signing-on were in any 
meaningful sense “volunteers”. But the fact that they were theoretically free 
agents, and there was no legal compulsion on them to join, means that we 
should locate them on the “free” end of the axis of our graph.
Thirdly, the ready supply of volunteers meant that governments through-
out our period could use impressment and militia service as a last resort 
to top up their forces, drawing upon those elements judged to be of little 
use to society and who had no political clout. There was greater resort to 
involuntary recruitment in the later seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
This was brought about by an expansion in the number of men under arms. 
Historically, around 1 per cent of the population has represented the ceiling 
for sustainable recruitment, but this f igure began to be routinely exceeded 
with Louis XIV’s France leading the way. Peacetime levels of about 10,000 
and 60,000-80,000 for major wars before 1650 soared to totals of 130,000 
38 Goodrick, The Relation of Sydnam Poyntz, p. 45.
39 Quoted in Hale, War and Society in Renaissance Europe, p. 127.
40 Quoted in McGinn, “St Patrick’s Day in Vienna, 1766”, Irish Roots Magazine, 1 (1996), pp. 10-11, 
cited in O’Reilly, “The Irish Mercenary Tradition in the 1600s”, p. 384.
41 Goodrick, The Relation of Sydnam Poyntz, p. 45.
42 Quoted in Stradling, Europe and the Decline of Spain, p. 124.
43 Coss, All for the King’s Shilling.
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and 360,000 respectively by the 1690s, representing over 2 per cent of the 
French population. Prussia during the Seven Years War (1756-1763) had 
250,000 men under arms, around 5 per cent of the population of 5 million, 
and kept an army of 150,000 in peacetime. Britain similarly came close to 
the 2 per cent mark during the Seven Years War and War of American In-
dependence.44 These wartime highs proved unsustainable in the long term, 
but they nonetheless represented an increase on earlier decades, and by the 
eighteenth century most European states had wartime military establish-
ments that were four or f ive times bigger than those of their predecessors 
200 years previously.45 One consequence of the increased number of men 
under arms was the need to make greater use of involuntary methods of 
recruitment. These methods were deployed especially by those states, such 
as Prussia, that maintained disproportionately large armies in relation to 
their population, and whose limited tax base and under-commercialized 
economies made it diff icult to mobilize liquid resources.46
The rewards of soldiering
Whatever the process that led to their recruitment, all soldiers expected 
to be compensated for what they did. This included receipt of pay, and in 
certain respects being paid made them similar to civilian wage-labourers. 
Pay rates for the “average” soldier – if such a thing existed – were on the low 
side but broadly consistent with those in the civilian labour market. The 1514 
Statute of Artif icers in England set the wages of skilled craftsmen at 6d per 
day, with other labourers at 4d. By comparison an ordinary infantryman 
received some 6d in mid-century. When inflation is taken into account 
this was hardly generous but not out of line with what one might expect.47 
Moreover, soldiers with specialist skills who were in short supply received 
additional rewards, so that manifold gradations of pay existed in early 
modern armies. Thus the company assembled by Count Brissac for royal 
service in 1567 included three commissioned off icers, two NCOs, a quar-
44 Gat, “What Constituted the Military Revolution of the Early Modern Period?”, pp. 36-38; 
Lynn, “Revisiting the Great Fact of War and Bourbon Absolutism”; Frost, The Northern Wars, 
p. 115.
45 Wilson, “Warfare in the Old Regime”, table 3:1, p. 80.
46 Wilson, “Social Militarization in Eighteenth Century Germany”, pp. 38-39; Scott, “The 
Fiscal-Military State and International Rivalry during the Long Eighteenth Century”, pp. 47-48.
47 Statutes of the Realm, 11 vols (London, 1810-1828), III, pp. 124-126; Tallett, War and Society in 
Early-Modern Europe, pp. 94-95.
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termaster, musicians, three kinds of pikemen, halberdiers, and three sorts 
of arquebusiers, all of whom received different levels of pay with the result 
that in this small unit there were fourteen distinct pay grades.48 Specialist 
troops received higher rewards than their locally recruited counterparts, 
partly in recognition of their superior f ighting skills. Landsknecht pay in 
sixteenth-century French royal armies was about 20 per cent higher than 
that of the native infantry, and the German units also received additional 
bonus payments. Swiss pikemen in French employ received an extra month’s 
wages in the event of battle, and survivors insisted upon receiving the pay 
of casualties.49
To be sure, higher pay rates did not simply reflect the state of the labour 
market and the specialist skills on offer. Thus, the heavy cavalry through-
out our period tended to be especially well rewarded. During the Wars 
of Religion, their off icers were paid twice as much as analogous ranks 
in the infantry; and even the lowest-paid mounted archer, at 17 livres per 
month, had a salary higher than most rank-and-file infantry. This certainly 
reflected their perceived usefulness on the battlef ield, but higher wages 
were also meant to cover the initial investment in horses and equipment 
that was required of the mounted soldier. The cost of outf itting a mounted 
archer was in the region of 400 livres; and a minimum of 600-700 livres was 
required for an homme d’armes who needed three horses and a significantly 
greater amount of armour. This was ten or f ifteen times the cost of equip-
ping a heavily armoured pikeman. Higher wages were also paid to cover the 
cost of feeding and replacing the horses while on campaign (given their high 
mortality levels, the latter represented a signif icant expense).50 Finally, and 
most importantly, higher pay rates in the cavalry were due in large measure 
to the superior social status of the members of this branch of the army.
It was probably in the artillery regiments – units that proved least 
attractive to the nobility and where there were the clearest functional 
divisions – that the laws of the labour market can be seen to have operated 
48 Wood, The King’s Army, pp. 88-89.
49 Potter, Renaissance France at War, pp. 129-130, 137. Being hired by the regiment made contract 
troops more expensive, since the employer had to fund an extra layer of regimental off icers: 
Wood, The King’s Army, p. 137.
50 Wood, The King’s Army, pp. 135-136; Robinson, “Horse Supply and the Development of the 
New Model Army”, p. 122 and passim. It cost around £12 to mount and equip a cavalryman 
in England in the 1640s, compared to an infantryman’s pay of 8d per day. See British Library, 
Thomason Tracts, E300(5) Ordinance...for the Raising of Five Hundred Horse; Asquith, The New 
Model Army, p. 19. Note the comments of Maurice de Saxe, Mes rêveries (1732), in Phillips, Roots 
of Strategy, pp. 119-120, 137.
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in their purest form. A French memoir from 1568 estimated that 2,620 people 
would be needed to service the artillery train of the royal army, including 
clerks, gunners, pioneers, pontoon specialists, tenters, drivers, and others. 
The highest paid was the grand master, at 500 livres per month; the lowest 
were the humble labourers or pioneers. As James Wood has indicated, the 
wages paid to the personnel of the artillery train, and the functions they 
performed, correlated very closely to an industrial enterprise. Thus there 
was a clear labour hierarchy, with those exercising managerial/supervisory 
roles receiving the most pay, followed by the skilled elements (roughly 22 
per cent of the total force), then the unskilled workers who comprised some 
75 per cent of the workforce. All the skilled workers, beginning with the 
gunners at 10 livres per month, received higher wage rates than the average 
pikeman or arquebusiers at 8-9 livres per month, and their pay compared 
favourably with that of the mounted archers who, when expenses were 
taken into account, may have cleared only 8.7 livres in monthly salary.51
Like their counterparts in civilian society, soldiers were not averse to us-
ing their “industrial muscle” to wring higher rewards out of their employers. 
This was especially the case with groups such as the Swiss pikemen and 
the Landsknechte, both of whom had a strong sense of communal solidarity 
reinforced by well-developed, autonomous internal structures that made 
them, in some respects, akin to guilds or trade unions. The Landsknechte, 
for instance, formed self-governing units in which the common soldiers, 
comprising the gemeente or community, elected their own off icers (the 
voerder, gemeene weyfel, and fourier), administered justice, and agreed their 
terms and conditions of employment.52 They used their corporate solidarity 
to drive up pay rates and to impose what now might be termed restrictive 
practices. Thus the Swiss in 1522 informed their immediate employer, the 
duc de Montmorency, that they would not assault fortif ied towns because 
this was simply “not their trade”.53 Just as the autonomy and restrictive 
practices of the guilds offended the lumières of later Enlightenment dec-
ades, so these same characteristics of the Landsknechte offended their 
employers even though their military skills made them indispensable. In 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the remedy in both instances 
appeared similar: to reduce the autonomy and self-governance of guilds and 
Landsknechte. In the case of the former this meant exposing them to the 
51 Wood, The King’s Army, pp. 161-168.
52 Baumann, Landsknechte; Burschel, Söldner in Nordwestdeutschland des 16. und 17. Jahrhun-
derts.
53 Du Bellay and du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, p. 189.
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rigour of the free market, and in the case of the latter it involved an attack 
on their internal structures of governance.
There are undoubtedly parallels to be drawn between soldiers and wage-
labourers in civilian society. Yet we should not take these too far. One 
difference was the irregularity of soldiers’ pay. To be sure, wage-labourers 
in civilian society were commonly laid off: as the need for farm labour was 
reduced in the winter months or as cyclical slumps hit manufacturing in-
dustries. Soldiers too were frequently dismissed at the end of the campaign 
season as the winter months approached. What was distinctive about the 
soldier’s situation was the extent to which he frequently received little or 
no pay even while he was employed. This resulted in the accumulation of 
arrears which could be substantial. By February 1568 a third of the heavy 
cavalry companies in the French royal army had received no pay since the 
f irst quarter of the previous year; and the wages of the rest of the army were 
more than six months in arrears. During the campaign around Landrecies 
in 1542, the English commander Wallop, then in imperial service, reported 
of his men that they were “veray poore and few or none of theym have 
any greate store of money, victualz be dere, clothes wax thyn, and cold 
weather encreseath”. Similarly, the veteran Sir James Turner, who fought 
in Ireland for a Scots contingent during the Wars of the Three Kingdoms 
(as the English Civil Wars are now more adequately referred to) recorded 
that the army “f ingered no pay the whole time I stayd in Ireland, except 
for three months”.54
One response of soldiers to low or no pay was to mutiny, and in some 
respects this withdrawal of labour may be regarded as the equivalent of 
the strike in the civilian labour market. Mutinies were most common and 
sophisticated in the Spanish Army of Flanders, though they were by no 
means restricted to these forces. Forty-five major munities were staged (and 
there was a good deal of ritualized drama in their conduct) between 1572 
and 1607, with some lasting more than a year. Mutineers elected leaders or 
“management committees”, negotiated with the government, and sustained 
themselves by levying local taxes.55 However, a second response of soldiers 
to low or no pay was unique and simply not available to civilian workers. 
Without the wages that were supposed to buy essential supplies, the soldiers 
54 Wood, The King’s Army, p. 275; Brewer, Gairdner, and Brodie, Letters and Papers, Foreign 
and Domestic, of the Reign of Henry VIII, XVIII, ii, p. 267; Turner, Memoirs of His Own Life and 
Times, p. 24.
55 Parker, The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, pp. 185-206, “Mutiny and Discontent in 
the Spanish Army of Flanders”; Wymans, “Les mutineries militaires de 1596 à 1606”.
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resorted to pillaging the local population, taking whatever they needed 
by force. Thus, Thomas Stockdale complained of the atrocities commit-
ted by soldiers based in Yorkshire during the 1640s, admitting that if only 
the troops had been paid “the sufferance and wrong would be unto many 
less sensible”.56 This easy, almost casual resort to violence, often involving 
extreme levels of brutality, can be explained in a number of ways. Robert 
Muchembled notes the constant and systematic pattern of conflict between 
troops and members of the rural community.57 Such poor relations in part 
reflected the long-standing urban/rural hostility that was a pronounced 
feature of early modern society; and troops recruited largely from the towns 
had little regard for inhabitants of the countryside whom they regarded as 
backward, stupid, and easy prey.58
However, we should probably look beyond town/country relations to 
the huge cultural gulf that separated soldiers from all civilians. As Wood 
notes, “The soldiery were an instrument of barely controlled violence and 
destructiveness and their vocation and values were based upon completely 
different assumptions about rules of law, property rights, and the appli-
cation of force and coercion that in any other context would be clearly 
criminal behaviour.” 59 Levels of violence were especially high whenever 
there was a heightened sense of the “Other” between soldiers and civilians 
brought about, for example, by pronounced ethnic, religious, or cultural 
differences.60 Foreign troops in particular saw themselves as set apart from 
the native civilian population. The notorious “Day of the Landsknechte” at 
Caen in 1513 when soldiers ransacked the town after having not been paid 
for months, the sack of Rome by Charles V’s unpaid German troops in 1527, 
and the “Spanish Fury” at Antwerp in 1576 were merely the best known of 
a long catalogue of outrages by non-native troops.61 Similarly, the appalling 
treatment of Irish civilians in the 1640s by English soldiers was grounded 
in the widely held belief that Irish Catholics were “backward” with respect 
to religion and culture. Barnaby Rich described them as “more uncivil, 
more uncleanly, more barbarous and more brutish in their customs and 
demeanours than any other people in the known world”.62 Moreover, it 
56 Johnson, The Fairfax Correspondence, I, p. 203.
57 Muchembled, La violence au village, esp. pp. 107-118.
58 Hale, War and Society in Renaissance Europe, pp. 190-191.
59 Wood, The King’s Army, p. 236.
60 Hale, “On the Concept of the ‘Other’ and the ‘Enemy’”.
61 De Bourdeille de Brantôme, Oeuvres complètes, VI, pp. 220-227; Tracy, Emperor Charles V, 
Impresario of War, pp. 32-36; Parker, The Dutch Revolt, p. 178.
62 Rich, A Short Survey of Ireland, p. 2.
soLdiErs in WEstErn EuropE, c. 1500-1790 151
made little difference when soldiers were meant to be allies of the civilian 
population. This can be exemplif ied by the behaviour of poorly paid Scots 
forces in England during the f irst Civil War, who committed numerous 
atrocities in their search for supplies, even though they were meant to be 
billeted upon a friendly population.63
The irregularity of their pay and their ready resort to violence when 
unpaid were not the only things that distinguished soldiers from civilian 
wage-labourers. Being paid a wage was not necessarily the main or even sole 
reason for f ighting. All soldiers anticipated an economic reward, but this 
might equally come from ransom or from booty as from pay, certainly before 
c. 1650. “Do you think we are in the King’s service for the four ducats a month 
we earn?”, Henry VIII’s Spanish captains serving at Boulogne rhetorically 
asked their general. “Not so my lord: on the contrary, we serve with the 
hope of taking prisoners and getting their ransom.” 64 Others expected to 
make a prof it by picking over the dead and wounded on the battlef ield 
and from the sack of a town after it had been taken by assault. The laws 
of war permitted the soldiers three days of unrestricted plunder of a town 
that had been stormed after it had unreasonably refused to surrender. 
This was justif ied partly on the grounds that it would otherwise have been 
impossible to bring the soldiers to the point where they were prepared to 
undertake the hazardous operation of storming a breach. Outside these 
instances, monetary reward might come through routine pillaging of 
peasants and others. Thus a sixteenth-century woodcut by Erhard Schön 
shows a Landsknecht and his female companion with poems accompanying 
the two characters. The Landsknecht, a former cobbler, explains that he 
will abandon shoemaking for soldiering to gain what he can, since being a 
cobbler rewards him little, though “in many wars I have won/Great wealth 
and manifold honors/Who then knows whom fortune favors?” She replies 
that, “Perhaps so much may be my winning [from pillage]/Much more than 
ever I could whilst spinning.” 65 We should not be surprised by soldiers’ 
expectation of reward by means of ransom and pillage, for the spoils of 
war f igured prominently as a form of legitimate compensation in the late 
Middle Ages, and a long tradition of legal plunder preceded early modern 
63 British Library, Thomason Tracts, E365(9), A Remonstrance Concerning the Misdemeanours 
of some of the Scots Souldiers in the County of Yorke, 1646. On patterns of soldier/civilian violence, 
see Tallett, “Soldats et actes de violence à l’encontre des civils dans les îles britanniques”.
64 Hume, Chronicle of King Henry VIII...Written in Spanish by an unknown hand.
65 Lynn, Women, Armies, and Warfare in Early Modern Europe, pp. 16-17.
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military practice. The taking of spoils was a def ining characteristic of just, 
or public, war.66
Cash-strapped governments, unable to pay the soldiers in full or some-
times at all, had little choice but to accept the routine nature of pillage. The 
Mercure françois put it bluntly: “One f inds enough soldiers when one gives 
them the freedom to live off the land, and allowing them to pillage supports 
them without pay.” 67 Indeed, sometimes the situation could be turned to 
one’s advantage. The system of regulated plunder that came to a peak in 
the Thirty Years War sought, not altogether successfully, to allow armies 
to live off the population by taking regular Kontributions. Although heavy, 
Kontributions were meant to preserve the productive capacity of the terri-
tory while tapping it for the army’s benefit.68 At other times, giving soldiers 
free rein to pillage was a deliberate act of strategy, designed to hamper 
the movements of the enemy forces and bring about their disintegration. 
Integral to pillaging before c. 1650 was the presence with the army of non-
combatants, including women, who foraged, plundered, managed the “take”, 
and exchanged goods for money or food with the sutlers and “fences”. The 
signif icance of all this from our point of view is that soldiers were not so 
much being paid to f ight but rather being given “a de facto licence to pillage 
in order to support themselves, often with the aid of their comrades and 
female partners”, and in these circumstances the soldier should be regarded 
less as a wage-earner and more as “a kind of sub-contractor, empowered to 
support himself by a form of petty entrepreneurship in a family economy 
based upon pillage”.69
The relationship of general contractors and noble off icers to their “em-
ployers” was equally ambiguous. As I have already noted, for the employer 
the attraction of using a general contractor was that in return for only a 
modest “up-front” payment, the contractor and his network of subcontract-
ing colonels and captains, f inanciers, and munitionnaires, were prepared to 
subsidize initial recruitment costs, and then cover the expense of paying, 
equipping, and supplying the troops until well into the campaign. The 
contractor and his network of associates were thus not so much employees 
of the state as its creditors. True, the use of general contractors was phased 
out after the end of the Thirty Years War. But, as we have seen, govern-
ments turned increasingly to their nobilities, who were expected to use 
66 Keen, The Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages.
67 Quoted in Tilly, The Contentious French, p. 123.
68 See Tallett, War and Society in Early-Modern Europe, pp. 55-56, for a summary. 
69 Lynn, “Comments on Mercenary Military Service in Early Modern Europe”, p. 7.
soLdiErs in WEstErn EuropE, c. 1500-1790 153
their personal resources to help with the recruitment, pay, and supply of 
their unit. As Redlich has observed, regiments ceased to be the large-scale 
business enterprises of Wallenstein’s day, but they nevertheless represented 
an investment from which the colonel/captain might hope to recover his 
capital and, with any luck, generate a profit.70 Whether nobles did always 
make a profit is open to doubt: as Hervé Drévillon has shown in the case 
of France, they acquired honour as a result of military service, but little 
monetary gain.71 Nevertheless, the fact remains that they were prepared 
to subsidize the crown, and in this respect they too were as much creditors 
as employees of the state.
There are, then, real diff iculties in seeing the soldier, certainly in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as a wage-labourer who fought merely 
for pay. However, the situation did become clearer by the eighteenth century. 
As any number of examples testify, the failure to pay and supply troops and 
the tacit approval of ransom and pillage as substitutes for regular wages 
resulted in mutiny, indiscipline, disorder, or desertion. Any one of these 
could cause the collapse of the army as a f ighting force and bring a campaign 
to a juddering halt. As the experienced contractor Count Rhingrave, presci-
ently warned, “The soldier cannot live on air […] where there is hunger 
and necessity, there will arise disorder.” 72 A seventeenth-century observer 
similarly noted that “The greatest weakening of an army is disorder. The 
greatest cause of disorder is want of pay.” 73 The duc d’Estampes warned 
that if he could not provide for his men they would either desert or join the 
enemy “because such men follow the éscu”.74 Accordingly, from the mid-
seventeenth century, governments began, albeit falteringly, to put in place 
a series of linked initiatives aimed at producing military forces that were 
more tightly controlled by the prince and better supported by the state. The 
objective behind these initiatives was to improve military eff iciency and 
to turn armies into more effective instruments of state power. As Michel le 
Tellier succinctly noted, “To secure the livelihood of the soldier is to secure 
victory for the king.” 75
70 Redlich, The German Military Enterpriser and His Workforce, II, pp. 55-62.
71 Drévillon, L‘impôt du sang. His archival sources probably lead him to understate the costs 
incurred.
72 Lublinskaya, Documents pour server à l’histoire des guerres civiles en France, p. 246.
73 British Library, Thomason Tracts, E116(36) Observations Concerning Princes and States upon 
Peace and Warre, 1642.
74 Lublinskaya, Documents pour server à l’histoire des guerres civiles en France, p. 97. See also 
Donagan, War in England, 1643-49, pp. 264-267.
75 Quoted in André, Michel le Tellier et l’organisation de l’armée monarchique, p. 64.
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First, governments sought to pay their soldiers regularly even if not 
always in full. The Dutch in many respects led the way, and were generally 
regarded as the best – in the sense of most reliable – payers in the late 
seventeenth century. Not only did the States have access to liquid funds, 
drawn from taxes levied upon the Republic’s thriving commercial trade, 
but they made use of the innovation of solliciteurs-militair, businessmen 
who, in return for an agreed monthly sum, were prepared to advance 
money to a captain and his company, thus ensuring the men their pay. A 
formalization of the system gave the solliciteurs-militair a monopoly on 
paying the troops in return for an agreed interest rate of 6.95 per cent on 
all the funds they advanced.76 The Dutch system of payment to some extent 
pref igured what would happen elsewhere. During the War of the Austrian 
Succession (1741-1749), for example, pay advances to the troops in the two 
French armies operating in Germany, the armée de Bavière and the armée 
de Westphalie, were handled increasingly by a body of specialist f inanciers 
such as Mauvillain.77 If soldiers were paid more routinely, governments 
nonetheless took action to ensure that there was no scope for bargaining 
over levels of pay and conditions of service. Thus the Landsknecht regiments 
were reorganized into companies; their elected off icers were abolished; 
pay was tied to musters; and troops lost the right to represent themselves. 
In a similar way, employers sought means to restrict the autonomy of the 
Swiss pikemen.78
Secondly, paying the soldiers allowed the enforcement of harsher dis-
cipline. As Everhard van Reyd stated bluntly, “One could not hang those 
[soldiers] one did not pay”, a judgement conf irmed by General George 
Monck who concluded that “if [the men] are punctually paid […] then your 
general can with justice punish them severely”.79 By the mid-seventeenth 
century, most of the rules and conventions governing the conduct of war-
fare were already in place.80 As far as the ordinary soldier was concerned, 
these were embodied in the articles of war issued by commanders at the 
76 Van Nimwegen, “The Transformation of Army Organisation”, pp. 170-171, 174-175. On the 
collapse of Dutch f inances after 1715, see Scott, “The Fiscal-Military State and International 
Rivalry during the Long Eighteenth Century”, pp. 34-36.
77 Félix, “Victualling Louis XV’s Armies”, p. 10.
78 Van Nimwegen, “The Transformation of Army Organisation”, p. 168.
79 E. Van Reyd, Histoire der Nederlantscher Oorlogen (Leuwarden, 1650), p. 324, quoted in 
Nickle, The Military Reforms of Prince Maurice of Orange, pp. 90-91; Monck quoted in Lloyd, A 
Review of the History of Infantry, p. 182. See also the comments of Maurice de Saxe, Mes rêveries, 
in Phillips, Roots of Strategy, p. 106.
80 Parker, “Early Modern Europe”, p. 41. 
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start of each campaign. The articles would not be altered in substance, 
though they were greatly expanded in detail, but from the second half of 
the seventeenth century they began to be enforced with a new rigour.81 In 
particular, those sections that forbade looting, theft, and mistreatment of 
civilians were implemented in an attempt to cut out or at least restrain 
unlicensed pillaging. Marshal Claude Villars’s use of “the very greatest sever-
ity” against breaches of discipline with respect to pillaging was typical.82 
All eighteenth-century armies thus had their equivalent of the French 
prévôts de maréchaux charged with keeping order in the camp and on the 
march, and military courts were held on a more routine basis than they 
had been earlier.
Apart from restricting pillage, the enforcement of more rigorous disci-
pline had the extra benefit from the commander’s point of view that raw 
recruits could be made to march, drill, and practise battlefield manoeuvres. 
Additionally, troops could now be obliged to perform duties such as digging 
trenches and latrines, carrying their own baggage, and preparing earthwork 
fortif ications. These were duties that their predecessors had frequently 
jibbed at and devolved onto the numerous women and other camp followers, 
or onto civilians haplessly pressed into service.83 As Wood has noted, these 
privileges were analogous to those of master-craftsmen, and their existence 
had meant that troops in the f irst half of our period had “operated more like 
skilled and somewhat independent contract workers, and the whole army as 
a cross between a warrior society and a specialized labor force”.84 Although 
it is important not to exaggerate the contrasts with an earlier epoch and 
to acknowledge national differences of practice, by the eighteenth century 
soldiers were increasingly cowed and obedient products of harsh discipline, 
epitomized at the extreme by the robotic Prussian forces, very different 
from the swaggering freebooters of two centuries earlier.85
As well as restricting opportunities for pillage, governments also denied 
soldiers the possibility of profit by taking over responsibility for ransom-
ing prisoners. Henry VIII’s Spanish captains had no counterpart in the 
81 Navereau, Le logement et les ustensiles des gens de guerres; Tallett, War and Society in Early-
Modern Europe, pp. 123-126.
82 Villars, Mémoires du Maréchal de Villars, II, p. 230.
83 McNeill, The Pursuit of Power, pp. 117-143. See plate 6 and accompanying inscription of 
Callot’s “Les Misères...de la Guerre” (1633), depicting villagers being led away probably to act as 
labourers: Daniel, Callot’s Etchings, item 271. 
84 Wood, The King’s Army, p. 304.
85 Kunisch, Fürst-Gesellschaft-Krieg, pp. 178-182; and the comments of Frederick the Great on 
“Prussian Troops” in Military Instructions.
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eighteenth century as governments asserted that prisoners became the 
property of the state which would handle negotiations for their release and 
take the proceeds of any ransom. Soldiers thus lost out f inancially on two 
fronts. More positively, however, governments did begin to take greater care 
of the welfare of their soldiers, arranging to supply them directly with food, 
equipment, tobacco, clothing, and housing, things that the soldier had previ-
ously been expected to purchase out of his pay. Again, the motivation was 
not altruistic but pragmatic: governments recognized that poorly supplied 
troops did not win wars. The Spanish Army of Flanders had led the way in 
this regard in the sixteenth century, but by the 1700s it was becoming com-
monplace for governments to put in place arrangements with large-scale 
civilian contractors for the supply of goods to the army.86 One unlooked-for 
consequence of the direct supply of clothing to the troops was that there was 
greater standardization of dress, leading to the development of uniforms 
with all that this implied in terms of making men more amenable to drill 
and discipline.87
To be sure, we should not exaggerate either the extent of these changes or 
the abruptness of the breach with the past. Change was gradual rather than 
revolutionary. The mechanisms of state administration were creaky and 
frequently broke down, leaving the soldier unpaid, unfed, and poorly clothed. 
Despite the harsh enforcement of discipline, desertion and disorder remained 
common features of armies, and civilians still suffered at their hands. The 
number of mutinies certainly diminished after c. 1650, but they still continued 
to take place and might have serious repercussions, as John Prebble’s study of 
Highland troops in British service demonstrates.88 Nonetheless, there were 
signif icant developments taking place, and the eighteenth-century soldier 
may be seen as more dependent than his sixteenth- and seventeenth-century 
predecessors on his wage and goods-in-kind provided by his employer, unable 
to bargain about pay and terms of employment, increasingly hemmed about 
by regulation, and part of a military machine in which standardization and 
uniformity was becoming the norm.
86 Félix, “Victualling Louis XV’s Armies”. See also Côté, Joseph-Michel Cadet, for the supply of 
troops overseas.
87 Labourers in the sixteenth-century French royal army had been given uniforms to make 
desertion harder: Wood, The King’s Army, p. 166.
88 Prebble, Mutiny.
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Social and cultural restraints on soldiering; duration of service
Some of the social and cultural factors that influenced recruitment – the 
identif ication of the nobility with military service and the ability of the 
better-off to avoid impressment and militia service – have already been al-
luded to, but it is appropriate at this point to look at two other socio-cultural 
aspects of f ighting for a living, and also to ask how long the soldier might 
expect to serve. It should be noted at the outset that the labour market 
for soldiers was an international one throughout the period. Foreigners 
constituted a signif icant and sometimes the majority element within 
armies. For instance, around 70 per cent of Francis I’s forces in 1542 were 
non-native, though the record probably goes to Sweden: only 12 per cent 
of its forces in 1632 were native.89 Such examples may not represent the 
norm, but it nonetheless remained common for a ruler to have half his 
forces made up of foreigners. One reason for this high percentage f igure in 
the sixteenth century was the need to employ specialist troops whose re-
cruitment had a regional basis: Genoese crossbowmen, Albanian stradiots, 
German Reiter able to perform the complex manoeuvres associated with 
the caracole, Bohemian users of the Wagenburg, Savoyard light cavalry, and 
Swiss pikemen. Thus, in France a memoir prepared for Catherine de Medici, 
the queen mother, at the start of the f irst civil war in 1562, envisaged using 
foreign contract troops to provide 53.8 per cent of the crown’s infantry 
forces (10.8 per cent Swiss, 27 per cent German, 8 per cent Italian, and 8 per 
cent Spanish) and 48.6 per cent of the cavalry (21 per cent Flemish, 25.6 per 
cent German, 2 per cent Savoyard).90 The development of general military 
contracting further eroded the distinction between native and non-native 
troops. The enterprisers’ polyglot forces came from every nationality. As 
Parrott observes, high-quality soldiers were important; origins were not.91
A shift in the methods of recruitment after c. 1650, with an increased em-
phasis on impressment, militia, and recruiting by commissioned captains, 
reasserted the importance of national origins, since the captains were often 
subjects of the prince whom they served. Nevertheless, foreigners continued 
to represent a substantial proportion of the state’s forces, ranging from 14 
to 60 per cent in the armies of Britain, France, Spain, and Prussia, though 
in the case of the latter many so-called foreigners were actually recruited 
89 Potter, A History of France, 1460-1560, p. 261; Nordmann, “L’armée suédoise au XVIIe siècle”, 
p. 136.
90 Wood, The King’s Army, derived from table 2.8, p. 56.
91 Parrott, “From Military Enterprise to Standing Armies”, p. 82.
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from Hohenzollern lands.92 The pattern evidenced by the larger states 
held good for many smaller ones too. Thus in 1734 Piedmont f ielded 14,000 
foreigners and 26,000 native troops, the non-native contingent compris-
ing some 35 per cent of the total.93 In the context of increased army size, 
non-national recruitment remained a resource that was too important 
to ignore. One incidental consequence of the international nature of the 
labour market for soldiers was the high levels of migration, particularly 
from fertile recruiting grounds such as sixteenth-century Italy and Ireland 
throughout the period.94
If national origins presented little bar to army service, what about gender? 
This may seem a curious question to pose, given that combatant soldiers 
were male. But what John Lynn has called the “campaign community” com-
prised a large number of civilians – craftsmen, lackeys, tradesmen, sutlers, 
carters, and pawnbrokers, for example. The army’s “tail” included numerous 
women, though they did not f igure on any muster lists.95 Their presence in 
armies was essential. They formed part of the libertine lifestyle that induced 
men to sign on; and they were integral to the maintenance and operation 
of armies. They were irreplaceable for the performance of gender-based 
duties: laundering, sewing, nursing, prostitution. They were also expected 
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to assist with siege work, digging 
latrines, foraging, and pillaging. As governments acted to reduce pillage 
and as the state’s capacity to pay and supply armies grew in the eighteenth 
century, so women’s role in securing food supplies declined. Governments, 
which had always regarded women in armies as potentially troublesome 
and as extra mouths to feed, now acted to restrict their numbers. Fewer 
women than previously marched with the armies, and as numbers of women 
diminished so too did the soldier’s freewheeling libertine lifestyle.
What of the length and terms of service? Sixteenth-century contract troops 
were the most privileged in these respects. Their period of service was defined 
by the Bestallung and was usually limited to f ighting a particular campaign. 
The contract also set out the conditions of service. Thus, 5,000 German troops 
contracted for service in Friuli refused orders from their Venetian employers 
92 Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates and Sovereigns, p. 29 table 2.1, pp. 26-32; Fann, “Foreigners 
in the Prussian Army”; Duffy, The Army of Maria Theresa, p. 55.
93 Loriga, Soldats – Un laboratoire disciplinaire, pp. 36-37, and tables 1/1 and 1/3, pp. 237-239.
94 Dubost, La France italienne au XVIe et XVIIe siècles, esp. pp. 60-65; Arfaioli, The Black 
Bands of Giovanni; Henry, “Wild Geese in Spanish Flanders”, p. 193; Genet Rouff iac and Murphy, 
Franco-Irish Military Connections, 1590-1945.
95 Lynn, Women, Armies, and Warfare in Early Modern Europe; Wilson, “German Women and 
War, 1500-1800”.
soLdiErs in WEstErn EuropE, c. 1500-1790 159
redirecting them to the fleet because their original contract had ruled out 
their use at sea.96 Additionally, they were in theory free to choose their em-
ployer, though in practice this choice might be restricted, since governments 
in the sixteenth century felt it worthwhile paying retainers to contractors to 
ensure f irst call on their services in the event of hostilities.97 The hard-won 
victory of Francis I against the Swiss at Marignano (September 1515) ironically 
encouraged the French to make permanent treaties with the Swiss cantons to 
ensure a monopoly over their outstanding pikemen.98 Moreover, the leaders of 
contract forces sometimes received grants of land and titles that made it hard 
for them to switch sides; they were reluctant to change during a campaign 
lest they lose arrears of pay and taxes from their current employer; and they 
had to consider geographical proximity and political relationships with a 
prospective employer before signing any contract.
Unlike sixteenth-century contract troops, volunteers who signed on with 
a captain made an open-ended agreement, to serve until disbandment at the 
end of the campaign or the war, whenever that might be. In practice, troops 
were frequently laid off in the autumn, especially in the f irst half of our 
period. Impressed men had no choice with regard to the length and terms 
of employment, and there was a trend in the eighteenth century, especially 
in some German states, to extend the period of service dramatically. For 
example, service in the Prussian army for those who had been forcibly 
drafted was theoretically for an unlimited period, though it was restricted 
to twenty years in 1792. In practice, however, many recruits were discharged 
early, and most received long periods of furlough allowing them to return 
home at harvest time.99 The extension of periods of service went alongside 
a trend towards retaining a body of men throughout the year, leading to the 
establishment of permanent forces. True, this was not a novelty. Standing 
armies had emerged in many polities during the f ifteenth century, and 
rulers additionally endeavoured to secure the ongoing availability of forces 
(not quite the same thing) by paying retainers to military contractors and 
through treaties with the Swiss cantons, as I have noted. But from the late 
seventeenth century onwards, the number of soldiers retained by the state 
throughout the year grew quite signif icantly.100 The need for peacetime 
forces grew with the decline of traditional and general contracting which 
96 Mallett and Hale, The Military Organization of a Renaissance State, p. 319.
97 See ibid., pp. 322-323; Parker, The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, p. 39, for examples.
98 Potter, A History of France, 1460-1560, pp. 264-265.
99 Wilson, “Social Militarization in Eighteenth Century Germany”, pp. 5, 16.
100 Tallett and Trim, “‘Then Was Then and Now is Now’”, p. 22, and Gunn, “War and the Emer-
gence of the State”, pp. 54-58.
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made it harder to hire an army “off the shelf”. A permanently retained body 
of forces, especially if they were veterans, provided the core around which 
the army could be expanded rapidly in wartime.
Once enrolled in the army, all soldiers were forbidden to desert, and 
only sixteenth-century contract troops had the opportunity (at least in 
theory) of changing sides during a war should the current employer not 
fulf il his side of the agreement. Desertion and enlisting with the enemy 
were offences that f igured in all military codes of conduct. As with much 
else to do with army life, there were efforts from c. 1650 onwards to enforce 
these twin aspects of the disciplinary codes in an attempt to enhance the 
f ighting eff iciency of armies.
Aggregate contract to state commission armies?
Our review of early modern soldiers suggests that the broad outlines con-
cerning the evolution of army style advanced by John Lynn in 1996 hold 
good.101 The aggregate contract army (1450-1650) was indeed pieced together 
by a variety of voluntary and involuntary methods, as well as through a 
quasi-feudal procedure that was a mixture of the two. The second half of our 
period (1650-1790) witnessed the development of the state commission army, 
a military force that was both better supported by the state and more tightly 
controlled by the prince. Regulation, discipline, and uniformity increasingly 
became the order of the day, and there was a growing move towards the 
direct state supply of goods that the soldier had previously been expected 
to provide himself, albeit this was generally conducted through the employ-
ment of private f inanciers and merchants. Numbers of soldiers increased, 
and the period witnessed the development of an existing trend towards 
the maintenance of standing forces. The Spanish Army of Flanders and the 
Swedes had been the paradigm forces in the period 1500-1650. After that 
point, two competing models emerged: the Dutch, who used subsidy forces, 
and the French army under Louis XIV, the latter being displaced by the Prus-
sians, who became the paradigm for Europeans from the mid-eighteenth 
century until their defeats during the Wars of the French Revolution and 
debacle in 1806. However, if the broad outlines of Lynn’s thesis remain intact, 
some amendments are called for, as he has acknowledged.
It is important to stress the continuing importance of both entrepreneur-
ship and the nobility in recruiting and supporting armies throughout the 
101 Lynn, “The Evolution of Army Style in the Modern West”.
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period and not just between 1500 and 1650. Traditional contracting as well 
as general contracting did go into steep decline after the mid-seventeenth 
century. Yet the commercialization of warfare continued in two important 
respects. First, the role of the nobility, who had always been integral to the 
raising of forces, was developed in novel ways. Monarchs continued to play 
upon the longstanding twinning of military service and noble status to 
persuade their elites both to join the army and to bring men with them. As 
we have seen, in some armies, most notably that of France, the introduction 
of a system of venality further encouraged them to use their private wealth 
and influence to recruit and support troops in the hope of a profit in the 
long term. Elsewhere, the hope of profit from the management of a company 
similarly persuaded them to put their money and prestige at the service of 
the monarch. The regiment was undoubtedly under greater state control in 
the eighteenth century, but entrepreneurship endured. We should not be 
surprised by this continued use of the nobility, for much recent scholarship 
has stressed the extent to which rulers, even in supposedly “absolute” states, 
relied upon negotiation and compromise with the social and f inancial 
elites – whether these comprised the traditional nobility, members of the 
court, provincial worthies, administrative and legal personnel, merchants, 
or others – to conduct business. This was especially the case with respect 
to the creation and maintenance of an army, a body of a size and cost 
unmatched by any other institution in the state. As David Parrott has 
noted, “The creation or transformation of an army is not some act of will 
imposed by the ruler upon a passive body of subjects. Armies and military 
institutions represent the relationship between rulers and political elites.” 102
The commercialization of warfare endured in a second way. A number of 
mainly German polities, but also Savoy and Sweden for brief periods, began 
to lease their forces to larger, and richer, states in return for the payment 
of subsidies. The hire of soldiers for monetary gain to the highest bidder, 
with little regard for the welfare of the men involved, has led to it being 
described slightingly as Soldatenhandel (soldier-trade); and the ruler of 
Hesse-Cassel in particular has been vilif ied for apparently bemoaning the 
fact that “only” 1,465 of his subjects were killed at the battle of Trenton when 
the British paid a premium for those killed in action rather than for those 
wounded or captured.103 Of course, we should not exaggerate the commercial 
aspect of this soldier-trade. As Peter Wilson has demonstrated, much more 
102 Parrott, “From Military Enterprise to Standing Armies”, p. 77.
103 Ingrao, The Hessian Mercenary State, p. 1; Wilson, War, State and Society in Württemberg, 
pp. 74-77, reviews the literature.
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than money was involved, the princes who hired out their subjects being 
concerned at least as much with the political, dynastic, and diplomatic 
returns to be gained. Indeed, the purely cash profits were frequently quite 
small or non-existent, most of the subsidy being eaten up by the costs of 
recruitment. Among the fortunate few to turn a monetary prof it were 
Hanover and the much smaller Ansbach-Bayreuth in 1797. Hesse-Cassel too 
stood out by virtue of its exceptionality in making large profits from the 
soldier-trade. Moreover, German states were discriminating when choosing 
subsidy partners, not always going for the highest bidder; and contracts 
generally contained clauses protecting the rights of the soldiers by, for 
instance, insisting that they be kept together as a unit and operate under 
the command of their own off icers. Nevertheless, even when these caveats 
are taken into account, there remained an important commercial aspect 
to this Kriegshandwerk, or “warcraft”.104
The Soldatenhandel poses a more signif icant diff iculty for Lynn’s tax-
onomy of army style, which needs to be adjusted accordingly, as he has 
proposed.105 This is because these hired regiments exhibited characteristics 
both of mercenary forces and of conscript troops at the same time. The 
term “mercenary” in the early modern period has to be defined with care. 
Modern definitions centre upon the tripartite notions of f ighting for pay, 
foreign service, and professionalism, and these have frequently and inap-
propriately been transposed to the early modern period.106 However, none 
of these qualities quite captures the essence of mercenary service in early 
modern Europe. First, after c. 1650 all soldiers expected to be paid, but 
that did not make them all mercenaries. Before 1650 pay was only one 
form of compensation for soldiering. Yet even if we extend the concept of 
monetary reward beyond pay to include the profits that soldiers hoped to 
make from ransoms and from pillage, this does not take us much further, 
since again all hoped to make a profit in this fashion. Secondly, the notion of 
foreign service is potentially misleading. To be sure, there is some reason to 
104 Wilson, “The German ‘Soldier-Trade’ of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries”, War, 
State and Society in Württemberg, pp. 84, 89; Ingrao, The Hessian Mercenary State, p. 127. 
105 Lynn, “Comments on Mercenary Military Service in Early Modern Europe”, pp. 1-3.
106 For a recent def inition, see United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Ad Hoc Com-
mittee on the Drafting of an International Convention against the Recruitment, Use and Training 
of Mercenaries (1982). M. Mallett stresses the concepts of f ighting for prof it and foreignness 
(“Mercenaries”, p. 209), though De Vries takes issue with this def inition (“Medieval Mercenar-
ies”). See also the comments by France in the same volume (“Introduction”). For an excellent 
overview of early modern mercenaries, see Sikora, “Söldner”. The diary of Peter Hagendorf 
provides f irst-hand testimony into the life of a seventeenth-century mercenary: Hagendorf and 
Peters, Ein Söldnerleben im Dreißigjährigen Krieg.
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equate mercenaries with foreigners because many of them in the sixteenth 
century were specialists with some regional basis for their recruitment. 
The instances of the Genoese crossbowmen, Albanian stradiots, German 
Landsknechte and Reiter, Savoyard light cavalry, and Swiss pikemen have 
already been noted.107 But all early modern armies contained large numbers 
of “foreign” troops, not all of whom were described as mercenaries and, 
conversely, there were many native recruits who volunteered to serve their 
ruler but who would be described as mercenaries. Thus, Thomas Churchyard 
referred to “mercenaries” taken by the Earl of Essex to Ireland, even though 
they were mostly men from Queen Elizabeth’s domains.108 Finally, profes-
sionalism: this has to do with expertise, standards, and longevity in service 
and, while well-established mercenary units, such as the Landsknechte 
and Reiter for example, would be expected to display these characteristics, 
professionalism could equally be a characteristic of non-mercenary forces.109
These points are thrown into sharper focus if we establish what the iden-
tifying characteristics of the early modern mercenary actually were. First 
was the notion that they were “hyred souldiers”, as one sixteenth-century 
chronicler put it.110 A second and related point was the notion of free agency. 
The mercenary was not obliged to f ight, by reason of feudal obligation or 
impressment, for example. He had a choice about whether to serve. Finally, 
the mercenary had no interest in the cause but fought simply for his own 
private interest. It is the second of these three, interlocking characteristics 
that raises problems for the classif ication of the eighteenth-century Sol-
datenhandel. The soldiers involved in it were hired, and they had no direct 
interest in the cause, and in these twin respects they were mercenaries, but 
many of them were not free agents since they had been forcibly recruited into 
their ruler’s army, either through impressment or the militia system (or some 
variant of it). This implies the need for a new category in Lynn’s taxonomy. 
He suggests a hybrid category, that of the “conscript-mercenary”.111
Discussion of mercenaries leads to a f inal area in which Lynn’s model 
needs to be adjusted. He points to the unreliability of the aggregate contract 
107 Though these contingents were actually not as homogeneous as is usually supposed and 
the geographical origins of “German” or “Swiss” units could be quite diverse. The Swiss were 
occasionally referred to as “Allemans”, and Landsknechte could be recruited in Guelders, the 
Vaud, and Savoy: Baumann, Landsknecht; Potter, Renaissance France, p. 131.
108 The Fortunate Farewell to the Most Forward and Noble Earl of Essex (London, 1599), in Nichols, 
The Progresses and Public Progressions of Queen Elizabeth, p. 433.
109 Trim, The Chivalric Ethos and the Development of Military Professionalism, esp. pp. 3-30.
110 Quoted in Trim, “Fighting ‘Jacob’s Wars’”, p. 80.
111 Lynn, “Comments on Mercenary Military Service in Early Modern Europe”, pp. 7-8.
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army largely because it “was composed in the main of mercenary bands” 
with the consequence that troops felt little loyalty to the ruler they fought 
for and were ready to turn on their employer, to pillage his subjects, and to 
mutiny.112 But is such a judgement on mercenaries justif ied? Early modern 
contemporaries certainly had a low opinion of them, but this sprang from 
a distaste for men who made war a profession rather than a vocation, not 
from any criticism of their f ighting abilities.113 So long as they were paid, 
mercenaries were loyal and prepared to f ight to the death if necessary. 
Thus, at the battle of Dreux (1562) the whole Landsknecht regiment f ight-
ing for the Protestants was killed or captured while there were very high 
casualties among the Swiss infantry f ighting in the royal army.114 Potter 
has concluded that in the sixteenth century mercenaries were employed 
precisely because “they were the best men available […] and usually, they did 
their job effectively”; and Parrott reaches similar conclusions with respect 
to the forces of the general contractors of the subsequent century.115 Thus 
the employment of mercenaries did not of itself render an army unreliable: 
quite the contrary, for they proved loyal and effective f ighters. Failure to 
pay them meant they downed arms, mutinied, and turned to pillage. But, as 
I noted earlier, this was what all troops did in such circumstances, though 
mercenaries may have attracted the greatest attention and opprobrium. 
Whatever its composition, any army that went without pay and supplies 
was liable to desertion, mutiny, disorder, and pillage.
The drivers of change
John Lynn’s taxonomy proposing a shift from an aggregate contract to a state 
commission army in the early modern period thus appears broadly correct. 
But what were the reasons for the change? Technological innovation has 
traditionally been privileged as an explanatory factor in military matters. 
However, what is notable about the period as a whole is the relative lack of 
novelty with regard to weapons systems and the slowness of their deploy-
112 Lynn, “The Evolution of Army Style in the Modern West”, p. 517.
113 This was a signif icant factor for Machiavelli, who deplored “men who make war their 
only calling”, even though he also had little regard for their loyalty and f ighting qualities. See 
Machiavelli, Arte della Guerra: Machiavelli, The Art of War, Wood (ed.), p. 20.
114 Wood, The King’s Army, pp. 120, 199. 
115 Potter, Renaissance France at War, p. 151; Parrott, “From Military Enterprise to Standing 
Armies”, pp. 83-85. See too the favourable comments on mercenaries in f ifteenth-century Italy 
in Mallett, Mercenaries and Their Masters, pp. 185, 195-198, 242.
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ment. Pikes gradually gave way to hand-held f irearms, and artillery came 
to have a signif icant place on the battlef ield, but the pace of innovation 
was slow, and of itself purely technological innovation played little part in 
the transformation of army style.
Rather than highlighting the “material technology” of conflict as a driver 
of change, we would do better to concentrate on the “social technology” 116 
of warfare, especially the role of discipline, army size, and institutional 
structures. As noted earlier, one of the features of the state commission 
army was the attempt to enforce higher standards of discipline. Contrary to 
what has been argued by proponents of the “military revolution”, discipline 
was not primarily imposed as a means of ensuring that soldiers were able 
to handle their weapons and manoeuvre effectively on the battlef ield, 
though these were certainly signif icant byproducts.117 Rather, discipline 
was necessary to avoid the resort to pillaging, mutiny, and disorder that 
all too often paralysed armies in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 
This was why the enforcement of discipline was only one of a package of 
measures designed to address these issues: paying soldiers more regularly; 
supplying them directly with items such as clothing, food, equipment, and 
housing; taking ransoms out of the hands of ordinary soldiers; restricting 
the number of women and “hangers-on” who travelled with the army; and 
limiting the ability of elite units to bargain over pay and conditions.
The rationale behind all these measures was the urgent necessity of 
making armies more effective as instruments of state power. This was also 
why the number of men under arms increased, albeit not in linear fashion, 
for quantity was as important as quality. A large military establishment 
allowed states to recover from defeat, to replace a routed f ield army, to 
sustain the demands of attritional warfare, and to occupy and control 
territory. To be sure, it could be argued that in imposing greater central 
control of their armies, governments were seeking to save money, and it was 
true that they were mindful of the desirability of curbing the activities of 
corrupt captains who swindled their own men and the royal treasury. But a 
search for economies was not what drove the transition away from aggregate 
contract armies, since the state commission forces actually cost more than 
their predecessors. They may possibly have been “cheaper man for man”,118 
yet overall they were much more expensive. They were more regularly paid, 
they required more state-provided goods and services, and they were far 
116 Lynn, “Clio in Arms”, p. 92. 
117 Rogers, The Military Revolution Debate, is the best introduction to the debate.
118 Lynn, “The Evolution of Army Style in the Modern West”, p. 519.
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more numerous than their predecessors and consequently more costly. 
Thus, Joël Félix estimates the additional costs to the French treasury of the 
War of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years War at a staggering 
2-2.5 billion livres tournois.119 Though eighteenth-century governments 
had a larger resource base on which to draw by comparison with their 
predecessors, the result of demographic growth and a burgeoning (and 
increasingly global) economy, military costs nevertheless ran well ahead of 
resources. To bridge the funding gap, eighteenth-century rulers resorted to 
a range of measures which varied from state to state, including raising levels 
of taxation, making use of loans, and expropriating resources, albeit with 
varying degrees of success.120 It was not, then, a search for economies that 
drove the transition from aggregate contract to state commission armies, 
but rather an attempt to make armies more fit for purpose even if this meant 
at its most basic level that the army simply stayed in existence.
We should f inally recognize that what informed governments in their 
search for military eff iciency was the intensely competitive relationship 
that existed between the states of western Europe that all too often spilled 
over into open conflict. The reasons for war were many and varied: dynastic 
claims, religion, trade rivalry, territorial aggrandizement, and the pursuit 
of gloire. Yet whatever the precise cause of conflict, western Europe was in 
a constant condition of tension, and sensible governments used intervals 
of peace to prepare for the next round of conflict. No wonder they were 
concerned with the war-waging capacities of their armies, for the fate of rul-
ers and even of states might be decided by their military capacities. Portugal, 
Siena, and Scotland were absorbed by their larger neighbours as a result of 
failures in military campaigns, just as military success was crucial to the 
establishment of an independent polity in the case of the Dutch Republic. 
In 1742, France and others planned to dismember Austria, Prussia narrowly 
escaped such a fate at the commencement of the Seven Years War, Sweden’s 
dearly won Baltic empire was taken from it, and in 1772 Poland suffered the 
f irst of the partitions that would remove it from the map until 1919. This 
intensely competitive nature of the European state system was what the 
eminent jurist Emerich Vattel had in mind when he argued for a pre-emptive 
right of self-defence by coalitions of states against over-mighty neighbours.121
119 Félix, “Victualling Louis XV’s Armies”, p. 1.
120 Scott, “The Fiscal-Military State and International Rivalry during the Long Eighteenth 
Century”, esp. pp. 34-40, 42-43. On French f inances, see Félix and Tallett, “The French Experience, 
1661-1815”, pp. 155-157, 160-162, 164-165.
121 Vattel, The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law, bk 3 ch. 3.
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The pressures to “keep up” in military terms by imitating or adapting 
perceived best practice of paradigm armies were therefore intense. It should 
be stressed that these competitive pressures did not operate in some simple 
fashion. All states had regard to their own particular circumstances. Some 
emphasized the use of impressment and militia service over the recruitment 
of volunteers; some preferred to hire troops, others to take subsidies; some 
employed especially harsh discipline; some – and Austria would be an 
example – were notably slow and ineff icient in providing for their soldiers. 
Yet the direction of travel was clear: larger armies, stricter discipline, more 
direct state supply, and greater state control. The consequences for soldier-
labour were profound.122
122 It should also be stressed that interstate competition did not lead inevitably to the emergence 
of the so-called absolutist or modern state in some Weberian fashion. There were a number of 
different national trajectories that could eventuate in the emergence of more or less coercive, 
absolutist states that existed alongside polities with quite different constitutional structures 
though all had responded to the demands of warfare. See James, “Warfare and the Rise of the 
State”, pp. 28-29 and passim.

 The Scottish mercenary as a migrant 
labourer in Europe, 1550-16501
James Miller
Between 1550 and 1650 the government in Scotland, whether as the monarch 
or as the Privy Council acting in the royal name, permitted more than sixty 
levies of troops to f ight in continental Europe. This occurred throughout 
the period of study but with peaks in the 1570s and the 1620s-1640s, cor-
responding with periods of f ighting in the Low Countries and later in the 
Germanic lands in the Thirty Years War (1618-1648). This is summarized in 
Table 6.1. As the raising of soldiers to f ight overseas also took place before 
and after these dates and as there were unoff icial levies, despite attempts 
to stop them for fear of unrest or political embarrassment, the true extent of 
recruitment of men to f ight overseas may never be fully known. The size of 
a licensed levy varied considerably, from as few as sixty men in the licences 
granted to Patrik Murray on 25 March 1602 for service in the Low Countries 
and to Thomas Moffat on 23 July 1635 for Swedish service in Prussia, to as 
many as several thousands. In at least some instances, for example for the 
3,000 men each to Robert Earl of Nithsdale, Alexander Lord Spynie, and 
James Sinclair of Murkle on 3 April 1627 for Danish service, these ambitious 
targets were not reached; and in the case of others, for example to Robert 
Stewart for Poland in 1623, very little, if any, recruiting took place. The 
more usual f igures mentioned in the licences are 200 or 300 men. With a 
proviso in mind about the accuracy and reliability of these f igures, it has 
been estimated that during the Thirty Years War (1618-1648), when the 
recruitment of soldiers for overseas service was at its height, as many as 
50,000 Scotsmen bore arms in European conflicts.2
1 I am grateful to Dr David Worthington, Head of the Centre for History, University of the 
Highlands and Islands, Dornoch, Scotland, for his help and encouragement with this paper.
2 Murdoch, “Introduction”, p. 19. Steve Murdoch and Alexia Grosjean have produced a da-
tabase on Scots active in the military and other walks of life in northern Europe in the period 
between 1580 and 1707; this can be accessed at http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/history/ssne.
170 JaMEs MiLLEr 
Table 6.1 A summary of some recruitment of soldiers in Scotland between 1550 and 1650 to 
join continental armies, as detailed in the Register of the Privy Council of Scotland (RPCS) 
and other sources. Some of the levies failed to achieve much or to reach the designated 
target numbers.
Year Destination Number of men designated in the 
source, with name of senior officer 
or recruiter in some instances
Source (all RPCS* 
unless otherwise 
stated)
1552 France 300 footmen and 400 cavalry, fol-
lowed by recruitment of “2 ensigns” 
(Gilbert kennedy, 3rd Earl of cassilis)
i, pp. 131-136
1564 denmark 2,000 Xiv, p. XLvii
1568 denmark unknown (captain Moncur) i, p. 640
1573 sweden 1,600 (archibald ruthven) ii, p. 235
1573 sweden 300 (captain campbell) ii, p. 238
1573 Low countries 900, under three separate licences; it 
is likely that many more went without 
licence 
ii, pp. 237, 256.
1577 Low countries 
or Flanders
13 licences issued – numbers of men 
not specified but possibly 3,500
ii, p. 643
1577 danzig 150 (captain rentoun) ii, p. 621






1602 Low countries 460 (including licence to patrik 
Murray)
vi, p. 721
1602 sweden unknown (colonel thomas ogilvie) Fischer, p. 70**
1605 sweden 1,600 foot and 600 cavalry (sir James 
spens)
Fischer, p. 71**
1607 sweden 200 cavalry (robert kinnaird) Fischer, p. 71**
1610 sweden unknown viii, p. 619
1612 sweden 300 (andrew ramsay’s illegal levy) iX, p. 430
1620 bohemia 1,500 (sir andrew Gray) Xii, pp. 255-259
1621 unknown 100 Xii, p. 412
1622 Low countries unknown (archibald campbell, 
7th Earl of argyle’s recruitment for 
spanish service)
Xiii, p. Lvi
1623 poland 8,000 (robert stewart) Xiii, p. Lvii
1624 sweden 1,200 (James spens) Xiii, p. 478
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Year Destination Number of men designated in the 
source, with name of senior officer 
or recruiter in some instances






300 2nd ser., i, p. 49
1626 denmark 
(later sweden)
possibly 3,000 (sir donald Mackay, 
Lord reay)
2nd ser., i, p. 244
1627 denmark 9,000 (probably fewer than 5,000 
recruited) (nithsdale-spynie-Murkle 
levies)
2nd ser., i, p. 565
1628 sweden 300 (James spens) 2nd ser., ii, p. 397
1629 Low countries unknown (hay of kinfauns) 2nd ser., iii, p. 99
1629 sweden 1,200 (alexander hamilton), 1,200 (sir 
George cuninghame)
2nd ser., iii, 
pp. 136, 208
1631 sweden 2,000 (sir donald Mackay, Lord reay) 2nd ser., iv, p. 218
1631 sweden 6,000 (sir James hamilton, Marquis of 
hamilton)
burnet, p. 5***
1632 sweden 1,400 (sir James Lumsden) 2nd ser., iv, p. 483
1632 sweden 200 (Lt col Mcdougall) 2nd ser., iv, p. 525
1633 France 1,200 (sir John hepburn) 2nd ser., v, p. 65
1635 sweden 60 (thomas Moffat) 2nd ser., vi, p. 65
1636 Low countries 300 (Lord almond) 2nd ser., vi, p. 225
1637 France 1,120 (captain robert hume) 2nd ser., vi, p. 401
1637 sweden 1,200 (cuninghame, Monro, stuart) 2nd ser., vi, 
pp. 458, 484
1638 France 1,000 (andrew, Lord Gray) 2nd ser., vii, p. 103
1639 France 2,000 (colonel alexander Erskine of 
Mar)
2nd ser., vii, 
pp. 106, 136
1642 France 6,000 (James campbell, Earl of irvine, 
and others)
2nd ser., vii, 
pp. 247, 281, 302
1656 sweden 2,500 (William, 3rd Lord cranstoun) Fischer, p. 122**
Notes
* Register of the Privy Council of Scotland (1545-1689)
** Fischer, The Scots in Sweden
*** burnet, The Memoires of the Lives and Actions of James and William Dukes of Hamilton and 
Castleherald etc.
It can be argued that the term “mercenary” is not appropriate in describing 
these men. The term current in Scotland in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries was the phrase “waged men of war” – in Scots, “wageit men of 
weare” or variants of it. “Mercenary” remains, however, a convenient word 
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to describe the soldiers who were f ighting for a commander or a political 
state other than that which from their place of birth or normal residence 
could be deemed their own, and it is used here in this sense. In discussions 
during the workshops in the Fighting for a Living project, it was suggested 
that a “mercenary” had to be free from social ties or obligations, available 
to be hired, and with no stake in a conflict other than as a paid man. These 
conditions do not apply to all the Scots who fought on the continent of 
Europe and, as will be apparent from this chapter, it was often social ties 
or obligations that led to them being recruited as soldiers in the f irst place. 
Often, too, their stake in a conflict sprang from religious leanings or a sense 
of honour; they were not always serving simply for the money.
The military roles the Scottish mercenaries played in the wars of the 
period lie outside the scope of this chapter and are only summarized below.3 
The focus here is on the circumstances or pressures in Scottish society that 
led so many to soldier abroad, in practice to constitute a form of migrant 
labour, rather than follow another livelihood at home. The chapter briefly 
describes the labour conditions they accepted. The information sources 
to which we can turn comprise contemporary legal and administrative 
records, letters, and other documents. Ordinary soldiers leave little trace in 
the records of the period and what does survive as evidence of their actions 
and motives is scant and unevenly spread in space and time. Other sources 
are the many histories of families and clans: they were usually written much 
later than the events they describe and are always subject to embellishment, 
but are our only access to a rich oral culture and tradition and, when treated 
with care, can provide valuable additional detail.
The socio-economic background
Lying on the periphery of Europe and having a relatively poorly developed 
economy, Scotland was open to the experience of economic emigration, a 
phenomenon enhanced during the years between 1550 and 1650 by popula-
tion growth and by frequent seasons of severe dearth with resulting high 
food prices.4 Several attempts have been made to estimate the population of 
the country in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and they agree that 
3 See, for example, Murdoch, Scotland and the Thirty Years’ War; Miller, Swords for Hire.
4 Socio-economic conditions are explored in general histories, e.g., Smout, A History of the 
Scottish People; Lynch, The Oxford Companion to Scottish History. David Worthington, British 
and Irish Emigrants and Exiles in Europe, has an overview of emigration studies. 
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the total must have stood between 800,000 and a little over 1 million. The 
emigration of so many soldiers, therefore, represents the loss, occasionally 
temporary but often permanent, of a substantial proportion of the country’s 
able-bodied young men and immediately provokes the question of why it 
took place, when it might appear to have been detrimental to the country’s 
own well-being.
The bulk of the population was scattered in rural villages and town-
ships, and most burghs were small enough to ensure almost everyone was 
closely dependent on a relatively primitive agriculture that was dangerously 
susceptible to harvest failure. Time and again evidence of distress occurs in 
the historical record, and we f ind repeated attempts by the authorities to 
impose alleviating measures, such as the banning or licensing of the export 
of grain and livestock, and even attempting to limit the number of dishes 
that could be served at meals (although gradated in number according to 
status so that a bishop could have eight, but a burgess only three).5 On 
21 June 1572 the Privy Council ordered people to remove themselves from 
the city of Edinburgh to stay with friends in the country where they might 
be “best staikit [best provided for]”.6 In the Chronicle of Aberdeen for the 
year 1578, we read that at that time there was “a great dearth of all kind of 
victuals through all Scotland, that the like was not seen in no man’s day 
before. The meal was sold for six s[hillings] the peck, the ale for tenpence 
the pint, the wine from the best shipment forty pence the pint; f ish and 
flesh were scant and dear.” 7
Epidemics of plague and other diseases added to the woes undergone 
by the general population. The Privy Council attempted to counter the 
spread of infection through restrictions on travel and the quarantining of 
sea travellers. There is no information on the numbers of people affected 
by such catastrophes, but their seriousness comes over clearly in what 
evidence does survive. In October 1606 the Earl of Dunfermline wrote to 
the king that “The tounes of Air and Striveling [Ayr and Stirling] ar almoste 
desolat”; this outbreak of plague lasted from 1603 to 1609, and took 500 lives 
in Perth in the winter of 1608-1609.8
For Scots who were free to go, therefore, the incentives to emigrate were 
strong. Some moved to England, despite long-standing hostility between 
5 Register of the Privy Council of Scotland (1545-1689) 14 vols (Edinburgh, 1877) [henceforth, 
RPCS], I, p. 94.
6 Ibid., II, p. 148.
7 Author’s translation of Scots original; in “The Chronicle of Aberdeen”, Miscellany of the 
Spalding Club (Aberdeen, 1842), II, p. 47.
8 Letters and State Papers During the Reign of King James the Sixth, p. 91.
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the neighbouring nations and the fact that there was legislation in England 
targeted against the Scots as enemy aliens. These emigrants, predominantly 
men, practised various trades and professions but, unsurprisingly in view 
of the frequent outbreaks of warfare between the two countries, none is 
listed as having been a soldier.9 The pathways to the continent were also 
well established through trade. In the later sixteenth century the favoured 
destination for Scottish emigrants was the Baltic area, in what are now 
Poland and its neighbours. Several thousand Scots are estimated to have 
taken ship for such ports as Stettin (Szczecin) and Danzig (Gdańsk) and 
then to have spread throughout central and eastern Europe.10 Many became 
respectable merchants, while others remained poor itinerant pedlars. 
Scotland also had a trading base in the town of Veere at the mouth of the 
Scheldt – and there was steady traff ic across the North Sea. As the Dutch 
had embraced Calvinism, a form of Protestantism shared with Scotland, 
it is easy to understand why Scots should be drawn to this part of Europe, 
where many joined the armed struggle in the Netherlands. When he wrote 
a prospectus in 1624 to attract settlers to the lands he had been recently 
granted in maritime Canada, Sir William Alexander observed that “Scotland 
by reason of her populousness being constrained to disburden herself (like 
the Bees) did every yeare send forth swarmes, whereof great numbers did 
haunt Pole [Poland] with most extreme kind of drudgerie (if not dying 
under the burden) scraping a few crummes together, til of late that they 
were compelled, abandoning their ordinary calling, to betake themselves 
to the warres against Russians, Turks or Swedens.” 11 What did the emigrants 
expect to f ind abroad? Overwhelmingly they tried to make a living through 
some kind of trade or mercantile activity, making use of family connec-
tions to obtain employment and opportunity. What Sir William Alexander 
remarks on – abandoning trade for soldiering – was a response to economic 
misfortune wherever there was a demand for men to f ill an army’s ranks.
Emigration as soldiers
Men also emigrated specif ically to f ind employment as soldiers. The Privy 
Council was aware in June 1573 of “a gude nowmer [good number] […] of 
9 Galloway and Murray, “Scottish Emigration to England 1400-1560”.
10 See, for example, Fischer, The Scots in Eastern and Western Prussia; and the international 
conference on “Scotland and Poland, a Historical Relationship, 1500-2009”, Edinburgh, 2009.
11 “Prospectus of the Colony of New Scotland, 1624”, quoted in Davidson, The Davidsons, p. 153.
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this realm” prepared to go abroad “under pretens to serve in the wearis 
[wars] in foreyn countries”.12 The Council also saw an opportunity here to 
relieve social pressure at home: in 1572, mindful of “the present hunger, 
derth and scarcitie of viveris [scarcity of food]”, it allowed men freely to 
travel to the Low Countries to f ight in the cause of Dutch independence.13 
The licensing of recruitment was an attempt on the part of government 
to control what was already happening irrespective of the wishes of the 
authorities and, perhaps more importantly, counter any attempt to hide an 
armed conspiracy under the cloak of recruitment for overseas service. In 
September 1587 the Privy Council issued a proclamation to be read at the 
market crosses in all the main burghs forbidding anyone to raise “bandis 
of men of weare [bands of men of war]” or to put themselves in arms, enrol 
under any captain, or go abroad as a soldier without royal licence.14 It was 
forbidden to attract soldiers away from royal service and for levies to as-
semble within sixteen miles of the young James VI’s residence at Stirling 
Castle. Recruiting captains were urged to embark their men at the nearest 
port, and at times were ordered to recruit without using drums, presumably 
for fear of rousing excitement or animosity in the general populace. Coping 
with the unruly behaviour of mobs of would-be soldiers on their way to 
seaports was a concern of the Privy Council in 1605, and the presence in the 
country in 1609 of two companies of Irish mercenaries forced by bad weather 
to land at Peterhead while en route to Sweden worried the Council greatly.15
As an example of an unofficial levy that was also declared illegal, we have 
the episode in 1612 when the Privy Council tried to prevent recruitment 
for service in the Swedish army against Denmark. The Council informed 
James VI, now resident in London as the king of Britain, that men had been 
violently pressed and taken against their will. Official attempts by the Privy 
Council to nip the levy in the bud included searching ships about to sail, 
ordering the discharge of recruits, and summoning to its presence Alex-
ander Ramsay, the senior off icer (who did not appear and was thereafter 
denounced as a rebel).16
12 RPCS, II, p. 235.
13 Ibid., II, p. 148.
14 Ibid., IV, p. 211.
15 Ibid., VIII, p. 390.
16 Ibid., IX, pp. 430-461.
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Indigenous military practices
One factor that made soldiering a viable option for young men going abroad 
and enhanced the feasibility of recruiting was the long tradition in the 
country of armed service. It was the custom for nobles to keep trains of 
armed men. The traditional view of Scotland as a country where, up until 
the Treaty of Union in 1707, the tension between the monarch and the 
nobility often caused the latter to break into rebellion or take up arms in 
pursuit of their own interests against either the crown or each other has 
been queried by recent historians, but it remains true that feuding, raiding, 
and the signing of bonds of manrent were common and that Scotland was a 
country prone to the violent resolution of difference.17 Comments from the 
writings of John Major (or Mair) are relevant here. “If two nobles of equal 
rank happen to be very near neighbours, quarrels and even shedding of 
blood are a common thing between them; and their very retainers cannot 
meet without strife”, he observed in 1521 in his History of Great Britain. “The 
farmers […] keep a horse and weapons of war, and are ready to take part 
in [their lord’s] quarrel, be it just or unjust, with any powerful lord, if they 
only have a liking for him, and with him, if need be, to f ight to the death. 
The farmers have further this fault: that they do not bring up their sons to 
any handicraft. Shoemakers, tailors, and all such craftsmen they reckon as 
contemptible and unfit for war.” 18 Major was more critical of Highlanders: 
“They are full of mutual dissensions, and war rather than peace is their 
normal condition. The Scottish kings have with diff iculty been able to 
withstand the inroads of these men.” 19
The social structure of the country was complicated by major cultural 
differences between the various regions, the most important being the 
one between what can be usefully, though crudely, termed the Lowlands 
and the Highlands, a cultural frontier often termed the Highland Line. 
John Major was aware of this but it is also commented upon by John of 
Fordun, a cleric who wrote what is regarded as the f irst full-scale history 
of Scotland in the mid-fourteenth century: “The people of the coast are of 
domestic and civilised habits, trusty, patient and urbane, decent in their 
attire, affable and peaceful, devout in divine worship, yet always prone to 
resist a wrong at the hands of their enemies. The highlanders and people of 
the islands, on the other hand, are a savage and untamed nation, rude and 
17 Wormald, Lords and Men in Scotland; Grant, Independence and Nationhood.
18 Hume Brown, Scotland before 1700 from Contemporary Documents, pp. 58-59.
19 Ibid., p. 60.
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independent, given to rapine.” 20 Fordun’s view was biased, but the cultural 
divide had become real by his lifetime. His “savage and untamed nation” 
comprised of course the mainly Gaelic-speaking clan society that played 
a prominent part in the Jacobite risings of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. This was a largely pastoral culture with a strong warrior ethos, 
grouped in kindreds and adherents holding territories, very prone to feuding 
with each other and capable of moving quickly into military mode. Within 
clan or kindred, blood relationships were important, and war parties of 
the clan were usually commanded by the chief himself or blood relatives. 
Writing in 1578, Bishop John Leslie, himself Highland born, showed that this 
warrior society persisted for a very long time: “A peculiar and proper vice 
is among these men, and to their well-being most pestilent, that naturally 
they are fond willingly and vehemently, if their masters command them, 
to sedition and strife: they rather be esteemed as noble, or at least as bold 
men of war, than as labourers of the ground or men of craft, irrespective 
of poverty or riches.” 21
Mention should be made in passing of a special class of mercenary soldier 
that sprang from the Gaelic Highland world. This was the “galloglass”, a term 
Anglicized from the Gaelic word galloglaigh, meaning “foreign warrior”. 
They were a restricted class of professional f ighters from the western sea-
board of the Highlands who found service in the retinues of Irish chieftains 
from the thirteenth century until the early 1600s. A few found service in 
Sweden during the Thirty Years War but, as a specialized group, they lie 
outside the main scope of this chapter.22
In the south of Scotland, in the Borders, the country marking the frontier 
with England, in the same period existed a society similar to that of the 
clans in having a pastoral economy and a predilection for raiding and feud-
ing. Here there were kindreds loyal to particular territory-holding families 
who could switch easily into military mode. In Bishop Leslie’s opinion 
in 1578, fear of war inhibited the cultivation of the soil among them. The 
similarity between Highlander and Borderer was recognized at the time: 
“The roll of the clans that have captains, chiefs and chieftains on whom 
they depend often against the will of their landlords on the Borders as in 
the Highlands.” 23
20 Ibid., p. 12.
21 Author’s translation of Scots original from ibid., pp. 165-166.
22 A general introduction can be found in Cannan, Galloglass.
23 Author’s translation of Scots original, RPCS, IV, p. 782. 
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Between the Highland and Border regions, in which the Scottish 
monarchy had a continuous struggle to maintain some hegemony, lay the 
Lowlands where approximately 60 per cent, from the best estimates, of 
the population lived, in a society divided between rural settlements and 
larger burghs. This region formed a belt across the centre of the country 
and extended up the east coast to the environs of Aberdeen and beyond to 
the Moray Firth. Presumably these were the people Fordun considered of 
domestic and civilized habit, yet in his study of bloodfeud in Scotland, K.M. 
Brown noted that 40 per cent of the 365 feuds he identif ied as occurring 
between 1573 and 1625 took place in the Lowlands with a further 23 per 
cent in the Borders.24
Although the Highlands and the Borders had the potential to be a 
good recruiting ground, it is signif icant that, as far as we can tell from the 
surviving evidence, including the names of the men involved, the bulk 
of the recruiting for overseas service took place in the Lowlands, in the 
most settled part of Scotland. The recruitment of soldiers in the Highlands 
did not become signif icant until quite late in the period of study, when 
Mackay’s Regiment was raised in 1626. One of Mackay’s off icers, Robert 
Monro, named the senior Scottish off icers in Swedish service in 1632: of the 
thirty colonels in his list, nine are known to have come from the Lowlands 
or the north-east; another sixteen probably from the same regions, judging 
by their surnames; only four from the Highlands; and one, the son of Scots 
emigrants, actually from Finland. Of the f ifty-two lieutenant colonels in 
Monro’s list, only six are Highland, and f ive of these are from the Lowland-
influenced parts on the east coast.25
In his major work on the Scots Brigade in the Netherlands, James Fergu-
son provides plenty of evidence for the Lowland contribution to this notable 
example of Scottish military service abroad.26 To give one example, in a 
document concerning soldiers to be paid after the death of their captain, 
Archibald Arskin (Erskine) at Zwolle in December 1608, of the forty-one 
legible signatures, f ifteen are indisputably Scots and a further ten could be 
Scots, and the names suggest a Lowland origin for all of them. As a general 
comment, Ferguson says in his introduction: Forth-side counties, especially 
Fife, “had the closest connection with the brigade, but Perthshire, Forfar, 
Aberdeenshire and the Highlands, more especially after General Mackay 
[1640-1692] entered it, and other parts of Scotland had their representatives 
24 Brown, Bloodfeud in Scotland 1573-1625, p. 5.
25 Monro, Monro His Expedition with the Worthy Scots Regiment.
26 Ferguson, The Scots Brigade in the Service of the United Netherlands.
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under its colours”.27 The General Mackay referred to is Hugh Mackay of 
Scourie (c. 1640-1692), with no connection to the earlier Mackay’s Regiment. 
Proximity to the east-coast ports and ease of travel played an obvious part 
in this preponderance of recruitment in the Lowlands but, as we have seen, 
the Lowlands were only relatively more peaceful and ordered than the 
farther-flung Highlands.
The nobles were capable of laying aside their own differences, at least to 
some extent, when an external threat appeared – always from England. In 
February 1546, for example, the Privy Council called on two Border families 
– the Kerrs of Cessford and Ferniehurst, and the Scotts of Branxholme – to 
set aside their own raids on each other “during the time of this present war 
between the realms of Scotland and England” and instead seek redress 
through the courts of law.28 The Minute in the Privy Council papers gives a 
vivid impression of the kindreds involved in these quarrels when it details 
“their kin, friends, men, tenants, adherents, allies and supporters” as coming 
under the order. Robert I (1274-1329) was able through violent suppression 
of his enemies to unite much of the country behind him during the Wars of 
Independence. His army contained men from different parts of the country, 
Highland as well as Lowland and Border, but despite such periods of near 
unity it remained true for most of the Stewart period, from 1371 onwards, 
that the levying of troops to prosecute the many outbreaks of hostilities 
with England was primarily a Lowland affair, with only a relatively small 
contribution of men from the southern edges of the Highlands and from the 
Borders. In a national emergency, though, the propensity of the Borderers 
for raiding and feuding allowed the rapid raising of a skilled and mobile 
cavalry force. This is described in a Minute in the papers of the Privy Council 
in October 1545: it charges three commissioners with the raising of 1,000 
horsemen to “pass and remain upon the Borders for the space of three 
months for defence of the realm against our old enemy of England”, and 
notes that they will be paid from an allotted sum of £18,000 Scots.29
At various times during the sixteenth century the Privy Council ordered 
a full levy of foot and horse. The example, noted in the Register of the Privy 
Council for 21 August 1546, to muster men for the siege and capture of Saint 
Andrews Castle, divided the realm into four parts, which included the 
sweep of coastal territory up the east coast via Aberdeen to the shores of the 
Moray Firth. All four were mainly part of the Lowlands and only impinged 
27 Ibid., I, p. xxv.
28 RPCS, I, p. 22.
29 Ibid., I, p. 16.
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on the Highlands, although there were also at times Highland elements in 
the assembled army.30 Such summonses were proclaimed at market crosses 
in all the burghs, and called on men between the ages of sixteen and sixty, 
dwelling in the countryside or in the towns, to assemble for military service 
with their weapons and enough provisions for twenty days. The resulting 
army was commonly called the Scottish host. A signif icant feature of the 
system was that it allowed the monarch to raise an army at minimum cost 
to the usually impoverished royal treasury, as the men called on to f ill the 
ranks were unpaid.
To maintain a degree of preparedness for f ighting there existed a system 
of training called wappenschaws (weapon shows) held at regular intervals in 
local districts. The first relevant act, in 1424 during the reign of James I, called 
on all men to begin training in archery when they reached the age of twelve 
years. The wappenschaw acts were reconfirmed and amended throughout the 
following years and reigns some fifteen times before 1600. This was partly to 
promote them when they had lapsed and partly to keep pace with technologi-
cal change. In 1456 we come upon the first mentions of artillery: “it is thought 
expedient that the king make request to certain of the great barons of the land 
that are of might to make carts of war, and each of them to have two guns, 
and each of them to have two chambers with the remnant of the gear that is 
appropriate thereto, with cunning [skilled] men to shoot them. And if they 
have no craft in shooting them, as now, they may learn before the time comes 
that it will be needful to have them.” 31 Hand guns in the form of hackbuts are 
first mentioned in the wappenschaw legislation in 1535. Every man who held 
land to the value of £100 was required to have a gun and people trained in 
its use. Fines of livestock or money were imposed upon defaulters who failed 
to attend wappenschaws. Those who had no skill for archery were called on 
to appear with hand weapons such as a spear or axe. This act from the reign 
of James II (1437-1460) is illustrative of the wappenschaw system and also 
reveals why it may not always have been popular among the common people. 
“It is decreed and ordained that wappinschawings be held by the lords and 
barons, spiritual and temporal, four times in the year, and that football and 
golf be utterly cried down and disused, and that the bow-marks be made at 
each parish kirk, a pair of butts, and shooting be made each Sunday. And that 
each man shoot six shots at the least under the pain to be raised upon them 
that come not; at the least 2d to be given to them that come to the bowmark 
30 Ibid., I, p. 38.
31 Ref James II 1456/5 in Records of the Parliaments of Scotland to 1707, available at http://www.
rps.ac.uk (accessed 3 February 2011).
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to drink. And this to be used from Christmas till Allhallowmass after […] 
And as touching the football and the golf we ordain it to be punished by 
the baron’s f ine.” 32 The ordinary men of the realm may have preferred their 
football or their golf to spending what little time they had free from labour 
in a kind of home guard. Surviving court books from burghs and baronies 
contain references to men being fined for failure to attend the wappenschaw. 
For example, the Court Book of the Barony of Leys in Aberdeenshire states, 
regarding a wappenschaw held on 24 January 1626, that on the following day 
fourteen men who had failed to attend were fined between 10s and 40s each.33
Despite some resistance to attending training, by the time of the main 
period of recruitment for armed service in Europe, there was a pool of 
manpower with at least some basic military experience on which to draw. 
There was also a ready precedent for sending troops abroad. In the early 
f ifteenth century, contingents of men, several thousand strong, had been 
sent to France to f ight for the Dauphin against the English. Before that 
period, individual knights had gone abroad from Scotland to f ight in vari-
ous conflicts but this was the f irst time there was a deliberate export of 
soldiers to aid a continental ally, a signif icant episode in the long-standing 
relationship between France and Scotland, known as the Auld Alliance. The 
Alliance also produced the Garde Ecossais, a small elite unit that comprised 
part of the French royal bodyguard.34 An attempt to reinvigorate this al-
liance in the mid-sixteenth century led to the raising of more troops for 
service in France. In 1552, the Privy Council ordered commissioners “over 
all parts of the realm” – though signif icantly no commissioner is named for 
the western Highlands – “to vesy [recruit] the men of the shire, including 
the men in the burghs if they are said to be able and reliable” to go to France. 
The same order included the raising of 400 horsemen in the Borders and 
the Lowlands for the same service.35
“The laudable profession of arms”
Against this sixteenth-century background of economic hardship and 
emigration stands a major factor in our study – the attitude of the noble 
32 Hume Brown, Scotland before 1700 from Contemporary Documents, p. 26. 
33 “Court Book of the Barony of Leys”, in Miscellany of the Spalding Club (Aberdeen, 1852), V, 
p. 223.
34 See, for example, Macdougall, “An Antidote to the English”.
35 RPCS, I, p. 134. 
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and landowning classes to warfare, an attitude summed up in the phrase 
coined by Robert Monro in his account published in 1637 of his experiences 
in Mackay’s Regiment in the Thirty Years War and used as a heading above.36 
For this section of society, being a soldier was a natural calling. In his study 
of this class, in Noble Society in Scotland, Keith Brown describes how the 
nobility held a martial ethos as an “integral facet of their identity”.37 In the 
system of national defence the nobility provided the monarch with his 
officer corps and also, through their tenants, with his manpower. In turn the 
non-noble landowners, the lairds, imitated the actions and shared the at-
titudes of their social superiors. In the period under study, the revolt against 
Spanish hegemony in the Low Countries and from 1618 the Thirty Years 
War, with smaller outbreaks of warfare elsewhere across the continent, 
offered plenty of opportunity for the members of these leading classes to 
exercise their love of arms and, in the process, they hoped, win fortune as 
well as glory. The temptation was particularly strong for those unlikely to 
inherit family wealth – younger sons, illegitimate sons – and those with 
a military talent but no patron to help them up the social ladder at home. 
In his book, Robert Monro talks of his comrades as “worthy Cavaliers […] 
whereof some from meane condition have risen to supreme honour, wealth 
and dignitie”.38 Finding employment as soldiers on the continent became 
almost a tradition in a few extended families: from the family of the Lords 
Forbes, three younger brothers, all sons of the tenth Lord Forbes, and the 
illegitimate son of one of these brothers were killed in the Thirty Years War.39
It was also recognized that military service abroad could open the door to 
other opportunities, as is illustrated by the Innes family of Cotts in Aberdeen-
shire. Alexander Innes of Cotts had several sons: the eldest son John served 
in the French guard before he inherited from his father in 1634; the second 
son Alexander wrote to his father from London on 12 December 1627, “My 
brother Robert is […] shortly to return to Germanie. I assure you Sir he has 
made ane gaynfull voyage. He hes imployed in London [2,000 merks] whitch 
I hope within half yeir will be in returne foure, and in Germanie he hes foure 
thousand moir. He hes ane angel in the day allowance from the Regiment so 
long as he is abrod”; Robert was Alexander’s f ifth son and was at this time 
a captain in the English army after previously being in the French guard.40
36 Monro, Monro His Expedition with the Worthy Scots Regiment, title page.
37 Brown, Noble Society in Scotland, p. 3.
38 Monro, Monro His Expedition with the Worthy Scots Regiment, Address to the reader. 
39 Tayler and Tayler, The House of Forbes, p. 168. 
40 Forbes, Ane Account of the Familie of Innes, p. 215.
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The recruitment of soldiers
These sons of nobles and lairds, who saw themselves as professional 
soldiers, had a better chance of f inding a place in a continental army if, 
especially in times of war, they could arrive with their own contingent 
of men, already armed or not. There was also the incentive of benefiting 
f inancially from levying men, always a tempting prospect for lairds who 
had landed themselves in debt, although this did not always work out well. 
In August 1661 Lord Forbes petitioned Charles II for payment he had never 
received for levying men for the king of Denmark’s service in 1626 as part 
of Mackay’s Regiment; the failure to pay him on time had resulted in a 
serious debt burden.41 The attractions of military service and cash payments 
for recruiting men are obvious for landowners struggling to make ends 
meet during years of climatic diff iculty, and would have been especially 
marked in the case of younger or illegitimate sons with no prospect of an 
inheritance. Unfortunately we know very little about most of the named 
military captains to whom the Privy Council issued recruitment licences. 
Many would have been professional soldiers but it is not clear how many 
were already in the service of foreign armies and had returned home to 
levy men.
Alongside the professional military men appeared some merchants, 
referred to as enterprisers, who offered to provide recruits to any needy 
commander. A prominent example of this group was Sir James Spens of 
Wormiston, a Fife landowner and merchant adventurer born in 1571. He 
was probably already trading in the Baltic area when he and his brother 
were approached by Karl IX of Sweden in 1605 to recruit 1,600 foot soldiers 
and 600 cavalry for Swedish service against Poland. This service was to be 
done with the British monarch’s permission, and Spens was to be paid 1,600 
daler for every 300 men and appointed as colonel in overall command of 
them, presumably ensuring for himself a regular salary.42 The daler, rex-
dollar, or riksdaler was the Swedish equivalent of the German reichsthaler, 
the international European currency of the time. This was the start of a 
rewarding career for the Fife merchant: he went on to organize further 
troop levies, serve as an ambassador for the British and Swedish monarchs, 
and was eventually ennobled as a Swedish baron before his death in 1632.
41 Tayler and Tayler, The House of Forbes, p. 185. 
42 Fuller biography available at http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/history/ssne (ID 1642) (accessed 
1 February 2011).
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As an example of a recruiter who failed to fulfil the terms of a recruitment 
contract, let me summarize the career of John Gordon of Ardlogie. The 
second son of an Aberdeenshire laird, Gordon received funds to levy and 
transport men to Germany as part of the larger recruitment under James 
Sinclair of Murkle in March 1627. This he failed to do and was outlawed – in 
the Scots legal expression, “put to the horn”. He evaded arrest and eventu-
ally escaped to Germany where, it appears, he was killed in 1638 in the 
contingents commanded by fellow Scot, also called John Gordon.43
During the reign of Karl IX’s son, Gustavus Adolphus, contracts for 
recruitment were based on rates laid down by the Swedish government.44 
A letter dated 21 April 1629 contains articles of agreement between Sir James 
Spens and a Captain Alexander Hamilton for the recruitment of 1,200 men.45 
Hamilton received the sum of £1,696 “lawfull English money” as equivalent 
to 7,680 riksdaler, or 4.5 riksdaler per £1. The captain’s expenses in recruiting 
included the provision of food and drink for recruits, usually some clothing, 
and their transport costs across the North Sea, as well as a hand-out when 
a man signed on. In his study of recruitment for Sweden in the 1620s, J.A. 
Fallon calculated that it cost 6s 8d to ship a man from Scotland to the Elbe, 
and that two weeks’ food and drink for a recruit cost 9s 4d. This leaves a 
balance of 4s, almost 1 riksdaler, a sum that Fallon suggested would have 
been handed to the newly signed-on recruit.46 This seems very generous and 
we must allow the possibility that some of the money might have stayed 
in the recruiter’s pocket, particularly as a recruiter could face a f ine if he 
failed to bring in the number of men promised or required.
Other factors and motivations
A factor of some importance in recruitment in the 1550-1650 period was 
religion. Solidarity with other members of the same religious denomination 
led many to take up arms: this was true of the recruitment to f ight in the 
1570s in the Low Countries against the Habsburgs; in the effort to restore 
Frederick and his queen, Elizabeth Stewart, daughter of James VI, to the 
Rhine Palatinate after 1618; and in the perceived defence of the Protestant 
cause under Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden. The fall of Haarlem to the Span-
43 Bulloch, The House of Gordon, p. 49.
44 Fallon, “Scottish Mercenaries in the Service of Denmark and Sweden”, p. 43.
45 Quoted in Fraser, Memorials of the Earls of Haddington, p. 92.
46 Fallon, “Scottish Mercenaries in the Service of Denmark and Sweden”, p. 183.
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ish in 1573 aroused an unknown but sizeable number of Lowland Scots to 
volunteer in the Dutch cause, and the Privy Council noted the issue of a 
recruiting licence to Captain Thomas Robesoun to be in the “defence of 
Goddis trew religioun”.47
The Scots Brigade in the Low Countries
It can be seen in Table 6.1 that there was a sizeable movement of f ighting 
men from Scotland mainly to France and Scandinavia in the mid-sixteenth 
century. This was followed by a signif icant series of levies for service in the 
Low Countries in the 1570s after the Dutch rising to throw off Habsburg 
rule. The levies began as the raising of companies under individual captains 
but in 1586 these companies were amalgamated into two regiments. The 
organization of the Scots in Dutch service thereafter went through a num-
ber of changes but a Scots Brigade, as the units were collectively labelled, 
remained a feature of the Dutch army until 1782. As already stated, the units 
of the brigade were initially recruited mainly in the Lowlands, and it was 
not until the mid-seventeenth century that we f ind signif icant recruitment 
from the Highlands. In an age when sons were often inclined and indeed 
expected to follow the same trade as their fathers, it is no surprise to f ind 
it being said of the Scots Brigade: “Probably no military body ever existed 
in which members of the same families were so constantly employed for 
generations.” 48 The records of the Brigade include note of Dutch authorities 
making the journey across the North Sea to seek men, for example in 1594 
when ambassadors crossed from Veere to Leith on such an errand, and 
again in 1632 when the States General sought to reinforce the existing four 
English and three Scottish regiments in Dutch service.
Recruitment for service in the Thirty Years War
The second major phase of recruitment of soldiers for overseas service 
came during the Thirty Years War. The early levies were used to reinforce 
the army of Count Ernst von Mansfeld, the mercenary commander, in the 
campaign in Bohemia in support of James VI’s son-in-law, Frederick of 
Bohemia, against the Holy Roman Empire. Later levies were also destined to 
47 RPCS, II, p. 237.
48 Ferguson, The Scots Brigade in the Service of the United Netherlands, I, p. xxiv.
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f ight in the effort to restore Frederick to the Upper and Lower Palatinate and 
to strengthen the Danish opposition to west-bound Habsburg forces, as well 
as to join the forces of Gustavus Adolphus. Large levies were implemented 
in the late 1630s and early 1640s for French service in the latter stages of the 
Thirty Years War when France entered the war in alliance with the Swedes 
and others against the Holy Roman Empire.
Attitudes to military service
The social hierarchies that existed in Scotland made the recruitment of men 
easier than it might otherwise have been. In the rural Highlands, the clan 
system could be readily adapted to secure men for continental levies. In 
1633 the parish minister of Wardlaw near Inverness recorded that Thomas 
Fraser, son of a local laird, used his clan connections and the assistance of 
Lord Lovat, the clan chief, to raise recruits.49 In another instance involving 
the Frasers, in 1656, clan leaders helped a recruiter enlist forty-three men 
in three days. It seems that the use of such social networks was standard 
procedure. When Sir Donald Mackay of Strathnaver issued commissions in 
his proposed regiment to the leading young men in neighbouring clans, he 
undoubtedly expected at least some of them to respond with enthusiasm 
and bring men with them to the colours, and this is indeed what happened.
In the Lowlands, the subordinate classes appear not to have shared 
the attitude to martial glory found among the nobles and lairds. The poor 
socio-economic conditions in the late sixteenth century and the familiarity 
with travel to the Low Countries prevalent on the east coast of Scotland may 
have helped in the recruitment of men in the Lowlands to join the conflict 
in the Netherlands, but later during the seventeenth century there is clear 
evidence of passive and even active resistance to recruitment. In April 1620, 
for instance, the levy to provide 1,500 men to go with Colonel Andrew Gray 
to Bohemia was proceeding slowly, and towards the end of that month the 
Privy Council ordered all beggars, vagabonds, and “masterless” men with 
no lawful trade or means of livelihood to enlist. Failure to comply with 
this command could result in a whipping or being burnt on the cheek for a 
f irst offence, and hanging for a second, at f irst glance a seemingly counter-
productive threat.50 The Council also directed criminals to be placed in the 
army, and in the Borders a proclamation was read out at market crosses 
49 Fraser, Chronicles of the Frasers, pp. 255, 417.
50 RPCS, XII, p. 259.
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to announce that reivers, men convicted of feuding and cattle raiding, 
were to be marked down for transportation. Early in May Colonel Gray had 
suff icient men to set off for Hamburg, but in the last days before sailing 
some of the recruits deserted and went into hiding in the Edinburgh area. 
From 1620 onwards it appears to have become common for courts to offer 
criminals the opportunity to go abroad in military service and for recruiting 
off icers to visit jails in the search for men.
A major levy was launched in the spring of 1627 to provide men for the 
service of the king of Denmark, then facing the advancing forces of the Holy 
Roman Empire in north-western Germany. The three commanders – Robert, 
Earl of Nithsdale, Alexander Lord Spynie, and James Sinclair of Murkle 
– were each granted £4,000 sterling for the task. The target of 9,000 men 
– 3,000 each – was extremely ambitious. Efforts to help recruiters attain 
it included another pronouncement from the Privy Council about taking 
up vagabonds and idle men, except that this time the Council went into 
more detail and mentioned “all Egyptians [gypsies]” and fugitive soldiers 
from other levies.51 The Council also noted reports of the targeted recruits 
forming themselves into “societies and companies” and preparing to use 
f irearms to resist recruitment. The Council warned sheriffs and burgh 
magistrates to apprehend all potential recruits from among the idle and 
masterless in their jurisdictions and asked them to assist the recruiting 
off icers “in bringing of these people to their colours”. Sea captains were 
forbidden to give fugitives passage to Ireland. The levy proceeded during 
the summer but it soon brought objections from respectable sections of 
the community. Recruiting captains were clearly desperate to f ill their 
quotas and were resorting to dubious tactics. The Council learned in June 
of men going into hiding and deserting, and also of men being violently 
taken against their will.52 In July, leading burgesses in Edinburgh protested 
that their sons and grandsons at the college were being induced to enlist 
by “alluring speeches”, causing some families to withdraw their offspring 
from the college and send them to other burghs for safety.53 There were 
complaints from the town of Burntisland in Fife in September that the 
soldiers waiting to go abroad were causing “manie great disordours”.54 In 
the midst of this troubled time around the Forth, Charles I launched a new 
war against France and called for a levy for men for an expedition to relieve 
51 Ibid., 2nd series, I, p. 565. 
52 Ibid., 2nd series, VIII, p. 379.
53 Ibid., 2nd series, II, p. 7.
54 Ibid., 2nd series, II, p. 79.
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the siege of La Rochelle. The Nithsdale-Spynie-Murkle levy probably raised 
only 5,000 men by the time the contingents sailed for Denmark in October. 
In 1629, Murkle was still trying to reach his original target of 3,000, had 
exhausted the recruitment grant, and had “ingaged his awin estait for the 
furtherance thairof”.55 Interestingly, in his petition to the Privy Council 
describing his unfortunate predicament, Murkle seems most concerned 
over being disgraced in the eyes of the king of Denmark and asks for a 
hearing with Charles I in the hope the British king will plead his case in 
Copenhagen.
By the late 1620s, therefore, it is evident that recruiters were f inding it 
diff icult to attract suff icient numbers of men to fulf il their obligations in 
the Lowlands, hitherto the main part of the country for the recruitment of 
soldiers for overseas service. The articles of agreement for recruitment of 
men for Sweden between Sir James Spens and Captain Alexander Hamilton 
in April 1629 refer to “the scantnes of men in Scotland”.56 During this period, 
the Lowlands enjoyed improvements in trade and the economy, better sea-
sons for agriculture, and fewer outbreaks of infectious disease.57 Prospects at 
home must have appeared better than they had in the previous half-century. 
It is only at this point that recruitment in the Highlands becomes significant. 
Charles I asked for 200 Highland bowmen for his La Rochelle expedition in 
1627 but in the previous year Sir Donald Mackay of Strathnaver (ennobled as 
Lord Reay in 1628) in the far north of the country had taken it upon himself 
to escape some domestic diff iculties by obtaining from the king a licence to 
raise troops for the continent on a much larger scale. Sir Robert Gordon, a 
neighbouring landlord, and possibly a cause of some of Sir Donald’s domestic 
diff iculties, recorded the eventuality as follows:
The yeir 1626 Sir Donald Macky (a gentleman of a sturring spirite) 
f inding himselff crossed at home, and matters not succeeding accord-
ing to his expectation, either in his owne particular estate or against 
his neighbours he taks resolution to leave the kingdome; and to this 
end he causeth his freinds to deale at court with the king for a licence 
to transport men to the Count Mansfeild into Germanie.58
55 Ibid., 2nd series, III, p. 147.
56 Quoted in Fraser, Memorials of the Earls of Haddington, p. 92.
57 Smout, A History of the Scottish People, pp. 99-103.
58 Gordon, A Genealogical History of the Earldom of Sutherland, p. 401.
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Count Mansfeld’s army was defeated before Mackay’s contingents reached it 
but Mackay’s Regiment, as it became called, entered the service of Denmark. 
After the Peace of Lübeck in July 1629, its off icers offered their allegiance to 
Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden and took their men with them. In contrast 
with the struggle faced by Nithsdale and his colleagues to f ill the ranks, 
the levy in the northern Highlands proceeded relatively quickly. Mackay 
received his licence in March 1626 and by October at least 2,000 men were 
ready to embark for the Elbe estuary.59 There were two possible reasons 
for this: this part of the country had not been really affected by previous 
recruitments, and it was a reflection of the ease with which clan society 
could be mobilized. Mackay was ably assisted in recruitment by the Forbes 
family in Aberdeenshire, where a proportion of the recruits were raised.60 
Despite the relative speediness of the levy, Mackay’s recruitment drive 
suffered, probably like all levies, from desertion, from men enrolling, 
receiving the initial payment, and then going into hiding. According to 
the Privy Council, “a grite number of thame” did this, and severe punish-
ment was proclaimed for them and any who helped them evade justice.61 
In the long run, even the clan system came under stress and did not always 
produce recruits: in September 1636 Captain Robert Innes, a laird’s son 
from Mackay’s Regiment, was angered enough to strike tenants of Gordon 
of Dunkinty near Elgin when they refused to allow their sons or servants 
to be recruited. Efforts to f ind new recruits by Mackay himself in 1629 also 
had some trouble in f inding men, partly a reflection of the low population 
density of the northern Highlands. Possibly to avoid stirring up public unrest 
over continual recruitment, when the Privy Council granted a licence to 
raise 300 men as replacements for regiments already in Swedish service, it 
added the instruction that this was to be done quietly, without drums or 
display of colours.62
In July and August 1632, the Dutch States General sought to recruit 2,000 
men in England and 1,500 men in Scotland to reinforce existing regiments.63 
Charles I gave his permission readily enough to the Dutch ambassador 
and his colleagues but warned them that the conditions on offer – each 
recruiting off icer to receive 8 guilders per man and the command of a 
company – would attract no one. Various reasons were put forward – that it 
59 RPCS, 2nd series, I, pp. 244-245. 
60 Tayler and Tayler, House of Forbes, p. 177.
61 RPCS, 2nd series, I, p. 311.
62 Ibid., 2nd series, II, p. 397.
63 Ferguson, The Scots Brigade in the Service of Denmark and Sweden, I, p. 411.
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was the wrong time of year, as high wages were on offer during the harvest; 
that recruiting was going ahead daily for Sweden and Muscovy, the latter 
offering 15 guilders per short month to the soldiers; that the targets per 
recruiting off icer were too high; that off icers would not like to recruit men 
and then not be put in command over them; that money was still owing to 
the Earl of Morton for a previous levy in 1629. These excuses were advanced 
in England; the ambassador failed to contact anyone in Scotland to f ind 
out if there was a better chance of success there. The levy failed. In 1633 the 
English government prohibited taking men out of the country for foreign 
service unless they were recruits to keep existing regiments up to strength.
The large levy in 1642 for service in France also ran into diff iculties, 
producing in the Privy Council records of the by-now familiar resorts to 
impressing “idle persons” and handing over convicted criminals to the 
recruiters. The Council records also show, however, that the authorities 
were not undiscriminating: for example, when eleven men complained 
that they had been taken by force and thrown into prison “where they are 
yitt lying almost starving for want of maintenance and their wyves and 
children ar begging through the countrie”, the Council sent off icials to 
investigate with the result that f ive were set free and six were retained, 
the latter having been deemed to have freely volunteered.64 There are also 
instances of landowners seeking the release of members of their workforce 
who had either volunteered or been inveigled into enlisting, an interesting 
point to which I shall return below.
Conditions of service
No written agreements or contracts covering the recruitment of the rank-
and-file soldiers have been located during the research for this chapter, and 
it is possible they were rarely if at all used. Verbal agreements founded on 
the existing conditions of trust and hierarchy could be expected in clan 
societies with their strong oral cultures, but they were also probably the 
norm in other parts of the country. The correspondence and contracts that 
do survive relate to off icial sources and educated elites.
The soldier serving abroad could usually hope for regular pay and the 
provision of food and clothing. These conditions appear to have been ac-
cepted at the time as reasonably fair, although it is diff icult to compare 
wages and prices in the various currencies of the day. Complaints and 
64 RPCS, 2nd series, VII, p. 450.
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dissension, amounting at times to mutiny, seem to have occurred only when 
pay and provisions were not issued when expected. In the late sixteenth 
century in Scotland, in one year a male farm servant could expect to earn 
from £1 6s 8d to £6, depending on skill and experience as well as regional 
variations. Rural wages were often supplemented with accommodation and 
some food but they seem very low when compared to what soldiers could 
hope for. The pay scale set by the Privy Council in 1586 for armed men to 
police the Borders ran from £20 a month for a horseman and £6 for a foot 
soldier to almost £70 and £50 respectively for their commanding captains.65
As an example of pay given to Scottish soldiers in Dutch service in the 
1570s, we have in the records totals paid out to commanding off icers for the 
fourteen months between 1 June 1573 and 31 July 1574. The largest sum went 
to Captain Baulfour (Balfour) – £8,015, the smallest to Colonel Ormeston 
– £50, with widely varying amounts to other off icers, which presumably 
reflect the respective lengths of service and complements of men, as well 
as the costs of bringing recruits over the North Sea.66 At the same time, 
under “pay”, Colonel Ormeston received £500, and this seems to have been 
the going annual rate for a man of this rank. In October 1575, the salary of 
Henry Balfour, by this time a colonel, was set at 800 guilders per year by 
the Dutch authorities. In May 1577, Colonel Balfour received £6,000 Artois 
for his services, as a lump sum at the termination of his period of service; 
he was soon requested to return to the Low Countries when war broke out 
anew in October that year.
In 1577 the Dutch laid down that “All captains [are] to pay their men 45 
stivers each, half monthly, while the engagement remains at 1,100 guilders 
monthly for 100 men.” 67 A village worker’s salary in the Low Countries at 
the time was around 200 guilders per year.68 In 1579, the pay scale for a 
company of soldiers under the command of a Colonel William Stewart ran 
from 12 livres per month for the drummer, the lowest paid, through 16 for a 
corporal, 24 for a sergeant, 40 for an ensign, and 45 for a lieutenant, to 90 for 
the captain.69 In September 1586 the authorities in Amsterdam were asked 
to pay to 150 Scottish soldiers who had newly arrived in the area 1 f lorin 
(1 guilder) per day to the captain, 10 patars (14 pence) to the lieutenant, 6 
patars each to the ensigns, sergeants, cadets, corporals, and clerk, and 3 
65 Ibid., IV, p. 111. 
66 Ferguson, The Scots Brigade in the Service of Denmark and Sweden, I, p. 36.
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patars to the ordinary ranks.70 The request to Henry Balfour to return to 
f ight for the States General in the renewal of hostilities in October 1577 
included the remuneration (apparently per year) offered to him and his 
men: £500 for himself, £200 for his lieutenant, £100 for his sergeant major, 
£40 for the quartermaster and the provost, £16 for the halbardiers, and £12 
for the provost sergeants.71
An attractive feature of service in the Low Countries in the Dutch cause 
was that the widows and children of off icers killed in action were given 
state pensions, amounts varying from 800 guilders per year awarded to the 
widow and son of Colonel Balfour in April 1581, to sums in 1610 of the order 
of £50 to £100 for each surviving relative.72
Costs forced the States General government of the United Provinces in 
the Low Countries to review the pay scales in 1587, when they dismissed 
companies they could not afford, asked off icers against assurance of a 
f inal settlement in the future not to seek payment for arrears as long as 
the war continued, required soldiers to swear to accept a 48-day month 
(off icers were given a 32-day month), and assigned garrisons to different 
provinces according to the province’s ability to pay.73 The commission dated 
26 June 1588 to Colonel Bartholomew Balfour included the statement that 
his company of 200 men would receive “2,200 pounds, of 40 groats the 
pound, every 32 days, with the reservation that henceforward he shall 
content himself with these payments every 48 days. With this he and his 
subordinate off icers and his soldiers, like others in the country’s service, 
must content themselves.” 74 A similar commission, dated 15 April 1593, to 
Captain Patrick Bruce commanding a company of lancers of 100 horses 
provides higher remuneration for mounted men – “his payment to be 3,000 
pounds per month of 32 days, the officers’ salaries and horse fodder included 
therein, provided he shall take care to procure […] all such payments out of 
said levies on the country districts of Flanders, the which he is to exact with 
all diligence and put in train, so that his pay beyond the present incomes 
can be escheat (or claimed) out of them; and he, the captain, his subordinate 
off icers, and cavalry shall like others rest satisf ied with receiving a month’s 
pay every 48 days.” 75
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The imposition of 32-day and 48-day months was not popular with the 
Scottish off icers. In June 1588, three captains, named as Meurrey, Nysbeth, 
and Waddel, told a committee of the States General that they were willing to 
serve “but that they must have the means to make their soldiers willing and 
to satisfy them”.76 There ensued a round of negotiations that lasted several 
weeks, in which Colonel Balfour tried to win the best deal for his men but 
which ended with the discharge of some off icers and the continuation of 
the 48-day month.
The pay scale for men to be recruited for Swedish service by Sir Donald 
Mackay is set out in a letter of June 1629:77 colonel – 300 riksdaler Swedish 
per month of 31 days; company captain – 100; lieutenant and ensign – 50; 
sergeant – 16; drummer or piper – 8; ordinary pikeman or musketeer – 6; 
scout and reserve – 5. The letter also sets out what would be expected of 
the mercenary:
[Off icers and men] participating in our adventures, shall not turn 
away from us in times of misfortunes, and as becometh such honour-
able and brave cavaliers and soldiers, they shall always be ready 
cheerfully and indefatigably to venture body and life.
There follows a list of the types of action in which the mercenary may 
expect to f ind himself – battles, skirmishes, watches, attacks, sieges, by day 
or night, on water or on land. The Swedish king undertook to provide a suf-
f icient monthly allowance with a twice-yearly settlement of accounts. Pay 
would not be reduced but there would be deductions for careless damage 
or breakage. The rate of exchange at the time is revealed in the articles of 
an agreement drawn up between Sir James Spens and Alexander Hamilton 
in April 1629 for the raising of 1,200 men, as mentioned earlier. The rewards 
for senior off icers could be very high and come in the form of grants of land 
and hereditary titles among the nobility as well as in payments of money, 
although only a few men benefited in this way.
For most soldiers the regularity with which they received their pay, 
food, and clothing was a major factor in keeping up their morale, and the 
reputations of commanders often rested on their performance in this regard. 
On long campaigns across great distances, the systems of victualling and 
payment could easily break down, and even Gustavus Adolphus, generally 
a reliable payer, had to deal with threats of mutiny from time to time. Some 
76 Ibid., I, p.98.
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mercenary commanders made no special arrangements for the support of 
their men and expected them to forage and plunder, practices that naturally 
visited misery on civilians and brought the reputation of the soldier to the 
level of the thief or rapist.
By the standards of the time, the Dutch were good at maintaining regular 
payment of salaries, although, as we have seen, there were still occasions 
when the soldiers were stirred to complain. The conscientious paymaster 
was always aware that the loyalty of a mercenary could be severely tested 
by a breakdown in pay, an eventuality that could easily occur when an 
army was in the f ield. The provision of clothing appears to have been very 
important for the attraction of recruits and the morale of the newly formed 
contingents. In 1627 Lord Ogilvie noted that his recruits would not “imbark 
with good will except they get thair clothes” and realized how important 
this was: “it does mutch good, and incurages many, quhen they sie the 
soldieris weill used, and speciall quhen they sie them passe throch the 
cuntrey weill apperelled”.78 Robert Monro records that the men in Mackay’s 
Regiment were issued with clothing and muster money after they had ar-
rived in Holstein from Scotland to join the king of Denmark’s forces, and 
briefly described how the off icers refused to wear the Danish cross with 
their Scottish colours, a short-lived instance of ethnic loyalty that was 
dispelled when King James VI’s off icials told them to obey who was paying 
them “in a matter so indifferent”.79 After six months of training and what 
Monro describes as getting in good order, the regiment was inspected by the 
king, took an oath of f idelity and heard the articles of war read, completing 
a comparatively well-organized and measured initiation that may have 
been far from typical of the mercenary experience.
Mention of duration of service seems to be missing from what we know 
of the contractual arrangements for the rank and f ile. It seems to have been 
customary for a soldier to serve as long as he was f it and the continuation 
of hostilities required his presence, his time ending when successful peace 
negotiations brought about disbandment.
Conditions of service related mainly to the active soldier. As mentioned, 
the States General in the Low Countries provided pensions for the widows 
and offspring of off icers but this was not true of every employer. The 
conditions offered by Gustavus Adolphus to Sir Donald Mackay included 
provision for the care of wounded and disabled men: “we shall provide a 
temporary home for them in our own dominions, but should they prefer 
78 Fallon, “Scottish Mercenaries”, p. 159.
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going beyond our kingdom a month’s pay shall be given to each”.80 Evidence 
is very hard to obtain as to what really happened to the ordinary soldier in 
the ranks when he became too old to continue or had to retire from active 
duty through injury. A few seem to have found a role behind the lines as 
cooks or orderlies; many may have been forced to resort to begging or a 
scrape-by existence in some menial occupation. We know from anecdotal 
evidence – the mention of veterans in later contexts – that some of the Scots 
found their way home from mainland Europe, likely taking advantage of the 
Swedish offer of a month’s pay, but no f igures on this are readily available. 
On his return to Britain in 1633, Robert Monro launched a venture to provide 
a hospital for wounded veterans.81
The response of the enlisted man to the conditions of service seems to 
have been generally one of acceptance, unsurprising in view of the options 
open to them once they had enlisted. The soldiers keenly perceived unfair-
ness in treatment. Sir Donald Mackay sought more money from the Danish 
authorities for his men when they protested that English units in the same 
army were being paid in a different manner. As Robert Monro put it – “It is 
a hard matter when the diligent and industrious Souldier is disappointed of 
his hire, and that he is rewarded with injury who did merit better.” 82 Diligent 
off icers in the f ield during the Thirty Years War were often exercised in 
maintaining the payment and hence the morale of their units.
At the last resort, the aggrieved soldier could always withdraw his 
service. A simple refusal to obey orders and mutiny, although this was an 
ultimately disastrous step, was made easier in the period under study by 
the accepted custom that defeated troops could switch sides and join the 
army of the victor. With the mercenary, loyalty was usually to comrade 
and commander rather than to country. Of his service with the Swedish 
army in northern Germany in the 1630s, James Turner commented in his 
memoirs: “I had swallowed without chewing, in Germanie, a very dangerous 
maxime, which militarie men there too much follow; which was, that so 
we serve our master honestlie, it is no matter what master we serve.” 83 In 
the 1570s-1580s in the Low Countries, when sieges of towns were common, 
a besieged garrison whose pay had fallen into arrears was often open to 
negotiation and surrender.
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Back home
One of the most diff icult aspects of this subject to explore is the effects mer-
cenary service had on the society from which the soldiers came. Although 
the removal of a signif icant number of active men from the population 
must have had some consequences, there seems to be a complete lack of 
evidence for a shortage of manpower in normal homeland socio-economic 
life. In times of dearth such a shortage may have been a blessing but this 
would have been a short-term benefit. The loss of manpower may well have 
been one reason for increasing resistance to recruitment and may have 
contributed, for example, to the Aberdeenshire laird’s tenants resisting the 
efforts of Robert Innes of Cotts to recruit their sons and servants.
In 1635, the Privy Council became so concerned over the amount of 
foreign “dollars [sic]” in circulation in the country, leading to fraud and a 
devaluation of the currency, that they passed in August an act allowing 
traders to use only domestic money for transactions and followed this in 
February 1636 with an act prohibiting the importation of amounts greater 
than 56s.84 The continental currency could well have been brought by 
returning veterans.
By 1650 there must have accumulated in Scotland a pool of men with 
military experience, men who had served abroad and found their way home 
again. At least, this seems to be implied by the petition in November 1641 
by Alexander Lord Forbes to the London Parliament stating “there are 
many soldiers desirous of employment […] Your Petitioner having formerly 
engaged in foreign wars desires that he may have leave to entreat such of 
the off icers and soldiers as shall not be any longer employed here and will 
willingly put themselves under his command in the service of any foreign 
prince.” 85
Events within Britain were soon to provide plenty of opportunity for the 
man with military training. Growing political tension in Scotland led to 
the military confrontation of the First Bishops’ War in June 1639. This was 
followed by further hostilities in 1640 and a gradual worsening of affairs 
until full-scale civil war broke out in England in 1642. Many of the Scottish 
mercenaries found their way home from the continent to f ight, where their 
experience served them well. After the mid-century, although individual 
soldiers and off icers still found places in continental armies, the raising 
of troops on any scale for the service of foreign powers became a memory.
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Military service in transition
In the f irst part of this chapter, I put forward a number of factors as deter-
mining the movement of mercenary soldiers from Scotland to continental 
Europe between 1550 and 1650. These factors are: a tradition of emigration 
in general, and previous experience of armed service in continental Europe, 
especially in France; socio-economic hardship at home; domestic military 
custom; the attitudes of the leading members of society to a military life; 
and new opportunities for armed service in continental Europe after the 
Reformation. This expansion of military service abroad as a feature of 
Scottish society can be seen in labour terms as the response to a growth 
in demand for a particular skill in a population where other opportunities 
for making a living were constrained in several ways.
Men with basic f ighting skills and experience in handling weapons could 
be found throughout the country. In the Borders and the Highlands, cattle 
reiving and clan feuds provided experience in campaigning over rough 
country, but even in the more settled Lowland areas the nobles maintained 
bands of armed men in their own service; among the mass of peasants and 
townsmen the wappenschaw system ensured that experience in handling 
weapons was normal. The custom of raising a host or army whenever an 
armed force was needed for national defence or security also kept alive the 
practices of military service.
Economic hardship at home, experience with weapons and armed ser-
vice, and existing emigration pathways to the continent were three strong 
“push” factors in encouraging men to look abroad. This was combined with 
a strong “pull” factor, the attitude of the nobility and the landowning classes 
to military service and their enthusiasm for “seeking fortune in the f ield”. 
Recruitment for overseas service was also encouraged from time to time by 
government for several reasons: as a way of coping with food shortages, as a 
way to get rid of social undesirables, and as an instrument of foreign policy. 
When mercenary activity by Scots may have had a negative effect on foreign 
relations, the government took steps to curtail or prevent it, for example, 
by issuing recruiting licences or, in the case of the Ramsay recruitment in 
1612, by seeking to suppress it completely.
It is also useful to see the phenomenon in terms of the work options that 
were open to a young man at the time. There was a high degree of hereditary 
employment, with the son of the merchant, tradesman, or labourer generally 
following in his father’s footsteps to earn a livelihood. This did not militate 
against some upward mobility but the absence of widespread, accessible 
education meant that only a few young people were given the opportunity 
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to attend any classes and benefit from formal tuition outside the family. 
Talented youngsters were probably spotted and encouraged, especially after 
the Reformation when a great need for new clergy arose, but this route of 
advancement lay open only to a relative few. Among the landowning classes, 
only the eldest son could hope to inherit an estate. Military service of some 
kind became, therefore, a real career option for many young men, especially 
when, as Major commented, a positive attitude to military service existed 
among farmers who scorned trades. To an extent, rural men shared the 
outlook of their social superiors and may have enlisted willingly, an attitude 
most likely to be prevalent in clan society and to have been an important 
factor in the comparatively rapid recruitment of Mackay’s Regiment in 1626.
It is possible that some labourers, urban as well as rural, saw enlisting 
as a soldier as a means of escape from the restricted life on offer at home 
and surrendered to the lure of adventure in preference to tedium and 
familiarity. For those who were fugitives from justice, answering the call 
of the recruiting off icer was an obvious way to evade arrest and a grim 
fate, and was probably a gamble worth taking, but even for men who had 
committed no wrong the prospect of soldiering may have been seen as an 
opportunity. The General Assembly of the Church of Scotland that came 
into existence with the Reformation after 1560 spoke against the oppression 
of poor tenants, although it failed to do much to ease their plight.86 In the 
burghs only merchants and craftsmen enjoyed the privileges that came 
with burgess status; all the other inhabitants, the majority that included 
servants, journeymen, labourers, and the poor, were called “unfree” and 
had no say in local affairs. As the seventeenth century wore on, conditions 
almost akin to serfdom were imposed on the labour force in the small coal-
mining and salt-panning industries around the Firth of Forth.87 Exchanging 
the constraints of civilian life in such circumstances for the discipline of 
an army, which at least offered the prospect of regular food, shelter, and 
comradeship, may have been a relatively easy decision to make. When some 
masters complained that their servants had been seized by recruiters and 
sought to have them released, the servants may not always have been so 
keen to return to civilian servitude. It seems that enlisting did not neces-
sarily take the soldier away from some kind of family life, as in July 1581 the 
Privy Council complained that the women following the troops abroad were 
86 Smout, A History of the Scottish People, p. 85.
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bringing dishonour on the country and called on ship captains to allow only 
legitimate wives of good repute to embark with the soldiers.88
Determining where the Scottish mercenary contingents fall on the 
axis of free/ unfree labour must take account of the clear distinctions 
between off icers and men in the conditions of service. Off icers were seen 
as professionals and were free to resign a commission, the most famous 
and exceptional example of this being the resignation of Sir John Hepburn 
from the Swedish army in 1632 after a perceived insult and a quarrel with 
Gustavus Adolphus.89 Sir John was, of course, a senior commander; a more 
junior off icer may not have felt so free to take such an independent course. 
The rank and f ile were unfree in the sense that they were expected to stay 
in service once enlisted, and were subject to laws on desertion.
With regard to the classif ication of labour relations used by the IISH, the 
Scottish mercenary soldier appears to accord with more than one category, 
depending on his individual status. The conscripted and pressed men in the 
contingents recruited in the Lowlands f it the definition of forced tributary 
labour. As well as receiving pay, they were paid partly in kind with food and 
clothing. With recruits who volunteered, the definition of labour relations 
becomes a little more complicated. In effect they were exchanging one form 
of labour relationship for another. For those who belonged to the “unfree” 
section of society, willingly leaving self-employment as a tradesman or 
employment as a labourer to become a soldier was surrendering a degree 
of personal independence for indentured tributary labour, but in times of 
economic hardship the gains could well have been seen as outweighing 
the drawbacks. Some volunteers from the burgess or landowner classes 
exchanged a non-working status for soldiering. An example here is James 
Turner who, in his own memoir, describes how as a student, aged eighteen, 
studying history and religious philosophy, he responded to “a restless desire 
[…] to be, if not an actor, at least a spectator of these warrs which at that 
time made so much noyse”, and enlisted in Sir James Lumsden’s regiment 
bound for Rostock in 1632.90 Robert Monro, the laird of Foulis in Easter Ross, 
volunteered to join Mackay’s Regiment to escape from domestic diff iculties: 
deep in debt, he engaged his estate revenues to his creditors for ten years 
and went off to be a military off icer.91
88 RPCS, III, p. 399.
89 Grant, Memoirs and Adventures of Sir John Hepburn, p. 182.
90 Turner, Memoirs of His Own Life and Times, p. 3. 
91 Monro, Monro His Expedition with the Worthy Scots Regiment, p. 3.
200 JaMEs MiLLEr 
The professional soldier, and in the context of this study, this usually 
means someone of off icer rank, was much more a self-employed individual 
free to accept a commission and, as circumstances permitted, move from one 
employer to another. With their enlistment in the military ranks, mercenar-
ies from the Highlands, where clan society prevailed, and from among the 
Borders kindreds can be seen as moving from a status of reciprocal labour, 
whether household- or community-based, or tributary labour to indentured 
employment. In the case of Mackay’s Regiment, one can argue that Sir Don-
ald Mackay saw the possibility of exploiting clan ties to f ind an honourable 
way out of personal constraints at home, taking it on himself to “offer” men, 
for whom he was their natural leader, to the service of others. In doing so, 
he was pioneering the exploitation of the clan system that the British state 
deployed from the latter half of the eighteenth century to furnish its army 
with men. The Scottish host, as raised by the government for a national cause, 
and expected to serve without pay for a f ixed number of days, was a form of 
tributary serf labour, a development from the feudal hosts of past centuries.
Scottish mercenaries, therefore, came from a variety of backgrounds 
to reach the status of paid soldier, transitions driven in the period under 
study, as we have seen, by a growth in overseas demand for soldiers against 
a background of socio-economic hardship at home, with ideological fac-
tors, principally motivations arising from the post-Reformation hostility 
between Protestant and Catholic, playing a subsidiary part. The period 
saw the transformation of the men who in an earlier generation would 
have comprised the post-feudal forces of the Scottish host and the armed 
followers of regional and clan leaders into the elements of an aggregate 
contract army. Some of those who survived the f ighting in Europe and 
returned to Scotland then became members of armies commissioned by 
the contesting forces in the civil wars in the British Isles, armies which were 
soon to be transformed once again into the forces of the state and the early 
modern conscript army. In this context, it is signif icant that a connecting 
thread can be traced from Sir John Hepburn’s recruitment for France in 1633 
and the British line regiment, the Royal Regiment of Foot, more popularly 
known as the Royal Scots, that was designated in 1684.
 Change and continuity in mercenary 
armies: Central Europe, 1650-1750
Michael Sikora
The second half of the seventeenth century saw signif icant changes in the 
structures of the most important military organizations on the European 
continent. Collectively, these changes are commonly labelled as the intro-
duction of standing armies. These changes certainly had a deep impact on 
the terms as well as the conditions of military labour. However, it needs to be 
discussed whether these developments should be understood as a categori-
cal transformation, putting military labour in a typological framework of 
its own, or whether it would be more appropriate to stress the aspects of 
continuity and to embed these aspects of change in a more evolutionary 
interpretative framework. This chapter will argue that several changes of 
particular importance altered the face of military labour so that it hardly 
could be equated with the classical era of mercenaries in the sixteenth 
and early seventeenth centuries. Nevertheless, the components were still 
tied to various traditions and did not constitute a completely innovative 
system that could be compared with the later transformations initiated by 
the French Revolution – though even the revolutionaries, of course, could 
not avoid being based on existing forms of military institutions.
In accordance with the objectives of the Fighting for a Living project, 
this chapter will initially outline the current state of research. Particular 
attention will be given to the modes of recruitment, which not only can be 
considered crucial criteria for categorizing the type of military labour but 
which also developed significant variations during the era under discussion 
here. The second part of the chapter will discuss and reassess the empirical 
f indings in the framework of some more general categories related to the 
typology and dynamics of military labour.
The most obvious expression of these changes was not inevitably con-
nected with the principles of standing armies and consisted simply of 
signif icant growth in the size of many armies. At the forefront of these 
developments was the French army, which established new levels for the 
military strength of a leading power within the European concert. Some 
f igures will illustrate the extent of growth. Of course, it is impossible to 
determine exact numbers; due to the lack of sources as well as discrepan-
cies between normative prescriptions, a limited range of records, and the 
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presumed reality, the numbers are the result of more or less rough estimates 
and ongoing discussions. Therefore they cannot offer more than an impres-
sion of the quantitative aspect of armies.
During the Thirty Years War, France may have mobilized at the most 
around 125,000 troops, desperately exploiting all resources. Several decades 
later, around 1695, the strength of the French army may have peaked at 
close to 340,000 troops.1 A comparison of peacetime statistics is no less 
informative. At the beginning of the seventeenth century the French king 
was already keeping a few thousand men under arms. However, around 
1680 – admittedly only in a short peacetime interlude in France’s struggle 
for hegemony – the army probably consisted of around 150,000 soldiers, 
signif icantly more than during the Thirty Years War only four decades 
before.
These numbers certainly give some impression of the strength of the 
most powerful army during this period. However, during the eighteenth 
century, one may say that obtaining or retaining the status of a leading 
power required the maintenance of more than 100,000 soldiers in peacetime 
and the mobilization of at least 150,000 soldiers during war. Such were the 
levels of mobilization attained by the rulers of Austria2 and Prussia3 during 
the Silesian Wars in the middle of the eighteenth century, representing 
a signif icant augmentation of their strength compared to the f irst half 
of the seventeenth century. Though the f igures still oscillated within a 
certain range and tended to grow, these benchmarks were not exceeded 
signif icantly until the levée en masse of the French Revolution marked 
another quantum increase in levels of mobilization.
To get an idea of the overall level of military mobilization in central Eu-
rope, one would have to include the forces of several medium-sized powers, 
including the Netherlands4 and some Italian states, as well as some princely 
1 Lynn, Giant of the Grand Siècle, pp. 41-58, includes some critical ref lections on the relation-
ship between the numbers derived from several archived lists and the real strength of the 
armies in the f ield. The precision of the methodology employed should cause some concern 
about comparing these numbers with other, less carefully derived f igures.
2 See Hochedlinger, Austria’s Wars of Emergence 1683-1797, pp. 98-104, 234-237, 297-303.
3 Probably the most reliable data can be found in Jany, Geschichte der Königlich Preußischen 
Armee bis zum Jahr 1807, I, pp. 8, 76, 83ff., 195-196, 387, III, pp. 12-13, 160ff., 186ff., 370ff., 435ff.
4 Van Nimwegen, The Dutch Army and the Military Revolutions; for a very basic overview, 
including some overall f igures, see van Nimwegen, “The Transformation of Army Organisation 
in Early-Modern Western Europe”, pp. 172-178.
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territories within the Holy Roman Empire,5 such as Bavaria, Hesse-Cassel,6 
or Saxony.7 However, the relationship between the strength of the army and 
the total population (the so-called military participation ratio) also varied 
markedly. France benefited from the extent of its territories and the size 
of its population, which resulted, according to estimations of the time, in a 
ratio of the army’s strength in relation to the whole population of around 1 
to 140. In contrast, Prussian military strength was based on a territory not 
half as big as France with an even smaller population density, so that the 
ratio was around 1 to 32. In the second half of the eighteenth century even 
this was exceeded by the military of Hesse-Cassel, reaching a ratio of 1 
soldier to 15 civilians.8 Of course, these f igures are hard to verify9 and raise 
some diff iculties of interpretation, which cannot be fully investigated here.
Observations: recruitment
As a result of these developments the demand for recruits increased dra-
matically. Indeed, the growth in absolute numbers was exacerbated by the 
continuous need for replacements in order to maintain the permanent exist-
ence of the armies. To be sure, the need for fresh recruits was unceasing, but 
reached signif icant peaks when rulers decided to start a military build-up, 
when new troops were raised in anticipation of a military confrontation 
or, even worse, when during war the losses had to be replaced as quickly 
5 Numbers can be found in Wilson, German Armies; mostly, however, they do not relate to 
general strengths but to wartime strength of territorial contingents deployed as auxiliaries or 
parts of the composite Reichsarmee. It is noteworthy that even some of the rather autonomous 
imperial cities maintained their own military, which will not be included here, due to their 
small numbers and special circumstances; see Schwark, Lübecks Stadtmilitär im 17. und 18. 
Jahrhundert; Kraus, Das Militärwesen der Reichsstadt Augsburg; Ehlers, Die Wehrverfassung 
der Stadt Hamburg im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert.
6 Ingrao, The Hessian Mercenary State; see Taylor, Indentured to Liberty; for a recent overview, 
though focused on early seventeenth-century militia, but with far-reaching considerations, see 
Gräf, “Landesdefension oder ‘Fundamentalmilitarisierung’?”
7 Kroll, Soldaten im 18. Jahrhundert zwischen Friedensalltag und Kriegserfahrung; for a 
compilation of several older f igures on the Saxon army, see pp. 70-73.
8 Ingrao, The Hessian Mercenary State, pp. 132-135.
9 The numbers are based on a list from the end of the eighteenth century, which can be found 
in Johann Georg Krünitz, Oeconomische Encyclopaedie, L (Berlin, 1790) (http://www.kruenitz1.
uni-trier.de/), pp. 746-755; the list, as part of the entry “Kriegs-Heer”, covers all of Europe, 
including a large number of territories of the Holy Roman Empire, and relates numbers of army 
strength to the population.
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as possible. Therefore the business of recruitment met challenges of a new 
dimension, too. In fact, methods of recruitment changed signif icantly.
The most important mode of recruitment remained voluntary enlist-
ment. This had been a well-established practice since mercenary service 
had become dominant in the later Middle Ages and had marginalized the 
feudal military service of the nobility.10 A signif icant aspect of this prac-
tice had been the fact that it did not really matter where the mercenaries 
came from. At one time, in the f irst half of the sixteenth century, the most 
reputable soldiers originated in Switzerland11 or, in the case of the so-called 
Lands knechte, from the south-western region of the Holy Roman Empire.12 
Other mercenaries, such as the Irish13 and the Scots,14 came from peripheral 
regions of Europe, while still other elements of the armies, even in the 
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, were also recruited either in the 
ruler’s territories or simply around the theatre of war. Such a composition 
gave parts of the armies a signif icant multi-cultural appearance.
On the other hand, the growth of the armies and, probably even more 
importantly, their enduring institutionalization in peacetime implied a 
stronger focus on the state’s own population. While precise comparisons 
are diff icult to determine and have to take account of differing local 
circumstances, the importance of foreign recruits seemingly decreased 
in armies such as the French15 or the Austrian,16 where they dropped as a 
proportion of the total to below 20 per cent. Recruiting beyond the state’s 
borders, however, continued to be a common practice. In this respect, 
France maintained a special relationship with the Swiss cantons by extend-
ing traditional treaties that provided f ixed numbers of Swiss recruits for 
10 Mallett, Mercenaries and Their Masters; Redlich, The German Military Enterpriser and His 
Work Force.
11 However, exclusive contracts mostly tied Swiss recruitment to French service; see as an 
overview Bodin, Les Suisses au service de la France. Swiss research on mercenary services is 
mostly focused on its social impact in Switzerland itself; see several contributions in Fuhrer et 
al., Schweizer in “Fremden Diesnten”, though it mostly refers to older works, and Gente ferocis-
sima; Küng, Glanz und Elend der Söldner; Bührer, Der Zürcher Solddienst des 18. Jahrhunderts; 
Schaufelberger, “Von der Kriegsgeschichte zur Militärgeschichte”; Schaufelberger, Der alte 
Schweizer und sein Krieg. Many authors also still refer to Peyer, “Die wirtschaftliche Bedeutung 
der fremden Dienste für die Schweiz”.
12 Baumann, Landsknechte.
13 Stradling, The Spanish Monarchy and Irish Mercenaries; Murtagh, “Irish Soldiers Abroad, 
1600-1800”; O’Reilly, “The Irish Mercenary Tradition in the 1600s”.
14 Miller, Swords for Hire; several contributions in Murdoch, Scotland and the Thirty Years War.
15 Corvisier, L’armée française de la fin du XVIIe siècle au ministère de Choiseul, I, pp. 55, 157f.; 
Lynn, Giant of the Grand Siècle, pp. 331f.
16 Duffy, The Army of Maria Theresa, p. 47.
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the French army, hired by the local authorities in Switzerland themselves. 
The Swiss were organized in separate units, which were retained during the 
entire eighteenth century, and they remained loyal until the last ones were 
massacred defending the French king against the Parisian revolutionaries 
in front of the Tuileries on 10 August 1792.
Even the individual enlistment of foreigners remained possible in the 
French army. The Austrian army profited from some scattered Habsburg 
possessions in southern Germany where recruiters had easy access to minor 
territories in the region.17 Along with Switzerland, the highly fragmented 
political landscape in southern Germany had provided one of Europe’s most 
important soldier-markets since the heyday of the Landsknechte. This was 
even more important for Prussia when it entered the league of Europe’s lead-
ing powers in the f irst half of the eighteenth century. Due to its relatively 
small population, the Prussian military build-up depended to a considerable 
extent on foreign recruitment.18 The proportion of recruits from beyond the 
borders of Prussia may have accounted for around one-third of the army, 
and Frederick the Great even tried to increase their numbers.19 Although the 
standing armies tended to become more homogeneous than before – further 
evidence for this will be discussed below – and since different armies had 
to deal with different conditions, recruitment continued to disregard the 
origins of the recruits. The concern with the quantity of recruits overrode 
any other considerations.
This was all the more true since growing armies altered the conditions 
of recruitment in another important regard. As far as we know, recruit-
ment did not meet serious problems during the heyday of mercenaries in 
the sixteenth century.20 Things changed during the seventeenth century, 
starting with the Thirty Years War, and these were later enforced by the 
17 A very close-up and colourful view of the everyday business of foreign recruitment in a 
southern German imperial city is offered by Schüssler, “Das Werbewesen in der Reichsstadt 
Heilbronn”; unfortunately only very few carbon copies of this work exist. The subject is cov-
ered fundamentally by Wilson, “The Politics of Military Recruitment in Eighteenth-Century 
Germany”. See also, from a more juridical perspective, von Rosenberg, Soldatenwerbung und 
militärisches Durchzugsrecht im Zeitalter des Absolutismus: for concrete examples, see pp. 104ff., 
134ff; Heuel, Werbungen in der Reichsstadt Köln 1700-1750.
18 Gugger, Preußische Werbungen in der Eidgenossenschaft im 18. Jahrhundert; Sicken, “Die 
preußische Werbung in Franken”; Jany, Geschichte der Königlich Preußischen Armee bis zum 
Jahr 1807; von Schultz, Die preußischen Werbungen unter Friedrich Wilhelm I. und Friedrich dem 
Großen.
19 Jany, Geschichte der Königlich Preußischen Armee bis zum Jahr 1807, II, pp. 236ff., III, pp. 50, 
184ff., 435f.
20 Burschel, Söldner im Nordwestdeutschland des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts, pp. 97f.
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changes outlined above. Obviously, it became more and more diff icult 
to motivate enough volunteers to join the army; at least, historians have 
revealed an increasing number of complaints about recruitment abuses in 
the records.21 In fact, recruitment involving the use or threat of violence, 
or the condemnation of delinquents to military service, seemed to become 
characteristic of this period of military history.
Some corrections or nuancing of this image are certainly necessary. First 
of all, one has to consider a certain bias inherent within the primary sources. 
While abuses were very likely to initiate resistance and formal complaints, 
and therefore the production of archival sources, a routine performed 
without opposition tends to be invisible to the historian. Accordingly, it 
is impossible to obtain a def initive record of the relative proportions of 
voluntary and enforced enlistment.22 Certainly the assumption that armies 
worked with large percentages of forced recruits seems to be unrealistic, 
though one should not underestimate either the impact of military disci-
pline even on forced soldiers, which will be discussed below, nor the range 
of possible motivations for truly voluntary enlistments.
Secondly, involuntary enlistment took very different forms. Of course, a 
large number of examples of forced recruitment exist. For example, many 
of them concern Prussian recruitment in the duchy of Mecklenburg in 
the f irst half of the eighteenth century.23 Obviously the Prussian military 
profited from internal struggles in the duchy and from its defencelessness 
against its already rather powerful neighbour. Typically, however, most of 
these examples took place during the period in which the Prussian king, 
Frederick William I, the so-called Soldatenkönig, implemented a strong 
military build-up by doubling the number of Prussian soldiers, so these ex-
amples cannot be considered representative of the usual practice of Prussian 
recruitment in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries without broader 
21 See Sikora, Disziplin und Desertion, pp. 221-226; Burschel, Söldner im Nordwestdeutschland 
des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts, pp. 104-108; Redlich, The German Military Enterpriser and His Work 
Force, II, pp. 173-181; von Schultz, Die preußischen Werbungen unter Friedrich Wilhelm I. und 
Friedrich dem Großen. For a collection of abstracts from Westphalian sources on Prussian 
recruitment, including documents on the Märkischen Aufstand, a local uprising against forced 
recruitment in 1720, see Kloosterhuis, Bauern, Bürger und Soldaten, I, pp. 23-46.
22 See Pröve, Stehendes Heer und städtische Gesellschaft im 18. Jahrhundert, pp. 42f.; in addition 
to some reports on recruitment abuses, Pröve offers data for one regiment, comparing the 
number of recruits during two peacetime decades with the number of off icial complaints in 
the local records, which suggests a ratio of only 5 per cent of irregular recruitments; of course, 
the example is small and the number of complaints might not be complete.
23 See von Schultz, Die preußischen Werbungen unter Friedrich Wilhelm I. und Friedrich dem 
Großen.
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research. The same thing seems to be true for the use of military service 
as a means of social discipline by forcing vagrants and delinquents into 
the army. Although there were examples for this in continental armies,24 
and although such examples severely damaged the image of the military 
in public discourse, these practices did not contribute signif icantly to 
recruitment overall.
On the other hand, involuntary enlistment did not always involve the 
use of violence. It seems to have been far more widespread for young men 
to be lured into military service by tricks and traps.25 For example, some 
signed up in taverns after being plied with alcohol; others were dazzled by 
unfulf illed promises or high, one-off payments for enlistment; while yet 
others accepted gifts only to be told subsequently that these represented a 
signing-on fee and that they were now enlisted. Moreover, even when there 
was no trickery involved, we should recognize that many men probably went 
into the army because of poverty or to escape some acute economic crisis.26 
Although volunteers in a formal sense, they did not join the military with 
real enthusiasm. Therefore, even considering that forcible impressment 
probably did not represent the norm, non-violent enlistments should not 
automatically be regarded as being wholly unforced. In any event, the great 
efforts made by governments to recruit soldiers and the undeniable abuses 
that this involved underline the fact that the growth of military organiza-
tions strained the reservoir of potential recruits and pushed the traditional 
methods of recruitment to their limits.
In response, rulers tried to expand or to develop alternative ways of 
recruiting. The options, however, were rather limited, too. Leading powers 
with large resources at their disposal could participate in what was later 
24 See Kroll, Soldaten im 18. Jahrhundert zwischen Friedensalltag und Kriegserfahrung, pp. 95-98; 
Burschel, Söldner im Nordwestdeutschland des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts, pp. 94f. Sikora, Disziplin 
und Desertion, pp. 229-232, also refers to some critics of the time, who were worried about the bad 
influence of such recruits on discipline and the reputation of the military. For some reflections 
on the juridical debate, see Fichte, Die Begründung des Militärdienstverhältnisses, pp. 129-135. 
In a literal sense, defectors from the opposing army were considered offenders, too, but their 
incorporation into one’s own army was quite a common practice.
25 Sikora, Disziplin und Desertion, pp. 226f.; Burschel, Söldner im Nordwestdeutschland des 16. 
und 17. Jahrhunderts, pp. 65, 105ff.; for these practices as a subject of popular literature, see the 
anonymous book List- und lustige Begebenheiten deren Herren Officiers auf Werbungen.
26 Kroll, Soldaten im 18. Jahrhundert zwischen Friedensalltag und Kriegserfahrung, pp. 92, 164, 
Pröve, Stehendes Heer und städtische Gesellschaft im 18. Jahrhundert, p. 37, and Burschel, Söldner 
im Nordwestdeutschland des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts, pp. 54-87, all discuss the high proportion 
of recruits from the lower classes of the population, not just in the eighteenth century.
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called the soldier-trade.27 Britain was the most important client, but France 
and others also took part in this practice. In short, minor princes, mostly 
from the Holy Roman Empire, provided troops in exchange for money 
or so-called subsidies. This practice gained a bad reputation in the late 
eighteenth century when German princes abandoned their subjects to an 
uncertain fate by sending them overseas, seemingly motivated by f inancial 
interests alone. It attracted even more criticism as such soldiers, perceived 
as victims of tyrannical arbitrariness, were engaged to fight in the American 
Revolution.
In fact, this way of increasing military power was already widespread 
in the seventeenth century. From a more formal view, such treaties can 
be considered a sort of alliance between rather unequal partners. While 
from the perspective of the major power, the business of recruitment could 
in a way be farmed out, the minor partner could hope to defend its own 
interests by gaining the support of a major player. In the late seventeenth 
century even Prussia, not yet a major player, transferred its own troops to 
foreign command in exchange for subsidies.28 The impressive enlargement 
of the Prussian army under Frederick William I was mostly motivated by 
experiences of dependency and unfulf illed promises.
In the context of the subject to be discussed here, the so-called soldier-
trade further developed pre-existing mechanisms for foreign recruitment, 
but exacerbated the need for recruits on the part of the contractor. Even for 
the client it did not offer a principal solution since this option could only 
be used for a certain time, usually in case of crisis or war. Typically it was 
more attractive for Britain than for the continental states because these 
troops could not contribute to the permanent strength of a standing army. 
Thus, the soldier-trade did not constitute a new principle of recruitment: 
it merely exported the problems inherent within the existing system by 
outsourcing them to others.
The only human resource rulers could unquestionably mobilize came from 
the population of their own territories. Intensifying recruitment therefore 
inevitably focused on the domestic population and accordingly contributed 
to the increasingly homogeneous composition of armies. In general, mobiliza-
tion of the domestic population was undertaken in two ways. One approach 
27 See, for this and the following paragraph, a recent summary and discussion of a long 
debate, with much further reading, Wilson, “The German ‘Soldier Trade’ of the Seventeenth 
and Eighteenth Centuries”; the most recent contribution, focusing on the everyday life of hired 
soldiers, is Huck, Soldaten gegen Nordamerika.
28 See Jany, Geschichte der Königlich Preußischen Armee bis zum Jahr 1807, I, pp. 388ff.
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was to involve local authorities in the struggle for voluntary enlistments, 
either by supporting the recruiting off icers or by obliging the authorities to 
deliver recruits themselves.29 Experiences with this option seem to have been 
variable. When required to meet target numbers of recruits, civil off icials 
tended to avoid confrontations with the local elites by focusing on vagrants, 
delinquents, or any outsiders regardless of their physical condition. However, 
it did not necessarily provide the military with capable soldiers; this could 
generally be better achieved by leaving recruitment in the hands of those 
off icers who would have to deal with the recruits afterwards.
In addition to these alterations to the established recruiting system, 
several rulers tried to make use of the personal obligation of their subjects to 
perform military service. From a typological point of view this policy must 
be understood as being completely different from voluntary enlistment. 
From a historical point of view this policy could connect with old but rather 
vague traditions. The duty of collective resistance against aggressors was 
deeply rooted in European societies, but it had not only been whittled down 
to times of emergency, but was also based on a much smaller geographical 
unit than the whole territory, linked as it was to local feudal structures and 
to urban30 or rural31 municipalities. In the case of a general levy decreed by 
the ruler to defend the whole territory, a rather mixed type of military force 
could emerge from these structures.32 In addition to the noblemen following 
their feudal obligations, there were rural levies from the noble lands as 
well as from the ruler’s personal estates, organized by the villages and 
court districts, together with contingents from the fortif ied towns, based 
on their own local defence systems. These towns gained a special strategic 
importance due to their walls, often connected with a certain degree of 
political and military autonomy. The participation of townsmen in defence 
of their municipalities, though not generally of much military signif icance, 
can be traced into the seventeenth and even eighteenth centuries.33
29 For Austria, see Hochedlinger, “Rekrutierung - Militarisierung - Modernisierung”, pp. 342-345.
30 The importance of the armed services in German cities has recently been stressed, though 
focusing more on public order and civic mentalities than on military functions, by Tlusty, The 
Martial Ethic in Early Modern Germany.
31 Since local military customs in the countryside are widely unexplored, the edition of a 
late-medieval f inding of law might be worth taking a look at; see Franz, Quellen zur Geschichte 
des deutschen Bauernstandes im Mittelalter, pp. 592-596.
32 A very good example of such complexity of military structures, combined with an edition 
of many archival sources, is offered by Schennach, Ritter, Landsknecht, Aufgebot.
33 Of course, sieges as a crucial part of early modern warfare were mostly carried out by perma-
nent or occasional garrison troops as part of the territorial army. On the role of the inhabitants 
of a fortif ied city and their relationship to the garrison troops, see Hohrath, “Der Bürger im Krieg 
210 MichaEL sikora 
Such local military organizations are usually called militias. We lack the 
detailed studies that would allow us to construct a comprehensive overview 
of the role of militias, although enough is known to establish that they were 
of varying military value. Nevertheless, for many early modern contempo-
raries the idea of militia service gained a special importance, with military 
philosophers such as Machiavelli associating it with the much-acclaimed 
ideal of a republican military force, based on the duty performed by free 
citizens and seemingly pref igured in the ancient Roman Republic.34 In the 
English debates of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the concept 
of militia was counterposed to the much criticized standing armies.35 In 
Germany during the same period, the term “militia” was frequently ill 
def ined, and could even designate the military as a whole. In the light 
of such divergent terminological usage, I should emphasize that in this 
chapter “militia” will be used as an analytical category, denoting a kind of 
non-professional military service, based on common duties, performed only 
on demand, and therefore, in an analytical sense, opposed in principle to 
the characteristics of standing professional armies.
It is important to note, however, that in certain regions a new type of 
permanent, though non-professional military service emerged several 
decades before the establishment of standing armies. Around 1600, threat-
ened by the Eighty Years’ War and the increasing tensions within the Holy 
Roman Empire, some minor princes and counts of the empire started taking 
precautionary measures to prepare their territories for military defence. 
And while they lacked the necessary resources to hire signif icant numbers 
of mercenaries, they tried to organize regular military training for a large 
number of their subjects who were selected in their communities according 
to prescribed ratios. Although the participants retained their civil status 
and remained within their localities, they were integrated into a loose 
organization, e.g., by dividing them into several companies, which were 
assigned to certain captains. From time to time, generally on Sundays, 
they were convoked for some basic military training, especially in the use 
of guns.
der Fürsten”; on the participation of citizens in defence efforts, see specif ically pp. 321-326. It is, 
however, not that easy to f ind signif icant examples; Schnitter, Volk und Landesdefension, referred 
to the defence of the Palatine city of Frankenthal against Spanish troops in 1621 and 1622. See also 
Egler, Die Spanier in der linksrheinischen Pfalz, pp. 66-68, for her section referring to the Theatrum 
Europaeum; seemingly, however, the major burden of defence was sustained by British mercenaries.
34 See Metzger, Die Milizarmee im klassischen Republikanismus.
35 See Schwoerer, No Standing Armies.
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Obviously, these formations36 still met some crucial criteria for militias, 
according to the definition given above. The participants served as non-
professionals, performed common duties, and, in a certain sense, still served 
only occasionally. However, at least two basic changes are no less obvious. 
Military service within these structures was no longer limited to times of 
emergency. In fact, such militias established a kind of periodic military 
service in peacetime even several decades before standing armies emerged. 
Secondly, the legal framework was renewed. In contrast to earlier levies 
the new militias, most often called Landesdefensionen (territorial defence 
forces), were not composed of different contingents but formed – at least in 
principle and ignoring the practice of privileges and exemptions – a homo-
geneous organization which did not systematically differentiate between 
subjects of the ruler, subjects of the noble landlords, and urban inhabit-
ants. Unlike earlier municipal militias, which more or less kept the idea of 
municipal autonomy and military self-defence, based – at least theoretically 
– on a reciprocal military obligation of the citizens, the Landesdefensionen 
were exclusively bound to serve the rulers’ policies. Their emergence can 
therefore be interpreted as enforcing the state-building process,37 because 
they helped to establish a monopoly of violence and reinforced a trend 
towards the equalization of the status of the ruler’s subjects at the cost of 
former noble and municipal privileges. Of course, one has to be aware of 
the diffuse realities that lay behind such theoretical abstractions, but the 
further changes to be discussed below will confirm the general thrust of 
developments.
Some of these organizations, e.g. in Saxony38 or in the Electoral Palatinate,39 
in Bavaria,40 or even in Brandenburg-Prussia,41 were maintained or resur-
rected even after the end of the Thirty Years War, though these minor 
territories started to build up permanent forces too. An even more striking 
36 For an overview, see Schnitter, Volk und Landesdefension.
37 See Schulze, “Die deutschen Landesdefensionen im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert”, specif ically 
p. 133.
38 Naumann, Das kursächsische Defensionswerk (1613 bis 1709); Kroll, Soldaten im 18. Jahrhundert 
zwischen Friedensalltag und Kriegserfahrung, pp. 125-129.
39 Bezzel, Geschichte des kurpfälzischen Heeres.
40 Würdinger, “Die bayerischen Landfahnen vom Jahre 1651-1705”; Staudinger, Geschichte 
des kurbayerischen Heeres unter Kurfürst Max II. Emanuel 1680-1705, I, pp. 648f., II, pp. 785ff., 
Geschichte des kurbayerischen Heeres unter Kurfürst Karl Albrecht - Kaiser Karl VII. - und Kurfürst 
Max III. Joseph 1726-1777, I, pp. 216ff.
41 Lampe, “Der Milizgedanke und seine Durchführung in Brandenburg-Preußen”, pp. 105-132 
(only available as a carbon copy); Göse, “Die brandenburgisch-preußische Landmiliz”. See also, 
in regard to the duchy of Prussia, later East Prussia, Marwitz, Staatsräson und Landesdefension.
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example for the relevance of militia forces within the framework of standing 
armies emerged in France. Here, local militias endured into the eighteenth 
century, providing, for example, soldiers to guard the coasts and borders. 
However, in 1688 the establishment of a Royal Militia was decreed. This 
step in fact created a new type of militia by transforming the principle of 
local military service into a countrywide organization at the disposal of the 
king.42 Varying numbers of militiamen could be called up by changing the 
quotas that each village had to supply; men from adjacent villages were put 
together in companies; off icers were assigned to oversee regular training 
on Sundays and holidays. In case of war, they formed provincial regiments 
which were put under the command of the army. These units were expected 
to support the army in different ways with up to tens of thousands of men, 
a small but not insignif icant number. The involuntary involvement of the 
population during the bellicose reign of Louis XIV, however, also provoked 
resistance; service with the militia was perceived as a “blood tax” on poor 
people. During the eighteenth century the militia underwent a change of 
fortune and was dissolved for many years, but never lost its bad reputation. 
From a more general perspective it nevertheless lent the French military 
system a kind of hybrid character (Lynn) by founding its recruitment on 
two very distinct principles.
Certainly the military value of militia units was limited, and it in fact 
diminished in comparison to the increasing eff iciency of permanently 
maintained troops. Nevertheless, militias or levies were still employed, 
even during the heyday of linear warfare in the middle of the eighteenth 
century.43 At the very least they seem to have been reasonably effective as 
defence forces for fortified places or against marauders. Thus, in comparison 
42 See, for example, Lynn, Giant of the Grand Siècle, pp. 371-393; Corvisier, L’armée française 
de la fin du XVIIe siècle au ministère de Choiseul, I, pp. 111-119, 197-231; Girard, Racolage et milice 
(1701-1715); Hennet, Les milices et les troupes provinciales.
43 Many militia activities are reported, though not yet systematically explored, from Moravia 
and Silesia, the main theatres of the Silesian Wars; they are mentioned in the multi-volume works 
of the off icial historiography, published by the Prussian General Staff, as well as the Austrian. 
See Großer Generalstab, Die Kriege Friedrichs des Großen, I.3, pp. 98f., 101, 108, 118, 140, 161, 178, 
286f., 313, II.1, 77f., 101, 220f., 222f., II.2, 90f., 139, II.3, 136, 143, 179, (and on Saxon militias) 194, 202, 
220, III.8, 3, 34f., 52, 85, 212; corresponding information can be found in Kriegsgeschichtliche 
Abteilung des K. und k. Kriegs-Archivs, Kriege unter der Regierung der Kaiserin-Königin Maria 
Theresia. Of course, there are also many hints about the lack of eff iciency of militias. Striking 
is the chaos caused by Hessian militiamen during the Battle of Sandershausen in 1758; they 
were positioned in the middle of the battle order, became disoriented, panicked, and f ired on 
everyone, friend or foe. See Savory, His Britannic Majesty’s Army in Germany during the Seven 
Years War, pp. 96ff.
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to the standing troops, the militias usually played only an auxiliary role. 
For example, they could serve as guards, thus relieving the army of some 
duties during wartime.
It seems that the most important auxiliary function was to provide 
reinforcements for the army, as a pool for voluntary engagement in one 
way or another. In practice, the distinctions between these two types of 
military organization could become blurred.44 Sometimes militia units 
were used directly to support the army in the f ield and were more or less 
integrated, and sometimes rulers called for direct levies to f ill the ranks of 
the standing units. Their traditional duty, formerly restricted to cases of 
necessity, rooted in local contexts, therefore tended to be transformed, step 
by step, into a resource for permanent military efforts at the unrestricted 
disposal of the ruler. Of course, one should add the stories of resistance 
against such measures.
In the Holy Roman Empire these developments were also reflected in 
the discourse on public law in the eighteenth century.45 The crucial point 
was whether the subjects could be forced into military service beyond 
those instances of acute necessity, which was out of the question. From the 
cabinet’s point of view the differences between voluntary enlistment and 
impressment were less theoretical than practical. Obviously, standing units 
were preferred to militias because of their greater military effectiveness. 
Enforcing an obligation on subjects to serve in the militias, on the other 
hand, was not only an easy way of recruiting, but also a cheap one, and this 
was crucial. Militias did not generate as many costs as standing armies; 
even when subjects were forced to enter the permanent units and therefore 
came to be paid regularly, nevertheless the initial costs of recruitment and 
especially the premiums for engagement (which were considerable) had 
been saved.
Furthermore, it is worth discussing the way in which particular problems 
of recruitment were solved in Prussia mostly during the second decade of the 
eighteenth century, not least because some contemporaries considered this 
solution to offer an example to be followed. In comparison to the practices 
outlined above, it might be astonishing to see that the Prussian military 
build-up started with a seemingly contrary action. Although Prussia had 
44 For an overview, see Sikora, Disziplin und Desertion, pp. 238-243.
45 Fichte, Die Begründung des Militärdienstverhältnisses, pp. 136-182; Sikora, Disziplin und 
Desertion, pp. 236-238; one of the most sophisticated contributions, though clearly situational, 
in opposition to recruitments in Württemberg, is [Moser], Abhandlung von Noethigung derer 
Unterthanen zu regulairen Kriegs-Diensten.
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a militia at its disposal at the beginning of the eighteenth century, it was 
dissolved by Frederick William I soon after he acceded to the throne.46 His 
action reflected a typical problem concerning recruitment: the existence of 
rivalry. The militia constrained recruitment to the standing army because 
the members of the militia enjoyed the privilege of being exempt from the 
reach of the recruiting off icers. From this point of view, the abolition of the 
militia should have facilitated more or less voluntary enlistment because 
the king exclusively favoured the expansion of the standing army.
Yet frictions and rivalries continued, no longer between militia and army, 
but between the different regiments of the army, which competed to f ind 
recruits from within the ruler’s territories. What would come to constitute 
the distinguishing characteristics of the Prussian system of recruitment 
did not emerge as the result of an intentional plan, but were developed 
piecemeal as solutions for particular problems.47 They can be summarized 
under three headings. First, the regiments tried to lay claim to potential 
future recruits to prevent other regiments from taking them. Therefore, at 
an early stage they started to put the names of young boys in the area around 
their garrisons onto lists, which were intended to reserve the individuals 
for service with the local regiment. Secondly, to avoid further conflicts, the 
central government started to draw boundary lines between the regiments 
and ended up creating recruiting districts, or so-called Kantone, from which 
the name Kantonsystem was derived. Once the system was elaborated, 
these cantons comprised a certain number of households to assure that 
every regiment had similar opportunities for recruitment. Within these 
cantons, the future recruits were already systematically registered by the 
army during their childhood, a task which was subsequently carried out 
with the help of local civil off icials.
Since the enlargement of the army absorbed many domestic recruits, the 
more so since they were picked out in such a systematic way, the economic 
advantages threatened to turn into disadvantages. The price was the loss of 
46 In fact, he did so less than two weeks after the death of his father. In 1718, Frederick William 
even forbade the use of the word “militia”, insisting his troops be called “regiments” or “soldiers”. 
Obviously the king was very keen on marking the difference: Frauenholz, Das Heerwesen in der 
Zeit des Absolutismus, pp. 194, 231f.
47 As a useful outline of the Kantonsystem’s development, see Jany, “Die Kantonverfassung 
Friedrich Wilhelms I.”; the most recent contribution to its exploration is Winter, Untertanengeist 
durch Militärpflicht? (on its emergence see specif ically pp. 39-97). For an overview of the 
inf luential debate on the social impact of the Kantonsystem and comparisons with other 
practices of domestic recruitment in German territories, see Wilson, “Social Militarization in 
Eighteenth-Century Germany”. Some documents can be found in Frauenholz, Das Heerwesen 
in der Zeit des Absolutismus.
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civilian labour force and tax revenue. This could partly be compensated for 
by intensifying foreign recruitment, but this was rather costly. It could be 
mitigated in detail by excluding certain professions from being recruited, 
based on regional and economic factors.48 The most important way out of 
this dilemma, however, was to furlough the domestic soldiers, the Kanton-
isten, for most of the year. In fact, during peacetime, they were obliged to 
join the troops only for two months in spring for exercises and manoeuvres. 
This was the third main characteristic of the Kantonsystem.
If the parallel existence of standing units and militias may be perceived 
as a hybrid military organization, the Kantonsystem was an even more 
bastardized form of recruitment. In its f inal stage it looked, in regard to 
the Kantonisten, very similar to a militia. Unlike in the Landesdefensionen, 
however, regular training did not take place in the civilian environment 
in the form of afternoon exercises, but was concentrated into a few weeks 
on the garrisons’ drill grounds; therefore, for most of the year, the soldiers 
lived a real civilian life in peacetime (if we disregard some complications in 
the details). Nevertheless, they were not organized in a separate institution 
from the army, but were mixed in with the mercenaries and formed the 
fundamental basis of a standing army, in respect of its numbers as well as 
presumably with regard to its mentality, though the latter is rather diff icult 
to discern.
It should also not be overlooked that the intention behind the Kan-
tonsystem was not to enforce obligatory military service on all potential 
Kantonisten, but rather to serve as a tool for the regiments to simply ref ill 
their ranks according to their current needs. After all, it did not emerge as 
an improvement of former militias, but as an optimization of regimental 
recruitment, which originally was based on individual volunteering. The 
Kantonsystem was therefore most precisely characterized as “legalizing a 
system of forced domestic recruitment” (“rechtliche Fixierung der inlän-
dischen Zwangswerbung”),49 a def inition that includes the assumption 
that genuine voluntary enlistment turned into a rather coercive practice 
as the Prussian army doubled in size under Frederick William I. As a result, 
however, the system turned violence into a predictable obligation – that is 
to say, physical force into legal force – and provided continous reinforce-
ments for the army. Therefore, it seemingly offered exemplary solutions for 
48 Kloosterhuis, “Zwischen Aufruhr und Akzeptanz”, Bauern, Bürger und Soldaten; Winter, 
Untertanengeist durch Militärpflicht?, specif ically pp. 263-275.
49 Von Schmoller, Umrisse und Untersuchungen zur Verfassungs-, Verwaltungs- und Wirtschafts-
geschichte besonders des Preußischen Staates, p. 278.
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typical structural problems of the time and inspired similar efforts in other 
territories, such as Hesse-Cassel and Austria.50
One should add that the implementation of the Kantonsystem in particu-
lar as well as militias in general had to take account of the local distribution 
of power since feudal structures were still of great importance in parts of 
central Europe. This was especially true in regard to the so-called Gutsherr-
schaft in parts of Brandenburg, where peasants were subject to a rigorous 
form of serfdom. However, turning them into Kantonisten also implied 
that they had been (at least partially) transferred from the jurisdiction of 
their landlords to the jurisdiction of the military. Although they may be 
said to have been doubly unfree, there are also hints that the rivalry of two 
authorities could strengthen their position in conflicts with their landlords. 
Therefore, the consequences of compulsory service in pre-modern societies 
may possibly turn out to be rather complex, though this cannot be discussed 
in detail here.
Looking at the composition of armies during the course of these transfor-
mations, but also considering the early modern period as a whole, requires 
at least two additional points to be made. First, most observations, including 
those outlined above, deal with the bulk of the army, which was constituted 
by the infantry. However, the cavalry continued to play an important role 
on the battlef ield as well forming a not insignif icant element of the forces. 
Although this aspect is neglected by historical research, it nevertheless 
seems that the recruiting of cavalrymen could usually be maintained by 
way of voluntary enlistment, and the system did not face the problems 
encountered with the recruitment of infantrymen. This was probably linked 
to the cavalry’s higher reputation and possibly also with a less exhausting 
kind of service. Whatever the case, the cavalry did not necessitate the 
utilization of any new methods of recruitment.
This is also true, albeit for different reasons, with regard to specialist 
units with more technical functions, such as the artillery. Although their 
importance on the battlef ield increased, they still formed only small units 
50 Ingrao, The Hessian Mercenary State, pp. 132-135; the impact on rural society has been 
analysed by Taylor, Indentured to Liberty, whose results provoked a little controversy; see the 
review by Charles Ingrao, Central European History 27 (1994), pp. 509-512, and the reply by Taylor, 
“Disagreement over the Hessian Military State of the Eighteenth Century”. Gräf, “Landesdefen-
sion oder ‘Fundamentalmilitarisierung’?”, discusses the influences of the older Hessian militias. 
The rules for the introduction of Kantone in Hesse, decreed in 1762, are printed in Auerbach 
and Fröhlich, Hessische Truppen im Amerikanischen Unabhängigkeitskrieg, III, pp. 29ff. For 
Austria, see Szabo, Kaunitz and Enlightened Absolutism 1753-1780, pp. 258-295; Hochedlinger, 
“Rekrutierung - Militarisierung - Modernisierung”, pp. 345-353.
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with long-serving soldiers, so that the need for recruits was rather limited 
and had no relevant impact on the principles of military organization.51
The same does not apply, however, to the role of the nobility. Military 
service was an essential part of the nobility’s collective identity and legiti-
macy. That did not mean that the glorif ied traditions of martial endeavour 
and chivalry aligned with military practice at the end of the seventeenth 
century. Nor did it mean that every nobleman actually joined the army. In 
fact, the Prussian king Frederick William I, once again, not only forced his 
subjects into military service, but also expected the noble houses of his 
territory to send at least one son into the army, an expectation that was oc-
casionally enforced with all the means at his disposal.52 The military service 
of the domestic nobility should have facilitated control either over the army 
or over the nobility itself. For many noblemen, in Prussia as elsewhere, a 
period of military service, even if only for a limited number of years, still 
constituted a meaningful and indisputable part of their biography and 
an honourable way to earn a living, at least in a symbolic sense, since the 
income of many off icerships did not cover the costs of keeping up noble 
appearances, which therefore must have been paid for out of the family 
fortune.
In terms of the army’s composition, the military service of the nobility 
represented a third constituent of military service alongside voluntary 
enlistment and the obligation of the subjects. The service of the nobles 
was based on a framework of cultural values and traditions53 from which 
ordinary soldiers were excluded and, although the noble members of the 
military comprised only a minority of the military personnel, their impor-
tance was enhanced by the fact that they almost exclusively occupied the 
off icerships. This reflected their privileged position in the society of orders, 
and the transference of these principles into the military inevitably led to 
a fundamental separation between the off icers and the ordinary men with 
regard to reputation, rank, and mentality. This, however, also corresponded 
to the latter’s everyday experience in civilian life.
Of course, it has to be admitted that not every off icer was of noble origin. 
This was especially true for the technical branches of the army; f irst of all 
the artillery, where the need for specialist knowledge made the service 
less attractive for nobles. This notwithstanding, even in the infantry and 
51 See, for example, Duffy, The Army of Maria Theresa, p. 108.
52 Büsch, Militärsystem und Sozialleben im alten Preußen, pp. 79-83; Göse, “Zwischen Garnison 
und Rittergut”.
53 Some general observations can be found in Sikora, Disziplin und Desertion, pp. 343-350.
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cavalry there was some opportunity for military careers to be pursued by 
non-noble soldiers who distinguished themselves. However, until the era of 
revolution and reform these cases continued to be individual exceptions, 
albeit with some fluctuations over time. Periods of extended warfare, above 
all the Thirty Years War, favoured such careers54 while the perpetuation of 
the military organization even tended to stabilize the connection between 
social and military hierarchy. Additionally it should be noted that climbers 
from the lower ranks were mostly ennobled as they rose up the military 
hierarchy. In a certain sense they adjusted to prevailing socio-cultural 
norms.
By contrast with the common soldiers, no structural changes have been 
detected with regard to noble entrants to the army as a result of the intro-
duction of standing armies. The pressure exercised by the king of Prussia 
does not seem to be representative. The transformation of the military 
into a permanent organization, however, changed the framework for all 
levels of military service. To complete the outline of the whole process 
this dimension has to be added to the discussion around recruitment. It 
certainly also influenced the motivation of possible recruits.
Observations: conditions
First of all, the permanence of the military allowed for the period of military 
service to be signif icantly extended. Wholesale demobilizations at the 
end of a war were reduced step by step,55 although all states, even in the 
eighteenth century, still continued to make use of the short-term formation 
and disbandment of units.56 On the whole, however, armies started to offer 
options for lifelong careers, or at least a livelihood, though the changes 
should not be exaggerated. Long periods of armed conflict, especially 
the Thirty Years War, prolonged in France by the Franco-Spanish War, 
required long-term service which had not actually been desired for its own 
sake at this time. The introduction of standing armies, however, not only 
institutionalized long-term service, but also established peacetime military 
service as a common practice for many thousands of military employees.57
54 See Kaiser, “Ist er vom Adel?”
55 The ongoing practice of army reductions even after 1648 has been emphasized by Kroener, 
“‘Der Krieg hat ein Loch ...’”.
56 A recently presented example is Nowosadtko, Stehendes Heer im Ständestaat, pp. 159-178.
57 Ibid., pp. 180-185; Pröve, Stehendes Heer und städtische Gesellschaft im 18. Jahrhundert, 
pp. 88-94; Fann, “On the Infantryman’s Age in Eighteenth Century Prussia”.
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It should be stressed, on the one hand, that this did not mean that a 
lifelong military occupation became the norm. Of course, the military 
authorities tried to keep their soldiers in service as long as possible. This 
was a traditional source of friction between military commanders and 
the soldiers because,58 during wartime, the authorities had always tried 
to compel the soldiers to serve until the end of the conflict. In peacetime 
standing armies, the circumstances were far less dramatic, but long-term 
service was still in the interests of the authorities because it kept military 
experience and skills in the army and saved the cost and effort of recruit-
ment. They therefore tried to impose long-term service as the only option; 
for example, in Prussia and Bavaria voluntary enlistment was in principle 
unlimited. There is some evidence from the eighteenth century that in fact 
soldiers increasingly tended to spend their whole professional life serving 
in one army.
On the other hand, this situation was not in the interests of potential 
recruits. There is evidence that most soldiers preferred to serve for a limited 
time and that there was room for negotiation over the length of service 
in some circumstances.59 Whether recruitment was being carried out in 
peacetime or in wartime obviously made a difference. During the Silesian 
Wars and the Seven Years War, Bavaria quickly resorted to contracts limiting 
military service to no more than three years just to get soldiers to sign on 
at all.60 Subsequent disagreements over the contract and date of dismissal 
resulted in conflict and desertions.
Alongside the introduction of a standing army, payment and subsistence 
had to be permanently provided, which proved a major challenge for state 
bureaucracies and especially for their treasuries, as well as being a major 
factor in changing the character of soldiers’ working conditions. In fact, 
the authorities managed the challenge by pragmatically developing mixed 
systems, which varied from time to time and from territory to territory, but 
which typically comprised a number of components. Such expedients had 
to some extent been pref igured during the Thirty Years War when they 
had developed as a result of the circumstances which mostly did not allow 
regular payment.
58 Redlich, The German Military Enterpriser and His Work Force, p. 218; Sikora, Disziplin und 
Desertion, pp. 193-196.
59 Once again, see Nowosadtko, Stehendes Heer im Ständestaat, pp. 180-185; Pröve, Stehendes 
Heer und städtische Gesellschaft im 18. Jahrhundert, pp. 88-94.
60 Staudinger, Geschichte des kurbayerischen Heeres unter Kurfürst Karl Albrecht - Kaiser Karl 
VII. - und Kurfürst Max III. Joseph 1726-1777,, I, pp. 240f.
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Of course, a monthly payment continued to form the core of remunera-
tion. While the pay of the mercenaries, at least its nominal level, had been 
relatively stable during the sixteenth century, some f luctuation can be 
observed during the second half of the seventeenth century, probably be-
cause of the conditions of the recruitment market. As a whole the nominal 
level of the monthly pay tended to decrease by up to 50 per cent, although 
precise comparisons are diff icult to draw.61
One element in the soldier’s monetary compensation was the premium, 
or signing-on bounty, paid as a reward for voluntary enlistment, and this did 
increase in importance. Originally recruits had received a certain sum to 
cover the costs of travelling from the place of recruitment to the place where 
the recruits were mustered. Later on, this payment changed its function 
and became a very flexible device that recruiters used to compete with one 
another.62 Of course, the premium was designed to overcome a potential 
recruit’s immediate concerns and to obscure the conditions of long-term 
service, and certainly its value to the recruit was negligible in the context 
of an extended period of soldiering. Nevertheless, the premium might 
well have weighed heavily with some potential recruits as they sought to 
evaluate the benefits and risks of signing on. On the whole, it is clear that 
the military authorities focused their efforts on the act of enlistment. Once 
recruited, the men were subjected to the judicial consequences of their 
contract and oath63 and the constraints of the institution. In this sense, 
premiums, as well as forced recruitments, compensated for a lack of supply, 
which was partly caused by poor salaries, which, for their part, resulted 
from the costs of standing armies.
The monetary payment did not cover all the soldier’s needs. He required 
clothes and weapons, food, quarters, and some everyday commodities. In 
contrast to previous practice, clothes and weapons were usually delivered by 
the authorities. This was, incidentally, the reason why clothing became more 
and more “uniform”, since it was ordered in large quantities and increasingly 
prescribed in detail.64 In some armies and in some periods, however, the 
61 Burschel, Söldner im Nordwestdeutschland des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts, pp. 188, 191f.; Redlich, 
The German Military Enterpriser and His Work Force, II, pp. 27, 29.
62 Burschel, Söldner im Nordwestdeutschland des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts, pp. 102-104; Redlich, 
The German Military Enterpriser and His Work Force, II, pp. 15-18.
63 Sikora, Disziplin und Desertion, p. 129; Fichte, Die Begründung des Militärdienstverhältnisses, 
pp. 88-118.
64 Hohrath, “Uniform”; deep insights into the material culture of an eighteenth-century 
army, with plenty of illustrations, are now provided by Hohrath, Friedrich der Große und die 
Uniformierung der preußischen Armee.
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cost of the equipment was deducted from soldiers’ pay. There were similar 
options to ensure the nourishment of the soldiers. Sometimes the soldiers 
had to use their pay to buy food on the open market; at other times basic 
foodstuffs were delivered to the army. In this case, sometimes the food was 
free and at times it was deducted from the soldier’s pay. Finally, in many 
territories, lodging was still provided by the civilian population, since the 
construction of barracks, as in France, remained the exception rather than 
the rule, and the soldiers were allocated to private households. Commodities 
that the soldiers could demand in many cases included wood, wax, salt, 
pepper, and vinegar. It seems to have been a widespread practice to shift 
the delivery of these items to the hosts, which could be considered a kind 
of tax. In some regions the hosts even had to serve the food for the soldiers.
Thus, the income of the soldiers was a mix of money and non-cash ben-
efits.65 It is diff icult to evaluate the totals, but it seems reasonable to suggest 
that the level of the soldiers’ income was comparable with the earnings of 
day-labourers or clerks on the lowest level. This may have allowed at best a 
modest, but stable living, though some documents also reveal complaints 
of poor conditions. These were also reflected in the regulations restricting 
the soldier’s right to marry. Such restrictions were designed to limit the 
number of dependent women and children in armies, with their associated 
costs.66 For a minority of soldiers things could turn for the better since 
wages grew signif icantly as they climbed the hierarchy of ranks. Common 
soldiers could supplement their income by taking on additional overtime 
shifts within the military, and also by offering their labour on the civilian 
market or by selling simple products.67 Many of them, for example, were 
former journeymen. So even non-military components can be added to a 
diversif ied set of income sources and benefits, which on the whole ensured 
the livelihood of the soldiers.
The non-military aspect of the soldier’s occupation directs the focus to the 
form of military service itself. Customary peacetime functions consisted of 
guard duty and sometimes possibly small missions to maintain public order, 
since the authorities did not yet have the large numbers of personnel required 
65 These paragraphs are a summary of the f indings of Burschel, Söldner im Nordwestdeutschland 
des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts, pp. 188-192; Redlich, The German Military Enterpriser and His Work 
Force, II, pp. 236-258.
66 Much deeper insight on this subject can be found in Engelen, Soldatenfrauen in Preußen; 
on the regulations, see pp. 41-68.
67 Nowosadtko, Stehendes Heer im Ständestaat, pp. 234-241; Kroll, Soldaten im 18. Jahrhundert 
zwischen Friedensalltag und Kriegserfahrung, pp. 286-289; Pröve, Stehendes Heer und städtische 
Gesellschaft im 18. Jahrhundert, pp. 252-266, also discusses illegal incomes.
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to enforce the civil law. However, these functions could be fulfilled by a small 
fraction of the soldiers recruited into the burgeoning standing armies. In 
fact soldiers of these armies enjoyed a lot of time unoccupied by military 
duties,68 as their additional earnings indicated. They fulfilled their military 
function, at least partly, by their simple presence and availability. Of course, the 
maintenance of their f ighting abilities was part of their everyday life as well.
This military training corresponded to the principles of so-called linear 
warfare which took its more or less f inal shape towards the end of the 
seventeenth century.69 The collective formations of the soldiers had changed 
over decades from large squares to broad but thin lines only four or three 
men deep. Since trained infantrymen deployed in such a fashion presented 
a powerful defensive formation, the extra numbers recruited into armies 
could be used to broaden the formation, with the option of outflanking 
the adversary. For the majority of soldiers the objectives of military train-
ing derived from this formation although the enduring importance of the 
cavalry and the growing importance of the artillery should not be denied.
It is well known and obvious even from this very short description that 
this kind of warfare did not call for outstanding dexterity and flexibility 
on the part of the soldiers. The main issue was to ensure that they were 
obedient and acted in a co-ordinated way. The major skills required were 
the use of the musket and collective movements of the whole body of troops. 
The handling of the musket was broken down into a certain number of 
distinct movements which were linked to specif ic commands. Contem-
porary military authors loved to illustrate this technique by presenting 
image sequences which in a certain sense pref igured modern instruction 
manuals by representing standardized operations.70 This dissection of the 
required movements seemingly facilitated teaching the recruits the use of 
muskets, which in fact required a complex sequence of manoeuvres since 
they were still one-shot muzzle loaders. Additionally, the fragmentation 
allowed progress in co-ordinating the action of the troops. By dividing a 
single operation into a series of discrete movements, the operation could 
be reconstructed as a collective action. Even more delicate was the chal-
lenge of moving many thousands of men on the battlef ield in the described 
way, when the front of an army could span several kilometres. This not 
68 Pröve, Stehendes Heer und städtische Gesellschaft im 18. Jahrhundert, pp. 155-159; Burschel, 
Söldner im Nordwestdeutschland des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts, pp. 214-217.
69 Lynn, Battle, pp. 111-125.
70 Sikora, “Die Mechanisierung des Kriegers”; see also Wellmann, “Hand und Leib, Arbeiten 
und Üben”.
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only required strict discipline to keep the soldiers in line but, in advance 
of this, long columns of marching soldiers also had to be deployed and 
transformed into a line, ideally without considerable gaps opening up and 
sections overlapping, all the while taking account of the conditions on the 
battlef ield and the actions of the adversaries.
To keep control over the troops according to these principles and under 
such circumstances, peacetime training seemingly was inevitable and must 
therefore be considered a crucial precondition for linear warfare. Of course, 
there were some differences between chronological periods and armies with 
regard to the intensity of the training, which ranged from one or two times 
a week up to daily exercises in the later Prussian army, albeit still limited to 
the morning.71 Training for collective movements was done in small units 
since the performance of large-scale manoeuvres required considerable 
effort and these were reduced to, at best, annual events, which may have 
become spectacular affairs attracting members of the court and foreign 
observers.72 Certainly it must be admitted that the theory in books and even 
the practice on the parade ground did not exactly represent the reality of 
the battlef ield, something which will not be discussed at this juncture. On 
the other hand, however, regular training not only implied something like 
an employment scheme for the soldiers and an attempt to control future 
battles, but also a certain military mentality.
This elaborate method of military training, which became well known as 
drill, can be traced back to the end of the sixteenth century, when the military 
leaders of the Dutch revolt tried to increase the efficiency of their military 
forces in their struggle against the superior Spanish army. Their reforms 
were inspired not only by military experience, but also by contemporary 
philosophy and the ideas of military authors of late antiquity.73 Therefore, they 
propagated not only certain details of military tactics and training, but also 
the ethical ideals of the perfect soldier, which were integrated into a renewed 
concept of military discipline. While losing some of its sophistication, the idea 
of discipline remained a key concept in the debates of military authors. It was 
substantiated not only in the image sequences mentioned above, but also in 
71 All details of Prussian military training, at least as they were intended to be fulf illed, can be 
derived from regulations which covered the entire spectrum of military duties and are mostly 
available as reprints; the most important are Reglement vor die Königl. Preußische Infanterie [...] 
(Potsdam, 1726, repr. Onsbarück, 1968) and, Reglement vor die Königl. Preußische Infanterie [...] 
(Berlin, 1943, repr. Osnabrück, 1976).
72 Luh, Kriegskunst in Europa 1650-1800, pp. 194-208.
73 Sikora, “Die Mechanisierung des Kriegers”; Sicken, “Die oranische Heeresreform”; Hahlweg, 
Die Heeresreformer der Oranier und die Antike.
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various ways in which weapon-handling was dealt with in the growing num-
ber of military manuals, which tended to increase the number of individual 
movements soldiers were expected to perform and commands they had to 
obey.74 They shaped an image of soldiers as subject to a rather mechanical 
ideal of training and fighting. Beyond the pure rationale of combat efficiency, 
the whole appearance of the soldiers was expected to reflect the qualities of 
discipline and obedience that imbued their whole being.
Once again it should be stressed that the reality of the parade ground 
probably looked much more prosaic than theories and manuals suggest, but 
without doubt the introduction of standing armies created the conditions 
for a signif icantly higher level of control over the soldiers. This control was 
expressed through more than just regular drills. It became manifest in a 
certain weakening of the soldiers’ rights as well. In contrast to the mercenar-
ies in the armies of the sixteenth century, who had cultivated some elements 
of corporate autonomy and representation based on their self-conception as 
contractual partners,75 members of the standing armies were increasingly 
subject to the one-sided duties confirmed by their oaths and subordinated 
to a military justice that was handled by academically trained jurists in the 
interests of and according to the guidelines of the rulers. As one example, it 
has been observed that, starting with the Dutch reformers, the soldiers were 
confronted with demands to carry out construction work on entrenchments 
and fortif ications.76 Although the real extent of such work cannot be quanti-
f ied, the claim marks a signif icant change, since such duties were strongly 
resisted during the heyday of mercenary business as incompatible with the 
honour of the warriors. The increase in control in the seventeenth century 
was also reflected in the intensif ied use of written means of registration 
and periodic inventory.77 Even the distribution of uniform clothing can be 
regarded as a symbolic expression of increasing control as it reduced the 
opportunity for individual expression and even eccentricity, which seems 
to have been quite typical of the older mercenary tradition.78
74 Kleinschmidt, Tyrocinium Militare.
75 Baumann, Landsknechte, pp. 92-130; Möller, Das Regiment der Landsknechte, pp. 52-112.
76 Burschel, Söldner im Nordwestdeutschland des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts, pp. 137-138.
77 See, for France, the insight in the vast possible quantity of data from the French records 
provided by Corvisier, Les contrôles des troupes de l’Ancien Régime. Almost all Prussian lists 
were lost during the Second World War, but even a single example can give an impression 
of the intensity of documentation; see (with photographic reproductions of the lists) Hanne 
(introduction), Rangirrolle, Listen und Extracte ... von Saldern Infanterie Regiment Anno 1771.
78 Rogg, “Zerhauen und zerschnitten, nachadelichen Sitten”, including ref lections on the 
interdependence between military clothing, civilian clothing, and the progress of military 
discipline. For a number of visual examples, see Rogg, Landsknechte und Reisläufer.
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Seemingly, the military turned out to be that element of the population 
that was best controlled and most disciplined by the authorities, with the 
exception of prisoners. However, a mere listing of those factors that drove 
the move towards the implementation of ever more restrictive discipline 
should not lead us to believe that the military was transformed into a 
frictionless machine (not an arbitrary metaphor, but one which became 
common at least during the eighteenth century).79 Although it is almost 
impossible to compare the level of insubordination and refusal, abuse, and 
disorder over time and changing conditions, at least the manifestations 
of refusal seem to have changed their profile. While mutinies apparently 
caught much attention and reflected the structures typical of the classic 
mercenary armies,80 they mostly disappeared from around the middle of 
the seventeenth century or were at least reduced to minor and exceptional 
incidents. This might have been the combined result of several factors: the 
increase in control and the decrease in collective advocacy of common 
interests, but also the stabilization of maintenance and payment which, 
though the sums were still rather poor, nevertheless probably prevented 
discontent and resistance.
On the other hand, desertion started to attract much more attention 
and effort.81 To be sure, soldiers had deserted in the preceding period, too, 
perhaps in signif icant numbers, but the phenomenon remained relatively 
invisible to historians, since even contemporary authorities did not or were 
not able to focus on this subject. From the second half of the seventeenth 
century, however, desertion was especially addressed in an increasing num-
ber of edicts and decrees. It became more precisely defined in these edicts 
and in the juridical debate, and in Germany even the word started to become 
established as a technical term.82 The growing tendency of authorities to 
categorize, list, and archive thus provides the historian with more abundant 
documentation of the phenomenon which, although often fragmentary, 
allows a more complete picture to be established than for earlier periods.
79 See Sikora, Disziplin und Desertion, pp. 45f.; for the parallels between the military discourse 
and the discourse on state politics, see Stollberg-Rilinger, Der Staat als Maschine.
80 Parker, “Mutiny and Discontent in the Spanish Army of Flanders”; Baumann, “Protest 
und Verweigerung in der Zeit der klassischen Söldnerheere”; Burschel, Söldner im Nordwest-
deutschland des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts, pp. 195-198.
81 See Sikora, Disziplin und Desertion; on desertion before the era of standing armies, see 
the contributions from Reinhard Baumann, Michael Kaiser and Peter Burschel in Bröckling 
and Sikora, Armeen und ihre Deserteure; for a different viewpoint, see Muth, Flucht aus dem 
militärischen Alltag.
82 Sikora, Disziplin und Desertion, pp. 54f.
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The motives for desertion must be regarded as diverse, but certainly 
enforced enlistment, violent modes of training and disciplining, and contro-
versies over the conditions of service played a major role during peacetime. 
Of course, the reasons and motives for desertion took a much more exis-
tential shape during wartime, due to considerable physical exertion, poor 
weather conditions, the lack of maintenance, and disintegration caused by 
military defeats. But even then, at least, mutinies remained an exception.
Therefore, on the whole, the intensif ied focus on desertion does not 
just indicate friction and considerable differences between the ideal of 
discipline and control and the realities of garrison life and campaigns. 
Alongside this, desertion must partly be interpreted as a reaction to, and 
an unintended result of, an increasing level of control and coercion. Thirdly, 
however, the efforts to record and to prevent desertion themselves reflect 
the increasing eff iciency of control. In this sense the shift from mutinies 
to desertions can also be labelled as the individualization, isolation, and 
marginalization of refusal.
In summary, the introduction of standing armies signif icantly changed 
the conditions of military service and the appearance of the soldiers. The 
permanence of the organization even during peacetime transformed 
military service into a reliable long-term, if not lifelong, occupation which, 
paradoxically, meant that f ighting was not the only job undertaken by sol-
diers. Continuous training ensured a higher level of f ighting skills, although 
these skills consisted of rather simple, mechanical manual operations. One 
should also note the signif icantly higher level of regulation, control, and 
discipline, which were accompanied by a greater use of coercion and internal 
violence. To situate the period 1650-1750 and the central European experi-
ence within the broader framework of military labour, however, requires 
some further discussion of basic issues, not least recruitment, for the method 
of recruitment profoundly influenced the basic constitution of the military.
General discussion: structures of recruitment
As outlined above, recruitment changed its shape, too. Since the concept 
of mercenary service seems to be inevitably connected with the principle 
of free contracting, the growing importance both of forced enlistment 
and of part-time soldiers such as militiamen or Kantonisten may indicate 
a possible discrepancy and the need for a reassessment of our typological 
categorization. On the one hand, one must stress the increasingly hybrid 
character of the processes of recruitment as a pronounced feature of this 
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stage of the development. It is characteristic mainly because it indicates a 
crisis in the customary modes of recruitment, as described above.
On the other hand, soldiers serving on the basis of a contract still formed 
the backbone of the armies. Of course, the increasing number of soldiers 
who were forced into a contract partly changed the face of military service 
and violated the principles of voluntary enlistment. However, it is hardly 
possible to def ine the forced soldiers as a new and distinctive type of mili-
tary service. First of all, it is impossible to quantify precisely that proportion 
of the soldiers who really had volunteered, for whatever reason, how many 
of them had been duped, and how many had been forced into the army by 
other means. The number of involuntary soldiers, however def ined, was 
probably signif icant, but there is no basis for the assumption that they 
were dominant. Rather, and more importantly, one has to assume that, 
beyond the ideal types of voluntary enlistments and enlistments forced 
by physical violence, the distinctions between voluntary and involuntary 
were quite fluid.
At least, the military authorities did not draw any distinction and dealt 
with all the contracted soldiers according to the terms of contract or, in 
practice, according to their own view of those terms. The one-sided interpre-
tation of military duties imposed by the authorities could add yet another 
aspect of force to the conditions of service from which all soldiers suffered 
in the same way. On the other hand, the authorities did not order or even 
legalize forced recruitments. However, they were widely tolerated. At most, 
authorities exceptionally intervened when forced recruitments caused too 
much dissent. Jurists who considered the issue dealt very cautiously with 
it. At least, the number of scholars who critically discussed the validity of 
a contract concluded by force gradually grew.83 The crucial point was that 
the authorities insisted on high numbers of recruits with no respect to the 
actual supply on the labour market.
Therefore, more or less inevitably, force and violence were adopted by the 
recruiting off icers in times of exceptional demand. It was a means for them 
to deal with low supply, to compete with other recruiters, and to fulf il the 
demands of their superiors. This might have happened within or beyond the 
borders of the territory and therefore still resulted in individual contracts 
without systematic recourse to any general obligations of the subjects. Obvi-
ously, these practices introduced more force into the military organizations 
and, in this sense, might be seen in parallel to the increasing importance 
83 Fichte, Die Begründung des Militärdienstverhältnisses, pp.  123-136, correcting Sikora, 
Disziplin und Desertion, p. 222.
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of military drill. They emerged gradually as an unpremeditated corollary 
of armies’ growth and, in a formal sense, still harked back to the character 
of voluntary enlistment, ending up in an individual contract. Therefore it 
seems reasonable to address these practices as an extreme or maybe even 
corrupted variety within the framework of individual engagement, at least 
intended to be voluntary. Since they were not systematically introduced, 
were without legal basis, and had no def inite characteristics, they can 
hardly be analysed as a distinctive and discrete alternative principle.
In contrast, this was definitely the case with regard to the militias. Their 
importance may be discussed in an even broader context, as possible fore-
runners of the military draft. For example, André Corvisier unhesitatingly 
considered the establishment of the Royal Militia in 1688 as the start of 
the draft in France.84 Of course, the Prussian Kantonsystem has also been 
discussed in regard to the emergence of the draft. Though a certain continu-
ity cannot be denied – and was even emphasized by Prussian reformers at 
the beginning of the nineteenth century85 – one should be aware that the 
system was not intended to impose military service generally across the 
board but to serve as a tool for a selective supplementation of the regiments. 
Moreover, like other militia organizations, it was embedded in a pre-modern 
society, and accordingly included a long list of exemptions from service as a 
Kantonist due to collective privileges or for economic reasons. Thus, these 
organizations were far from implementing a general and equal duty with 
all its socio-political implications.
Even from a more pragmatic perspective one has to keep in mind that, 
in the framework of the standing armies, the militias’ functions remained 
mostly subsidiary to those of the units of long-term professional soldiers. 
In most territories, militiamen, numerically, formed only a small or at least 
the smaller proportion of the military. Although militia units were used 
on the battlef ield, alongside the line regiments, large-scale warfare was 
based on the standing professional army. When militias were used as pools 
for recruitment, they simply turned into a more ref ined option for the 
reinforcement of the standing armies.
The example of the Prussian Kantonsystem stands out as an exception 
since the call-up of peasants established a semi-professional – or, in regard 
84 Corvisier, “Les transformations de l’armée au XVIIe siècle”, p. 90. For a recent contribution 
to this debate, see Hippler, Citizens, Soldiers and National Armies, which includes considerations 
on the Royal Militia, pp. 18-23.
85 For a discussion on tradition and innovation in regard to the Prussian military reforms, see 
Sikora, “Militarisierung und Zivilisierung”, pp. 172-178; Winter, “Kontinuität oder Neuanfang?”
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to their absence for the most part of the year, somewhat like a “quarter”-
professional – structure as a pillar of the state’s military strength. From its 
emergence, however, this system can be traced back to pragmatic solutions 
avoiding the abuses of voluntary enlistment and did not emerge from the 
militias. As mentioned above, the Prussian militias were dissolved even 
before the establishment of the Kantonsystem, since they weakened the 
number of potential recruits for the recruiters. It is also remarkable that, 
later on, the Prussian officials still fell back on the militias in times of urgent 
necessity. During the Seven Years War in particular, regional militias were 
raised.86 As local and regional defence forces they simply performed the tra-
ditional function of militias. In relation to the standing armies they served 
as an emergency stopgap if troops were absent and provided, in practice, 
hardly any real support for the army. The burden of strategic warfare was 
exclusively shouldered by the permanent units including the Kantonisten.
To sum up, standing armies of this period should still be considered as 
being dominated by the principle of individual enlistment, intended to be 
voluntary. If this argument is accepted, one can describe military service 
in this period as mostly characterized by free and commodified forms of 
labour. In fact, this points to a basic similarity with the preceding forms of 
mercenary service since this may be considered as the major manifestation of 
commodified military labour. As has been pointed out, not all military service 
was of this kind, and the principle of free and commodified labour was to some 
degree adulterated by the growing use of impressment, the incorporation of 
militiamen into the professional forces, and the hybrid type of Kantonisten.
Nevertheless, the essence of mercenary service still was far from eroded 
altogether. Whether to still call these organizations mercenary armies or 
not depends upon one’s point of view: whether one wants to stress that the 
changes around 1500 and around 1800 were much more deeply rooted and 
categorical than the changes around 1700, or whether one wants to privilege 
the differences that have been outlined on the preceding pages. The author 
would tend to stress the continuity of mercenary service;87 although obvi-
ously significant and profound changes of military organizations took place 
during the period under discussion, they cannot be simply described as a 
disappearance of mercenary structures. The change emerged and proceeded 
within a framework dominated by paid military service.
86 Lampe, “Der Milizgedanke und seine Durchführung in Brandenburg-Preußen”, pp. 138-148; 
Schwartz, Organisation und Verpflegung der preussischen Lanmilizen im Siebenjährigen Krieg.
87 For broader argumentation on the characteristics of mercenary service and its signif icance 
in regard to early modern military structures, see Sikora, “Söldner”.
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It should be noted, however, that the concept of the mercenary, although 
the term is well established in common and scientif ic language, raises some 
problems. From the beginning of the early modern period, since the days 
of Machiavelli, mercenaries were the object not only of military discourse, 
but also of political and moral attributions. This was exacerbated from 
the perspective of observers looking back from the nineteenth century, 
who condemned mercenary service as a fundamental contradiction to the 
basic values of the nation-state. Even nowadays the debate on mercenaries 
depends not only on objective analysis, but also on political outlook. For 
example, modern juridical def initions of mercenaries in fact exclude such 
institutions as the French and Spanish Foreign Legions which, according to 
widespread understanding, are otherwise perceived as typical examples of 
mercenary units; the criteria of these def initions are also diff icult to apply 
to an unequivocal classif ication of private military companies.88 Therefore, 
the term “mercenary service” must be used with caution and reflection.
Since the ideological components of mercenary def initions complicate 
the analytical use of the concept, the definition should be reduced to its 
crucial formal feature, which is the individual contract as the basis of a – at 
least intentional – free and commodif ied type of military labour. In this 
sense, the concept of mercenary service still seems the most adequate cat-
egory for use in characterization and analysis of the dominating structure 
of military service in the eighteenth century. Thus, to discuss the transi-
tions of mercenary armies, one has to revert to a lower level of structural 
characteristics, just to gain slightly more sophisticated arguments. Such 
arguments can be determined from the common characteristics that usu-
ally are associated with the concept of mercenary service.
General discussion: factors of cohesion
One such characteristic seems to be the general understanding that merce-
naries are basically defined by the fact that they were foreigners in relation 
to their engagement. The category of foreigner raises problems when used 
88 See, for example, Major, “Mercenaries and International Law”; recent publications on juridi-
cal problems concerning mercenary business include Bakker and Sossai, Multilevel Regulation 
of Military and Security Contractors; Francioni and Ronzitti, War by Contract; and in a historical 
context Sikora, “Söldner”, pp. 211f. The juridical framework was f ixed as a resolution of the 
General Assembly of the United Nations in the International Convention against the Recruit-
ment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, A/Res/44/34, 4 December 1989, http://www.
un.org/ga/documents/gadocs.htm.
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in the context of the early modern period. For example, the Spanish army 
f ighting against the Dutch Revolt, several decades before the era discussed 
here, was composed of a significant portion of Dutch soldiers,89 who accord-
ingly fought in their own homeland and for their legitimate ruling authority. 
On the other hand, they were in a rather ambiguous position since they 
could also be viewed as foreign members of a foreign army. Other examples 
from the Thirty Years’ War, chosen at random, reveal the predominantly 
regional character of voluntary enlistment, or mercenary engagement, 
depending on the place where the recruitment was undertaken.90 This could 
mean that large numbers of a ruler’s subjects joined up when the ruler or 
his army commander decided to initiate recruitment within or close to 
the ruler’s territory.
Although the composition of armies before 1650 obviously was not of 
purely foreign origin as most definitions of mercenary would imply, it seems 
that the percentage of homeland recruits increased as a consequence of the 
establishment of standing armies; above all, as a consequence of increased 
efforts to raise recruits from the ruler’s own territory. It is true that pro-
portions varied, but nevertheless genuinely foreign recruits remained a 
signif icant element of armies. Change, in this respect, was more gradual 
than is suggested by those who pose a sharp dichotomy between mercenary 
and standing armies. Indeed, one may argue that although the percentage of 
domestic recruits grew significantly, this was not the defining characteristic 
of standing armies since the number of foreigners in their ranks remained 
relevant. To put it another way, this fact indicates that, in principle, the 
origin of the soldiers was still largely irrelevant. It would probably be helpful 
and adequate for analytical purposes to simply omit the criterion of origin 
for defining mercenary service, at least in regard to the early modern period, 
but this is not essential for the problems discussed here.
A more signif icant change may be detected regarding the framework of 
military labour. Some aspects of this have already been alluded to earlier, 
and these can be encapsulated in the notion of uniformity. This was literally 
true concerning military dress, and nearly so for the modes of f ighting 
and the body movements of the soldiers, which were intended to become 
programmed. Of course, regulations should not be mixed up with the 
reality on the battlef ield, but the impact of military drill should not be 
underestimated either. Although the mercenaries of previous decades were 
89 Parker, The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, pp. 27ff., 271f.
90 Burschel, Söldner im Nordwestdeutschland des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts, pp. 145-150; Kapser, 
Die bayerische Kriegsorganisation in der zweiten Hälfte des Dreißigjährigen Krieges, pp. 250-261.
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supposed to f ight as a part of a homogeneous body of soldiers, the personal 
drill created a new level of control and discipline.
In a broader sense, a similar argument can be advanced concerning the 
relationship between soldiers and military commanders since the soldiers’ 
earlier options of self-determination and protest, though they should not 
be overestimated, were weakened in favour of the total submission of the 
soldiers to the disciplinary power of their drill masters, and to a military 
justice run in the interests of the military commander. Even the fact of 
peacetime service can be interpreted as a factor leading to greater uniform-
ity. Since the actions of mercenaries in the past had been exclusively linked 
with the conduct of war, their image, for better or worse, was dominated by 
the connotations of f ighting and bravery, violence and cruelty, adventure 
and misery. The peacetime members of a standing army were much more on 
show and to a larger audience than before, but the public perceived them as 
guardsmen, as puppets on the strings of commanders, and even as earning 
money, employed not only as soldiers, but working with their own hands 
in just the same way as many others in town worked. Having a night out 
on the town with comrades and enjoying the ensuing debauchery seemed 
to be the most singular aspects of a soldier’s life, but social acceptance of 
these activities depended largely on one’s point of view.
This certainly must have had consequences for the conception of the 
role of the soldiers. Recent research has done much to add to our under-
standing of the public perception and self-perception of the mercenaries 
in their heyday in the sixteenth century, most prominently reflected and 
certainly idealized in many printed woodcuts, but also documented in 
clothes, songs, poems, plays, and (mostly very critical) treatises.91 Comments 
from non-soldiers mostly combined criticisms of their idleness, violence, 
and immorality with a certain fascination, which seemingly fed into the 
self-perception of mercenaries, thereby helping to enhance their status as 
an order of outsiders, based on claims of a distinctive honour, autonomy, 
and extravagance as well as on superiority and a disdain for civilian life. 
Though extremely ambiguous, being a mercenary attracted a lot of attention 
and promised, if not esteem, a kind of fearful respect.
No such claims can be asserted on behalf of the members of standing 
armies. Most obviously, these soldiers were far less attractive for artists, at 
least in the singular. The soldiers were mostly depicted as drilled puppets 
or as uniformed masses. Though they were still the object of much moral 
91 Huntebrinker, “Fromme Knechte” und “Garteteufel”, pp. 87-173; Rogg, Landsknechte und 
Reisläufer; Burschel, Söldner im Nordwestdeutschland des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts, pp. 27-38.
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criticism, the most prominent attitude beyond this seems to have been pity, 
due to the poor conditions of life and demeaning discipline. A few memoirs 
reflect at best a kind of picaresque way of life, but no evidence for keeping 
the former nimbus of extravagant, though intimidating adventures.92
From an analytical perspective, the changes can probably best be con-
ceived as a quantum leap in professionalization. The possibility of lifelong 
service, or at least continuous service uninterrupted by peacetime lay-offs, 
as well as newly rigorous regulation, which should not only be interpreted in 
the framework of military discipline, but also as a job description, compris-
ing both lists of duties and special skills, contributed to shaping a daily 
working routine. Thus, the decline of public attention and attraction can 
also be understood as an aspect of the soldiers’ normalization and inte-
gration into civilian society. As a result, the mercenaries of the standing 
armies achieved a much higher level of professional standards than former 
mercenaries, who were already commonly perceived as professionals. In 
partial contrast to this chapter’s emphasis on some crucial continuities, 
this reshaping of military service has also been taken as an argument to 
evaluate these changes as a categorical transformation from “mercenary” 
to “soldier”.93 In terms of soldiers’ self-conception, the new standards left 
space for adopting a kind of professional self-esteem; however, there is only a 
little evidence for its real relevance. Towards the end of the century, military 
authorities tried to encourage its emergence by praise and rewards.94
General discussion: making a living
As outlined above, soldiers’ incomes had lost much of their appeal. This is 
of particular importance since the desire for personal gain is commonly 
92 Some of the most cited sources of this kind include Bräker, Lebensgeschichte und Natürliche 
Ebentheuer des Armen Mannes im Tockenburg; Seume, Mein Leben; Kerler, Aus dem siebenjährigen 
Krieg; F[riedrich] C[hristian] Laukhards, vorzeiten Magisters der Philosophie, und jetzt Musketiers.
93 See Burschel, “Krieg, Staat, Disziplin”, based on Burschel, Söldner im Nordwestdeutschland 
des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts.
94 A public celebration to acclaim a Saxon non-commissioned off icer for f ifty years of service 
is anonymously reported in “Schilderung einer Nationalscene”, Bellona (1781), pp. 89-96. Some 
memoirs can also be understood as an expression of a proud professional self-esteem, for exam-
ple, those of a former Prussian non-commissioned off icer, who had served for f ifty-two years: 
see Leben und Thaten eines Preußischen Regiments-Tambours. Certainly an extreme example, 
but nevertheless striking, is Müller, Der wohl exercirte Preußische Soldat, a treatise by a former 
Prussian musketeer who felt compelled to explain the principles of Prussian military training 
to the public.
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considered the exclusive motivation for mercenary service. Obviously, 
service as a member of a standing army did not offer much prospect of 
enrichment. Of course, in former times, the mercenaries’ hope for wealth 
through booty had been mostly unrealized. As was pointed out above, with 
regard to material rewards, military service at least offered an alternative 
option among other occupations at the lower end of the social pyramid. In 
addition, when one considers the attractiveness of the signing-on bounty 
and the longer term prospects, there is no reason to deny that the expec-
tation of a poor, but at least reliable livelihood may have swayed those 
contemplating service. Such considerations weighed all the more heavily 
when the soldier’s comparatively stable existence is compared to the poor 
conditions in rural villages, which were always threatened by the risks of 
f luctuating crop yields. The desire for private gain was, then, most likely a 
relevant factor in motivating soldiers.
Of course, it is impossible to gain a complete understanding of the 
soldiers’ motives; this is all the more true when dealing with less obvious 
assumptions and with the question of whether the introduction of standing 
armies offered new kinds of collective motivation. There are hints of the 
importance of a certain esprit de corps, which was usually related not to 
the army as a whole, but to the regiment.95 Of course its effects could have 
an impact only after recruitment. Certainly, the permanent existence of 
the units strengthened these effects on a smaller scale by stabilizing peer 
group structures and, on a larger scale, by grouping together icons of glory 
and tradition and transforming them into a regimental memorial culture. 
In fact, this kind of collective identity seems to have been supported by the 
military authorities and, since it corresponded to the values of noble honour 
and to the social logic of rank and reputation, it might have been the most 
typical motivational factor. In a more general sense, it can be considered a 
special mode of professional self-confidence.
In the light of a growing percentage of native soldiers, it seems reason-
able to assume that there was an increasing importance of some kind of 
patriotism or loyalty to the ruler or at least a certain sense of duty. Prob-
ably, the Prussian system favoured the transfer of some provincial or even 
local identity into the army by keeping Kantonisten from the same area 
95 Nowosadtko, Stehendes Heer im Ständestaat, pp. 90-97; Kroll, Soldaten im 18. Jahrhundert 
zwischen Friedensalltag und Kriegserfahrung, pp. 205-220; Sikora, Disziplin und Desertion, 
pp. 268-281.
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together.96 However, since there is very little evidence on the thoughts of 
ordinary soldiers, generalized assumptions about the motivation of soldiers 
are rather speculative.97 At the very least, it can be stated that there is no 
evidence of widespread enthusiasm for military service or of systematic 
efforts to appeal to the common people in terms of patriotic loyalty. This 
became more prominent only in later eighteenth-century discourse, but 
mostly as a debate among the elites. In summary, although the changing 
framework of military service undoubtedly influenced soldiers’ motives, it 
is impossible to gain a reliable insight into these on a larger scale. Of course, 
one has to expect a certain mix of motives, and probably the changing 
composition of the armies caused an increasing variety thereof.
General discussion: military labour and state-building
Soldiers’ motives, however, may be discussed on a broader horizon since 
the establishment of standing armies formed one aspect of an even more 
important process. From the perspective of state-building, standing armies 
represented the crucial manifestation of state structures themselves. In 
contrast, these structures def initely lacked the fully developed character 
of state authority, as long as military power could be exercised by rather 
autonomous commanders as Wallenstein or Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar, who, 
according to the work of Fritz Redlich, are usually designated as military 
enterprisers, or by high-ranking nobles in France, making use of their own 
kind of autonomy and independence.98 However, this is not the place to 
discuss similarities or differences between f igures such as Wallenstein 
and Condé. Regarding the military, the major challenge of state-building 
was the integration of more or less autonomous military structures and the 
marginalization of any form of opposing military organization. In fact, the 
establishment of standing armies reflected the establishment of a monopoly 
of violence.
96 King Frederick II once wrote in his political testament from 1768 that the Kantonsystem 
would encourage rivalry between soldiers for a reputation for bravery and that friends and 
relatives, f ighting together, would not leave each other: Dietrich, Die politischen Testamente 
der Hohenzollern, pp. 516f.
97 For some reflections on this subject, see Kroll, Soldaten im 18. Jahrhundert zwischen Frieden-
salltag und Kriegserfahrung, pp. 133-179; Sikora, Disziplin und Desertion, pp. 305-325.
98 Lynn, Giant of the Grand Siècle, pp. 284-286; Parrott, Richelieu’s Army, pp. 313-365, sees a 
strong contrast between military enterprisers and the French army, but also gives examples of 
the crucial role of the high nobility and their networks.
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Regarding the military organization itself, the contrast should not be 
stressed too sharply. The military before 1650 was not a completely private 
business. Normally, troops were raised at the level of the regiment by 
licensed colonels, who had capital and networks at their disposal to fulf il 
organizational work which, at that stage, could not be performed by the 
ruler’s administration. The licence, however, included, beyond basic regula-
tions, a commitment to the ruler as the only source of legitimate power.99 
Our concept of a military enterpriser would be misleading if military 
business were to be perceived as totally independent from the framework 
of legitimate power. The princes simply could not enforce total control. On 
the other hand, even the structures of the standing armies still provided 
a certain potential for independent economy, in German armies mostly 
shifting from the level of regiments to the level of companies, forming the 
so-called Kompaniewirtschaft.100 Certainly, colonels and captains could no 
longer act against the ruler, and most def initely had to act according to a 
more detailed set of regulations, but the regiments and companies still 
formed, if not autonomous, then self-contained units, combining training, 
economy, justice, and command, which were all in the hands of the com-
manding off icers. The regiments and the companies remained a source of 
considerable income for them. Since all sums for paying, equipping, and 
maintaining the soldiers went through their hands, based on f ixed rates 
paid by the government, the colonels and captains not only took their own 
salaries but also benefited from the profits to be made from managing their 
units, whether these were legal or illicit.101 For example, probably the most 
widely practised swindle was receiving money for soldiers who had never 
existed or who had left the unit as a result of desertion or death.
With regard to the common soldiers, they suffered much more from the 
intensified control, as a result of greater surveillance and military discipline, 
which was discussed above and which can also be interpreted as the out-
come of state-building. Of course, as employees, the monopoly of violence 
99 This has been recently stressed by Baumann, “Die deutschen Condottieri”. In contrast 
to warlords such as Wallenstein or Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar during the Thirty Years War, 
one should also keep in mind the example of the very important Catholic general Johann 
Tserclaes Count of Tilly, who acted with extraordinary loyalty to and trust in his sovereign, 
Duke Maximilian of Bavaria: see Kaiser, Politik und Kriegführung, specif ically pp. 16-23.
100 Redlich, The German Military Enterpriser and His Work Force, pp. 77-88.
101 John Lynn calls the structures of the French army in the eighteenth century still a “semi-
entrepreneurial system”; see Lynn, Battle, pp. 137-139, 361. The term was originally coined by 
David Parrott, who avoided using it in his recent works in order to stress the differences between 
French practices and German military enterprisers.
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was less relevant for them than the monopoly of employment. However, it 
is not certain whether they really profited from business competition in 
former decades and, as already mentioned, competition for recruits still took 
place in some regions and probably offered more opportunities for negotia-
tion than before. This resulted from supply and demand, not from the fact 
that the recruiters were no longer enterprisers but government employees. 
On the other hand, the increased effectiveness of ruling elites and military 
organizations also resulted in a suspension of the market mechanisms 
through forced recruitment, as a result of which many impressed soldiers 
paid a very one-sided, existential price by suffering not only from coercion, 
but also from war injuries and death. Obviously, the high authorities were 
less engaged in disciplining such recruiting methods. Therefore, for the 
soldiers, the changes deriving from the increasing control over the military 
commanders seem to have been of less importance.
As a result, most observations suggest considering the changes as more 
gradual than categorical. Summed up, however, the gradual changes resulted 
in a framework of military service which was substantially different from the 
preceding period, though mostly based on the same principles. As a common 
denominator, inevitably rather general and superficial, the different levels of 
change might be conceptualized as aspects of an ongoing institutionaliza-
tion and integration of the military as a whole within the framework of 
state-building. From this perspective, the reduced autonomy of the military 
commanders and their incorporation in the corps of public servants can be 
paralleled to the intensif ied disciplining and uniforming of the common 
soldiers and their location in the everyday life of the garrison cities.
Despite all the continuities, developments around the establishment 
of standing armies marked a crucial phase in European military history. 
Although drill practice had been invented several decades earlier, its imple-
mentation as a common European feature created an outstanding attribute 
of modern military organizations as a whole. Obviously, military obligations 
imposed on the subjects became increasingly significant, although they had 
not yet became dominant and still served only subsidiary purposes, mostly 
to avoid the costs of recruitment. Nonetheless, these practices prepared the 
way for the development of the draft and seem to characterize this period as 
a stage of transition in which different principles were combined. However, 
instead of reducing this era to a prelude not yet determined, it might be 
more adequate to perceive it as the unfolding of options in the course of 
emerging state power. Not surprisingly, the reasons and motives for this 
dynamic process have attracted much scholarly attention. The debate was 
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significantly shaped by Michael Roberts’s concept of a “military revolution”.102 
This is not the place to either sum up the whole controversial debate or to 
reinvent the answers. Some aspects of the debate, however, will help to put 
the changes in an evolutionary context.
According to the original concept, the military revolution was completed 
just before the spread of standing armies, but these were still perceived as 
an outcome of the revolution, flanked by the strengthening and centraliza-
tion of political power to provide the required resources. The roots of this 
process were traced back to the tactical reforms at the end of the sixteenth 
century. The main thesis, therefore, was aimed at the assumption that not 
only military changes, but also major social and political developments, 
were initiated by genuine military innovations. These started with a new 
tactic and in addition were fuelled by the new scale of strategic warfare 
during the Thirty Years War, characterized by long-range campaigns and 
the need for numerous occupational forces. This should have resulted in 
the need for more soldiers.
One may object that the main example, the campaigns of Gustav Adolf, 
were noteworthy due to the constraints, from the Swedish perspective, 
of a quasi-overseas theatre of war, and that subsequent wars did not see 
comparable strategic efforts. On a more general level, it has to be considered 
that the appetite for a growing number of soldiers may have been motivated 
by even simpler arguments: since technological means were rather limited 
in their impact, military superiority normally was achieved by larger armies. 
From this point of view, the more crucial change must be considered the 
previous replacement of feudal armies by mercenary armies, the expansion 
of which was only limited by the need for money, while feudal structures 
had restricted at least the core of military power to the limited number 
of more or less obstinate nobles. The further development seems to have 
been mostly, although certainly not solely, dependent on the government’s 
increasing possibility to absorb resources.
Certainly, the Dutch reforms implemented an important additional 
aspect. Originally introduced to compensate for the numerical inferiority 
of the Dutch forces, the result of the reforms turned out to be a signif icant 
102 Roberts, The Military Revolution, 1560–1660; since then, the concept of a “military revolution” 
has been f irmly established in academic curricula, but has also been widely and critically 
discussed and, on the other hand, expanded to other periods and to other parts of the world, so 
that it has rather lost its signif icance. Classical critics include Parker, The Military Revolution, 
and Black, A Military Revolution? See now Black, Beyond the Military Revolution. Other recent 
publications referring to the catchword include Knox and Murray, The Dynamics of Military 
Revolution, 1300-2050, and Nimwegen, The Dutch Army and the Military Revolutions 1588-1688.
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increase in military effectiveness. After this time, the value of soldiers 
could be measured not only by their number, but also by the quality of 
their training. Therefore, preparing the military forces before the start 
of war became an inevitable prerequisite for military effectiveness and 
consequently resulted in standing armies. Even then, sheer superiority of 
numbers did not ensure success on the battlefield, as the remarkable victory 
of inferior forces, such as the Prussians’ at the battle of Leuthen in 1757, 
indicates.103 However, such instances did not encourage the king of Prussia 
or other rulers to reduce their forces by replacing quantity with quality.
A short remark must support the assertion that technological innova-
tion was of less importance, since the seventeenth century saw two major 
changes. This was the replacement of matchlock guns with flintlock guns, 
which were easier to handle, and the total abandonment of pikes in favour of 
the exclusive use of guns, which could be adapted to hand-to-hand combat 
by the use of the newly invented bayonet. Certainly, the disappearance of 
the pike marked a watershed of great symbolic meaning since it represented 
the triumph of gunpowder weapons. This story, however, covers at least two 
centuries, step by step, and was not completed until the beginning of the 
eighteenth century.104 It is noteworthy that, during the eighteenth century 
bayonet attacks – thus the use of the reduced, but much more manageable 
version of pikes – in fact could become decisive on the battlefield.105 Though 
it was accompanied by tactical changes, the f inal abandonment of pikes 
did not indicate a technological revolution, nor does it offer explanations 
for the arms race at the end of the seventeenth century.
This seems also to be true in regard to the growing importance of the 
artillery in the eighteenth century. Due to technological changes, which 
made cannons more mobile on the battlef ield, and the corresponding tacti-
cal changes, the artillery’s role was subsequently transformed from a merely 
subsidiary one to having a crucial, though not yet decisive, importance of 
its own.106 Although the intensified use of artillery caused considerable losses 
and suffering, it still did not modify the efforts to produce the highest pos-
sible number of soldiers nor did it affect the basic structural characteristics 
of military service.
103 As a sceptical approach to a rather mystifying event, see Kroener, “Die Geburt eines Mythos 
– die ‘schiefe Schlachtordnung’”.
104 See, among others, Black, European Warfare 1660-1815, p. 39; Luh, Ancien Régime Warfare 
and the Military Revolution, p. 139.
105 Luh, Ancien Régime Warfare and the Military Revolution, pp. 156-160.
106 Ibid., pp. 167-178.
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The essential precondition for the quantum leap in army strength was the 
strengthening of centralized political power and intensif ied accumulation 
of resources. The military development reflected, and was closely connected 
to, a restructuring of governance, pushed forward by the experiences and 
the results of the Thirty Years War, including a new framework for state 
rivalry. In different ways, at different moments, and with different degrees 
of success, but focused on a few decades, rulers profited from the defeat of 
their enemies, the breaking of opposition, the weakening of participatory 
elites, the establishment of consensual policies in favour of external compe-
tition, and, last but not least, the amelioration of confessional antagonisms. 
In this sense, it has been suggested that the Thirty Years War enjoys real 
signif icance as a state-building war.107
The stabilization of internal hierarchies and administrative structures 
enabled governments to draw conclusions from the rather improvised 
handling of warfare during the war, including military strength, tactical 
innovations, control and eff iciency of the military, and discipline of the 
common soldier – all the aspects discussed above. The ongoing conflicts 
over hegemony on the continent, the Baltic, and the Balkans compelled 
all participants to reach comparable levels of operational readiness and 
accelerated the spread of standing armies. Therefore, they represented both 
the slowdown of internal rivalries and a certain acceleration of external 
rivalries. The spending of most resources on the needs of the military 
pushed the soldiers into the centre of this process. In fact, one may assert 
that they were the most intensively governed section of the population. It is 
no wonder that they also became a symbolic medium to express the ruler’s 
power and sovereignty (and in a certain sense, condensed in parades and 
guards of honour, they have kept this meaning until today). The quality of 
change in terms of the political framework can be paralleled, in some way, to 
the changes in military organization as an essential part of this framework.
However, although the institutionalization of governmental power 
reached new heights of eff iciency and stability, some basic elements stayed 
the same. The revolution had not yet arrived. Most people were still governed 
107 This point mainly follows the arguments of Black, A Military Revolution?, pp. 67-77, including 
aspects of changes in the sphere of political constitution and the socio-political role of the 
elites. In this wide sense, the category of state-building wars was elaborated by Burkhardt, 
Der Dreißigjährige Krieg, in nuce on p. 27. This perspective also touches on the debate on the 
f iscal-military state, which was brought up by Brewer, The Sinews of Power. See also Storrs, The 
Fiscal-Military State in Eighteenth Century Europe, and Glete, War and the State in Early Modern 
Europe; however, the complexities of this approach cannot be discussed and included at this 
point.
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by dynasties from the high nobility whose attitudes towards the military 
forces were not substantially different from those of former monarchs. The 
augmentation of army strength and the extension of compulsory service 
resulted from the intensif ied power of governments to intervene in their 
citizens’ lives and was not paralleled by a newly def ined and founded 
relationship between subjects and state.
Therefore, it remained a maxim of ruling and of warfare that the soldier’s 
role was still a functional one based on payment and force. There was a 
closely connected political implication, namely that these armies were at 
the disposal of monarchs and ministers, instruments of their ambitions and 
interests, and deployed within the context of cabinet warfare. To continue 
the metaphorical framework, the soldiers served as hired or forced construc-
tion workers in the building of the state, at best being inhabitants without 
rights; they were in no way co-proprietors.

 Peasants fighting for a living in early 
modern North India
Dirk H.A. Kolff
It is several years since historians have abandoned the idea of medieval 
and early modern India as a huge but static collection of economically self-
sufficient and politically autonomous village units. With respect to large parts 
of India, another image has taken its place, that of a dual world, composed 
on the one hand of a sedentarized segment of settled, rain-fed agriculture 
and, on the other, one of mobile pastoralism in the arid half of the Indian 
subcontinent. The frontier between these worlds ran right across the sub-
continent, though, rather than one frontier, the phenomenon consisted of 
a complex set of frontiers, frontier zones, and dynamic “inner frontiers” of 
exchange, intrusion, and negotiation linking and holding together vast regions 
bordering on them. In accepting this model, it should be noted that, on the 
one hand, cattle-based economies never existed independently from town 
and village markets, while, on the other hand, the political management of 
settled agriculture could not do without alliances with, or appeasement and 
employment of, pastoral warriors. On a more local level, village management 
often depended on either an annual exodus of seasonal labour and herders to 
grazing grounds during the post-harvest season or the engagement of mobile 
frontier manpower from outside during the busiest months of the year. Mobile 
labour, therefore, did not generally lack an agrarian base of some sort; neither 
were villagers unacquainted with faraway service, whether as weavers, herd-
ers, soldiers, or agricultural labourers. Also, a village’s temporary diaspora 
would, if it appeared attractive to do so, lead to entire families settling down 
permanently in regions near or far. Landed communities would welcome 
in their midst families of relative strangers with their ploughs (a term for 
a pair of bullocks) from either the pastoral or the sedentarized worlds and 
integrate them in their systems of exchange of produce and division of labour. 
Military entrepreneurship by warlords often led to agrarian management 
rights in a number of villages (watan), mostly in or near their home region, 
being granted to them and their f ighting men. More often than not, in one 
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way or another, soldiering was an activity directly or indirectly supportive of 
agrarian pursuits.1
This is especially the case in northern India, the part of the subconti-
nent to which my contribution restricts itself, just as the essay by Robert 
Johnson focuses on southern India. For North India, it makes sense to 
think in terms of a market for diasporic or mobile labour as an almost 
autonomous phenomenon kept in existence by the dynamics of the frontier 
that linked the worlds of extensive agriculture and pastoralism, and by the 
demographic cycles in non-capitalist village economies primarily focusing 
on production for home consumption.2 That labour market, as well as the 
ecological exchanges of produce and animal husbandry, played a crucial 
role in the survival strategies of peasants and cattle farmers, always looking 
for secure labour conditions under circumstances of unpredictable harvests 
or supplies of food. It had a major impact on the formation of patronage 
networks and political entrepreneurship or “states” at the regional and 
local levels. The migratory and frontier cultures of India’s villages and 
regions constitute the great machine of much of the subcontinent’s social 
history. Neither can its political history be fully understood without taking 
account of its dynamics. Every year, people would look for new niches in 
the labour markets within their migratory reach on both sides of the divide 
between agriculture and cattle farming, thus causing the cog wheels of the 
great frontier machine to change gear according to seasonal patterns. The 
intensity of the process varied at different times and in different places. Its 
professional categories – agricultural, industrial, commercial, or military – 
were not closed compartments. Weavers could turn into peasants and vice 
versa; both professions required a degree of mobility and, therefore, training 
in the use of arms. Military labour could be seasonal and dependent on a 
surplus or def iciency of farm hands at home. Yet, many men spent decades 
as professional soldiers, most of them never giving up hope of one day 
returning home to their f ields or acquiring an agrarian living. To keep such 
options open and thus to be able to continue contributing to the economy 
of one’s home villages or clan area formed an essential part of a migrant’s 
culture of survival.
When considering how, in pre-modern Indian history, states and regional 
identities were “forged”, the issue of the management of internal frontiers 
and labour markets, including the military labour market, will always be 
1 Gommans, Mughal Warfare; for a map of the major ecological frontiers see, p. 11. On the 
centrality of watan, see Gordon, “Symbolic and Structural Constraints”.
2 See for such economies Thorner et al., A.V. Chayanov on the Theory of Peasant Economy.
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at the centre of the analysis. Taking as his point of departure the agrarian/
pastoralist order of India, Jos Gommans has turned on its head, as it were, 
our understanding of the geo-political, ecological, and human-resource 
basis of the Mogul empire. Similarly, in a brilliant recent book on medieval 
Gujarat, Samira Sheikh has shown the explanatory force of a focus on the 
“continually contested relationship” between the arid, largely pastoralist 
Saurashtra peninsula and the fertile agricultural and trading plains of the 
eastern mainland.3
So, regional and central state-formation in India was to a large extent 
(though perhaps less so e.g. in Bengal) an effort to establish control over 
the dynamics engendered by the subcontinent’s climatic and ecological 
frontiers. Yet, historical experience seems to prove that this regionally 
segmented military labour market could not in itself serve as a decisive base 
for the creation of a larger empire. In his contribution to our project, Kaushik 
Roy shows that, when such empires nonetheless came into being, the initial 
impulse often came from outside the world of peasant and regionally based 
soldiering. During the two periods of Indian empire-building that fall within 
our time scheme, i.e. those of the Moguls and the British, India’s pattern 
of peasant soldiering – i.e. its main market for military labour – though 
remaining intact, fulf illed very different functions. Under the Moguls, it 
was temporarily suppressed and lost its prominence to non-Indian, mostly 
tribal professionals. This explains why, for too long, as Stewart Gordon has 
argued, historians focused on the empire’s mansabdari (service nobility) 
system, thus neglecting “the ordinary, ongoing processes of military service 
in India”, which often were village-based or predicated on regionally rooted 
labour markets.4 The vitality of these processes was clear again, when, 
after a very gradual re-emergence during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, the British, though thoroughly reorganizing it, embraced its 
tradition of professional service and built their Indian empire on it.
In the course of the sixteenth century, the military system of the imperial 
Moguls was, as it were, superimposed on this tradition by the Central Asian 
conqueror Babur (in Delhi 1526-1530) and his grandson Akbar (effectively 
1568-1605). The core of this system consisted of the descendants of the old 
Turkic and Mongol nomadic warriors from the deep steppe who were born 
3 Gommans, Mughal Warfare; Sheikh, Forging a Region, p. 19. An example of an even smaller-
scale frontier is that between the khadar f lood-prone lowlands and the bangar uplands of the 
Upper (Ganga-Yamuna) Doab, the management of which formed the basis of the eighteenth-
century Gujar states in the area. See Kolff, Grass in Their Mouths, pp. 471-477.
4 Gordon, “Symbolic and Structural Constraints”, p. 159.
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and raised as horse-breeders, and trained from early childhood as mounted 
archers and raiders in Central Asia.5 Provided they were accompanied by 
cannon, musketry, and heavy cavalry, this arm of light cavalry with their 
composite bows f ired from the saddle and their stunningly swift horseman-
ship was irresistible on the battlef ields of North India and indispensable 
for those striving for empire at the time.6
Demography, technology, and invasion, in short, were the main deter-
minants of the role of military labour in post-1500 India. The vicissitudes of 
empire continued to have a bearing on the character and military impact 
of frontier-based peasant recruitment and service. During the sixteenth 
century, mounted archers still contributed in a decisive manner to the 
conquests of the Moguls in North India. With more success than some of 
his predecessors, Akbar overlaid this system on the tradition of peasant 
soldiering of Hindustan, the central part of the great alluvial plain of North 
India. My essay focuses on this tradition and I will try to show how, under 
different guises, it remained a constant force in medieval and early modern 
Indian history. Its dynamics continued to an important degree to be fed 
by the survival strategies of a peasantry that was compelled to contend 
with the exceptional vagaries of the monsoon as it manifests itself north 
of the Tropic of Cancer. As always, peasants responded to the insecurity 
of harvests by investing in non-agricultural pursuits such as soldiering. 
This kind of soldiering was, in other words, a voluntary one, energized in a 
bottom-up manner by a demand for a source of non-agrarian income that 
would spread one’s risks and underpin an economy based on inherently un-
stable family farms. In a characteristically Indian way, the entrepreneurship 
of brokers who were in a position to negotiate deals with distant warlords 
and thrones, whether they were clan leaders or independently operating 
jobber-commanders, so-called jamadars, was crucial in the process.7
The Mogul system, therefore, was a complex one. It was, moreover, not an 
unchanging one, if only because the Indian enemies of the empire adopted 
some of its techniques, even mounted archery, though a less thoroughly 
trained version of it, and found answers to the challenges it posed. Mean-
while, the supply of accomplished archers from the Central Asian steppes 
came almost to a halt. Other weapons came to the fore. During the sixteenth 
5 On the technique of horse and bow and their effect in battle, see Hildinger, Warriors of the 
Steppe, pp. 15-32; on the coherence of the Mongol system, see May, The Mongol Art of War.
6 For Mogul military superiority in India, see Streusand, The Formation of the Mughal Empire, 
pp. 51-69.
7 The jamadars can be seen as performing the characteristically India function of dalali, the 
Indian term for brokerage in its widest sense.
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century, Mogul artillery arsenals developed and grew. The f ighting reputa-
tion of musketeers improved as the accuracy of their f ire increased; they 
became a valuable tool in the hands of the central state. Already under 
Akbar, attempts were made to keep expert units of foot-musketeers under 
strict central control and keep them away from the nobles. Then, gradually, 
the broad-based North Indian military labour market – its demographic 
resources so much richer than those of the steppes – reasserted itself and 
re-emerged as a vital resource of the state, even of the empire. During 
Jahangir’s reign (1605-1627) Hindustani peasant infantry became strikingly 
visible again in the sources.
At that time, those available for longer or shorter periods for employ-
ment as foot-soldiers in the military labour markets of the subcontinent, 
whether all-India, regional or local, cannot have represented less than 10 
per cent of the adult male population. It was clear that the empire would 
not have the means to employ a suff icient number of these units and to 
disarm the rest.8 Crucial in this respect was the increasing dissemination 
of the comparatively affordable matchlock among groups of professional 
foot-archers and many other communities of armed peasants. This phenom-
enon could not but weaken imperial control over North India, especially 
in the central part of it, Hindustan. Though men armed with swords and 
shields successfully continued to offer themselves for hire, many villagers 
equipped themselves with f irearms, resulting in a newly vibrant labour 
market for peasantry-based infantry. The empire never found an answer to 
the challenges it posed. It has been suggested that the segmentary nature 
of Mogul military organization and its policy of delegating authority to 
employer-noblemen called mansabdars, hampered the “formation of a 
kind of army in which arms of musketeers and artillery were given their 
due”, and that a large-scale adoption of the flintlock – which could not, as 
the matchlock was, be manufactured by village blacksmiths – would have 
been possible only when the empire itself had taken up the production of 
superior f irearms. Technology, however, stagnated, while attempts by the 
Mogul court to prevent local blacksmiths from making muskets were late 
and failed.9 The massive presence of f irearms in the villages turned the 
8 Kolff, Naukar, Rajput & Sepoy, p. 3.
9 M. Athar Ali, The Mughal Nobility Under Aurangzeb, rev. edn (Delhi, 1997), p. xx, cited 
by Khan, Gunpowder and Firearms, p. 155. On the importance of the “segmented structure 
of political control which favoured military units which, in terms of command and control, 
approximated to war bands rather than to a disciplined army” in India, see Wickremesekera, 
“Best Black Troops in the World”, p. 34.
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agrarian crises of the second half of the seventeenth century into as many 
explosive challenges to the empire.
So, as after the reign of Akbar, matchlocks spread in the countryside, and 
the conditions for the development of an imperial army equipped with flint-
locks and cast-iron cannon, which would have kept the Moguls in control, 
remained unfulf illed. It was only during the second half of the eighteenth 
century that several of the Indian regional rulers established foundries 
capable of producing cast-iron guns. Some also began using f lintlocks 
and hired European off icers to command battalions thus equipped and 
trained, a development that has been said to represent an “Indian military 
revolution”.10 But, as Iqtidar Alam Khan writes, it was not enough: “in the 
absence of a concerted drive to modernize the entire army organization”, 
it did not prevent the formation, by another outsider, the British East India 
Company, of another Indian empire. This new empire, however, unlike the 
Mogul one, was predominantly based on the indigenous agrarian labour 
market of North India and on the Company’s drive towards a degree of 
organization, technological advance, and discipline that the Moguls had 
not been able to achieve.11
Long before the British conquests, therefore, military initiative had 
shifted from the Mogul mansabdars to patrons, political entrepreneurs, 
and jobber-commanders with close and eff icient links to the supplies of 
peasant labour in the central provinces of the empire. In due course, the 
crucial brokerage and recruitment of peasant soldiers from the core region 
of Hindustan, which had, in a number of cases, been handled by clan leaders 
with both local roots and strong links with the emperor, came into the 
hands of numberless independently operating jobbers (jamadars) with 
strong local links and great freedom of negotiating their terms of service. 
The increasing monetization of the economy may have had a certain role 
in the process, though the circulation of silver was already signif icant in 
Akbar’s time.
Especially in Hindustan, the demographic factor of the dynamics and the 
almost limitless supply of armed peasants, as demonstrated in a frightening 
manner by the late sixteenth-century military census ordered by Akbar, 
had a decisive role in the slow loss of grip and initiative of the Moguls. But 
not only there. Further south, in Malwa and in Deccan, in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries, as Gordon has shown, village and regionally based 
10 Wickremesekera, “Best Black Troops in the World”, p. 66.
11 For the ideas set out in the preceding three paragraphs, see especially Khan, Gunpowder 
and Firearms, pp. 143-199.
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troops of cavalry in search of patronage, watan, and pay represented a f ight-
ing tradition that similarly continued as a high-prestige, high-pay branch 
of military service, entirely independent of the Mogul and Turkic cavalry 
tradition. The case proves abundantly that by no means all agrarian-based 
military service took the form of foot-soldiering.12 Even in North India, 
this was not the case. Yet, in this essay, partly because it will allow me to 
carry the story into the British period, I will stick to North India and, more 
specif ically, to the example of Hindustani infantrymen.
Families rooted in (semi-)pastoral India, like nomads elsewhere, were, as 
noted, compelled to adopt flexible survival strategies. Baluchi cameleers, for 
instance, found employment as armed guards with caravan leaders on the 
main Gujarat-to-Hindustan routes. Many of them were archers, although 
some had swords and acquired f irearms at an early stage. One seventeenth-
century European observer found them an unruly lot and warned against 
engaging Baluchis and Jats simultaneously as one’s protectors, as they would 
tend to attack each other instead of working together. Another found that in 
the Gujarati diaspora and towards Agra there were many honest men among 
them. For travellers, they were essential. They cost 3.5 rupees a month; 
their leaders, styled muqaddam (a term also used for village leaders) or 
mirdah, received 4 rupees and travelled with their men. Not only did they 
conduct caravans: between Gujarat and Hindustan, almost any journey was 
inconceivable without them. Bands of them were easily hired in towns or 
qasbas (market towns) along the road. There they had labour agents who 
answered for their honesty and received 1 rupee for each contracted man. As 
others with pastoralist origins did, many of them joined the regional military 
labour market of Gujarat under the denomination of qasbatis (townsmen) 
and, it appears, acquired some land. The Mirāt-i Ahmadi says about their 
activities in the service of the province of Gujarat in the eighteenth century:
They attacked villages, drove away cattle, escorted Mughal off icials, 
took responsibility of collecting tribute from landholders on a small 
salary, they got enlisted as recruits in the army for a few days, served 
the chiefs and inspectors of the district police.
Generally reluctant to serve outside Gujarat, some of them nevertheless 
tried their luck in other provinces and “made bravery their profession”.13 
Direct employment by the empire could lead to the grant of land, even 
12 Gordon, “Symbolic and Structural Constraints”.
13 Kolff, Naukar, Rajput & Sepoy, pp. 4-6.
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of entire villages. Aurangzeb, for instance, gave nine villages in the old 
Saharanpur district north of Delhi to a number of such Baluchis on the 
condition that they exterminate the numerous highway robbers in that 
part of the country. This made sense. Safety on the roads had all along been 
their speciality. Here, in Saharanpur, they remained powerful throughout 
the eighteenth century and, when the East India Company took over the 
Upper Doab from the Marathas, the land revenue of the villages concerned 
was settled with the Baluchi chiefs.14 The pattern was a common one. Clans 
must, writes Sheikh, often be seen “in terms of their changing occupations”. 
“Groups that entered Gujarat as pastoralists could settle down to become 
cultivators while small bands of forest-dwelling cultivators could achieve 
military successes and become chieftains.” 15
The above case of the Baluchis, who, apparently, offered their labour 
in a purely free and commodif ied form, may serve as an example of the 
social and spatial mobility that was typical of North India in the early 
modern period and in which the military labour market played such a 
dynamic role. The military entrepreneurship of the Baluchis – who turned 
into travel guards, then town-based f ighters, regional and imperial profes-
sional soldiers, landowners-cum-policemen, and f inally village managers 
in British-ruled India – is just an illustration of the kind of f lexible oc-
cupational genealogy Sheikh draws attention to. It is important to note 
that, as the quote from the Mirāt-i Ahmadi showed, the military culture of 
these groups of men was always one of negotiation and of keeping several 
options for economic survival open. This attribute would, over the centuries, 
remain a distinguishing feature of the political culture of North India, 
where, more than in western Europe, the climate, i.e. the monsoon, was 
f ickle and harvests unpredictable. One hesitates, however, to label these 
pastoralists looking for watan, on the basis of their continuous search for 
the best terms of service and employment, as “mercenaries”, which is a term 
that seems to have little meaning before the age of nationalist politics and 
the love of a “fatherland”.
There were, especially in the world of settled agriculture, many instances 
in which peasants, though as skilled in the use of arms as most life-long 
soldiers and, therefore, f it to move and enter the all-India labour market, 
were never under the necessity to leave home for long periods or f ight over 
other than local issues. Local issues there were many. It was impossible 
14 F.C. Smith, Mag. Saharanpur, to Sadr Nizamat Adalat, 4.3.1824; Bengal Criminal Judicial 
Proceedings, Western Provinces, 13.10.1825 no. 13, reply paras 569-594.
15 Sheikh, Forging a Region, p. 104.
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to retain the respect of and to keep going the negotiations with armed 
travellers, hostile neighbours, or the representatives of government itself 
without a readiness to risk armed conflict. When, in 1717, a Dutch East 
India Company caravan was attacked in Malwa by 2,000 people armed with 
muskets and 3,000 others, the Dutch merchant in charge described these 
men as “peasants”. Soldiers employed by traders often plundered along the 
way. In this case, it seems, the suffering villagers responded to such acts of 
violence by staging a looting counter-offensive of their own. In 1632, men 
working the f ields near Kanpur in Hindustan did so with their guns, swords, 
and shields lying nearby, because they were at variance with the people of 
a town half a mile away. And around 1650 in the nearby Agra area, where 
every village had a small fort, semi-rebellion was endemic. The ploughmen 
kept a musket slung on their back and a powder pouch at their waist. It was 
the heyday of empire. Yet, the landowners never paid revenue without a 
f ight. Their strong negotiating position vis-à-vis the local governor enabled 
them to have the relief loans (taqavi) they received from him after a bad 
harvest converted into supplies of lead and gunpowder. But even without 
the threatening presence of hostile outsiders, carefully measured dosages 
of violence were a necessary part of agrarian management. Armed gangs of 
rural stakeholders were a phenomenon inseparable from the country scene.
The martial skills of these men were essential survival tools, however, 
in other than strictly local circumstances. In combination with forms of 
small-scale migration, the use of force was often an integral part of the an-
nual agrarian cycle. Seasonal soldiering or looting enabled quite a number 
of people in town and countryside to survive the slack agricultural season. 
In August 1636, soon after the onset of the monsoon, partly because the 
rains made the roads impassable, plundering ceased on the roads of Gujarat; 
the peasants returned to their f ields. Similarly, the weavers of the town of 
Baroda in the 1620s, who were generally at home during the rainy season, 
went to serve in the provincial army in the dry months of the year. In times 
of dearth or famine, this occupational and spatial mobility of labour was the 
rule rather than the exception and must have saved many lives. No doubt, 
most of these men were f it to enter the regional or all-India military labour 
markets. Yet only a limited number of them did so.16
More often than not, rather than offering their services to one of the 
states in their region, they confronted them. It is striking how frequently 
we hear of village soldiers attacking state soldiers. Whenever the risks 
16 Kolff, Naukar, Rajput & Sepoy, pp. 4ff., 16. For some more examples, see Khan, Gunpowder 
and Firearms, pp. 178-180.
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seemed worth taking, peasants resisted and fell on intruders who, from 
their point of view, were mere mercenaries, though perhaps they had an 
agrarian base somewhere far away just as they themselves had one nearby. 
They attacked army units campaigning far from their barracks, and fugitive 
soldiers making their way from a battlef ield. In the latter case, great loot 
often fell into the villagers’ hands. Thus, in the early sixteenth century, the 
great Rana Sanga’s camp was once plundered by villagers in the Agra area. 
And after Sultan Khusru, Akbar’s son, had been defeated in the Punjab in 
1606, peasants killed most of the leaderless soldiers they could lay their 
hands on and captured all the prince’s horses, camels, and other animals. 
There are examples of villagers closing their market to units of the imperial 
army or defending local merchants badly treated by their governor. The 
sources mention dozens of such instances. On a battlef ield, peasants could 
even be a signif icant factor without being recruited by either side. During 
his years in India early in the nineteenth century, Arthur Wellesley had 
learned that, if you moved after your enemy with “celerity” and suff iciently 
distressed him, armed peasants could help you a great deal. “Whenever the 
largest and most formidable bodies of [freebooters] are hard pressed by our 
troops, the village people attack them upon their rear and flanks, cut off 
stragglers, and will not allow a man to enter their villages.” 17
In principle, of course, these men were martial and mobile enough 
to make f ighting their entire living. During Akbar’s siege of Chittor in 
Rajasthan in 1568, the fort was defended, Abu’l Fazl says, by 8,000 Rajput 
warriors and some 40,000 peasants who showed “great zeal and activity”. 
This widespread participation in the resistance against Akbar’s aggression 
made him, according to the same source, decide to have nearly 30,000 of 
the defenders killed on the day the fortress fell, which he would not have 
done, one assumes, if he had thought them a negligible military presence.18 
These people were f it for service almost everywhere. When the rains and 
harvests failed, in cases of f lood or unbearable devastations of war, many 
would leave their homes and look for work, whether weaving, ploughing, 
or military, wherever there was food and a demand for their services. In 
more or less normal years, on the other hand, the range of mobility of the 
sedentarized part of the people remained limited in practice, even though 
some of the young men, hearing of great prizes being won by others in 
faraway lands, felt a pull to leave and try their luck. For most of them, 
17 James, Wellington at War 1794-1815, p. 103.
18 See Kolff, “Chittor”.
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however, the issue of whether to serve any other leaders than their own 
local or regional clansmen did not arise. Why was this so?
The reason was that without intermediary agency most armed peasants 
had no access to military service at the level of the great regional states 
or at that of the empire. And successful agency was rare. The survival 
strategies of the state – whether that of the Moguls, their rivals, or their 
predecessors – and that of the peasantries seemed mutually antagonistic. 
Confrontation was the rule. There are instances where that confrontation 
induced a kind of migration or diaspora of its own. In Hindustan, the great 
fertile region between the Punjab and Bengal dominated by the rivers Ganga 
and Yamuna that constituted the core of the market for peasant military 
labour in India, the encounter of the peasantry and the state exacerbated 
during the 1620s and 1630s and led to regular enslavement, deportation, and 
extermination. It is reported that Abdullah Khan Firuz Jang, then in charge 
of the Kalpi-Kanauj region, defeated all the hitherto unsubdued Chauhan 
rajas and rebels there, had the leaders beheaded, and the peasants’ wives, 
daughters, and children, some 200,000 of them, transported to Iran and sold 
there. Abdullah Khan himself boasted he had sold half a million women and 
men. Large numbers of them, also from other areas, were deported across 
the Indus, while Afghans were forced, though not as slaves, to move in the 
other direction to the plains. Certainly, Abdullah Khan was more given to 
tyrannical methods of pacif ication than most of his contemporaries. But 
the spirit of resistance to taxation of many peasant communities in the 
strategic or core areas of state-building convinced not a few rulers that 
only desperately stern measures would work. Another aspect of this is the 
urgent demand for peasants and artisans in Iran and Central Asia, where 
many of those deported by the state must have been employed, as were 
the 120 slaves – tillers of grain, diggers of canals for irrigation, bronze and 
metal workers, a potter, a cook, a tinker, and a bowl maker, “fathers, sons 
and grandsons […] all Hindustanis”, who were employed on an estate near 
Bukhara towards the end of the f ifteenth century.19
Such attempts to smother the martial energies of semi-pastoral agrar-
ian Hindustan could give only temporary relief to the imperial rulers of 
the alluvial plains. If the Mogul empire was aiming to transform itself 
according to “early modern” military-f iscalist principles, which it did to 
an extent, the systematic deportation of potential taxpayers would have 
been an irrational policy. But any other attempt at actually disarming the 
19 Chekhovich, Samarkandskie dokumenti, XV-XVI vv, pp. 172, 233-234; Kolff, Naukar, Rajput 
& Sepoy, pp. 12ff.
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countryside would, as we saw, be equally impractical. Only the British 
Company would, in the 1798 to 1818 period, achieve something approaching 
the demilitarization, though not the disarmament, of its Indian territories. 
The Mogul empire, in other words, never adequately overcame the problem 
of its being faced not with just recalcitrant individual landholders, but also 
with armed peasantries that represented the backbone of society and could 
not be destroyed without dire consequences to the agrarian productivity 
on which the regime depended for its survival.
Another course open to state-builders was to selectively seek alliances in 
the evolving world of pastoralist warlords and to invite to military service 
some of the migrant bands of warriors in search of patronage and marriage 
such as were always active on the borders of settled agriculture.20 In return 
for local revenues they could be entrusted with the pacification of turbulent 
territory, so that, if successful, they would have the choice of opting for a 
sedentary way of life. A provincial Mogul force, sent against uncooperative 
taxpayers in Gujarat in 1684, included “a numberless multitude of men of 
the country, consisting of Grasiyas and Kolis, who are tillers of the soil but 
follow the army by command in exchange for freedom of tribute; as they 
receive nothing for food, they keep themselves going mostly by theft”. To 
the state, the local knowledge of such men was valuable; they were also 
cheap. But their looting for a living could do more harm than good. They 
certainly partook of the quality that marginal people generally have from 
a military point of view: semi-pastoralist robbers and men from the hills 
and forests make excellent skirmishers against similar types of f ighters. 
Though alliances with such groups were part of one of the central aspects 
of state formation, namely the effort to establish control over the dynamics 
of the major ecological frontiers, these men might not easily be turned into 
units suff iciently dependable for use on a major battlef ield. Nonetheless, 
such men were often enlisted and proved useful.
As hinted at, there were yet other strategies open to men who aspired 
to build an early modern territorial polity. There was indeed no way the 
Mogul government could do without the help of Indian chiefs and patrons, 
especially those with access to units of peasant f ighters. It was crucially 
important to f ind the right agency that enabled the recruitment as infantry 
from the peasantries of a signif icant and well-selected number of those one 
could not otherwise control. This policy was successful to an extent. Before 
and during the late seventeenth-century “agrarian crisis” of North India 
that would to a large extent be induced by increasing state oppression and 
20 Ziegler, “Marvari Historical Chronicles”.
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agrarian overtaxation and would, in Irfan Habib’s words, render the Mogul 
dynasty, at least partly, “its own grave-digger”, the empire co-opted some 
of the best managed resources of the armed peasantry.21
From early on, an important role was played in Mogul armies by semi-
migratory professional peasant soldiers, often under the command of their 
own zamindars (agrarian territorial managers).22 Akbar’s famous military 
census of the realm dating from the 1590s resulted in the registration of a 
staggering 4 million armed zamindars’ foot-soldiers. This inventory of North 
India’s military labour market betrays the empire’s uneasy awareness of the 
impossibility of controlling its peasants or employing more than a fraction 
of them.23 The phenomenon of a state aspiring to a monopoly over the instru-
ments of coercion on its territory is foreign to Indian history. The negotiating 
position of some of the leaders of these village-based infantrymen was 
generally far stronger than that of their contemporaries in Europe. The 
imperial off icers were not entirely free to recruit whom they wished. Many 
in the end were employed thanks to the crucial agency of lineage leaders 
and, later, a category of men called jamadars: men to whom the common 
soldier was far more loyal than to the states that had contracted him.
Let me elaborate on this theme with respect to the most striking example 
of it that can be found, the recruitment history of the Avadhi- and Bhojpuri-
(Hindi dialects) speaking part of Hindustan (now eastern Uttar Pradesh and 
western Bihar), a little to the east of the part of North India where Abdullah 
Khan performed his police atrocities. The phenomenon of how for many 
centuries the peasants of this region maintained their hold on the military 
profession in North India and turned soldiering into a major tool of their sur-
vival represents a major, though not the only, chapter of the military history 
of India in the early modern period. Other features of that history, especially 
the apparatus set up by the Moguls to achieve a measure of control over North 
India’s military labour market, are discussed by Kaushik Roy in this volume.
The soldiering tradition of Hindustan was kept alive by its peasantries for 
almost four centuries, its village leaders tenaciously guarding their position 
as a recruitment area for the best-rewarded units of infantry in North India. 
As a tradition of peasant soldiering, it is traceable at least to the f ifteenth-
21 Habib, The Agrarian System of Mughal India, pp. 364-405. Habib here shows how, paradoxically, 
the agrarian collapse of the empire was to a significant extent caused by the extractive opportuni-
ties offered to its centrally managed off icial elite, the mansabdari “apparatus”, of the empire, the 
organization of which was, in itself, one of the great achievements of the Mogul leadership.
22 For a def inition of the term zamindar, see Habib, The Agrarian System of Mughal India, 
pp. 384-389.
23 ‛Allāmi, The Ā‛īn-i Akbarī, II, pp. 141-367. See also n. 7. 
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century Sharqi sultanate of Jaunpur. Many Rajput, i.e. warrior-clan, vassals 
of this realm served the Sharqi sultans with their peasant war bands. There 
is evidence of close alliances between the sultans of this period, Sharqis 
and others, and their Rajput warlords. Such alliances were not necessarily 
of an unequal nature. In terms of the taxonomy of our project, they partake 
of the quality of reciprocity. Just as Rajput women occupied an honourable 
place in the sultans’ seraglios, Rajput alliances with Muslim women and 
their presence in Rajput royal households were considered regular. Women 
acted as the seal on and as proof of the intimacy and sacredness of these 
Hindu-Muslim alliances. After the sultans lost control of Jaunpur to the 
Lodi Afghans of Delhi in the 1480s, a clan of local Rajputs spearheaded an 
insurrection in support of this “reciprocal” and “intercommunal” tradition 
of alliance-formation. In the rising, 200,000 or even 300,000 Hindustani 
footsoldiers are reported to have participated: inflated f igures no doubt, 
but, compared to the 15,000 horsemen the source mentions, clearly convey-
ing the impression of enormous manpower originating with the regional 
landholders and their peasantries.24
Perhaps because the subsequent failure of the rising and the conquest of 
Hindustan by the Lodis reduced their chances of military employment in 
their own region, and possibly even before the Lodis put an end to the Jaunpur 
sultanate,25 many of these levies moved west and south in search of naukari, 
the term then and later used for the honourable service of roaming warriors. 
These migrating professionals proved to be in great demand. They facilitated 
the renewal of the splendour of the royal Tomar Rajput court at Gwaliyar, as 
well as of the Muslim courts in Malwa and elsewhere in Central India. The 
generic term used for these soldiers, “Purbiya”, not only indicates a non-ethnic, 
geographical origin from the eastward (Purab, i.e. Hindustan, the country 
east of Delhi); it also came to define a migratory soldiering identity of its own, 
an identity that implied the ability of those representing it to contract royal 
patronage in a labour market that extended far beyond their home region.
After the collapse of its fortunes under the Tomars, the Purbiya tradition 
of naukari marketed, so to say, its next incarnation or soldiers’ identity. 
It was introduced to the North Indian military labour market under a 
more distinct brand name than that of Purbiya, namely that of Ujjainiya. 
The leaders of the Ujjainiya clan were zamindars, or territorial lords, of 
Bhojpur in the southwest of Bihar. They now assumed the role of recruit-
24 Saeed, The Sharqi Sultanate of Jaunpur, pp. 101-107; Niamatullah, Niamatullah’s History of 
the Afghans, Part I, pp. 72-73, 136-140.
25 See for this discussion Khan, Gunpowder and Firearms, pp. 218-226.
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ing captains in a grand way and with their war bands began to compete 
in the supra-local market for expert f ighting units. By the Rajputs of the 
west of India, especially those in the region later called Rajputana, the 
Ujjainiyas would, along with most other clans in Hindustan, be considered 
genealogically “spurious”, that is, not of pure lineage and therefore unfit as 
marriage partners. And, it is true, their strength lay elsewhere. During the 
f irst decades of the sixteenth century, they made themselves indispensable 
as specialized recruiting agents and commanders of Purbiyas. The role of the 
clan in marketing the services not only of their own men, but also of all those 
associated with the old Purbiya recruitment tradition, in negotiating for 
them their conditions of employment and in leading them in the f ield was 
a cardinal one and explains how the name Ujjainiya became the trademark 
and identity of the men they led. The great reputation these units acquired 
with the pretenders, warlords, and rulers of North India was enhanced by 
the close association of Ujjainiya brokerage, f irst with the pilgrimage centre 
of Baksar near Bhojpur and, secondly, with the Sur Afghans, then at the 
start of their comet-like emergence as a North Indian dynasty in the 1530s.
A bath in a holy tank (the term here is used in the Indian sense of a 
water reservoir) of Baksar, known as Tiger Tank, ensured a young peasant 
of whatever caste both consecration as a fearless warrior – for that is what 
a tiger is – and, importantly, after a painless deconsecration during which 
one shed one’s tiger nature after long years of service (naukari), a chance to 
return to one’s village farm. The Afghan Farid Sur, the future Delhi sultan 
Sher Shah, depended a great deal on the Ujjainiya Rajputs’ ability to muster 
men by the thousands – by no means all from their own clan, but from 
the inexhaustible manpower of Hindustan – and on his personal relation-
ship with their leaders. From the point of view of the Hindustani peasant 
f ighter, the decision to serve an Ujjainiya lord could turn out to be a f irst 
step towards assuming the Ujjainiya Rajput identity oneself and to being 
adopted as a member of the clan. Military recruitment often was, as noted 
earlier, a great engine of identity change. But this was not necessarily always 
so. In the military labour market all identities remained open, multiple, 
flexible, and temporary for as long it was in the interest of the functioning of 
the military profession as an aspect of the agrarian economy of Hindustan.
At the battle of Surajgarh, in which Sher defeated the Bengal army, he 
put 3,000 hand-picked Afghans and 2,000 “Ujjainiyas” under their leader 
Gajpat Ujjainiya in his f irst line. After the battle was won,
all the spoils of war, comprising elephants, horses, and other equip-
ments, which had fallen into the hands of [Gajpat] were allowed to be 
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retained by him. At the time of departure of [Gajpat] he [Sher] tied 
with his own hand the bejewelled sword to hang round [Gajpat’s] 
waist, bound his arm with a jewelled armlet, gave a string of pearls 
round his neck, f ixed a bejewelled ornament in his headdress, gave 
a horse, head-to-foot dress and a sword for prince Bairishal [Gajpat’s 
brother], and gave Baksar as a f ief to him.26
I have quoted this passage because it articulates and advertises the fame 
of both the Sur Afghans and the Ujjainiya leadership as agencies of great 
distributive intensity: naukari under a military agent such as Gajpat and, 
indirectly, under a ruler such as Sher meant a share in spoils that might be 
huge. The chronicles telling the story of the great early sixteenth-century 
Purbiya warlords of Malwa such as Silhadi likewise strongly and explicitly 
emphasize their wealth and largesse.27 The organized loot of large-scale war 
was far more profitable than the haphazard local plundering of straggling 
travellers and small groups of soldiers. To be recruited in those years by an 
Ujjainiya broker indeed meant profit and privilege.
The degree, therefore, to which one’s dream as a naukar would come true 
was dependent on the diplomatic and entrepreneurial talent of the dealer in 
manpower or the recruiting warlord one joined and entrusted one’s fate to. 
In addition, however, there was the imponderable factor of big politics. In the 
case of Sher Shah, his bitter struggle with the Mogul Humayun compelled 
the Ujjainiya agency to split into factions in order to keep open options of 
naukari in several directions, a strategy that, as we saw, was of the essence 
for peasant survival in North India. Sher Shah and Humayun cultivated 
the Ujjainiya clan connection as desperately as the local Rajput lineages 
needed the treasure and loot of major campaigns.
In situations like this, positions easily shifted. For groups of peasant 
soldiers, there was a constant need to reconsider one’s temporary identity as 
an Ujjainiya naukar, and to re-evaluate the status of the lord or ruler whose 
salt (namak) one ate. Loyalty to a throne could stand in the way of survival. 
This characteristic of contingent or ad hoc service applied much more 
strongly to the broker-state relationship (which can be described in terms 
of commodif ied labour and aggregate contracts) than to the relationship 
of the broker, or patron, with his soldier clients (which was of a reciprocal 
nature). This broker-mediated, two-level model, I suggest, is valid for the 
entire pre-British period. The commodifying agency that turned village 
26 Ambashthya, “The Accounts of the Ujjainiyas in Bihar”, p. 438.
27 Kolff, Naukar, Rajput & Sepoy, pp. 85ff.
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labour into state labour was provided by brokers with local roots, who were 
pivotal in ushering the peasant to a niche of service at the level of the state 
in a way that preserved his autonomy to a fair degree.
Not all options, however, would be open at all times. After the Moguls 
f irmly established themselves in North India in the 1570s, the patronage of 
the state became even more of a prize than earlier. The Ujjainiyas retained 
a hold on only a minor share of it. They hung on as managers of extensive 
agricultural tracts in western Bihar and continued as pugnacious leaders of 
undoubted regional notoriety; yet, by the time of Shahjahan’s reign (1628-
1658), they had lost their role as the principal recruiters and middlemen 
of the great reservoir of military labour of central Hindustan to others. 
At least partly, Mogul favour by then had shifted f irst to the clan of the 
Kachhwahas of Amber in Rajasthan, and then to the Bundela Rajputs who 
were zamindars in the region roughly between the home of the Gwaliyar 
Tomars and that of the Ujjainiyas.
No Bundela leader was ever as spectacularly successful as the Mogul 
emperor Jahangir’s favourite Raja Bir Singh Deo (d. 1627) in channelling the 
resources, f inancial as well as otherwise, of the empire towards himself, his 
clansmen, and the soldiers of Hindustan. A hugely talented recruiting agent 
and military manager, he succeeded in putting numerous units, mainly 
infantry, at the disposal of Jahangir without ever having to relinquish per-
sonal command over them. He obtained an elevated mansabdari (service 
nobility) rank: in 1615, it was 4,700, at that time a very high f igure. Only very 
few men in the empire ever succeeded to the same extent as Bir Singh Deo 
in monopolizing control of the military labour market of Hindustan and 
combining the usually distinct functions of employer (mansabdar) and 
recruiter of peasant infantry. Jahangir gave Bir Singh Deo, “than whom 
in the rajput caste there is no greater nobleman”, as he wrote of him, the 
title of maharaja. Like his Tomar and Ujjainiya predecessors, the f inancial 
means Bir Singh Deo was able to invest in and extract from the Mogul state 
were impressive. In 1624, he f irst contributed a sum of between 200,000 and 
300,000 rupees to the cost of the imperial campaign in eastern Hindustan 
against the rebellious prince Khurram, the future emperor Shahjahan, and 
in the end plundered his camp seizing as booty many gold coins, jewels, 
3,000 horses, and 40 elephants. Or perhaps it is better to say that he pre-
vented Khurram’s enemies from getting hold of these valuables, because, as 
a Dutch chronicler remarked, Bir Singh Deo was a great friend of the prince. 
Naturally, as a manpower broker he had to have friends in both camps in 
order to remain in place as a partner in the empire’s extortionate enterprise.
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Bir Singh Deo’s spending practices, like those of his predecessors, were 
impressive. In Agra he had a palace on the river, next to the mansion of the 
famous Man Singh Kachhwaha. His building activities in Bundelkhand, his 
home region, advertised his f inancial might and his standing as a pious and 
trustworthy leader: the palace-fort of Datiya, erected at a cost of 3.5 million 
rupees, was only one of them; the famous tanks of Bir Sagar and Barwa 
Sagar and the Chaturbhuj Vishnu temple at Orchha, part of which still 
stands, were others. An even greater achievement of his was the Keshav Dev 
temple, devoted to Krishna, at Mathura, which according to Jean-Baptiste 
Tavernier, the French traveller, was one of the most sumptuous buildings in 
all India and was visited by large numbers of pilgrims. Bir Singh Deo himself 
went to Mathura as a pilgrim to weigh himself against an amount of gold 
which, together with an additional 81 man of gold, probably representing 
the eighty-one districts (parganas) that constituted his realm (or f ief, if you 
like), was then distributed as charity. It was his way to wash off the physical 
and political impurities of his career – he was the murderer of Abu’l Fazl, 
Akbar’s distinguished minister – and to reconnect with the principles of 
dharmic order, as well as to advertise, far beyond his native Bundelkhand, 
his dominant position in the military labour market of Hindustan.28 But 
the exercise also shows the enormous distributive energy generated by 
military entrepreneurship. Through him and men like him, large sums of 
money found their way back into the village economy, though probably 
not always into the hands of the same villagers who had paid these sums 
as taxes in the f irst place.
In this manner, Bir Singh Deo set in motion the tradition of imperial 
naukari, or service, of Purbiya/Hindustani peasant soldiers under jobber-
commanders of the Bundela clan. Apart from its economic importance 
in terms of the flow of agrarian revenue back to the countryside, the phe-
nomenon of massive military service, or naukari, had a profound cultural 
impact on peasant society. This is illustrated by the veneration in which the 
soldiers – again, by no means all of them of Bundela lineages themselves – 
who followed Bir Singh Deo and his successors, came to hold Hardaul, one 
of the great Bundela’s own sons. After his murder by one of his brothers, 
Hardaul became the object of devotion in a soldiers’ cult that took root in 
the core region of Purbiya recruitment, i.e., in all the districts that supplied 
young men ( jawans) to the jobber-commanders, Bundela and otherwise, 
who took over Bir Singh Deo’s business after his death. The story is too long 
28 Kolff and van Santen, De Geschriften van Francisco Pelsaert over Mughal Indië, pp. 187, 191-192, 
225, 249; Kolff, Naukar, Rajput & Sepoy, pp. 128-130.
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to tell here. But the cult was yet another means through which peasant 
boys came to partake of a specif ic and cherished soldiers’ identity.29 The 
remoulding of old social and ritual distinctions, the adoption of second or 
parallel identities of a sect or clan nature, whether temporary or permanent, 
was a natural corollary of what I termed naukari and an inextricable part 
of the workings of the military labour machine of North India.
After the decline of the Ujjainiya clan and Bir Singh Deo Bundela’s 
death, minor lineage heads of both clans would continue to be active in 
recruitment, brokerage, and state service. During the heyday of the empire, 
however, the Mogul system compelled a considerable number of clans and 
extended families of zamindars to give up the large-scale employment of 
war bands that they had undertaken on their own account. Though some 
continued to seek imperial contracts while at the same time resisting the 
empire’s interference in their home lands, others fell back on the manage-
ment of their villages, while attempting to extricate some external income 
from police duties and local political patronage.
With this, the military labour market for infantry as a longue durée 
phenomenon once more entered a new phase, this time partly emancipated 
from the old monopoly of localized Rajput clan brokerage and assuming 
a more regional identity. It came of age, as it were, in the jobbing and 
ritual practices of the brahmanical pilgrimage centre of Baksar, already 
mentioned, right at the centre of the old Purbiya and Ujjainiya recruiting 
grounds in the Bhojpur district of West Bihar. As early as 1580 we hear of 
a Brahman Mogul off icer who attempted to draft soldiers at that place or, 
rather, at the holy tank of that name; he was killed on the bank of the Ganga 
by the Ujjainiya interest, then still too strong to brook interference. Half a 
century later, however, Mogul intrusion became the rule rather than the 
exception. Soon, large numbers of soldiers derived their identity from a real 
or supposed connection with Baksar rather than from a Rajput clan’s agency. 
Signif icantly, they became known as Baksariyas, a name that, until the end 
of the eighteenth century, would almost be synonymous with Hindustani 
musketeers or matchlockmen, though one also meets some Baksariya 
cavalry. A Mogul source of 1690 still mentions Baksariyas and Bundelas as 
the categories that sum up the presence of regular matchlockmen in the 
imperial army. But soon one f inds only the f irst identity. By the second 
decade of the eighteenth century, the British East India Company had some 
of these “sepoys” in its pay. In 1757, “Baksariya” musketeers served under 
29 Kolff, Naukar, Rajput & Sepoy, pp. 145ff.
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Clive, who, in the next year, raised the third Bengal sepoy battalion in the 
Bhojpur area.30
The Baksariyas served under jamadars, off icers without an ethnically 
def ined identity, to whom they owed their recruitment. In the eighteenth 
century, these off icers, increasingly without a decisive agrarian base them-
selves, came fully into their own as a category of recruiters-cum-off icers. 
They represented the crucial manpower-nexus of the military labour 
market. In the absence of the old clan brokers and probably connected 
with the adoption of sharpshooting matchlocks by peasant infantry units, 
men rose from the ranks and set themselves up as autonomous brokers. 
As jamadars they performed the task – well-known in the labour history 
of India – of jobbers, in this case jobber-cum-commanders. Without their 
recruitment expertise and negotiating skills, the Purbiya tradition of 
soldiering could not have maintained its remarkable near-monopoly of 
the market for infantrymen in North India. The ordinary sepoy was only 
“a musket in a mass of f irepower”, dependent, as he had always been, on 
some sort of labour agency.
On the jamadars’ loyalty often depended the political fortunes of the 
Moguls, the Mogul empire’s successor states, and the British Company. The 
fate of Siraj ud-Daula, the ruler of Bengal and Clive’s adversary at Plassey 
in 1757, hinged crucially on his principal sepoy jamadars.31 However, far-
reaching as the revolutions in the brokering profession were for some of 
the elite groups of Hindustan, in the experience of the peasantries service 
conditions must have remained largely the same. Their near-monopoly of 
the labour market never depended on the particular brand or label under 
which their clan leaders or jamadars negotiated for them and offered their 
services to mansabdars, provincial rulers, or the British. The Baksariyas, 
moreover, just as the Ujjainiya and Bundela soldiers before them, and as 
their successor incarnation, that of the Company’s sepoys, would do, always 
looked forward to returning to the family farms of Hindustan they had left 
as boys of perhaps only seventeen years of age. They served as jawans, that 
is young men, which even today is the name affectionately given in India 
to the common soldier. At the age of forty, when according to tradition one 
ceased to be a jawan, it was high time to return home to one’s village.32 What 
30 Wickremesekera, “Best Black Troops in the World”, p. 100.
31 Yang, The Limited Raj, pp. 191-194; Kolff, Naukar, Rajput & Sepoy, pp. 171, 174, 177, 179.
32 The dedication on war monuments in modern India “Jay kisān, jay jawān” (“Hurrah for the 
peasant, hurrah for the soldier”) is a strong reminder of the continuing association in public 
opinion of the two occupations.
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did not change either, at least for a while, was that, though restricted in 
their freedom by British off icers and new rules of discipline and drill, they 
endeavoured where possible to keep their options open and renegotiate 
their contracts, especially with respect to pay and, as we shall see, caste 
status.
Another centuries-old feature of the Hindustani labour market may, 
under Company rule, even have become more prominent. I mean the self-
recruiting character of the peasant armies discussed earlier. During the 
eighteenth century, recruiting parties are known to have been sent to vil-
lages in Company territory. Often, however, men came to military stations 
on their own initiative. The regiments actively encouraged their sepoys to 
bring friends and relatives as potential recruits. In 1773 it was reported that 
young village men “presented themselves daily on the parade ground for 
employment”, although, when an urgent need arose, trustworthy Indian 
off icers, jamadars and havildars, were sent out on behalf of the Company 
regiment to bring in new recruits. Even until the so-called Mutiny of 1857, 
methods of self-recruitment like these remained the common system.33 
From within the regiments, Indian agency and patronage monopolized and 
fulf illed the military employment requirements of the conquering colonial 
state. Rather than the Company’s army representing a world separate from 
village society, it served, in a way, as the military wing of the agrarian 
economy of Hindustan, a guarantee of a steady flow of cash to numberless 
village managers.
Members of many different castes, including a large number of low and 
“spurious” castes, had traditionally maintained a strong foothold on military 
employment.34 As the Company conquered North India and reduced the 
number of territorial chiefs and rulers, however, it acquired a unique posi-
tion in the labour market. To a dramatic degree, the employers’ demand for 
military labour now fell far short of the available supply. Employment op-
portunities decreased and competition for fully paid military jobs became 
fierce. Naturally, the landholding, mainly high-caste elites of the traditional 
recruiting grounds of Hindustan, who were allowed to recruit whom they 
pleased by the army authorities, were in a position to be as selective when 
filling vacancies as they chose. So, they turned their regiments into preserves 
of their own castes. Any soldier would now make the most of his family and 
33 Barat, The Bengal Native Infantry, p. 49; Alavi, The Sepoys and the Company, pp. 47-48. 
Wickremesekera speaks of “the jamadari system of recruitment” having become widespread 
by the early eighteenth century: “Best Black Troops in the World”, p. 40.
34 For examples, see Kolff, Naukar, Rajput & Sepoy, pp. 117ff.
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village ties and present his younger brothers, nephews, or fellow villagers 
to his commanding off icer as recruits. The process was already underway 
in, for instance, the maharaja of Benares’ army before it reached that of 
the Company. So the dominant castes of Hindustan, Bhumihar brahmans 
and several clans of Rajputs, made themselves into the dominant castes of 
the Company’s sepoy army, not only culturally, but also numerically. As a 
result, the Company’s regiments, self-perpetuating institutions as never 
before, became inward-looking preserves of Hindustani elite power. The 
Company could not have stopped the process. In fact, as it strengthened the 
social cohesion of the regiments, off icers acquiesced to and encouraged it; 
colonial blindness even made them suggest it was their own predilection 
for the cleaner castes that had set the process going.35
So, the arrival of the East India Company on North India’s labour market 
did after all mean a break with tradition. The Company was in a position to 
establish a monopoly as an employer of soldiers, at least at the state level. 
This largely stopped the ongoing hassle and fuss of the soldiers’ brokers 
over their clients’ terms of service. There was little to negotiate now. Village 
elites may have held on to their monopoly of recruitment in large parts 
of Hindustan; the fact of the exclusion of other state employers by the 
monopolist Company severely reduced the sepoys’ power of negotiation 
when it came to formalizing the terms of service.
Genealogically speaking, it is true that the Company’s sepoy army was 
a straight descendant and a reincarnation of the Purbiya-Tomar-Ujjainiya-
Bundela-Baksariya tradition of Hindustani peasant soldiering. It is also true 
that sepoys continued to send huge amounts of pay to their home villages. 
By its grants of land to pensioned-off soldiers – a kind of latter-day watan 
system – the invalid establishment of the Company’s Bengal Army even 
strengthened its link and that of its sepoys with the traditional recruiting 
grounds of Hindustan. But with only one employer left, the role for broker-
age, for labour agents and jobber-commanders ( jamadars) dwindled to 
almost nil. Desertion and defection to another warlord or state were no 
longer options. In the newly juridif ied atmosphere of the colonial state, 
aggressive attempts at renegotiating one’s terms of service were deemed 
to be mutinies.
Inward-looking, I said. Those sepoys who were lucky enough to retain 
employment with the monopolist Company compensated their loss of 
negotiating power by inventing a cult of themselves as pure brahmans 
35 In a similar process, the untouchables were gradually excluded from the ranks of the Madras 
Army: Wickremesekera, “Best Black Troops in the World”, p. 103.
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and respectable Rajputs. The Company, as we saw, obliged. Lower-caste 
sepoys, such as the Pasis, who had contributed much to the centuries-old 
Purbiya tradition of mobile labour and had helped fight Clive’s battles, “were 
excluded from the line, in order to more fully conciliate the higher classes”.36
Even then, the Bhumihars – a new identity of “military brahmans” – and 
Rajputs who succeeded in holding on to employment, could never com-
pletely reconcile themselves to a contract that deprived them of all options 
of service other than those that suited the British. Their last bid to regain 
their old freedom of negotiation according to the ancient code of honourable 
free agency or naukari would come to naught in the rising of 1857.
After that, the options on the market for mobile labour in Hindustan 
would be even more meagre than before. In a radical shift of policy, the 
British turned westwards, especially to the Punjab, for its recruits. The old 
system – which I characterized as a two-tiered one, composed, at the level of 
the village economy, of a relatively free and reciprocal relationship between 
surplus agrarian labour and locally rooted brokers and, at the level of the 
broker-state relationship, of freely contracted service deals of aggregated, 
commodified labour – collapsed for good. For most men in the old recruiting 
villages of Hindustan, there was no alternative, then, but to stick to their 
share of the family f ields and, if it seemed advantageous, force out of the 
agrarian labour market the lower-status men they had deprived of profitable 
army service two or three generations earlier. No compensation in the form 
of new employment opportunities was offered except in the tea gardens of 
Assam, as a strongman in one of the armed gangs of the odd big landholder 
in Bengal, or as an indentured labourer in one of the overseas parts of the 
empire. For these jobs, brokerage was in the hands of men appointed by the 
colonial authorities in Calcutta, men with no roots or interest in agrarian 
Hindustan, which now entered a long phase of often abject poverty.
36 Chattopadhyaya, The Sepoy Mutiny, 1857, p. 72; Singh, Indian Army under the East India 
Company, p. 157; Kolff, Naukar, Rajput & Sepoy, pp. 28, 117ff. The quote – taken from the remi-
niscences of a British off icer published in 1830 – is found in Peers, “‘The Habitual Nobility of 
Being’”, 550. See also Gordon, “Symbolic and Structural Constraints”, p. 173.

 “True to their salt”
Mechanisms for recruiting and managing military labour 
in the army of the East India Company during the Carnatic 
Wars in India
Robert Johnson
South Asian personnel were critically important to the British military 
effort in the Carnatic Wars (1746-1748, 1749-1754, 1757-1763). Since European 
personnel were relatively few in number, they were compelled to augment 
their strength with a trained cadre of indigenous men.1 As in other theatres 
of war in the period 1746-1763, the recruitment of military labour into armies 
from beyond the parent state was common. In North America, Europe, and 
South Asia, native or mercenary forces were employed with an emphasis on 
the steady improvement of their eff iciency and cost-effectiveness although 
quality was linked to the tasks they were to perform.
Drawing on the background to the Carnatic Wars, this chapter analyses 
the types, recruitment patterns, and uses of military labour, offering a 
comparison between those drawn from Europe and the subcontinent, 
including the assessments made by contemporaries. In contrast to recent 
historiographical trends that seek to emphasize ideological judgements 
about the use of South Asian labour, archival records suggest the Brit-
ish were eminently pragmatic in their decisions about manpower. They 
interpreted conditions in India through their own experiences, looking for 
particular “types”, but they also borrowed from local practices, particularly 
when the sheer demand for trained manpower in the 1750s outweighed 
any ideological considerations. Nevertheless, the British were aware of the 
need to acknowledge cultural sensitivities, and the Company army was not 
entirely converted to a “European” model.
In order to assist in making wider comparative judgements about military 
labour in this period, it is possible to identify here certain taxonomies and 
evolutionary trends in common with other areas of global labour history 
research. The army of the East India Company in the period 1746-1763, 
regardless of its quality, represents a shift from a force consisting of Euro-
1 South Asian labour was not conf ined to f illing the ranks of the Europeans’ armies, as a 
great number of local civilians and camp followers were vital to the functioning of the logistical 
chain. However, this aspect of employment remains outside the scope of this chapter.
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pean “conscript professionals” with a handful of “ethnic conscripts” and 
“ethnic mercenaries”, led by an off icer corps that was in part “mercenary 
professional”. By the end of the Third Carnatic War, the troops of the East 
India Company resembled “ethnic professionals”, augmented by auxiliaries 
who might still be categorized as “ethnic mercenaries”, thus constitut-
ing a “mixed force” of labour types. The European contingent, raised by 
a combination of voluntarism and “crimping” (impressment), remained 
either “professional mercenaries” or “professional conscripts”. This chapter 
examines these changes and continuities, illustrating an army on the cusp 
of a signif icant transformation in its imperial labour systems.
Staying true to their salt: The historiographical context
Over the past thirty years, a great deal of attention has been paid to inter-
pretations of the British colonial encounter in South Asia in the light of 
post-colonial studies.2 There has been a comprehensive search for the ideo-
logical assumptions and constructions of the colonizers and the subsequent 
reactions of the colonized. The approach itself has been scrutinized and 
critiqued, with detractors arguing that the colonized were not simply pas-
sive victims of colonizing “discourses” and power relationships, but active 
agents in the dynamic processes at work. Subsequently some scholars have 
tried to show that the British Empire and its colonial subjects were engaged 
in “dialogues” of power, that the British system was flexible and porous, and 
that the debate had not taken suff icient notice of gender in its analysis of 
class and race.3 However, there seemed to be a universal acceptance of the 
idea that “empire” was inherently violent, stripping peoples of power and 
dignity, and at times altering their behaviour so profoundly that, even after 
independence, colonial taxonomies persisted. With a deeply moralizing 
agenda in keeping with late twentieth-century ideas of social justice and 
equality, the British period in India was condemned as fundamentally 
unjust, often cruel, and irredeemably corrupt. These debates are particularly 
important in any consideration of military labour in South Asia in the 
eighteenth century.
However, far from simply being a system of violence, the East India Com-
pany used its army, in keeping with mid-eighteenth-century ideas about 
2 Said, Orientalism; Guha and Spivak, Selected Subaltern Studies; Spivak, “Can the Subaltern 
Speak?” 
3 Washbrook, ‘Orients and Occidents’. 
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the state and public order, to establish pacif ied regions more conducive to 
commerce. They were engaged in partnerships and alliances. The recruit-
ment of an effective, trained, and disciplined army was a crucial element 
of this process, and was seen as fundamental to the exploitation of the 
military labour market.
It is important to emphasize, from the outset, this pragmatic character of 
governance, recruitment, military organization, and pacif ication. Despite 
numerous attempts to identify ideological reasons for the expansion of 
Company rule in India, the conduct of its off icers and the raising or use 
of armies, the British displayed a practical approach to the problems they 
confronted. Their points of reference were, unsurprisingly, entirely Euro-
pean, but they applied no rigid systems and responded in a way that took 
account of local conditions to establish their own local supremacy, the free 
flow of trade, minimal costs, and maximum profit. Moreover, the army was 
crucial to the way that the East India Company developed: faced with a 
great threat from French forces and local instability, the Company employed 
a greater proportion of trained Indian personnel and engaged in a series 
of signif icant military operations. While the British adopted European 
standards in selection, training, and tactics, they were also conscious of the 
limitations of British personnel in terms of health, quality, and availability.
It is generally accepted that the British learned from the French model in 
the Carnatic Wars of the 1740s, namely, that Indian manpower, trained in 
European modes of warfare, was crucial to winning campaigns in the sub-
continent. Philip Mason suggested that, once the British learned the value 
of the Indian sepoy, they possessed the means to conquer the subcontinent.4 
However, Channa Wickremesekera disagreed, pointing to the widespread 
contempt for Indian soldiers and their secondary roles in the campaigns.5 
He argued that the Europeans felt the Indians were incapable of effective 
leadership or initiative. Indians were used primarily as factory guards or 
garrison troops. Where units were raised, they were Europeanized, that is 
trained, drilled, and even clothed on European lines, under British off icers. 
He argued that Indian troops were rarely used against French troops, and 
tended to be deployed only to guard the baggage and lines of communica-
tion. If they performed well, the British attributed this to their own off icers 
or the inspiration of the British troops who accompanied them. In the key 
engagements of the Seven Years War (1756-1763, contemporaneous with 
4 Mason, A Matter of Honour, pp. 29-38. 
5 Wickremesekera, European Success and Indian Failure in the SEC. See also Wickremesekera, 
“Best Black Troops in the World”. 
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the Third Carnatic War), European troops invariably led in the assault. The 
only significant changes, he argued, were in the numbers actually employed 
(which was a consequence of extended commitments) and an equalization 
in weaponry between British and Indian troops (since, after 1760, both were 
armed with flintlocks).
It is easy to assume that racial stereotypes, which were to become so 
prominent in the nineteenth century, determined ideas in this period. In 
fact, calculations about the need for, and costs of, military labour were more 
important. The East India Company was eager to find those who would work 
with it and sought, in peacetime, simply to keep labour costs to a minimum. 
Moreover, manpower demands in wartime could overcome peacetime 
prejudices very rapidly. Furthermore, while it is easy to f ind episodes in 
which Indians were not trusted to make independent judgements without 
the direction of European officers, this would also apply in exactly the same 
way to European infantrymen. Men with rural backgrounds, lacking educa-
tion, characterized both European and Indian foot soldiers. Discipline was 
harsh for both, but was proven, time after time, to be necessary to drill men 
to overcome their instinctive desire to save themselves in close-quarters 
battle. The forging of a collective solidarity and sense of purpose, often 
through the moniker of the regiment or the willingness to follow a particular 
leader, applied equally to British and Indian troops. The environment and 
human health also had a part to play. Gerald Bryant argued that the need 
to garrison India and to provide internal security, in an environment that 
Europeans found debilitating and even lethal, one for which Indian troops 
were better suited, meant that Indians were preferred. 6 Moreover, some 
European off icers were critical of the poor performance of low-quality 
European soldiers compared with the sepoys.
In the 1740s, the British had been content to use casually employed local 
armed men for the protection of their caravans, goods, and quarters.7 From 
the outset, control of territory brought with it the obligation of maintaining 
the security of the population, although the Company’s priority was to avoid 
this sort of commitment in favour of commercial activity. Initially, the only 
reliable military forces were European troops shipped from the British Isles. 
The f irst were the King’s troops, four companies of which landed in Bombay 
in 1662 and who were invited to take up their arms in 1668 as “mercenary-
professionals” of the East India Company. In 1664, two companies of “Ra-
jputs” had been enlisted, but they got neither British off icers nor training. 
6 Bryant, The East India Company and Its Army. 
7 Mason, A Matter of Honour, p. 30.
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They used their own weapons and possessed no uniforms, and their pay 
was often in arrears. They were accordingly described by the governor of 
Bombay as “more like bandits in the woods than military men”. In response, 
he organized a militia of all freemen and landholders. The off icers were 
British but the ranks were f illed with Indians, most of whom had converted 
to Christianity. Nevertheless, in 1706, six companies of “Gentoos” (Hindus) 
were disbanded because they were so unreliable. By the 1740s, garrisons 
were held by Europeans and elderly or inf irm “mestees” (men of mixed 
Portuguese and Indian descent, sometimes described as “Portuguese”), 
“Topasses” and “Peons” (Christian Indians, the latter being the term used 
in Madras), and “seapoys” (men armed with their own weapons, f it only for 
guard duty).8 In February 1747, Madras was protected by 3,000 peons but 
only 900 had muskets and these were all matchlocks. The verdict that one 
must draw is that the Indian troops in the Company’s employment before 
1750 were cheap and were attracted by f inancial reward but were of a very 
low quality indeed – all of which was the result of peacetime parsimony.
The British Indian forces serving the Company were transformed by 
encounters with the French. The nawab of the Carnatic had been defeated 
by a French force made up of Europeans and sepoys under Captain Paradis, 
while the f leet under Bertrand de la Bourdonnais had taken Madras in 
1746. By contrast, the British, despite having a strong fleet, failed to capture 
Pondicherry simply because they lacked the resources and manpower for 
a land campaign. Although Madras was returned on the conclusion of 
peace two years later, the seriousness of the threat and the French alliances 
with local rulers had revealed the precarious position of the East India 
Company in the subcontinent. The “unoff icial war” between British and 
French forces in India in fact continued, with each unable to maintain a 
f leet off the east coast of India for long, and with both sides plagued by 
the steady loss of European troops, who died of disease. The French and 
particularly the British had too few European troops to take and hold all 
the hill fortif ications that lay between their territories or those of their 
allies. Garrisoning the settlements that were captured used up precious 
manpower. The solution was therefore entirely pragmatic: recruit more 
Indian personnel who could cope better with the climate, survive local 
diseases, and augment the dwindling numbers of trained Europeans.
The British position was weakened further when Marquis Joseph François 
Dupleix, the governor-general of the French possessions in India, allied 
himself with the new nizam of the Deccan, and earned the Mogul title 
8 Lenman, Britain’s Colonial Wars, p. 88.
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of “Commander of the Seven Thousand” from the Emperor. At Arcot, the 
French had gained another ally, Chanda Sahib, the new nawab of the Car-
natic. This put several thousand Indian troops at the disposal of France. The 
British had backed Chanda Sahib’s rival, Mohammed Ali, at Trichinopoly 
and provided a garrison of 600 men, but the city was besieged in 1751. At 
Fort St George in Madras and Fort St David, there were barely 350 British 
personnel available – too few for a relief force. Nevertheless, Robert Clive, 
who had been appointed originally as commissary of supply, was permitted 
to march out with 200 European and 300 Indian troops, and three small 
f ield guns, to make an audacious attack on Chanda Sahib’s capital at Arcot. 
After the surprise capture of the town, Clive put the settlement, with its 
mile-long perimeter, into a state of defence. Clive possessed only 120 British 
and 200 Indians f it for duty at the commencement of the siege. After a 
bombardment, a series of sorties, and a major attack on a breach in the 
walls, this garrison had been reduced to 80 British soldiers and 120 sepoys. 
Nevertheless, reinforced, and then relieved at Arcot, by additional indig-
enous troops, Clive pursued the French and Indian armies and inflicted a 
major defeat on them at Arni.
Clive’s successes helped turn the tide of the war: Chanda Sahib’s forces 
were drawn off from Trichinopoly; Mysore and a portion of Marathas joined 
Mohammed Ali. Dupleix tried to restore the situation by advancing towards 
Madras with 400 Frenchmen and 2,000 sepoys. This force ambushed Clive 
at Kaveripak (1752), when the British had force-marched to intercept him. 
Clive defeated the ambush with his own outnumbered brigade. Indian men 
employed by the Company went on to f ight against the French and their 
allies, describing themselves as the “veterans of Arcot” which, given there 
had only been 120 survivors and the new force numbered 600, might refer 
to French-trained sepoys who had changed sides.9 There are other possible 
explanations. They may have been sick soldiers who had recovered, or new 
recruits who had joined the core of the old formation, although changing 
sides was not so unusual in the fluid arrangements of the labour market 
of southern India.
What was clear, from the emergence of the French as a more signif icant 
rival to the East India Company in the subcontinent after 1750, was that 
the British were def icient in trained manpower. Indian personnel were 
therefore trained by Clive and others on the French model and, by the end 
of the f ighting in 1753, it was clear that organization, improved discipline, 
and the toughening experience of campaigning had improved the quality 
9 Mason, A Matter of Honour, p. 30.
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of the British Indian forces. The fact was that European personnel in India 
were not available in sufficient numbers. Part of the problem was the supply: 
there was considerable competition for recruits with the regular army 
back in Britain. The outbreak of the Seven Years War in Europe therefore 
necessitated that regular regiments were sent out to India. This immediately 
raised questions about whether the Company or the Army should exercise 
command and jurisdiction, but with 63 per cent of the Company’s forces 
being made up of regular units, the issue of manpower and who was to 
provide it became a critical and much debated issue.10 In Britain, potential 
recruits sought to avoid all of the tropical destinations as death traps, and 
that included India.11 The regular army, which needed to f ill its own ranks, 
pressured its parliamentary allies to limit Company recruitment quotas. 
These pressures meant that the Company was compelled to release more 
funds to raise local personnel.
The recruitment of the Company Army
In 1757, Robert Clive had recruited the f irst Bengal native regiment, the Lal 
Paltan, as a selected 515 men serving under British off icers, thus expand-
ing the Company Army from its companies in Madras and its garrison at 
Bombay. According to a return of the Bengal troops dated 10 April 1757, 
Clive commanded some 1,914 “Seapoys”, of which 1,400 were, in fact, from 
Madras. In addition, the return listed 257 topasses, 157 of whom were drawn 
from Bombay and the rest from Madras, but all of these were confined to 
garrison and guard duty.
The new Bengal sepoys were picked using the standard British criteria 
of the day. Many British soldiers were enlisted in rural Scotland as well as 
the English countryside because of a preference for rural workers. Tall and 
physically robust men were selected because of the endurance required 
in military service. Agricultural labourers were considered tougher, more 
used to the outdoors, able to move longer distances, and more biddable than 
urban folk. The Indian recruits had to stand 5’7” tall and meet the same 
10 Gilbert, “Recruitment and Reform in the East India Company Army”, p. 91. 
11 In analysing the numbers sick in Clive’s return of 1757, we f ind that, for the British, 16 off icers 
of 70 were sick, representing 23 per cent of their strength. There were 176 Other Ranks (ORs) 
of 1,219 (including 25 of 257 Topasses), representing 14 per cent. For the sepoys, 53 of 1,914 were 
sick, representing just 3 per cent of their strength. Average sick rates in 1790s for the Company 
Army as a whole were 17 per cent and the death rate was 5 per cent: WO 17 1742 and 1743. National 
Archives, Kew.
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physical standards as would any British enlisted man. There was little that 
was ideological about this, and the approach was universal.
There were, however, some other considerations. In 1750, Robert Orme 
drew up a categorization of “martial races” based on the dietary habits and 
climatic zones of the subcontinent.12 While the issue of “martial races” has 
become mired in ideological debates on race that belong to the nineteenth 
century, in this period the criteria and associations were far more pragmat-
ic.13 In general terms, Orme believed that wheat-growing areas produced 
physically better and therefore more “martial” types than the areas where 
rice was grown and where people were shorter. Accordingly, the Company 
confined its recruitment to villages in wheat zones and therefore largely 
within its own territories.14 In 1757, immediately after Plassey, the Company 
recruited in the Bengal Presidency because it was dissatisf ied with the 
standards of recruits in the nawab of Bengal’s forces, but it found that few 
men met the required height standard.15 The rural men were thought to 
be “undersized”. As a result, by the 1770s, recruitment had been extended 
into northern India, where, again, wheat-growing predominated. There, the 
British most often selected what they considered “higher-caste Brahmans”. 
This was not just because of their physique however, but of self-perceptions 
of “warrior traditions” and their ability to influence the recruitment of other 
“sturdy” peasants. This self-perception as an ethnic professional social group 
is evident in other locations outside South Asia in this period.
Another criterion for the recruitment of British troops in Scotland, ac-
cording to John Prebble, had been the need to find employment for unskilled 
men who might otherwise foment disorder.16 The signif icant demographic 
shift in Britain in the mid to late eighteenth century meant rural over-
population could be managed in part by a natural f low to urban areas 
and in part by employment in the armed forces. Having just confronted 
the serious rebellion of the ’45, it was understandable that British authori-
ties should be focused on questions of civil order and the management of 
populations. In the Terai areas of Bengal, Robert Brooke was charged with 
establishing a regiment to absorb selected hill-raiders and to employ them 
in the pacif ication of their own homelands. Warren Hastings expressed the 
view that preserving the caste system in India would prevent the “danger 
12 Orme, Historical Fragments of the Mughal Empire.
13 The debate and its origins are fully unravelled in Roy, Brown Warriors of the Raj.
14 See, for example, Maj. Stainford to K. Kyd, 9 March and 17 March 1779, P/18/47, India Off ice 
Records [henceforth, IOR]. 
15 Khan, Seir Mutaquerin. 
16 Prebble, Mutiny; Galloway, White People, Indians and Highlanders. 
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that they will soon be united and embodied as an armed nation after the 
example of the Sikhs”.17 He was concerned that they might “become too 
formidable for their rulers”. The Company therefore continued to co-opt 
potential and even actual enemies throughout the next seventy years and, 
with the exception of the Bengal regiments, looked particularly for men 
from marginalized or peripheral rural communities who would have little 
sympathy for the majority of the population.
The effect of British concerns about rebellion and the raising of Indian 
regiments was to exaggerate the special status of caste privileges in Indian 
units, preserving their preference not to travel across the Kala Pani (the 
black sea), to eat only certain foods, and to respect religious rituals. These 
enhanced the self-esteem of the troops, but caused resentment among 
civilians of similar caste. These moves were designed to enhance recruit-
ment, separate the sepoy from any attachment to the people, and ensure 
continued loyalty to the Company above the local population. It was for 
these reasons also that the Company’s military men opposed the ingress of 
Christian missionaries who might, reflected the subsequent commander-in-
chief, Charles Cornwallis, “endanger a government which owes its principal 
support to a native army composed of men of high caste whose f idelity 
and affections we have hitherto secured by an unremitted attention not 
to offend their religious scruples and superstitions”.18
However, the practice of recruitment, following British methods, was 
not entirely uniform. In Britain, recruiting sergeants would seek disaf-
fected workers, enquiring as to those who felt their masters were unjust, 
their wages too low, or their lives too limited by their womenfolk. Pay and 
employment, especially when other options were limited, were a strong 
incentive to enlist. Family size seems to have made a difference for some, 
as opportunities to inherit land or business were curtailed. A tradition of 
some sort of public service within the family, often military, could make the 
appeal stronger. Young men, regardless of their nationality, often express a 
desire to be tested as a rite of manhood, or to experience adventure in such 
a way as to elevate their esteem with peers, family, or clan. Some men were 
trying to escape issues at home (the “push” factors) including getting women 
pregnant, drudgery, and petty crimes, but others felt the army had its own 
attractions (the “pull” factors), including the ostentation of uniform, or the 
17 Warren Hastings, Collections of Essays, Add. 29234, Hastings Papers. 
18 Cornwallis to the Bishop of Salisbury, 1788, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/187, National 
Archives, Kew. 
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appearance of young men returning on furlough who were better fed, taller, 
and f itter and who often encouraged others to enlist.19
In Britain, there were also some sharp practices. Wealthy men hoping to 
advance themselves by the raising of a regiment for the government, such 
as the Duke of Athole in 1778, were not above using the middlemen of local 
businesses and hired agents as “human blood hounds” to pursue men and 
conscript them.20 Off icially, recruiting sergeants were permitted to raise 
groups of men “by beat of drum”, literally beating a tattoo to get the atten-
tion of young men and then regaling them with stories of immediate cash, 
generous wages, adventure, and personal glory. At country fairs and taverns 
alcohol and stirring military music sometimes encouraged men further. 
These tricks tended to attract a low quality of recruit, as recruiting sergeants 
themselves recognized. Many people had a low regard for the army, and 
artisan families felt that enlistment was the act of the desperate. However, 
countless young men still regarded the army as a manly profession, with 
glamorous uniforms likely to seduce women.
In its search for European personnel, the Company was forced to hire 
“crimps”, agents who were paid on the basis of the number of recruits they 
ensnared.21 Kidnapping was common, the victims being locked up until they 
could be placed on board a ship and sent out to India. The only volunteers 
coming forward were those attempting to escape imprisonment or the 
gallows. There were no off icers to escort them or depots in Britain and 
consequently there was no attempt to instil any discipline or training. 
They were largely debtors, drunks, and criminals, and they were accused of 
carrying “insolence, mutiny, profligacy, debauchery and disease into their 
Armies in India”.22 To make matters worse, the Company did not have the 
powers of martial law over their recruits while they were still in Britain. 
Part of the reason for the draconian recruitment process was to prevent 
men simply escaping back to civilian life.
When the Seven Years War began, the numbers of men recruited for the 
Company actually fell as the services at home took a larger share of the pool. 
In 1754-1755, the Company had obtained 1,001 men, but a year later only 
488 were procured. In 1759-1760, only 202 men were found, and in 1761-1762 
19 Laver, British Military Uniforms; Samuel Hutton, “The Life of an Old Soldier”, cited in Palmer, 
The Rambling Soldier, pp. 15-17. 
20 Penny, The Traditions of Perth, pp. 60-61. 
21 The f igures we have for the 1770s suggest that the lowest price was 1 guinea per man (1776), 
but in wartime (1777) this rose to 5 or 6 guineas per man: Committee of Shipping Report B92, 
3 December 1776, IOR. 
22 Letter by “A.B.”, The Public Advertiser, 12 March 1771. 
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this had fallen to 197.23 The Company Army complained that too few were 
being sent to maintain their regiments and they had to turn to as many 
Europeans in Bengal as they could f ind to remain effective.24 In 1759, the 
Court of Directors admitted it was “impossible” to provide the 2,000 men 
required by the army in India because it was experiencing “the greatest 
diff iculties in raising recruits”. They directed that operations should be 
limited to the manpower available.25
After the war, gradually there were changes to the system. In 1769, the 
Company was permitted to raise recruits “by beat of drum”, that is, by 
off icially advertising rather than by kidnapping, and was also empowered 
to raise a regiment in Britain, with commissioned off icers. Complete units 
would be sent out, rather than “trickle-posting” any arrivals. It was permit-
ted that up to a third of the regiment could consist of “foreign protestants”, 
but there was a deep suspicion of enlisting Catholics or Germans.26 Indeed, 
the Company directors were most concerned that the regiment might be 
answerable only to the British government and could, therefore, threaten 
the independence of the Company altogether. Another issue was cost: for 
all its faults, crimping was cheaper than regular army recruiting or paying 
vast bounties, and the Seven Years War cost the Company a fortune.
Regular officers in Britain were equally prejudicial on their side about the 
new arrangements. They argued that India was a drain on manpower which 
swallowed up men who should be deployed in the defence of Britain. One 
member of Parliament likened India to “a sink”.27 As a result, the reforms 
failed and the system reverted to crimps, only to collapse once more during 
the American War of Independence until it was decreed that Irishmen might 
be recruited from 1781 onwards. However, standards of recruits remained 
very low, and some were actually sent back to Britain. Figures for the 1790s, 
which appear to be typical even earlier in the century, suggest a rejection 
rate of 10 per cent.28 Some were: “particularly incapable of carrying the load 
of arms, ammunition, necessaries and provisions, and undergoing hardships 
and fatigues, to which soldiers to be useful;[?] to the public must necessarily 
submit”.29 It was not until 1799 that the practice of crimping was brought 
23 A. J. Farrington, L/Mil/9/85, IOR.
24 Despatches to Bengal, 25 March 1757, IOR. 
25 Despatches to Bengal, 1759, IOR.
26 Gilbert, “Recruitment and Reform in the East Indian Company Army”, p. 98. 
27 London Evening Post, 16-18 April 1771. 
28 See Colonel Brownrigg’s Inspection Records, 1792, WO 113/15: National Archives, Kew.
29 Court of Directors Letter to Bengal, enc. Cornwallis to Directors, 15 December 1790, L/Mil/
Misc./127, IOR. 
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to an end and recruitment put under the jurisdiction of the regular army.30 
However, the Company remained short of European men and failed to f ill 
its own quotas.
The organization, management, and performance of the 
Company Army
In his account of the fall of Calcutta to Siraj ud-Daula, the nawab of Bengal, 
in 1756, John Holwell noted that the defences were manned by a handful 
of gunners with 145 infantry of which, in total, only 60 were Europeans. 
The militia consisted of 100 “Armenians”, who were “entirely useless”, and 
a further 100 Indian “boys and slaves who were not capable of holding a 
musket”.31 He estimated that, even with men drafted from the ships in port, 
the garrison numbered only 250, including off icers. Predictably, when Siraj 
ud-Daula’s forces came into view, the militia deserted and some Company 
off icers f led to the ships. The standard interpretation of the war is that 
dramatic improvements were made to the quality of the Indian troops 
through the imposition of discipline and European drill. By increasing 
manpower and quality, the British were able to turn events around. How-
ever, the improvement of the Indian troops was only part of the formula: 
the logistical expertise of Stringer Lawrence, Vice Admiral Charles Watson’s 
amphibious operations up the Hooghly River, and Robert Clive’s leadership, 
intrigues, and personal courage were crucial, as was the Company’s capacity, 
in contrast the French Company, to fund the conflict.
The improvements had begun with Stringer Lawrence in Cuddalore in 
1748. He imposed strict discipline on topasses and Europeans alike at Fort St 
David, mindful that Madras had fallen to the more effective French forces. 
In December 1758, that new force was put to the test in a siege at Madras, 
and endured two months of bombardment and more than a thousand 
casualties before it was relieved. But it was also the growing campaign-
combat experience of the Company troops through the Carnatic Wars 
that made the greatest difference. New units could draw on the expertise 
of veterans, especially junior commanders, and apply this directly to their 
30 A fascinating contrast can be made with the Royal Navy’s patterns of recruitment in the late 
eighteenth century. New research by Jeremiah Dancy suggests that “pressed men” constituted 
on average no more than 10 per cent of the crews since ships required skilled labour. The decline 
of crimping coincides with the disfavour towards impressments in the Senior Service: Dancy, 
“British Naval Manpower During the French Revolutionary Wars”. 
31 Cited in Lenman, Britain’s Colonial Wars, p. 106. 
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training. Clive’s sepoys displayed remarkable endurance when besieged, on 
campaign marches and in battle. At the siege of Arcot, for example, their 
morale remained intact despite a steady attrition of their numbers, and in 
the march to intercept Dupleix in 1752, his sepoys made 50 miles in just 
twenty hours, covering a total of 66 miles in thirty-six hours and winning 
a night battle at Kaveripak against the odds. At Volconda (or Golkonda) 
(29 May 1752), a force made up almost entirely of Indian personnel in British 
service charged a French battery and their supporting infantry. Despite 
taking heavy casualties, the sepoys pressed home with the bayonet and 
killed or captured the French, which suggests that their discipline, training, 
and trust in their junior leadership were robust. The following year, Subadar 
Sheikh Ibrahim, without any British support, defended his battery position 
against a Franco-Indian force, and earned a signif icant reward from the 
Company for his devotion to duty.32 With six years of f ighting behind them, 
with improved discipline and the personalized and charismatic leadership 
of Lawrence, Watson, and Clive, the Company had an effective sepoy army 
with naval support to rival the French.
After the Carnatic/Seven Years War, greater military eff iciency in Asian 
units was manifest in other ways. The standards of British recruits coming 
to India showed no sign of improvement, prompting the governor-general 
to write: “what shall I say of the Company’s Europeans [soldiers]? [...] I 
would inf initely rather take the 73rd [Native] Regiment upon service with 
me than the six Company’s battalions.” 33 Such comments have to be seen 
in context: the sentiments may be exaggerated because of a sense of exas-
peration. Nevertheless, European off icers were aware that Indian troops 
were cheaper, better adapted to cope with the demands of campaigning in 
the heat and humidity of South Asia, and, when trained in the European 
manner, capable of the same achievements.
Although there had been only companies in the 1740s, it was decided in 
1759 to raise battalions of Indian troops to match the French threat. Two 
had in fact already been formed, but an additional f ive battalions were 
mobilized. By the end of the war, the Company Army’s establishment was 
for ten battalions. Each battalion consisted of nine companies, each of 120 
men, and one of these was a grenadier company.
In Clive’s “Return of 1757”, the Indian troops are recorded as having 
various ranks of subadars; jamadars; havildars and naiks; colour (f lag) 
men; “Tom Toms” (drummers), trumpeters, and “Seapoys”. It had been 
32 Mason, A Matter of Honour, p. 38.
33 Cornwallis to Dundas, 16 November 1787, Home Misc. Series, vol. 85, IOR.
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assumed in the 1740s that Indian ways were so strange that only Indian 
off icers could command Asian troops at the company level. Indeed, the 
f irst Indian off icers were really contractors who served as recruiters for the 
men. Loyalty to the contractor was more important to the early recruits 
than to the Company. But new contracts in the 1750s changed this. Each 
man was made aware that he served the Company and was paid by the 
Company. In November 1755, regulations stipulated that there should be 
one subadar, four jamadars, eight havildars (sergeants), and eight naiks 
(corporals). At the end of the war, this establishment of Indian leaders 
was reduced (one subadar, two jamadars, and six havildars per company) 
and each battalion was furnished with two commissioned off icers, three 
sergeant-majors (Europeans), and a “Black Commandant”. However, Mason 
noted that these Europeans were in little more than a supervisory capacity 
or there to maintain numbers. There was little chance of promotion as a 
commander in an Indian battalion, as progression could only be made 
in European units. They were to: “make them keep up a good command 
amongst the sepoys and to support them well in it”.34 The sergeant-majors 
were to have “immediate direction of three of the companies” and were 
charged to take “care of their discipline”. Mason suggested that the non-
commissioned off icers (NCOs) were the backbone of the Indian units and 
that the concept of gentlemanly off icers had not yet manifested itself. He 
also argued that the survival of the “black commandant” was testament to 
the importance of the old “reciprocal” chieftain system. In fact, it seems 
likely that the commandant was an adviser to the Europeans on cultural 
matters and the link to the recruiting base on which the battalion depended.
What was the appeal for Indian men to serve in the Company army? 
There was not perhaps the strong tradition of service that would come to 
characterize the Rajputs in British formations from the mid-nineteenth 
century. What the British could offer was regular pay at 6 rupees a month.35 
Many Indian rulers rarely paid their men more than eight months a year, 
leading to widespread brigandage, but even this salary was often in arrears 
and siphoned off in ghost pay-rolling by intermediate commanders. The 
advantage of the small European formations was that it made corruption 
more diff icult. The Company was also flexible in its arrangements. Sepoys 
of South India were permitted to take their families along with them to 
stations and garrisons and even on campaign. Pay advances were available, 
and, as early as 1762, sepoys on overseas service could opt to have a portion 
34 Mason, A Matter of Honour, p. 63. 
35 Lenman, Britain’s Colonial Wars, p. 100.
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of their pay delivered directly to their families. Indians could pay for com-
missions from 1763, and these were still relatively cheap (a week’s pay in 
1763), making personal advancement possible within the Company Army.
Many European soldiers, enlisted either as conscripts or volunteers, 
grumbled about having their pay held back because of costs they had to 
meet: 2d here and 2d there for blankets, boots, cleaning equipment, and ad-
ditional or extraordinary rations. Some soldiers wrote about not being able 
to leave the service because of indebtedness. However, this was not always 
f inancial, but rather a matter of honour. The Indian expression having to 
remain “true to their salt” seems to have pervaded British personnel in some 
cases and not just the sepoys of the Honourable East India Company. Such 
sentiments would have taken time to develop, but the shared isolation of 
India, regular pay and continuous employment, and the camaraderie of 
the ranks transformed an otherwise alienating experience into a positive 
one. In other words, recruits became regular soldiers with an esprit de 
corps, and a professional indifference to outsiders. Oaths of loyalty were not 
introduced until 1766, but they appear to have underpinned some existing 
understanding about service in the Company Army and how it related to 
concepts of personal honour.36 The creation of battalions led to the adoption 
of colours and these were incorporated into a symbiosis of European and 
South Asian rituals to create a bond of loyalty and possession. Southern 
Indian troops, for example, thought of their leaders and their colours as 
distinctly and uniquely theirs.
Did the Indian infantry in Company service determine the outcome of 
the Carnatic Wars in South Asia? What assessment can be made of their 
effectiveness? It was once assumed that the British possessed technologi-
cal superiority, which gave them the edge in their engagements with the 
Indian states. In fact, matchlocks with which the Indian forces were armed 
had a higher rate of f ire and a marginally greater range than the flintlock, 
although the flintlock, in trained hands, could sustain the same rate of f ire. 
Moreover, the French forces in India were armed with the same weapon 
types as the British. Indeed, within a few years, all the armies in India were 
using flintlocks.
Certainly the British made extensive use of light, quick-f iring, manoeu-
vrable artillery. At Trichinopoly in May 1754, three British six-pounder 
guns devastated French infantry with case-shot at close range. Roundshot 
ricocheting through dense cavalry also warded off large formations of 
mounted men. Artillery was widely available in South Asia but many guns 
36 Mason, A Matter of Honour, p. 66. 
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possessed by Indian rulers were f ixed or diff icult to move, and there was 
little standardization in their ammunition or calibres. However, while 
Indian forces failed to produce guns that could be manoeuvred easily, 
many of the batteries of the southern rulers were staffed by European 
gunners. At Plassey, for example, the guns of Siraj ud-Daula were directed 
by French artillerymen.
The differences between European and Indian forces were really more 
regular organization and better discipline, which, in turn meant that, on 
the battlef ield, sepoys and European troops could maintain a high rate 
of f ire and sustain casualties without losing cohesion. These ref lected 
a particular type of military labour organization. Large numbers of ill-
disciplined cavalry or poorly armed peasants, led by individuals who merely 
wished to demonstrate their personal courage, failed against the relentless 
machinery of European warfare. The point is that it did not matter whether 
the forces were Europeans or not; what mattered was their level of training, 
morale, and discipline.37 It is interesting to note that the Marathas adopted 
European methods to create a disciplined and cohesive army, built up with 
mercenary troops including Europeans in senior positions, and they too 
enjoyed some years of success against the British.38
In R.O. Cambridge’s Account of the War in India, published in 1772, the key 
reason for the defeat of Indian armies by the Europeans and their sepoys was 
the former’s neglect of infantry. While Indian cavalry were perfectly capable 
of charging against other horsemen, they tended to avoid the well-drilled 
Company infantry for fear of losing their horses on which their wealth 
depended. For the Company, raising and training infantry was cheaper than 
cavalry, and the infantry could hold ports, forts, and garrisons as well as 
act as a strike force.39 Moreover, if supported by light artillery, infantrymen 
could traverse all terrain in southern India. Certainly the labour categories 
in the 1757 Return for Plassey indicate that all the troops were dismounted.40
The lack of cavalry put the Company at a disadvantage in terms of recon-
naissance and therefore of intelligence-gathering, but this, if anything, 
made them even more dependent on local sources of power, their Indian 
allies, and intrigues against their adversaries.
37 Ibid., p. 40.
38 Gordon, The Marathas: 1600-1818. 
39 Lenman, Britain’s Colonial Wars, p. 96. 
40 Letters by Clive, 6 February 1757 ff., 1962-10-142, National Army Museum, London.
“truE to thEir saLt” 283
Comparative analysis
The second part of this chapter addresses the comparative elements of the 
early East India Company army in terms of terms of service, type of labour, 
type of army, and the causal drivers of the rise, dominance, or decline of 
the East India Company’s forms of military labour.
In addressing the variables in military labour in the East India Company 
Army, I should f irst note that the British had always employed local labour 
in India, particularly for the unskilled tasks associated with commerce and 
with the security of their factories, stores, and godowns. Defence against 
more numerous Indian forces relied largely on alliance and negotiations. 
The inadequate nature of peons or topasses in any offensive capacity, 
compared with disciplined and French sepoys, was already evident before 
the Seven Years War broke out, and so it is perhaps no surprise that the 
British enhanced their own systems to deal with the French threat. The 
result was a larger and more effective, if more expensive, Company army 
and, more signif icantly for this study, a transformation in the character of 
military labour.
In the terms of service offered, the East India Company barely differenti-
ated between British and Indian recruits. Troops were paid a regular wage 
in return for military service. Rates of pay were low but were comparatively 
better in real terms to Indian troops. In the recruitment of topasses and 
peons for garrison duty, the rate of pay was high enough to attract some 
men to employment but appeared to be lower than that for most artisans. 
For Europeans, recruiters in Britain would target men who perceived their 
wages to be too low and offer cash inducements and bounties. Nevertheless, 
the Company failed to attract enough men to maintain its regiments in 
wartime and was forced to pay for “crimps” to impress manpower. Crimping, 
despite its unpopularity, proved cheaper than trying to compete in the 
labour market against civilian artisan wages. British soldiers argued that 
they were held in a form of bondage because they became indebted to the 
Company for their rations, uniform, and equipment. By contrast, Indian 
men were paid a regular salary that proved attractive compared with the 
standard practices of Indian rulers or corrupt commanders. Indians in 
British service could transfer salaries to families, purchase commissions, 
and obtain pay advances.
Soldiers’ duration of service was closely related to the issue of pay. The 
topasses who garrisoned Bombay in the 1740s had no specif ied age limits 
for service and consequently some were quite elderly. European soldiers 
were all considered to be “long service” but many of them were anxious that 
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diseases might kill them before they reached the end of their service anyway 
(the death rate being 5 per cent across the army). Nevertheless, Indian and 
British personnel shared the desire to take up regular employment and 
therefore accepted long service as a guarantee of work and wages.
British soldiers in Company service were subjected to far more legal 
constraints than the Indian personnel, in terms of employment parameters. 
The Company was unable to compete with the regular British Army for 
its recruits in the United Kingdom for many years, and it turned to the 
practice of crimping as a direct result of its consequent manpower short-
ages. The illegal nature of the practice was ignored by British authorities 
because it tended to sweep up the elements of society that were thought 
“undesirable”. The imprisonment of recruits before transportation to India 
was a measure to offset the lack of legal support for recruitment: recruits 
were not subject to martial law and would therefore have simply deserted 
at the f irst opportunity. However, these conditions suggest that many of 
the British soldiers in the East India Company army could be categorized 
as “conscript-slave”.
The constraints on the employment of Indian troops were cultural rather 
than legal. Caste preferences and ethnic prejudices could limit the type 
of recruit and the tasks they might be expected to perform. The British 
themselves adopted cultural preferences of their own, although pragmatism 
and necessity dictated the numbers and physique of the recruits. For the 
European troops there were added constraints: a desire to avoid the employ-
ment of too many Catholics and Germans, for example, yet an acceptance 
of criminals. These criteria and the type of recruit the Company managed 
to employ exasperated the off icers who sought greater numbers, eff iciency, 
and effectiveness.
In assessing the taxonomy of military labour in the East India Company 
Army, it is necessary to categorize their types and variations. While forms 
of military labour across South Asia as a whole were very mixed, the phe-
nomenological varieties of military employment are, for the purposes of 
comparison, classified here according to two criteria of either un/free labour 
and un/commodif ied labour, and the subcategories of ethnic (reciprocal 
labour); enslaved (tributary); conscripted (tributary); mercenary (com-
modif ied); and professional (commodif ied). In addition, military labour 
in the East India Company Army is assessed against the taxonomies of 
forces that are feudal, aggregate contract, state commission, conscript, or 
modern volunteer armies. This chapter, while to some extent following John 
Lynn’s model of acknowledging change and transformation, also addresses 
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the issue of typology and its dominance, locating the example of the East 
India Company in the history of military labour embraced by this volume.
The earliest experiments in using local labour by the East India Company 
were not a success, and in terms of categorization we might identify the 
f irst “Rajpoot” garrison troops as “mercenary ethnic” although the Chris-
tian converts and mestees were so outcaste in Bombay that they might be 
described as “conscript ethnic”. The British personnel and local militia of 
freeman and landholders recruited by the Company in Bombay in the last 
decade of the seventeenth century appear to f it the category of “mercenary” 
and “mercenary ethnic”. In Madras in the 1740s, the 3,000 peons employed 
also seem to f it the category of “mercenary ethnic”. After the setbacks of 
1746, where Madras fell to the French, the demand for manpower increased 
but there was no change to the type of South Asian military labour: the 
new, expanded force was still “mercenary ethnic” in character. Garrison 
duties and the protection of lines of communication and depots, for which 
these new forces were required, did not necessitate a change in labour type. 
They were raised on the basis of being a cheap and barely trained force, and 
consequently the quality of these forces was low.
However, by 1753, the type of labour was in the process of changing 
to “professional ethnic”. Robert Clive introduced standard organization, 
intensive training, and regular pay. The seasoning experience of being on 
campaign further improved the quality of the troops, and they began to 
develop a new identity of professional indifference to other South Asian 
forces or populations. However, we should guard against exaggerating 
the change. The muster returns on Clive’s forces in 1757 indicate that the 
Company’s army was very mixed: while a signif icant number of men were 
categorized as trained “seapoys”, there were still garrison troops and militia. 
In the 1750s, the Company’s forces remained a mix of “mercenary ethnic” 
and “professional ethnic”.
The further complication with the Indian personnel of the Company army 
is that, throughout the second half of the eighteenth century, recruits were 
sometimes offered by heads of families and these soldiers were expected 
to enlist through tradition. These men might be regarded as “tributary 
enslaved” labour within a system that was ostensibly “mercenary” and 
“commodif ied”. However, it is also clear that, after the success of Arcot in 
1751 and with the attraction of regular pay, some personnel came forward 
as volunteers. Some recruits self-selected on the basis of caste or ethnicity, 
although the Company Army remained inclusive. The self-perception of 
“professional ethnic” developed through the second half of the eighteenth 
century, but, as a trait throughout South Asia, this perspective was not 
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limited to the Company’s forces. To enhance further the sense of profes-
sional status and to ensure there was no fraternization with indigenous 
populations, the Company recruited men from peripheral regions more 
frequently. The selection of former hill-raiders in the Terai region of Bengal 
f it within this design of creating a “professional ethnic” force, but the men 
employed in the Terai case, who were recruited to absorb surplus labour 
that had turned to crime, might be regarded as a category of “ethnic slave”.
The categorization of the Company army is problematized still further 
by the British personnel. Off icers were generally “professional-mercenary” 
in their employment, although some used enlistment merely as the means 
to gain access to civilian commercial opportunities in South Asia, and 
therefore regarded themselves as “free” and “uncommodif ied” labour. 
Soldiers were far more complex. Those pressed into service by aristocratic 
landowners through local businessmen or other intermediaries were es-
sentially induced to enlist against their will, and therefore were “enslaved”. 
Crimping and kidnapping also fall into this taxonomy. Others were lured 
into the army by the chance of better pay or opportunities and might be 
classed as “mercenary”. The fact that up to a third of personnel could be 
recruited from foreign, that is European, and sectarian sources suggests 
that a portion of the army could be classed as “mercenary ethnic”. Service 
for long periods overseas, for those that remained or survived the ravages 
of climate and disease, led to the steady professionalization of the troops. 
Re-enlistment, or the service of these long-term “professionals”, needs to be 
considered as other elements of the Company Army in this period.
What emerges is an army of Asians and Europeans that was in a period 
of transition. Indian personnel shifted from “mercenary ethnic” to “profes-
sional ethnic”, while British troops broadly changed from “enslaved” to 
“professional” in service but remained “enslaved” or “mercenary” as recruit 
types for most of the century. Yet, the Company Army remained a mixed 
force, its types dependent on tasking as either a f ield army or garrison 
troops. The army overall was dependent on sources of labour supply, low 
in Britain but abundant in India, and offered terms of service that were 
considered bad in Britain but attractive in South Asia.
Finally, we must make some assessment of the emergence and domi-
nance of the forms of military labour in the East India Company Army. 
The reasons for the change in the form of military labour in this period can 
be summarized as a shift in the supply and demand in the military labour 
market; ideological factors (on the British side); f inancial and economic 
pressures; and changes in the military-strategic situation in South Asia. 
While it is somewhat artif icial to attempt to attribute to each of these 
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elements a greater or lesser signif icance, since all are interdependent, it 
was the military-strategic situation that set in motion changes in the form 
and structure of the East India Company’s military labour.
The fundamental insecurity of the Company’s position in South Asia, in 
part caused by the decay of the Mogul Empire and in part by the rivalry and 
competition of European and Asian agents, necessitated a more effective 
security force. Attempts to create a compact that prevented the French 
and the British Companies from going to war with each other, even if there 
were “Troubles” in Europe, had failed by 1755. Furthermore, the East India 
Company could not rely entirely on bilateral agreements with local rulers, 
as Siraj ud-Daula demonstrated in 1756. The subsequent security provided by 
the Company’s fortresses and new troops acted as a magnet for the traders 
and peasants around Bombay and Madras, and in some cases these popula-
tions provided services, Company servants, and troops. The Maratha raids 
and the siege of Madras in 1741 nevertheless underscored the vulnerability 
of the British factories and their dependence on maritime support.
It was the French attack on Madras in 1746, launched by 1,100 Europeans 
and 800 French sepoys against a garrison of 200 barely trained militia, that 
spurred the Company to improve its security and release the necessary 
capital. Fort St David was saved only by the intervention of the Royal Navy 
in 1748, and it seemed that the Company was clinging to its possessions by 
its f ingernails. Lawrence’s rapid training of a sepoy force enabled him to 
achieve a small but signif icant victory at Cuddalore. Dupleix, in command 
of Pondicherry, used 3,000 sepoys to defend the town against a British am-
phibious operation led by Admiral Edward Boscawan in 1748, but the British 
already had 3,500 sepoys in their own force to augment their relatively small 
European contingent. By 1752, when Lawrence surrounded the French at 
Sriringham Island, the Company had a large and experienced force of Indian 
troops led by equally seasoned off icers. By the end of the war, there were 
ten Indian battalions in Madras alone, representing a force approaching 
10,000 men. With the infantry came the mobile British artillery that could 
f ire faster and with greater reliability than any Asian equivalent.
To support this apparatus, the Company marshalled its f inances care-
fully, while the fortunes of the French Compagnie des Indes dwindled. 
Nevertheless, the demands of war tended to push the Company off icers 
towards further conquest to meet the costs and realize the wealth in Mysore, 
Arcot, Trichinopoly, and Tanjore. Clive acknowledged that control of these 
territories and their land revenue was “what we are contending for” in the 
conflict, which has subsequently been termed “military-f iscalism”. The war 
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had “militarized” the Company in Madras and set up a model which was 
to be replicated in Bengal.
The fall of Calcutta further necessitated an expansion of the Company’s 
security forces. Watson and Clive launched an aggressive campaign to 
recover the city and then to take the f ight deep into Bengal. Again the 
navy’s support was vital, but the decisive element was Clive’s exploitation 
of the resentment of Siraj ud-Daula by Mir Jafar, his chief of staff, and his 
subsequent defection at Plassey.
Financial considerations had formerly limited the size, form, and quality 
of the Company’s military labour but the necessity for more manpower 
and greater eff iciency on operations in the 1750s came to override the 
desire for economy. In the case of European personnel, the diff iculties of 
raising suff icient numbers of men, made worse by the wastage of disease, 
remained constant throughout the period, but it proved far easier and 
more cost-effective to enlist larger numbers of Asian troops. Wastage rates 
among Asian personnel were also lower. Moreover, the terms and condi-
tions of service were regarded as unsatisfactory by British troops whereas 
indigenous personnel embraced opportunities for regular pay.
The “ideological” element of the British approach to military labour is 
problematic. A comparative study of the situation in Great Britain and 
in India in the eighteenth century reveals the universal assumptions the 
British brought with them about recruitment and the practical demands 
for manpower, diminishing notions of a specif ically “Orientalist” approach 
in the subcontinent. At the same time, the diversity of the regions the 
British encountered, separated as they were by distinct cultures and 
customs, forced the British to adapt their practices. They did so in an 
entirely pragmatic fashion to achieve the primary objective of asserting 
their supremacy and maintaining good order. While the British always 
favoured physically tall and robust recruits from rural areas, they put more 
emphasis on discipline, drill, and endurance. Experienced off icers and 
NCOs were preferred, but this was not limited to Europeans. The Company 
army was not deployed only against the French, although this had been the 
priority in the 1740s and 1750s. The army was required to protect vulnerable 
lines of communication and garrison conquered areas to ensure internal 
security. In Scotland, the senior off icers of the army apparently regarded 
recruitment as a tool to employ and therefore absorb excess manpower 
in marginal areas to prevent civil disorder. The same practice may have 
influenced them in India. However, it is clear that they placed loyalty high 
on their agenda, and believed governments had to make their presence 
felt within their territories to discourage rioting, rebellion, and raiding. 
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In India, they maintained this framework, but increasingly paid attention 
to local systems of patronage and adapted recruitment accordingly. It was 
perhaps signif icant that the commander of the Madras Presidency Army 
was Yusuf Khan, a low-caste Hindu who had converted to Islam, embraced 
the Company, and rose rapidly through the ranks.
Indian recruits enlisted with a set of cultural norms which the Com-
pany embraced and incorporated into their army, even though they often 
misunderstood and misinterpreted the nature of local societies. While 
some attempts were made to “Europeanize” their drill and appearance, the 
Company agreed to recognize the ideas of “warrior castes” and incorporated 
local expectations and rituals, f iltered through the lens of expectations 
formed by British cultural norms. This ability to transcend their own 
ideological parameters and create a new synthesis of identity among their 
military personnel proved to be an enduring strength of the Company 
Army, but its neglect and erosion were a source of anger and frustration 
that contributed to the outbreak of the Mutiny in 1857.
The conclusion that might be drawn on the character of the sepoy army 
in the Carnatic Wars is that it was recruited out of necessity and emer-
gency, and was certainly modelled on the French system, but was really 
a pragmatic response to an enhanced strategic threat, the need to keep 
down costs, and the availability of a pool of manpower. The signif icance 
of the Indian troops can be exaggerated and authors have tended to focus 
on it because of its later proud history, or because it appeared to become 
the instrument of imperial oppression. In fact, it was one tool – alongside 
the Company’s wealth, the initiative of its local leaders, and the presence 
of the Royal Navy – that helped to neutralize its European and Asian rivals. 
The purpose of the army was to fulf il the tasks of the East India Company, 
namely the acquisition of trade and land revenue.

 “The scum of every county, the refuse of 
mankind”
Recruiting the British Army in the eighteenth century
Peter Way
“There are two ways of recruiting the British army”, wrote Campbell Dal-
rymple in his 1761 military manual,
the f irst and most eligible [best] by volunteers, the last and worst by a 
press. By the f irst method, numbers of good men are enrolled, but the 
army is greatly obliged to levity, accident, and the dexterity of recruit-
ing off icers for them; by the second plan, the country gets clear of their 
banditti, and the ranks are f illed up with the scum of every county, the 
refuse of mankind. They are marched loaded with vice, villainy, and 
chains, to their destined corps, where, when they arrive, they corrupt 
all they approach, and are whipt out, or desert in a month.1
In times of war, the f iscal-military state’s appetite for soldiers proved vora-
cious.2 The strength of the British Army in the Seven Years War swelled from 
roughly 31,000 men to 117,000 (on paper or 93,000 in effective strength) from 
1755 to 1762, with the army in America accounting for 30,000 of these troops 
at its peak strength.3 This did not include the numerous provincial troops 
of the colonies, which numbered from nearly 10,000 to in excess of 20,000 
1 Dalrymple, A Military Essay, p. 8. 
2 Military mobilization constituted the greatest enterprise in European societies at this time. 
The armies of the main European military powers, France, Spain, the Habsburg Empire, Prussia, 
and Russia, often reached into the hundreds of thousands in times of war. John Childs estimated 
that in 1756, for example, Austria’s army numbered 201,000, France’s 330,000, Russia’s 330,000, 
Prussia’s 143,000, and Britain’s 91,179. Even relatively small states f ielded sizeable armies, such 
as Hesse-Cassel (16,500), Hanover (29,000), and Württemberg (12,000). In total, fourteen states 
f ielded 1,300,000 men, and this prior to full mobilization for the Seven Years War. See Childs, 
Armies and Warfare in Europe, p. 42.
3 Conway, War, State, and Society, pp. 56-59; Pargellis, “The Four Independent Companies 
of New York”; Selesky, War and Society in Colonial Connecticut, p. 111. See also Lucassen and 
Lucassen, “The Mobility Transition in Europe Revisited”, p. 76.
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men in any given year during the war.4 The combined f igure of 40,000 to 
50,000 should be doubled to arrive at total combatants when considering 
losses due to battlefield casualties, victims of disease or accident, desertion, 
and the end of service terms. These numbers were no small matter for any 
society, especially considering that the overwhelming majority of recruits 
came from Britain.5
The British Army of the eighteenth century had become a modern vol-
unteer force, with a number of qualif ications. Impressment (i.e., conscrip-
tion) was the most signif icant departure, although it only ever generated a 
distinct minority of soldiers. Britain also relied on mercenary forces hired 
from independent German polities, largely to f ight for its interests on the 
continent, but also in the American Revolution across the Atlantic. The 
army arrived at this particular configuration as the result of a number of 
long-term historical processes, the f irst being political in nature. Through-
out the seventeenth century, England engaged in ongoing internal conflict 
and regime change – civil war, regicide, creation of the Commonwealth, 
restoration of the monarchy, and revolution – that occupied it at home. 
But with the defeat of the Stuarts, pacif ication of Ireland, union with 
Scotland, and, ultimately, succession of the Hanoverian regime it secured 
its domestic sphere (excepting several Jacobite uprisings), and expanded 
its human resources that could be turned from the plow to the sword. 
Secondly, the changes in military tactics, technology, and scale associated 
with the military revolution and the rise of the f iscal-military state stoked 
European wars. Late to join in this acceleration of armed conflict, Britain 
in the eighteenth century became a leading player, f ielding ever-larger 
armies and constructing a state capable of combating continental powers.
Most profoundly, the economic and social transformations associated 
with the transition to capitalism positioned Britain at the forefront of 
modernity in terms of waging war. The conversion of agriculture and 
landholding patterns to commercial production, the expansion of handi-
craft industries through the reorganization of production, the tapping of 
global trade through the creation of commercial trading companies and 
expansion of the merchant f leet, and the establishment of colonies rich 
in raw materials substantially enhanced the productivity of Britain’s 
economy, enabling it to fund grossly expensive wars. At the same time, 
4 For the numbers of provincial troops requested and the number to actually take the f ield 
between 1759 and 1762, see The Journal of Jeffery Amherst, pp. 327-331.
5 Conway estimates that 147,000 men from Britain and Ireland served in the regular army 
during the Seven Years’ War: War, State, and Society, p. 65.
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these developments, by pushing many agricultural laborers off the land 
through enclosure and changes to agricultural practices, as well as many 
artisans out of the trades due to the inexorable deskilling of the crafts, 
created a proletariat with nothing but their labor to sell, and in times of 
war the army proved an insatiable consumer of labor. Furthermore, states 
fought wars of an increasingly commercial nature to maximize national 
wealth through the defense of home industries, the protection of trade, and 
the acquisition of colonies, their resources, and peoples. Warfare intimately 
intertwined with developing capitalism, and military recruitment played 
a key role in the freeing of labor power to work in the interests of capital. 
Mobilization functioned as a component of the process of the “primitive 
accumulation” of capital (to use Marx’s term), which acted to “free” laborers 
from traditional economic relationships, alienate them from control of the 
means of production, and harness their labor to commercial activity that 
benefited others.
The soldiers’ story forms part of a broader proletarian tale, but it is also 
specif ic to military workers. And, in the case of the British Army, even that 
is not a single tale but one with many plots as Britain pulled together diverse 
peoples from its dominions through force, inducements, or lack of other 
options. Soldiers came from specif ic historical backgrounds character-
ized by particular economic and social relationships, which recruitment 
necessarily disrupted, not only for the individual recruit but also for the 
community from which the army extracted him. By the time of the Seven 
Years War, market forces obtained in England and Wales, Scotland, and 
Ireland, albeit in varying configurations, making their populations recep-
tive to recruitment and giving the British Army its modern complexion. In 
the American colonies, however, the economy had not developed to this 
extent and labor scarcity prevailed, meaning fewer men proved receptive 
to long-term service in the regular army and recruitment met with outright 
resistance, in a foreshadowing of the Revolution, although many joined the 
colonial forces on yearly enlistments as a means of accumulating capital for 
their own economic advancement. More than a simple contract between 
an individual and institution, states, societies, cultures, and communities 
negotiated military labor. The fiscal-military state thus played an important 
role in the economic transformation of England and its satellites through 
its harnessing of human labor to national warmaking in the interest of 
commercial economic activity.
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Mobilization
Military mobilization in the early modern era occurred in three ways. 
States commissioned noblemen to raise a stipulated number of troops or 
contracted fighting units from foreign military enterprisers, but neither pro-
vided it with direct control of the f ighting force. Finally, the state compelled 
men to f ight through pressing those without apparent employment, crimi-
nals, and convicts, or by imposing a levy on districts or cities to f ield a set 
number of men, a procedure that met with resistance due to its involuntary 
nature. By the end of the seventeenth century, however, the modern form 
of mobilization had emerged, in which the nation-state directly raised and 
administered a standing army. In central and eastern Europe, particularly 
in Prussia, centralized systems of conscription developed which essentially 
coerced military labor in wartime, whereas the Habsburg territories, France, 
and Spain relied more extensively on volunteers to stock their armies.6
The British came to depend upon volunteers due in part, paradoxically, 
to its unpopularity. The army’s role in the Civil War and English Revolution 
engendered a fear that the military posed a potential threat to the civil 
power and rights of Englishmen that had to be kept in check. The often-
unscrupulous operations of regular recruiting parties, and the periodic 
adoption of press acts during wartime alienated many. To help ease these 
fears the standing army relied upon annual parliamentary enabling legisla-
tion by a Mutiny Act, while the civil power regulated recruitment, and 
adopted conscription only in times of need.7
Recruits usually received a cash bounty from which to purchase a shirt 
and shoes. Recruits were acquainted with the articles of war and, according 
to the Mutiny Act, had to be brought before a justice of the peace or consta-
ble more than twenty-four hours after but within four days of enlistment to 
attest to their willingness to join the army. If a recruit denied his willingness 
to serve he had to repay the money he had received upon enlisting as well 
as a penalty of 20 shillings for costs incurred by the recruiting party. Once 
the party had gathered a body of recruits, they took them to a recruiting 
depot or back to the regiment. Competition among regiments for troops and 
the uncoordinated nature of regiment-based recruiting made recruiting 
6 Redlich, The German Military Enterpriser and His Work Force; Parker, The Army of Flanders 
and the Spanish Road, pp. 29-39; Childs, Armies and Warfare in Europe, pp. 49-54; Anderson, 
War and Society in the Old Regime, pp. 16-32; Wilson, German Armies, p. 277; Black, European 
Warfare 1660-1815, pp. 218-224.
7 Childs, “The Restoration of the Army 1660-1702”, p. 53; Steppler, “The Common Soldier in 
the Reign of George III”, pp. 1-3.
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in England diff icult. Death, desertion, drafting into other regiments, and 
discharges meant the necessity of constant recruitment. J.A. Houlding 
calculated that the regiments stationed in the British Isles had to recruit 
1.5 per cent of their strength on a monthly basis during peacetime, and 
2.1 per cent in wartime. Thus, regiments often found it hard to get enough 
men to maintain their strength. Some recruited year-round, establishing 
depots and having recruiters on permanent duty. Others turned to “crimps”, 
private individuals paid by regiments to perform recruiting in the stead of 
a formal military recruiting party. Recruiters and, especially, crimps who 
had a vested economic interest in producing recruits, did not scruple at 
kidnapping men and spiriting them away to military service.8
The British state also coerced men into the army, adopting impressment 
during every major war of the eighteenth century, although it functioned in 
a more limited fashion than did the naval press gang. Civil magistrates and 
constables oversaw impressment, which targeted (in the words of the f irst 
Press Act of 1756) “able bodied Men as do not follow or exercise any lawful 
Calling or Employment, or have not some lawful and suff icient Support”. 
Such men would be brought before the commissioners to determine if they 
were suitable for impressment, the officials receiving payment for each man 
pressed. Owning property or possessing the right to vote protected one 
from the press, as did providing a substitute. Having a large family, being 
too old or inf irm, bearing a good character, or having friends in high places 
could extricate a man from service; a bad reputation or lack of employment 
doomed him to the army.9
The Newcastle ministry by the end of 1755 had decided to raise ten new 
regiments as the Seven Years War loomed, and the need for these addi-
tional forces became more urgent in 1756 when fears of a French invasion 
heightened. With the numbers of volunteers seemingly dwindling, Parlia-
ment passed a Press Act in March 1756, but the Privy Council suspended it 
within a month as the invasion threat had incited enough men to volunteer. 
8 Steppler, “The Common Soldier in the Reign of George III”, pp. 8-18; Frey, The British Soldier 
in America, pp. 3-4; Childs, The British Army of William III, pp. 108-114; Middleton, “The Recruit-
ment of the British Army”, p. 228; Brewer, Sinews of Power, pp. 49-50; Houlding, Fit for Service, 
pp. 125-126. 
9 Press Act cited in Middleton, “The Recruitment of the British Army”, p. 229; Brewer, The 
Sinews of Power, pp. 49-50; Henry Moore, “A return of men inlisted at Guil[d]ford in the County 
of Surr[e]y by the Commissioners and Justices”, 10 April 1756, no. 1035, box 23 Loudoun Papers, 
North American, Manuscript Department, Henry E. Huntington Library, San Marino, California 
[henceforth, in form LO1035/23]; Gilbert, “Charles Jenkinson and the Last Army Press”, p. 7, 
“Army Impressment during the War of the Spanish Succession”. 
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However, by August upon further expansion of the army, it soon became 
clear the number of volunteers had dwindled, and the government adopted a 
new Press Act. This act proved less successful, and in 1757 political pressure 
made Pitt abandoned it.10 Yet London, for example, yielded 500 pressed men 
in 1756 for service in the 35th Regiment alone. Coerced soldiers tended, 
not surprisingly, to be less enthusiastic about military life, often deserting 
from the transports before sailing and upon arrival in America. Loudoun 
reported of the 35th’s “raw” troops, “the prest Men, I dare not yet trust 
so near the enemy”, as he had six desert to the French together, two of 
whom were discovered starving in the woods and promptly hanged.11 The 
army also took up reluctant troops in other manners. People convicted of a 
crime received pardons contingent on enlisting in the army. Thus, William 
Desborough, found guilty of stealing sheep in November 1760 and sentenced 
to death at Huntingdon, earned a pardon by enlisting in a regiment of foot. 
Similarly John Baker, Jeremiah Smith, Charles Dailey, and Thomas Elliott, 
sentenced to death for highway robbery at Maidstone that same month, 
received pardons predicated upon joining the 49th Regiment in Jamaica, 
which often equated to a delayed form of capital punishment due to the 
high mortality rate resulting from tropical diseases in the West Indies.12
The Duke of Wellington, military hero of the Napoleonic wars, famously 
referred to his troops as “the scum of the earth”.13 Such a negative perspec-
tive not only mirrored the point of view of British soldiers; it also persists 
today among some historians of the army.14 Such classist language not only 
insults its subject; it also prevents any serious engagement with the social 
background of soldiers or the historical processes by which they came to 
serve in the army. Lumping them together as the residue at the bottom of 
society excuses military historians from conceptualizing these men as 
either historical agents or victims of power structures; they become merely 
10 Middleton, “The Recruitment of the British Army”, pp. 228-230; Gilbert, “Charles Jenkinson 
and the Last Army Press”, p. 7; Gilbert, “An Analysis of Some Eighteenth Century Army Recruiting 
Records”, p. 39.
11 Maj. Henry Fletcher, “A Return of a Detachment; Impressed Men; and Recruits of His 
Majesties [sic] Thirty Fifth regiment of Foot”, 4 Sep. 1756, LO2774/44; Loudoun to Daniel Webb, 
27 March 1756, London, LO974/21; [Loudoun] to Colonel Burton, 17 Sep. 1756, LO1828/41; [Loud-
oun] To the Duke of Cumberland, 3 Oct. 1756, LO1968/44.
12 Calendar of Home Office Papers of the Reign of George III, p. 13. 
13 Henry, Notes of Conversations with the Duke of Wellington, p. 14. 
14 For example, Chandler and Beckett, the editors of The Oxford History of the British Army, 
purport: “Soldiers were inevitably recruited from the dregs of society […] The unattractive 
features of service life which persisted until the very end of the nineteenth century were not 
conducive to recruiting the more respectable elements of society” (p. xvi).
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soldiers, units of a more important whole, subsumed within histories of the 
army that assume nationalist discourses. Dalrymple, at least, captured the 
distinction between “good men” who volunteered and the pressed “scum of 
every county”, though the class bias of an army off icer still came through. 
Closer attention to the backgrounds of recruits, however, reveals a martial 
workforce that neatly mirrored the laboring classes of the era, making 
soldiers more the salt of the earth than its scum.
The common conception of soldiers presumed they hailed from the 
rootless mass that willingly lived idle and unproductive lives, exactly the 
people for whom the state drafted vagrancy and poor laws as well as press 
acts. Stripped of the moral content such a perspective contains an element 
of truth. The proletariat thrust up by primitive accumulation, the people 
who lived by the sweat of their labor and had a tenuous grasp on subsistence, 
undoubtedly counted military service as one certain form of employment. 
But they alone could never satisfy the army’s demand for manpower during 
wartime, especially on the scale of the Seven Years War, when recruitment 
cut deeply into the British populace. At the same time, economic change 
cut adrift craftsmen as well as common laborers. Periodic downturns and 
the high unemployment and prices that came with them had an impact 
throughout the laboring classes, while changes in the nature of craft 
production undermined some artisans’ ability to achieve subsistence and 
rendered others surplus to their masters’ need. Elsewhere I have utilized 
data garnered from the Out-Pension Books of the Royal Chelsea Hospital 
to explore the economic background of Britain’s soldiers in the Seven Years 
War, a study that revealed an unexpectedly skilled background: those with 
trades accounted for almost half the men, while manual laborers made for in 
excess of 40 per cent. Within the crafts three trades predominated – textile 
workers, shoemakers, and tailors – crafts among the f irst to experience the 
reorganization of production attendant upon primitive accumulation.15
The British Army, as well as drawing soldiers from the wider laboring 
classes, also cast the net widely in recruiting to f ill the ranks. While in 
reality an expression of English might, the army in its social composition 
more exactly reflected the imperial reach of that might. Fighting on the 
scale that William Pitt aspired to in the Seven Years War required an army 
beyond the means of England alone, even beyond those of Great Britain. 
England looked elsewhere in its dominions to man its army, to domains 
already compromised by English imperialism, Scotland and Ireland, and 
15 Royal Hospital, Chelsea: Disability and Royal Artillery Out-Pensions, Admission Books, Series 
116, War Off ice Papers, PRO, UK; Way, “Rebellion of the Regulars”; Marx, Capital, pp. 784-848.
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beyond. One could argue that the British Army was the most British of 
institutions by the mid-eighteenth century. Regimental returns for the 
army in America in 1757 reveal an ethnically heterogeneous rank and f ile. 
The English-born accounted for 29.7 per cent of the whole, Scots 27.3 per 
cent, Irish 27.3 per cent, and continental Europeans 4.3 per cent. Colonials 
made up 5.3 per cent of the army, while foreign-born residents of America 
equaled 5.7 per cent (see Table 10.1 and Chart 10.1).















no. % no. % no. % no. % no. % no. %  
4212 29.8 3873 27.4 3874 27.4 755 5.3 607 4.3 803 5.7 14124
Sources: Lo4011/no. 1/90; Lo6695/99; Lo2533/no. 4/90; Lo2529/no. 1/90; Lo4012/no. 1/90; Lo1944 
no. 5/90; Lo 6616/88; Lo1683/no. 1/90; Lo5661/85; Lo1391/no. 1/90; Lo1384/no. 2/90; Lo3936/
no. 1/90; Lo6639/89; Lo1345/no. 5/90; Lo6616/88; Lo4068/no. 2/90; return of Four independent 
companies, 15 July 1757, Lo6616/88. the returns represented 14,124 common soldiers and 
noncommissioned officers of the army in america’s total strength of approximately 20,000 men. 
see brumwell, Redcoats, p. 20.
Chart 10.1
Given the relative populations of these elements of Greater Britain, it is 
clear that Scotland and Ireland disproportionately manned the army. 
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Working from population estimates for the respective nations (see Table 
10.2), each soldier born in England or Wales (Welsh soldiers are typically 
subsumed with the English in army returns) who served in the regular 
army in America in 1757 represented 1,599 inhabitants of their homeland. 
By comparison every Irish soldier served for 824 fellow Irish people, whereas 
a Scottish soldier left only 327 Scots proportionately at home. Thus, an 
Irishman was roughly twice as likely and a Scottish male f ive times as 
likely to serve in the American army than an Englishman or Welshman. 
Furthermore, the data estimated total population, male and female, so to 
arrive at a true approximate service ratio we need to halve those f igures, 
meaning that English and Welsh men had a likelihood of 1 in 800 of serving 
in the American army, Irish 1 in 422, and Scots 1 in 164. Moreover, the ratio 
for Scots overstates the case, as the majority of recruits were drawn from 
the Highlands, which was less populous than the Lowlands. Finally, these 
calculations do not take into account those soldiers serving within Great 
Britain, on the European continent, in the West Indies, or elsewhere in the 
British Empire. Clearly the male populations of Ireland and Scotland had 
been harnessed to the British war machine, disproportionate contributions 
that resulted from specif ic historical developments. Mobilization thus took 
place in distinct settings, operating differently in and having a differential 
impact on each locale. A review of the main theatres of mobilization makes 
this clear, but also reveals a central thread in the process: the interconnect-
edness of the raising of armies and economic transformations associated 
with the emergence of capitalism taking place within these societies.








Wales 6,736,000 1760/1 4,212 1:1,599
Scotland 1,265,000 1755 3,873 1:327
Ireland 3,191,000 1754 3,874 1:824
*Source: Mitchell, British Historical Statistics, p. 8.
The fact that soldiers came from all ranks of laboring classes and across the 
empire means that any engagement with the military as a socioeconomic 
institution must make allowance for the contingencies of different histori-
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cal class experiences. At the same time, the commercialization of human 
relationships strikes a recurring theme in these different histories. Such 
change weakened or severed peoples’ grasp on subsistence attained by 
working the land or plying a trade, as a result preparing them for wage labor 
including that in the army.
England, military metropole
Linda Colley maintained that the series of wars between Britain and France 
from 1689 to 1815 constructed Britishness, a sense of difference from those 
people outside Great Britain, largely founded upon Protestantism and forged 
in warfare, which connected its different parts together.16 Colley’s model has 
been criticized for its exaggeration of the integrating powers of Protestant-
ism, her timing of the real unif ication of national interests within Great 
Britain, and, most tellingly, its Anglocentrism. In many ways, Britain should 
be understood as England writ large. England constituted the heart of the 
British dominions. England’s Parliament controlled Wales and Scotland 
from 1707, and retained f inal authority over the Irish Parliament. The f iscal-
military state operated essentially in the interest of England in harvesting 
taxes and duties from across its possessions, and developing military policy 
with the defense of England as its main priority. English diplomats crafted 
foreign policy to ensure the established Protestant religion, promoted 
trade that primarily benefited England, and protected the interests of the 
Hanoverian regime. And, when diplomacy failed, England’s politicians set 
the country on a war footing, dragging Wales, Scotland, Ireland, and its 
other dependencies along too. Fighting wars, however, constituted one area 
where the English willingly shared the effort and the results.
The opening of hostilities with the French in the Seven Years War and 
the rapid escalation in the scale of mobilization sent recruiting parties out 
across England in a quest to satisfy the need for military manpower. The 
press played a role but voluntarism proved essential to the war effort. Why 
men willingly enlist to f ight in wars is a question that has long intrigued 
military historians. Patriotism immediately suggests itself, and one should 
not underestimate its power in an era that witnessed the emergence of 
strong nationalist and imperialist currents in British culture.17 Just as often, 
historians note that recruits joined up for adventure, or in f light from 
16 Colley, Britons, pp. 3-6, 9, 11-19, 38-46, 55-57.
17 Wilson, “Empire of Virtue”.
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boring laboring life, overbearing parents, a demanding master, a clinging 
love interest, or the law. The fact that most recruits were youths in their 
late teens to early twenties supports the wanderlust explanation. As well, 
economic necessity prompted enlistment, according to historians of early 
modern armies. At times of poor harvests and high prices, unemployed or 
underemployed individuals without the means to support themselves opted 
for the wage, food, and clothing of the soldier.18
But one must be wary of perceiving a whiplash effect between immediate 
short-term economic depression and military enlistment. Recruitment 
cannot be measured by a price index. Long-term economic forces played 
the primary role, restructuring economies in ways that increased produc-
tivity and created a labor surplus that both helped to pay for wars and 
produced the manpower necessary to do the f ighting. And the English 
agrarian economy proved so productive that it required fewer people to 
work the land, thus freeing others to work in industry, or indeed the army.19 
As the leading commercial nation of Europe, England led the way in the 
capitalist reconfiguration of society. Agricultural improvement, including 
the enclosure and conversion of common lands to market production, the re-
organization of production within certain trades, and the resultant creation 
of a landless, tradeless proletariat provided the army with a ready supply 
of recruits, willing or not. Moreover, England suffered economic depres-
sion and incidents of famine beginning in 1756, leading to unemployment, 
strikes, bread riots, and general discontent at exactly the time recruitment 
ramped up for the Seven Years War.20 James Wolfe, sent with troops to 
quell disturbances among Gloucester weavers late in 1756, expressed some 
sympathy with their situation in letters to his mother. “The obstinacy of the 
poor, half-starved weavers of broad-cloth that inhabit this extraordinary 
country is surprising. They beg about the country for food, because, they say, 
the masters have beat down their wages too low to live upon, and I believe 
it is a just complaint.” At the same time, he recognized their desperation 
could prove a bonus for the army. “I hope it will turn out a good recruiting 
party, for the people are so oppressed, so poor and so wretched, that they 
18 Anderson, War and Society in the Old Regime, pp. 46, 121-123; Steppler, “The Common Soldier 
in the Reign of George III”, pp. 32-35; Guy, “The Army of the Georges”, p. 95.
19 Wrigley, “Society and the Economy in the Eighteenth Century”, pp. 72-73, 76-81, 89-91.
20 Rule, The Vital Century, pp. 102-104, 110, 147-148, The Labouring Classes in Early Industrial 
England, pp. 256-259; Malcolmson, Life and Labour in England, pp. 113, 125; Hayter, The Army 
and the Crowd, pp. 84-87; Brewer, The Sinews of Power, pp. 52-53.
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will perhaps hazard a knock on the pate for bread and clothes, and turn 
soldiers through sheer necessity.” 21
Stay and starve in England only to get a knock on the head for protesting 
your condition, or join the army; many faced this conundrum in the Seven 
Years War. Merchant capital required armed forces to secure and defend 
its interests, and the changes initiated by capital accumulation – both in 
the long-term structural changes that freed labor power and in the short-
term economic crises that undercut subsistence – generated capital’s own 
martial labor force. The fact that Britain rose to the status of most advanced 
economic power and the dominant military power in the mid-eighteenth 
century derived from no mere coincidence. This story, so familiar from read-
ing Marx and the great British Marxist historians,22 proves more complex, 
for remember that only three in ten soldiers in the British Army in America 
came from England. Viewing the British army as simply the product of 
internal English economic developments obscures the heterogeneity of the 
very institution, and the multiple sources of manpower it tapped to wage 
war, each a product of particular historical forces.
Scotland, the military plantation
“I am for always having in our army as many Scottish soldiers as possible”, 
William Wildman, Lord Barrington, the member of Parliament for the 
border town Berwick-upon-Tweed, avowed to the House of Commons in 1751, 
“not that I think them more brave than those of any other country we can 
recruit from, but because they are generally more hardy and less mutinous; 
and of all Scottish soldiers I should choose to have and keep in our army 
as many Highlanders as possible.” Whereas Colley reads this comment as 
a measure of Scotland’s successful integration into Great Britain, Andrew 
Mackillop believes Barrington’s views reflected Britain’s “cannon-fodder 
policy”, whereby in the aftermath of the failed Jacobite uprising of 1745-1746, 
Britain harnessed Gaelic militarism to its overseas imperial interests, but 
not until the Seven Years War did Britain’s policy of stripping the Highlands 
to wage its wars become fully realized.23
21 Wolfe to his mother, n.d. Nov. 1756, Wolfe to his mother, 24 Oct. 1756, in Willson, The Life 
and Letters of James Wolfe, pp. 304-306.
22 Here, I will only mention E. P. Thompson and the “bible” of labor history, The Making of the 
English Working Class.
23 Barrington cited in Colley, Britons, p. 125; Mackillop, “More Fruitful than the Soil”, p. 58.
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The fact that English military policy had a direct impact on the govern-
ance of Scotland in general and the Highlands in particular derived from 
the Act of Union and the abolition of the Scottish Parliament. The British 
Army played a central role in the Highlands, forming six independent 
Highland companies in 1725 to police the region and build roads to make 
the “savage” Highlands more accessible to British rule and commerce. In 
1739, it formed four further companies, and the ten companies combined to 
form the Black Watch, the f irst regiment of Highland troops incorporated 
within the regular army. In 1745, John Campbell, 4th Earl of Loudoun 
(commander-in-chief in America, 1756-1758), formed a second regiment.24 
In the short term, British Army recruitment in the Highlands remained 
inseparable from the repression of the Jacobite threat, f inally laid to rest on 
Culloden f ield in 1746. The army then raided the territories of rebels, taking 
prisoners, disarming suspected rebels, laying waste crops, and confiscating 
livestock. Trials were held and more than 100 captives executed for treason, 
and many more were transported to the colonies as indentured servants or 
to serve as troops in regiments stationed abroad. The British government 
adopted a number of legislative measures intended to subordinate the 
Highlands, confiscating rebel lands, disarming the populace, banning the 
wearing of tartans, regulating the practice of religion, and reforming the 
legal system. The army played a central role in reclamation of the Highlands, 
becoming the British state’s most powerful expression in this region tainted 
by rebellion.25 The threat of Jacobitism had directed government policy 
into a military sphere, and ensured the persistence of a cultural form, clan-
ship, that it was meant to eradicate. In the process, England ghettoized the 
Highlands as “an imperial-military reservoir”.26
Britain then set about reorganizing the region’s economy on the pattern 
of commercial agricultural production developing in England, establishing 
the Board of Annexed Estates to manage the thirteen estates annexed to 
the crown (other confiscated properties were auctioned off to pay debts). It 
also shouldered the task of “improving” the Highland agricultural economy 
by converting clan patterns of land management to a more commercial 
24 Plank, Rebellion and Savagery, pp. 18-21; Mackillop, “More Fruitful than the Soil”, pp. 13-20, 
22, 29.
25 Youngson, After the Forty-Five, pp. 25-26; Houlding, Fit for Service, p. 13; Plank, Rebellion and 
Savagery, pp. 1-3, 6.
26 Mackillop, “More Fruitful than the Soil”, pp. 39-40. Scots also had a history of service in 
continental armies, particularly that of France. See McCorry, “Rats, Lice and Scotchmen”.
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basis.27 It soon developed a program that set about shortening leases, pro-
moting single-tenant farms of suff icient size to produce market surpluses, 
establishing security of tenure, removing surplus farm labor, restricting 
subtenure and evicting unwanted tenantry, better managing husbandry, 
and developing new villages. These acts led to large-scale eviction in 
some areas and sparked fears of depopulation. In 1760, the commissioners 
proposed “the propagation of a hardy and industrious race, f it for serving 
the public in war”.28 This position merely recognized an ongoing process 
by which military service absorbed much of the surplus labor generated by 
changes to the Highland economy.
With the outbreak of hostilities with France, concern over the use of 
Highland troops dissipated, and William Pitt, who took power in November 
1756, decided to raise two new battalions of Highland troops from clans 
that had followed the Stuarts. Fortuitously, just as economic depression 
in England had facilitated mobilization, so did famine in Scotland in 1757. 
Another Highland battalion formed in 1758, two more in 1759, and by 
war’s end ten new battalions of Highlanders had been raised, making the 
Highlands much more militarized than the Lowlands.29 The Press Act also 
dragooned Highlanders into the army. In April 1756, with the act about to 
go into effect, the commissioners of supply and justices of the peace in the 
County of Inverness decided to canvas the gentlemen of the various districts 
to identify men to draw up a list of “f itt and proper” men to press into the 
North American service. A return of troops in the 42nd Regiment present 
at Schenectady, New York, the next year indicates that Highland justices 
had in some instances to resort to the last method, as thirty-f ive men were 
recorded as serving the six-year term of pressed men.30
To understand Scottish recruiting, however, it must be situated in its 
socioeconomic environment. The country’s population was essentially 
stagnant, growing at just 0.6 per cent in 1750-1800 (half of England’s rate), 
meaning that recruitment constituted a net loss demographically.31 At the 
27 See Plank, Rebellion and Savagery, p. 12; Youngson, After the Forty-Five, pp. 26-27; Macinnes, 
“Scottish Gaeldom”, p. 71.
28 Mackillop, “More Fruitful than the Soil”, pp. 77-83; quotation from Hints Towards a Plan for 
Managing the Forfeited Estates, cited on pp. 89-90.
29 Middleton, “The Recruitment of the British Army”, pp. 226-231, 234, 237; Mackillop, “More 
Fruitful than the Soil”, pp. 46-50, 229; Middleton, “A Reinforcement for North America”.
30 Commissioners of Supply and Justices of the Peace, Extract minutes, 5, 6  April 1756, 
LO1017/22; Francis Grant, List of the men of the 42nd Regiment who have Inlisted for a Term of 
Years according to the Press Act, 16 April 1757, LO4214/74. 
31 Houston, “The Demographic Regime”, pp. 12-13, 20-21.
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time of recruitment for the Seven Years War, Scotland as a whole possessed 
a three-tiered rural social structure of landlords, tenants, and landless 
laborers. Land constituted the key to subsistence in what was still es-
sentially a peasant society with greater similarities to mainland Europe 
than to England.32 In the rural Lowlands, the social structure rested on 
ferm-touns, which ranged from small units of twenty families or fewer to 
some the size of villages. Usually tenants rented the lands in the touns by 
leasehold from an absent landlord, with a smattering of owner-occupiers 
evident in some areas. A toun could be held by one tenant or by several with 
holdings of varying sizes, larger in the south-east, whereas in the north-east 
smallholdings proved more common. Cottars (families that held small plots 
of land by subtenure) mostly worked the land, owing duties to the tenant or 
landowner. Servants engaged for six months to a year in full-time service, 
who often came from cottar families and could eventually set themselves 
up as such, also performed agricultural labor. Changes in the eighteenth 
century favored tenants and owner-occupiers, with their hold on the land 
being restrained only by terms of lease, and ordinary people’s access to the 
land became limited. The number of touns held by a single tenant grew in 
number. They consolidated their holdings and enclosed lands to convert 
to pasture for their sole use. This erosion of common rights deprived cot-
tars and subtenants of land, converting them to employees of landlords or 
tenants. Still smallholdings persisted everywhere, and in some areas so did 
the old heterogeneous holding, common rights pattern. In the northeast 
counties of Banff, Kincardine, and Aberdeen, the rise of crofting meant that 
people farmed small strips of land but also worked part-time for farmers 
through economic need. Crofters came to replace cottars.33
The dwindling availability of land meant people often combined farming of 
smallholdings with wages earned from labor on farms, as craftsmen, or in the 
building trade. Rural underemployment became common especially outside 
the peak farm work seasons, and this pushed people into paid employment, 
bringing them into competition with tradespeople, especially in cloth manu-
facture. Weavers often experienced slack periods and had to find employment 
elsewhere. Outside towns little full-time manufacturing work existed, except 
in the mining and salt industries. The linen industry, which doubled produc-
tion about every twenty to twenty-five years between 1730 and 1800, depended 
on finding cheap, exploitable labor, and developed a putting-out model of 
production whereby the raw materials were sent out to rural workers for 
32 Devine, “Introduction”, p. 2.
33 Gray, “The Social Impact of Agrarian Change in the Rural Lowlands”, pp. 53-61.
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spinning. In the 1730s-1740s, spinning increasingly encroached on the north 
and the Highlands. The craft career path broke down and journeymen became 
lifelong wageworkers. Journeymen’s societies emerge by the early eighteenth 
century and, later, permanent organizations arose among such trades as tailors 
and shoemakers. Rising prices caused the most disputes, leading to calls for 
higher wages, but typically the state backed the capitalist.34
In the Highlands the bàle or clachan, the traditional township and basis 
of settlement and management, functioned essentially as a communalis-
tic, multi-tenanted farm managed by tacksmen, who leased lands from 
clan leaders and sub-leased portions to clan members. From the 1730s, 
landowners, who viewed traditional clan practices as an impediment to 
improvement, began eliminating the bàle along with tacksmen in the move 
to single-tenant farms and crofting communities of individual smallhold-
ings and common pasture. The defeat at Culloden freed clan leaders to 
pursue progress and break down the communalistic ethos of the clans, 
in the process subordinating Scottish Gaeldom to the market and British 
imperialism.35 Military recruitment played an important role in the process. 
For the Highland elite, recruiting regiments constituted the main means 
of “colonizing” the resources of the British f iscal-military state. Recruiting 
targeted those on the margins of the Highland economy, not established 
tenants or proven rent-payers. Faced with rising recruitment bounties, 
landlords sought to transfer the costs of recruiting to their main tenants by 
asking them to f ill quotas or pay for substitutes. These men resisted because 
recruitment drained the very manpower they required to commercialize 
their holdings, drove up wages, and made them maintain subtenants and 
cottars on the land to satisfy landlord levies rather than to evict them 
and improve the land.36 Also, the need for recruits meant that those at 
the bottom of Highland society wielded some control over the terms of 
enlistment. Landlords faced with scarcity felt compelled to offer favorable 
terms to recruits. Enlistment bounties exceeded the amount allowed by 
the government in the late 1750s. Those without suff icient liquid capital 
had to grant land in place of monetary bounties, either securing existing 
landholdings or promising grants of new land upon returning home from 
service. In return for providing military recruits, subtenants demanded to 
34 Whatley, “The Experience of Work”, pp. 228-230, 233-234; Fraser, “Patterns of Protest”, p. 278.
35 Dodgshon, “West Highland and Hebridean Settlement Prior to Crofting and the Clearances”; 
Macinnes, “Scottish Gaeldom”, pp. 70-72, 75-76.
36 Mackillop, “More Fruitful than the Soil”, pp. 84-88, 101, 103, 107-109, 132-133, 139-140, 144, 
155-156, 169-173.
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hold land directly from the landlord, and thus circumvented tacksmen. Thus 
recruitment, in part a matter of landlord coercion, also proved a means of 
social advancement for the subtenantry.37 Recruiting raised the expecta-
tions of landless and subtenant groups, and these were met by subdivision 
of the land. Mackillop concludes that “one of recruitment’s most important 
social effects lay in the fact that it undermined the hierarchical structure 
of Highland farms and expedited the emergence of crofting”.38 Good in 
the short term in that it expanded access to land by the lowest ranks of 
highland society, in the long term, however, it led directly to the Highland 
Clearances in the postwar era.
The Jacobite revolt of 1745-1746 provided the British f iscal-military state 
the wedge with which to pry open the Highlands for economic improvement. 
Military recruitment played a key role in that improvement, skimming off 
former rebels and the common people uprooted by the commercialization 
of the Highland economy. While lairds and recruits alike exploited the 
capital generated by the military leviathan, in the end the army’s needs 
transformed the region and the clearances followed in its train. At the same 
time, Scots came to play a central role in the British Army and Highlanders 
crafted a unique military persona, with the tartan becoming as much a 
symbol of British militarism as the red coat.39
Ireland, island garrison
Ireland’s relation to the fiscal-military state differed from that of Scotland in 
that it did not serve primarily as a military plantation that produced troops 
for Britain’s overseas military enterprise. The army off icially did not recruit 
Irish Catholics and only enlisted Irish Protestants during wartime, although 
signif icant numbers of Irish did enter the army. The island functioned f irst 
and foremost as a military depot and source of funds to support British 
militarism. By stationing 12,000 soldiers there in times of peace, amounting 
to more than one-third of the peacetime army, England could maintain 
a large force without immediately threatening the homeland but easily 
within reach in times of need.40 Moreover, by placing these regiments on 
37 Ibid., pp. 84-88, 107-108, 157-160.
38 Ibid., pp. 129, 162-163, 166.
39 Allan Macinnes estimates the army recruited 48,000 men from the Highlands from the 
beginning of the Seven Years’ War to the end of the Napoleonic Wars: “Scottish Gaeldom”, p. 83.
40 Houlding, Fit for Service, p. 45.
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the Irish establishment paid for by taxation set by Ireland’s Parliament, 
Britain colonized its resources and expropriated its wealth. Finally, given 
the troubled history between the English and Irish, garrisoning 12,000 
troops on the island made them a de facto occupying force, suppressing Irish 
Catholics, and elevating Irish Protestants, but keeping both subordinate to 
Britain. Ireland’s unique role resulted from its particular history of coloniza-
tion by, rebellion against, and religious strife with England.
England viewed Ireland, unlike Scotland or Wales, as a colony. More so than 
other British colonies, however, its history involved successive invasions and 
military conquest. First came the wave of Anglo-Norman invaders, followed 
by “New English” colonizers of Ireland in the period 1560-1660. The rebellion 
of 1641 led to the Cromwellian reconquest and the imposition of a Protestant 
ascendancy. The English Revolution and the defeat of James II and VII by 
William of Orange’s Protestant armies handed control of provincial power 
and land to the Anglo-Irish ratif ied in the Treaty of Limerick of 1692, and 
there soon followed a series of penal laws restricting the political, economic, 
and social rights of Catholics.41 Unlike Scotland, however, Ireland retained 
its parliament, although first Catholics and then Presbyterians would lose 
the franchise, making it an expression of Anglo-Irish will. This became the 
body nominally overseeing the Irish establishment of the British Army.
The English Disbanding Act of 1699 set the Irish establishment at 12,000, 
where it remained until 1769 (although at given times a number of regiments 
could be on duty elsewhere in the empire). During peacetime, desertion, 
death, and the old and inf irm serving in the ranks vitiated its nominal 
strength, reducing the number of effective soldiers by as much as a quarter. 
Conversely, during wartime, the establishment expanded, for example, 
reaching 17,000 for a period in 1756-1757 and 24,000 from 1761 to the peace 
in 1763.42 As it had before the Treaty of Limerick, the Irish Parliament 
dominated by the Anglo-Irish paid for the army from its revenues, yet had 
no control over the number of troops or the expense, as a royal proclamation 
applied the act to Ireland. Here nakedly appears Ireland’s colonial status 
in military matters. The Lord Lieutenant, the king’s civil representative in 
Ireland, also acted as a military governor, but exerted limited control over 
this force. The regiments remained subject to the British Mutiny Act, and 
their primary functions entailed the defense of England and the provision 
41 James, Ireland in the Empire 1688-1770, pp. 22-25, 52, 234-236, 289-291; Linebaugh and Rediker, 
The Many-Headed Hydra, p. 57; Canny, “Identity Formation in Ireland”, pp. 159-160; Pittock, 
Inventing and Resisting Britain, p. 49; Connolly, Divided Kingdom, pp. 197-203.
42 Houlding, Fit for Service, p. 24.
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of reserve military forces for deployment elsewhere at the expense of the 
Irish. Only in the 1740s did Britain place regiments sent abroad from Ireland 
on the English establishment and assume their expense. The Anglo-Irish 
derived patronage opportunities from it, such as the awarding of commis-
sions and contracts for supplies. Unlike the Scottish example, though, the 
Anglo-Irish did not directly tap the resources of the British f iscal-military 
state, instead colonizing the Irish in general through additional taxes.43 
The British government prof ited substantially, but from the perspective 
of many Irish, however, the army must have seemed like a giant parasite.
The “Irish” army was Irish in name only. In 1701, Britain proscribed Catho-
lics from serving in the army. Catholics did join the army unoff icially, but 
they had to abjure their faith when enlisting.44 Many Irish Catholics, in fact, 
demonstrated their true allegiance by enlisting with Britain’s enemies.45 
Britain also normally rejected Irish Protestants from army service: f irst 
to ensure Catholics did not enter the army by claiming to be Protestant; 
and, secondly, as Presbyterians comprised two-thirds of Irish Protestants, 
to keep out suspected dissenters. During wartime, however, manpower 
needs overrode these concerns and the army recruited Irish Protestants.46 
The Irish army, then, amounted to a force of 12,000 English and Scottish 
troops garrisoned in Ireland and paid for by the Irish through taxation set 
by the Irish Parliament, which exerted minimal control over the army. Some 
historians have argued that the combination of penal laws and a standing 
army did not make Ireland a police state,47 but the presence of this many 
soldiers makes it hard not to view the army as an occupying force.
Ireland’s economy in the eighteenth century experienced similar 
changes to those in Scotland and England, with the expansion of com-
mercial agriculture, the development of new manufacturing activities, 
and the reorganization of traditional forms of craft production producing 
surplus labor that elsewhere armies would partially absorb. Yet political and 
religious reasons prohibited paid military labor as an option for many set 
43 Guy, “The Irish Military Establishment”, pp. 212-214, 216-217; Childs, “The Restoration of the 
Army”, p. 51; Connolly, Divided Kingdom, pp. 322-323; Mackillop, “More Fruitful than the Soil”, 
pp. 23-24; James, Ireland in the Empire, pp. 174-178, 181-182, 210-211.
44 James, Ireland in the Empire, pp. 264-265; Guy, “The Irish Military Establishment”, pp. 217, 229.
45 Pittock, Inventing and Resisting Britain, pp. 49-50; Murtagh, “Irish Soldiers Abroad”; Con-
nolly, Divided Kingdom, pp. 89-90, 286-290, 375-376.
46 Guy, “The Irish Military Establishment”, pp. 217-219; James, Ireland in the Empire, pp. 178-180; 
Mackillop, “More Fruitful than the Soil”, pp. 23-24; Houlding, Fit for Service, p. 46.
47 James, Ireland in the Empire, pp. 289-291; Guy, “The Irish Military Establishment”, p. 219; 
Houlding, Fit for Service, pp. 46-47.
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free from the soil and trades. A quick look at Irish economic development 
identif ies the factors that lay behind enlistment when war opened the door 
to military service for many. A landed aristocracy, urban and rural middle 
classes, and lower classes of peasants and laborers comprised the Irish social 
structure. By 1700, most landlords came from the Anglican Anglo-Irish, as 
the penal laws restricted Catholics landholding in a number of ways, while 
the middle class was more heterogeneous.48 Catholics formed the majority 
of the lower classes, particularly those that tilled the soil, and dominated 
the countryside. Peasant society had been organized communally into a 
clachan, a pattern similar to that in Scotland. A group of families leased 
the land collectively with each getting equal access to land for tillage and 
pasture in a system called rundale. From the seventeenth century, this 
arrangement came under increasing pressure from ongoing broad shifts 
in land management wrought by those who wished to farm the land for 
commercial purposes, most notably by enclosing tilled land for pasturage 
of sheep and later livestock. The commercial pressures began the breakup 
of the peasantry. Some proved able to transform into small tenants with 
enough land and livestock to farm on their own and pay cash rent. The 
majority became laborers, most of whom held only small pieces of land they 
rented with labor, while the rest sold their labor to pay cash rent for small 
plots in the conacre system. “In both cases, however”, according to Sean 
Connolly, “their true position was of a rural proletariat exchanging their 
labour for the means of subsistence.” 49 The relationship between landlord 
and tenant also altered as a result of the commercialization of land use. 
Landowners tended to lease their lands in blocks to middlemen who then 
rented the lands to peasants for a prof it, often squeezing too much out 
of those who worked the land, rendering them vulnerable to even minor 
problems affecting the Irish economy.50
Ireland experienced repeated crises of subsistence with famines occur-
ring in 1720-1721 and 1728-1729, but most devastatingly in 1740-1741, which 
caused mortality comparable to the Great Famine of the 1840s. The harvest 
failure of 1756-1757 must also have played a role in the recruitment of the 
army.51 Commentators at the time have pointed to the shift from tillage 
48 James, Ireland in the Empire, pp. 219-225.
49 Connolly, Divided Kingdom, pp. 349, 350, 358, 359, 361-362 (“rural proletariat”), 358-359; 
Miller, Emigrants and Exiles, pp. 27-28.
50 Connolly again disputes this contention, arguing that the transition had been ongoing 
for some time and that in reality most of Ireland was better suited to pasturage. See Connolly, 
Divided Kingdom, pp. 347-348, 350-351.
51 Ibid., pp. 344-346, 359; Linebaugh and Rediker, The Many-Headed Hydra, p. 187.
“thE scuM oF EvEry count y, thE rEFusE oF Mankind” 311
to pasturage for commercial purposes as a root cause of Irish poverty 
and social dislocation.52 Landlords enhanced productivity in large part 
by weakening the bond between peasants and the soil: by enclosing and 
consolidating the land; appointing middlemen tenants to further exploit 
smallholders; shortening leases to an annual basis; and charging excessive 
or “rack” rents, among other tactics. The net effect was to force people onto 
ever-smaller pieces of land for cultivation with their only recourse to f ind 
paid employment of a temporary or permanent nature. This cottier class 
grew over the century. Some lost all ties to the land and joined a swelling 
proletariat that sought work where it could be found, on large farms, in 
urban centres, or across the Irish Sea, and, indeed, in the military of one 
power or another.53 Peasants suffered under this yoke for the most part, 
but periodically rose up against landlords and improvers using clandestine 
collective violence to seek to roll back change, most notably in the Houghers 
campaign of agrarian terror of 1711-1712 and the Whiteboys movement that 
emerged in 1761.54
Ireland’s small but developing manufacturing sector provided a main 
source of employment for the displaced agrarian classes as well as crafts-
men. Many of Ireland’s products came from agriculture. Improved farms 
produced beef, butter, grain, and (indirectly) beer and f lour for urban 
consumption and, more importantly, for the international provision trade 
(including supplying the army). The manufacturing sector developed 
somewhat more slowly, and British trade restrictions have often received 
the blame, especially the Woolens Act of 1699, which prohibited the export 
of wool and woolen cloth from anywhere but England. This situation un-
doubtedly harmed the weaving trade, and protests against the act occurred 
periodically. Still, wool production for the domestic market remained an 
important industry. Much of the weaving into cloth took place rurally on 
the putting-out model, with women spinning yarn in their households. 
Production soared with the abandonment of the English import duty in 
1739.55
Linen manufacture concentrated in Ulster constituted the leading sector 
in the economy. Irish linen production took off with the immigration of 
52 Connolly, Religion, Law, and Power, pp. 49-50.
53 James, Ireland in the Empire, p. 217; Miller, Emigrants and Exiles, pp. 27-28, 34, 217-218; 
Beames, Peasants and Power, pp. 6-13; Mokyr, Why Ireland Starved, pp. 144-147.
54 Connolly, Religion, Law, and Power, pp. 52, 201, 219, “The Houghers”, Divided Kingdom, 
pp. 300-302; Smyth, The Men of No Property, pp. 33-35, 44; Beames, Peasants and Power, p. 155. 
55 Connolly, Religion, Law, and Power, pp. 50-52, Divided Kingdom, p. 346; James, Ireland in the 
Empire, pp. 201-203.
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English and Scots, and by the 1670s large-scale commercial production was 
already evident. In 1696, England removed import duty on Irish linen and in 
1705 allowed direct export to other colonies. Economic growth transformed 
northeastern Ireland. Ulster’s eastern counties came to depend on linen 
manufacture to the degree that they became net importers of food. Petty 
producers working in households carried on weaving using their own 
yarn or that purchased on the market, sometimes employing journeymen 
weavers. The spinning of yarn and weaving of coarse linen spread west 
and south of Ulster, while elsewhere farmers raised livestock and crops 
to support industrial towns. The Ulster economy became overdependent 
on linen and subject to shock when trade worsened, more so in the east 
where agriculture had largely been abandoned.56 When the economy took a 
downturn in Ulster, some chose to cross the Atlantic to escape, as occurred 
in 1718-1729 when thousands left as a result of poor harvests, famine, rising 
tithes, and problems within the linen trade.57 The Irish economy prospered 
in the 1730s as the linen trade grew. Conacre continued spreading, with land 
subdivided to provide small lots for weavers’ subsistence needs. This system 
also exposed them to any agricultural disruption as happened in 1740, 
when crop failure caused food prices and rents to rise, famine set in, and 
the linen trade declined. This crisis prompted another wave of migration, 
many indenturing themselves to get to the colonies.58 As the linen industry 
matured, more weavers were unable to set themselves up as independent 
producers. All those people who depended on the industry, the women 
who spun the linen and farmers who grew food to feed the linen workers, 
also suffered when trade did. Desperation led some to join the Oakboys or 
Hearts of Oak, formed in 1763 to protest economic conditions.59
Irish economic development in the eighteenth century had a negative im-
pact on many. While national wealth and consumption grew substantially 
from 1700 to 1760, it did so for those already better off. The majority lived a 
subsistence existence and poverty pervaded society. Cottiers found them-
selves more vulnerable to their landlords, while the urban poor crowded 
into slums in the major cities.60 The spread of commercial agriculture and 
manufacturing set many adrift. This proved particularly the case at times 
56 Connolly, Religion, Law, and Power, pp. 51-52, Divided Kingdom, pp. 351-352, 354-356; Griff in, 
The People with No Name, pp. 25-32.
57 Griff in, The People with No Name, pp. 65-79, 88-89, 90-94, 97.
58 Ibid., pp. 159-160.
59 Connolly, Divided Kingdom, pp. 302-303.
60 James opined that, on the whole, conditions for the Irish poor were worse than in England: 
James, Ireland in the Empire, pp. 212, 222-224.
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of economic dislocation, such as the years 1756-1757 when bad harvests and 
high prices prevailed, coincidentally the time when recruitment for the 
Seven Years War f irst spiked.61
The Seven Years War affected the army in Ireland early on. The two 
regiments sent to North America with General Edward Braddock in 1755, 
the 44th and 48th, had come from the Irish establishment at a peacetime 
strength of 310 rank-and-f ile. Drafting 420 men from regiments in Britain 
and Ireland brought each of the two units to 520 before they left Cork.62 Such 
drafting became the norm throughout the war whenever the government 
ordered reinforcements for North America; whether for existing regiments 
rotated across the Atlantic or newly raised units, drafts from those forces 
remaining behind brought them up to strength.63 The escalating demand 
for f ighting men prompted the dispatch of ever more troops from the Irish 
establishment: in September 1756, the 22nd Regiment and drafts from the 
twelve Irish battalions; and in 1757 the 17th, 27th, 28th, 43rd, and 46th 
Regiments, as well as further drafts.64 In turn, the remaining units in 
Ireland found it necessary to recruit so as to return to strength. To meet 
these additional manpower demands, Whitehall decided to lift the ban on 
enlisting Irish Protestants, seemingly as early as 1756. In April of that year, a 
lieutenant of the Royal American Regiment complained that recruiting for 
the new unit in Ireland had been very diff icult as twenty-four companies 
were to be raised for service and 1,600 men had already been enlisted, 
making for thin pickings. And, in August, the Earl of Halifax reported that 
1,100 men had been raised in Ireland to f ill up the regiments in America.65 
The large number of Irish in the American army by the summer of 1757 
attests to the rapid recruitment of Protestants in the short time since the 
prohibition had been lifted. The regiments sent from the Irish establishment 
in 1756-1757 for which returns survive exhibited the highest proportion of 
Irish soldiers: the 17th (39.8 per cent), 22nd (41.4 per cent), 27th (45.8 per 
cent), and 28th (56.3 per cent). The Irish also accounted for 33.9 per cent of 
61 Connolly, Religion, Law, and Power, p. 137.
62 T[homas] Robinson [1st Baron Grantham], Circular to the Governors in North America, 26 
Oct. 1754, LO503/11 and T. Robinson to Gov. Shirley and Sir Wm. Pepperell, 26 Oct. 1754, LO504/11; 
Maj. Gens. Abercromby and Webb to Loudoun, [26 Oct. 1756], 5832/47.
63 On drafting, see, e.g., Henry Fox to Gov. Lawrence, 14 Aug. 1756, LO1486/34. On desertion, 
see, e.g., Barrington to Loudoun, 15 June 1757, LO3837/85; D. McDonald, A Return of the Men 
left by the 62d. Regmt. in Ireland, 19 Dec. 1757, LO5042 no. 1/111]; D. McDonald, A Return of the 
number of men found in Ireland belonging to the 62d. Regmt., 18 Dec. 1757, LO5042 no. 5/111.
64 Brumwell, Redcoats, pp. 19-20.
65 George Brereton [to Loudoun], 8 April 1756, LO1026/23; Dunk [George Montagu, 2nd Earl 
of] Halifax, 13 Aug. 1756, LO1478/33; Hiasinte de Bonneville, 28 March 1757, LO3192/70.
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the four companies of the New York Independent Regiment, a clear indica-
tion of the recruiting of Irish natives in the American colonies.66
Irish Protestants (and clandestine Catholics), dammed up as a source 
of military labor by imperial policy much of the time, f lowed fairly evenly 
throughout the army once the war-induced need for men opened the sluice 
gates. The Irish did not attain the same prominent profile in the army as 
did Highlanders. The contingent basis of their enlistment made them seem 
more a last resort, while the bogeyman of Catholicism complicated their 
relation to the British. Nonetheless, in the Seven Years War, they formed 
a signif icant component of the army, and their experience with improv-
ers, landlords, and bosses no doubt colored their relationships within the 
military.
German military migrants
The scale of conflict in the Seven Years War strained manpower resources to 
such a point that Britain had to look beyond its dominions for war workers. 
Across the English Channel it found what it needed in two forms: foreign 
princes willing to hire out their military forces; and individuals who could 
be recruited directed into the British Army. Although not part of the British 
Empire, German peoples of Europe did play an important role during the 
Seven Years War, both on the continent where Prussia proved an essential 
ally and where mercenary units from other states fought in the British 
interest, and as recruits to the regular British Army dispatched to the 
American theatre. Ultimately, Britain decided to f ight the war in North 
America with its own army and to f ight in Europe primarily by proxy. In 
January of 1756 Britain signed the Convention of Westminster with Prussia 
to prevent that state from siding with France. Frederick the Great waged 
total war, exploiting resources and civilians to the full, and his policies had 
a signif icant impact on western and northern Germany, which had been 
largely conflict-free since 1714. Not only did Prussia forcibly harness people 
to the war machine but also the ferocity of continental conflict uprooted 
many, making them ripe pickings for recruiters from various armies. Fred-
erick’s military support came at a price for Britain, which promised in 1758 
to provide Prussia with £670,000 annually to subsidize its war effort. At the 
66 13 July 1757, LO2533 no. 4/90; [July 1757], LO2529 no. 1/90; 13 July 1757, LO4012 no. 1/90; 14 July 
1757, LO1944 no. 5/90; 15 July 1757, LO6616/88.
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same time, Britain assumed the cost of the entire Hanoverian army, which 
would amount to £1.2 million per year.67
Britain also hired the services of mercenary soldiers. With the decline 
of independent military enterprisers, mercenary captains who hired their 
companies to f ight for other, larger states found it diff icult to raise armies 
of a suff icient size from their own territories. They could recruit in foreign 
domains, or could contract units from another army to support their own. 
Increasingly, they hired a specif ic number of troops raised and maintained 
by a foreign power, particularly smaller states in the Holy Roman Empire, 
in return for the payment of a subsidy. Subsidizing forces from abroad 
tended to be faster and simpler than raising new regiments at home. Subsidy 
agreements also proved more flexible, as troops could be hired for short 
periods and dispensed with when not needed. Political considerations also 
played a part, as subsidy agreements served as a form of political alliance 
with mutual responsibilities stipulated.68 Since the Glorious Revolution, the 
British had depended on a largely volunteer army, but could do this only 
by extensively utilizing foreign soldiers. Peter Taylor argued that the fear 
of a standing army led the English to “subcontracting the defense of their 
liberties and privileges to Germans, Native Americans, and Africans.” The 
“tributary overlords of German territorial states” secured much English 
business in supplying troops from within Europe, pushing most independ-
ent military contractors out of the market. They could meet this demand 
for soldiers for hire as their subjects legally owed them military service, 
but in doing so they had to alter the political economies of their states.69 
Many (including William Pitt) thought at the time the Hanoverian regime 
of Britain in fact cared more about their status as Protectors of Hanover 
than as defenders of the British realm, and the outbreak of hostilities with 
France in the colonies in 1754 prompted Britain again to contract with 
German territories – Hesse-Cassel, Ansbach, and Würzburg – to hold men in 
reserve to help protect Hanover. Hanover itself received an annual subsidy 
of £50,000 to expand its army by 8,000 men. During the invasion scare 
of 1756, Britain paid for twelve Hanoverian battalions and eight Hessian 
battalions to be stationed in the south of England.70
67 Wilson, German Armies, pp. 263, 275, 277-278; Anderson, A People’s Army, pp. 298-299.
68 Childs, Armies and Warfare in Europe, pp. 85-86.
69 Taylor, Indentured to Liberty, pp. 9, 11, 21.
70 Anderson, Crucible of War, p. 127; Wilson, German Armies, p. 263; Houlding, Fit for Service, 
p. 323, n. 1.
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The “military-subsidy relationship” England had with Hesse-Cassel sheds 
light on the phenomenon. Subsidy treaties usually took the form of mutual 
defense pacts, with arrangements for payments made per man supplied, 
a subsidy to the state for the duration of the war, and pay for the soldiers. 
The soldier’s food would be paid for out of his “subsistence” (or pay). The 
British received soldiers who were trained and equipped in return. During 
the Seven Years War, Britain contracted with Hesse-Cassel, a part of the 
Holy Roman Empire, for 12,000 men in 1755, almost 19,000 in 1757, 12,000 
two years later, and more than 15,000 in 1760. From 1751 to 1760, British 
subsidies accounted for 40 per cent of all state revenue for Hesse-Cassel. The 
monies allowed for the maintenance of a standing army of 14,000 within 
the landgravial domain, equivalent to 1 soldier per 19 Hessian civilians, as 
opposed to a ratio of 1 to 36 in both England and Prussia.71
The Hessian state raised subsidy armies by developing a military tax, 
the Kontribution, for the training, equipping, and payment of troops, 
but the increased military expectations posed ideological problems for 
the Landgraves. To circumvent the novelty and scale of demands, they 
targeted “marginal” people – the masterless, indolent, those deemed the 
most expendable.72 The state in the 1740s became increasingly intrusive of 
the household and defined marginality more loosely, taking servants, day 
laborers, and apprentices when it could not be demonstrated that their labor 
was essential to the local agricultural economy. Just before the Seven Years 
War, the Landgrave promised not to force people into service if they could 
not be spared without harming the household. But in 1762, the state removed 
the distinction between the militia and subsidy army, and all suitable males 
were expected to serve if called. This penetrated the peasant household 
more deeply, taking away from the head of household decisions central to 
its economy and familial relations.73 The nature of the state, society, and 
economy of Hesse-Cassel became attached to the dictates of the British 
f iscal-military state, albeit more indirectly than within Great Britain and 
its colonies. From London, Hessians were viewed as so much military labor; 
from Hesse-Cassel, with the fortunes of the state resting on the sale of its 
population as soldiers, the people could not but take on a military cast.
The British Army also attempted directly to exploit the continental 
market in military labor. Warfare had wracked much of Europe through-
out the seventeenth century and into the eighteenth, causing social and 
71 Taylor, Indentured to Liberty, pp. 1, 21-25, 36-37.
72 Ibid., pp. 49-51.
73 Ibid., pp. 68-70.
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economic dislocation. In some areas, as Aaron Fogelman’s study of German 
immigration in the period reveals, the devastation proved so severe that 
traditional cultural practices had been subverted, opening the door for the 
emergence of new forms of social relations and economic production, with 
expansive states, profit-minded nobles, and commercially oriented peasants 
looking toward the market. For many pushed to the margins, emigration 
became an increasingly attractive option, particularly in southwestern 
Germany and parts of Switzerland. War in the seventeenth century had 
severely disturbed society in the region through depopulation, and sig-
nif icant change followed in its wake during the decades of peace. States 
grew in size and became more intrusive in village life. In agriculture, a shift 
occurred from the three-f ield system of usage that included common land 
to more commercial agriculture. The depopulation caused by warfare broke 
down traditional social and economic practices but also eventually led to 
marked demographic growth and socioeconomic change. As land proved 
readily available, people began marrying earlier and setting up independ-
ent households, farmed the land more intensively, and practiced partible 
inheritance. At the same time, both local nobles and the state sought to 
assert their control over their domains and enhance revenues. Peasants 
fought enclosure, attempts to alter inheritance patterns and restrain early 
marriage, and initiatives to push them into manufacturing, at times taking 
direct action. By the mid-eighteenth century, however, population growth 
peaked and landholdings were becoming too small to support a family. 
These processes led to a wave of emigration.74
The labor demands for the all-out North American offensive were such 
that the army turned to the continent to f ill out the ranks. Britain’s Hano-
verian dynasty and Protestant faith made Germans an obvious source to 
tap. Thus, when in February 1756, the government decided to raise a new 
regiment from among the Germans and Swiss resident in America to be 
called the Royal Americans (the 62nd, later 60th, Regiment), seasoned non-
commissioned off icers (NCOs) and soldiers were to be enlisted in Holland, 
Germany, and Switzerland to complement these raw recruits. Recruiting 
orders did stipulate “none but healthy Steady Men being protestants, and as 
many as he can procure who have already been in the Service”. The recruits 
should be between eighteen and thirty-f ive years old, 5’2” or taller, and no 
Frenchmen were to be taken. To secure as many recruits as possible, the 
army allowed the colonel some money “for the passage of a small number 
of Women and Children, which he will be indispensably [sic] Obliged to 
74 Fogelman, Hopeful Journeys, pp. 6, 16, 18-28, 48-65.
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take for the Success of the Affair and the acquisition of proper Men”.75 The 
British in Frankfurt and Cologne found they were competing with recruit-
ers from the imperial Prussian and Danish armies and were having some 
trouble meeting their requirements. The pickings proved so thin that one 
off icer suggested getting men as indentured servants for America and then 
converting them to soldiers, presumably against their will.76 But in April, 
one recruiter reported that he expected to raise 100 good men in Germany. 
Later in August, he noted that, while the recruits seemed fairly good, he had 
hoped for more experienced soldiers, or tradesmen, but they were recruiting 
late in the season. An off icer in New York upon reviewing these German 
recruits for the Royal Americans, complained that the majority were “Raw 
men”, while he also discovered “12 strange little Lads they Call Miners” and 
ten boys for drummers.77
A glimpse into the nature of the German influx into the army can be 
found in one particular recruiting document of troops raised in Europe for 
service in the Royal Americans by Herbert, Baron de Munster.78 The data 
reveals that 94 of the 152 men recruited as privates and noncommissioned 
off icers (61.8 per cent) reported having prior occupations, each with some 
specific skill ranging from gardener to peruke-maker but with only brewers, 
miners, and tailors reaching double f igures. No one listed farmer or laborer, 
although it is safe to assume that some of the f ifty-eight individuals who 
returned no occupation had performed manual labor or came from family 
farms. Recruits averaged twenty-four years of age, typical for the army as a 
whole, and it is likely that some had not yet set up independent households. 
Most appear to have come from German principalities, with Switzerland 
at twelve recruits the next most likely place of nativity, but others hailed 
from as far af ield as Scotland (two NCOs), Poland, and Bohemia. Clusters of 
recruits came from individual places, as well: four from Basel, Switzerland; 
ten from Darmstadt in Hesse; ten from Frankfurt in Hesse; f ive from Frein-
sheim in the Palatinate; and nine listing Saxony as their birthplace. These 
recruits came from mixed occupational backgrounds, but one instance 
75 Plan for recruiting in Germany [Feb. 1756], LO2576/19. The army also enlisted German 
Protestants from the prisoners of war of the French army held at Portsmouth. See Earl Loud-
oun, Memorandum Books, HM 1717, vol. 10, 11 March 1756, Manuscript Department, Henry E. 
Huntington Library, San Marino, California.
76 Joseph Yorke to Maj. Gen. Napier, 23 March 1756, LO959/21.
77 James Prevost to [Loudoun], 7 April 1756, LO1024/23; Prevost [to Loudoun], 14 Aug. 1756, 
LO1491/34; John Young [to Loudoun], 2 Sept. 1756, LO1681/38. 
78 List of Recruits under Command of Herbert, Baron de Munster . . . arrived the 27th of August 
at New York, 1756, LO1607/37.
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occurs of people of a particular occupation from the same town enlisting. 
Thirteen miners signed up from Clausdal (Clausthal) in Saxony in the Harz 
Mountains, a town that since the sixteenth century had been associated 
with the iron-mining industry promoted by the dukes of Brunswick. It is 
not clear what prompted this exodus from mining in Clausdal, but these 
individuals likely were the “12 strange little Lads they Call Miners” the Royal 
American off icer referred to upon their arrival in New York.
The regimental returns from 1757 showed 607 foreigners enlisted in 
Europe with the army in America, or 4.3 per cent of the whole. The Royal 
Americans had also been active in recruiting foreigners in America. The 
returns show 803 such recruits in 1757, but it is not clear whether this f igure 
included Scots and Irish recruited in the colonies as well as Germans, al-
though the army sent German-speaking recruiting officers to Pennsylvania 
and posted recruiting announcements in “Dutch”.79 A clearer example of the 
German presence as a whole lies in the dispersion of foreigners throughout 
the regiments. Seven of seventeen units returned no foreigners recruited in 
America, and 507 of the 803 men (63.1 per cent) had found homes in the four 
battalions of the Royal American Regiment, the one specifically raised from 
Germans in the colonies.80 This regiment also had commissioned off icers 
from Europe who spoke German.
Wars past and rapid socioeconomic change yielded a harvest of men from 
German Europe to f ight in the red coat of Britain in the Seven Years War. 
At the same time, the desire of some heads of small states to profit from 
bartering their military labor power to Britain condemned their people to 
wage war not of their own making. Britain’s war industry proved blind to 
national or ethnic boundaries when it came to f illing the ranks.
America, reluctant recruiting ground
Lord Loudoun, commander-in-chief of the American army, arrived in New 
York on 23 July 1756, and shortly thereafter began expressing his opinions of 
colonials. The general wrote in late August that colonials “have assumed to 
themselves what they Call Rights and Priviledges, Tottaly unknown in the 
Mother Country and are made use of, for no purpose, but to screen them, 
from giveing any aid, of any sort, for carrying on the Service”.81 Relations 
79 Samuel Kemble to Capt. William Skinner, 22 July 1756, LO1324/30.
80 From an analysis of the returns utilized in Table 10.1.
81 [Loudoun] to Cumberland, 29 Aug. 1756, LO1626/52.
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between the army and colonists soon had congealed into bad blood and they 
grew only more heated under Loudoun’s vice-regal rule. Conflict erupted 
between the army and the colonies over issues of provisioning, quartering, 
and trade, but the mobilization of military manpower constituted a root 
source of disagreement. Raising an army in America brought the f iscal-
military state across the Atlantic and to colonies that had little experience 
of the military revolution. Attempting to extract even a small proportion of 
the British Army from the colonies cut into the heart of local economies and 
made the British-American relationship all too frequently an adversarial 
one, as a Chester County, Pennsylvania, tavern-keeper made all too clear. 
On 12 December 1757, John Baldwin discovered Sergeant James Jobb of the 
New York Independent Companies attempting to enlist two young men 
and “Swore by God that he would beat the brains of any Scoundrell Soldier” 
recruiting in his inn. The sergeant “answer’d that he had Lord Loudoun’s 
Orders for what he was about”, to which Baldwin replied, “God Dam Lord 
Loudoun and his Army too, they are all Scoundrells and a burden upon the 
Country[.] What had he or his Army done Since their comeing but deprived 
the people of their hands [indentured servants and hired laborers], and if 
the Country Served them right they would kick them all out, like a parcel 
of Scoundrells, as they are, for they would never do the Country any good.” 
Baldwin then attacked Jobb, wounding him, while his friends attacked 
the recruiting party, causing them to f lee. Two days later, Baldwin and 
his companions disrupted Jobb and his party when recruiting in another 
tavern in Wilmington, Delaware, leading to a “Ryot” and the wounding of 
several soldiers.82 Baldwin had laid his hands not only on one poor recruiting 
sergeant, but also on the pulse of the conflict over recruiting: who would 
control America’s labor, army off icers or colonial masters, and to what 
ends, state or private?
The supply of military labor, both the provincial troops raised by the colo-
nies and the regular troops recruited by the army in the colonies, provided 
a flashpoint for internecine conflict. Every year the commander-in-chief 
informed the colonial governors of the number of provincial troops he 
expected the colonies to raise for the campaign. The scale of mobiliza-
tion demanded by the British eclipsed past war efforts and the economic 
wherewithal of the colonies, so foot-dragging naturally occurred. The often-
strained relations between the executive and legislative branches of colonial 
governments, the assemblies’ control of the purse strings, and in certain 
instances the prevalence of internal sectarian politics meant the number of 
82 Information of James Jobb, 14 Dec. 1757, LO5011/111.
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provincial troops actually f ielded often fell well short of those requested. For 
example, the army requested 9,000 provincial troops for the 1756 campaign 
against Fort Crown Point and the provinces fielded 6,434 privates and NCOs. 
And General James Abercromby called for 20,000 provincial troops in total 
for the 1758 campaign and, although this was supported by Pitt’s promise to 
reimburse the colonial governments, in April he reported that fewer than 
18,000 had mobilized.83
Constitutional concerns regarding the exercise of imperial powers only 
partly explain the colonies’ reluctance to mobilize on the scale expected 
of them. The negative impact of extracting so many men from the civil 
economy worried officials, but so did the fact that broad mobilization caught 
up those of a status not normally expected to serve in the ranks. Governor 
Thomas Pownall explained Massachusetts’s failure to meet Abercromby’s 
request for provincial troops in 1758 in terms that revealed the same class 
politics operated in the colonies as did in Britain.
I believe the real Truth is in attempting to raise 7,000 Men, we have 
overeached our Strength, the last thousand edges too near upon those 
who from their Situation & Circumstances thought it would not come 
to their Share [...] Laws will execute themselves while they extend 
only to a given rank of Men, but when they begin to entrench upon 
a Rank above that, you are sensible how much they labour and are 
obstructed.84
Class status played a key role in provincial mobilization throughout the war. 
The colonial assemblies forced men into service in their regiments, while 
the usual allowance of the provision of a substitute worked to ensure most 
draftees came from the laboring classes.85 Colonial leaders thus did not 
scruple at forcing many of their own citizens into the provincial regiments, 
83 James Abercromby, Return of Provincial Forces of the Several Colonies raised for the reduc-
tion of Crown Point, 26 June, 1756, LO1254/28; W[illiam] Shirley to Sir Thomas Robinson, 11 
Aug. 1755, LO622/13; Massachusetts General Court, Resolutions regarding Crown Point, 14 Jan. 
1756, LO759/17; Connecticut General Assembly, Resolution on the raising of men and money 
for operations in 1756, 21 Jan. 1756, LO763/17; [Abercromby] Circular Letter to the Governors 
of Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, 15 March 1758, no. 45, box 1, Abercromby Papers, 
Huntington Library [henceforth in form AB45/1]; [Abercromby] to Wm. Pitt, 28 April 1758, 
AB215/5.
84 Pownall to Abercromby, 19 June 1758, AB366/8.
85 Anderson, A People’s Army, pp. 41-42; Cress, Citizens in Arms, pp. 5-7; Selesky, War and Society 
in Colonial Connecticut, pp. 155-162; Titus, The Old Dominion at War, pp. 59, 63-65, 79-80, 98-100, 
145-148; Ferling, “Soldiers for Virginia”, p. 316. 
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but balked when their own class confronted the possibility of having to 
serve in the front ranks.
The colonies took advantage of their control over the raising and provi-
sioning of provincial troops to limit the impact of mobilization; however, 
the army exercised direct authority in the recruiting of colonials to the 
regular forces, and this subject proved more contentious in the British-
American relationship. Colonial resistance to British recruitment to the 
armed services, in particular impressment to the Royal Navy, had a long 
tradition.86 In the Seven Years War, however, the enlistment of volunteers 
to the army provoked much controversy, superficially because of the tactics 
used in recruitment, but at root due to the impact mass mobilization had 
on the labor requirements of the colonial economies.
Enlisting in America ran essentially the same as in Britain, even though 
the part of the Mutiny Act dealing with recruitment did not apply until 
1756. Recruiters were allowed levy money for each man, from which they 
had to provide necessaries, provisions, and transportation, as well as offer 
a bounty to lure men into the service. But commanding off icers pressured 
them “to get the Recruits as cheap as you can”.87 Recruiting off icers, in their 
rush to man the army, at times stooped to trickery, and this inflamed public 
opinion. James McDonell claimed that, while drinking with a friend, he 
fell in with a recruiting party from the New York Independent Companies, 
“as he was told next Morning, being that Night so Drunk that he doth not 
remember seeing a Red Coat in the house, and was greatly surprised in the 
Morning when the said Corporal told him he was enlisted”. He deserted and 
received 200 lashes in punishment.88 Other prospects could require greater 
subtlety. A Royal Americans recruiting party owed Joshua Boud money for 
food and lodging in his public house. He took a dollar, he thought in pay-
ment, but the soldiers said he had enlisted and took him before a magistrate, 
who, despite his refusal to enlist, confined him without subsistence until 
he yielded.89
Sharp recruiting practices, acknowledged and tolerated to a degree in 
Britain, prompted more controversy in the colonies, and to an extent tainted 
all recruiting for the regular army. Horatio Sharpe, Maryland’s governor, 
86 Most notably, a November 1747 impressment riot in Boston. See Rogers, Empire and Liberty, 
pp. 38-40; Brunsman, “The Knowles Atlantic Impressment Riots of the 1740s”.
87 Lt Col Gage’s Recruiting Instructions, [3 Jan. 1758], LO5328/115. Levying recruits to the 
Royal American regiment required an estimated £5 per man in 1756. See Estimate of the several 
Articles of Expense on the American Service, [March 1756], LO6738/22.
88 WO/71/65/361-366, 14 July 1757.
89 Joshua Boude, Petition to Loudoun [1756], LO2456/57.
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informed Loudoun that recruiting parties for the 44th and 48th Regiments 
had attacked a vessel in a river and assaulted several persons, including a 
County High Sheriff in his own house.90 Some citizens brought “Vexatious 
Suits” in the courts of law against recruiting off icers for performing their 
duties.91 Debts owed by putative recruits were invented or inflated and the 
men got themselves incarcerated to prevent their having to join the army.92 
Colonists could turn to violence if obstruction did not work. A Philadelphia 
mob attacked recruiters in 1756, beating a sergeant to death, jailing the rest, 
and liberating the enlisted men.93 Three riots took place in Wilmington, Dela-
ware, in the fall of 1757, in which recruiters suffered beatings. Although the 
recruiting officer knew the identity of the mob leaders, he did not trust local 
authorities to prosecute.94 “I have had my party out in the Country but they 
generally get Mob’d”, Captain Mackay reported from Portsmouth, Maine, 
in December 1757; “one of them was beat in the Streets the other Evening 
by f ive Sailors, as yet I can make no discovery of the Authors, but I have a 
warrant out against one who has taken the liberty to threaten”.95 In Boston 
on February 3, 1758 a “Broil [...] between a Mob, & some of the Recruiting 
Parties” took place over NCOs allegedly committing “some imprudences that 
hurt ye Service. To see a Drunken Man lugg’d thro’ ye Streets on a Souldiers 
back guarded by others wither it was or was not to carry him before a Justice 
to swear must certainly give a Strong impression of ye method of enlist-
ing & certainly have an ill effect on an inflam’d Mobb”, warned Governor 
Pownall of Massachusetts. However, Boston justices investigated the “Noise 
& Tumult” and attributed it to “some mistaken apprehensions among some 
Young and undesigning Persons”.96 Questionable recruiting practices help 
explain some of the colonial opposition to the mobilization of manpower, 
but deeper social and economic factors also played a role.
The struggle over labor most clearly evinced itself in the army’s recruit-
ment of indentured servants. From the military’s perspective, the need 
for f ighting men trumped all other concerns during wartime; to masters 
90 Horatio Sharpe to Loudoun, 18 May 1757, LO6353/80.
91 In one instance, the 44th Regiment had to pay the attorney general of the Jersies £12. 16s. for 
defending recruiting off icers from such suits: John Duncan, 44th Regiment of Foot on Account 
of Recruiting &c for the Year 1757, 24 June 1757, LO6600/86.
92 Weekly Returns of the Recruiting Parties of Capt. Mackay, Lt Cottnam and Ens. Archbold for 
the 40th Regiment, Jan. 1758, LO6919/118; Samuel Mackay to Col Forbes, 6 Feb. 1758, LO5549/119.
93 Pargellis, Lord Loudoun in North America, p. 107; Rogers, Empire and Liberty, p. 42.
94 Capt. Charles Cruickshank to Loudoun, 14 Dec. 1757, LO5012/111.
95 Samuel Mackay to Col Forbes, 16 Dec. 1757, LO5023/111.
96 T. Pownall to Loudoun, 6, 13 Feb. 1758, LO5547/119, LO5569/120; Boston justices to Pownall, 
7 Feb. 1758, LO5550/119.
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who viewed their servants as commodities, enlistment constituted theft. 
Instructions for raising the regiments for the 1755 campaign indicated 
that indentured servants should not enlist without the consent of their 
masters,97 but in the wake of Braddock’s defeat the need to bring the regi-
ments up to strength led Governor William Shirley of Massachusetts, acting 
commander-in-chief, to remove this exception. By February 1756, a crisis 
brewed. Horatio Sharpe warned that masters, “having a great part of their 
Property vested in Servants”, were outraged by the practice, and expressed 
fears that “an Insurrection of the People is likely to ensue”.98 Corbin Lee, 
who managed an iron forge in Maryland worked by indentured servants, 
complained not only of the loss of the labor but also of the tactics practiced 
by recruiters. “It is not unusual with many of these recruiting Gentlemen 
when they meet with a person that will not be bullied out of his Property 
and tamely give up his Servant without any sort of Recompense immediately 
to deem him an Enemy to his Majesty’s Service.” He believed the actions 
of the recruiting off icer to be “Illegal nay felonious; for they stole into our 
Plantations disguis’d like thieves in the dead of night made our Servants 
Drunk forced them to inlist and curried them off”.99 The Pennsylvania 
General Assembly advised the lieutenant governor that many masters had 
complained “a great Number of Bought Servants are lately inlisted by the 
Recruiting Off icers now in this Province, and clandestinely or by open 
Force conveyed away”, yet according to the law masters possessed “as true 
& as just a Property in the Servant bought as they had before in the Money 
with which he was purchas’d”.100
Complaints soon turned to legal action. “The off icers have been arrested 
for entertaining these Servants, Violences used by the Populace” in Penn-
sylvania and Maryland “for recovering them from the Off icers, and the 
Servants imprison’d for inlisting”, lamented William Shirley. He looked to 
the king to establish a policy in an attempt to allay “the present disputes 
& Heart-burnings”. Masters of two servants enlisted in New York sued the 
recruiting lieutenant of the 48th Regiment in 1756, and he had to post bail 
or be jailed. That same year several Pennsylvania masters initiated legal 
proceedings against recruiters. Colonial lawyers, revealingly, argued that 
servants, as property, had no free will, and thus could not be taken against 
97 Recruiting Instructions [1755], LO727/15.
98 Horatio Sharpe to William Shirley, 2 Feb. 1756, LO793/186.
99 Corbin Lee to Gov. Horatio Sharp, 30 April 1757, LO3506/76.
100 Pennsylvania, General Assembly, House of Representatives, Address to Robert Hunter 
Morris, 11 Feb. 1756, LO819/18. 
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their masters’ wishes.101 Direct action against recruiters also occurred. Pieter 
Van Ingen of the Royal Americans enlisted a servant of Samuel Henry at 
Trenton, New Jersey, in August 1756. Henry later confronted him in a tavern 
demanding his servant or money in recompense, striking him on the head 
with an iron-tipped cane when he refused. Van Ingen chased him off with 
his sword, but Henry returned with friends in an attempt to capture the 
servant. Again the recruiting party drove them off. When they tried to 
leave, though, Henry attacked Van Ingen with a pitchfork, which he parried 
with his sword. He retreated inside and had his men fasten knives to poles. 
They sallied forth and routed Henry’s party, which surrendered the f ield 
and the servant. But when mob rule failed, Henry turned to the law, and 
had a justice send a constable to Van Ingen demanding he give up the man 
or the money, or go to jail. Van Ingen refused and a writ was served upon 
him, and he was jailed in a “Stinking” cell despite the protest of his colonel 
as to the illegality of his imprisonment.102
The ongoing furore over recruitment necessitated state intervention. 
Parliament extended the Mutiny Act to the colonies and adopted legislation 
on the recruitment of both free individuals and indentured servants in March 
1756.103 To quell any complaints that free men had been duped into enlisting, 
the law required a recruit to be taken to a justice of the peace after twenty-four 
hours and within four days of his listing to swear to his willingness to enlist. If 
he balked, he had to return the levy money and pay 20s sterling for expenses; 
otherwise he was considered enlisted. The act also addressed the thorny issue 
of recruiting indentured servants, making it lawful to recruit indentured 
servants who volunteered, but stipulated that, if the owner protested within 
six months, the recruiting officer must either give up the servant upon being 
repaid the enlisting money, or pay the master a sum to be determined by two 
justices of the peace based on the original purchase price and the amount of 
time left to be served.104 Parliament with this act codified the fiscal-military 
state’s premise that the army’s need for manpower prevailed over private 
101 William Shirley [to Henry Fox], 8 March 1756, LO890/20; Shirley to Robert Hunter Morris, 
20 Feb. 1756, in Lincoln, Correspondence of William Shirley, II, pp. 391-392, n. 1; Robert Sterling 
to Loudoun, 23 Aug. 1756, LO1548/35; Major Rutherford [to Loudoun], 23 Aug. 1756, LO1549/35; 
Charles Hardy to Lord Halifax, 7 May 1756, in Pargellis, Military Affairs in North America, 1748-
1765, pp. 174-175.
102 Pieter Van Ingen, Aff idavit, 18 April 1757, LO3376/74; James Prevost [to Loudoun], 5 April 
1757, LO3294/72; John Smyth, certif icate, 6 April 1757, LO3300/73. 
103 Great Britain, Parliament [An act for the better recruiting of His Majesty’s Forces on the 
Continent of America; and for the Regulation of the Army . . .]. 25 March 1756, LO2583/21. 
104 In response, Benjamin Franklin f iled a petition on behalf of fellow Pennsylvania masters 
claiming £3,652 and a half pence Pennsylvania currency for 612 servants listed: List of Servants 
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interest, whether communal or familial concern for the liberty of individu-
als who enlisted, or masters’ property in human labor for the purpose of 
individual economic gain. In taking this position the act effectively made the 
army the preeminent employer of labor in the colonies, at once master to free 
laborers and bonded servants purchased from reluctant owners.
The recruiting legislation did not prevent conflict from occurring over 
mobilization in the colonies, however, as it did not remove the root issue of 
control of labor power. “We shall have a great deal of diff iculty to recruit of 
our Regiment”, confessed an off icer, “the People of this Country having no 
great affection for a red Coat, nor do they stay long with us after they list 
when they f ind an opportunity to take their leave.” Another complained 
“there is a general backwardness in the people of this province to the Kings 
service, which is but too much encouraged by all sorts of people, as they 
seem to consider every man, we enlist, as a real loss to the Province”.105 Thus 
regiments in Halifax found it necessary to recruit as far south as Maryland 
in 1756, having more luck the further south they went, whereas those in 
South Carolina two years later had to strike 300 miles northward.106 The 
physical requirements were also lowered with any man “free from Ruptures, 
Convulsions, and Inf irmities, and f it for service”, being acceptable. In 1758, 
Loudoun remarked that if the army wanted to get “f ighting men, We must 
not at present Insist either on Size or Beauty”. Perhaps this explains how 
John Rainsdown, described as “hump back’d, crook’d Legs, and 4 feet 6 
inches high”, got into the Royal Americans.107 Still, the army operated well 
below its strength on paper. Such reluctance to serve in the regulars played 
a role in Pitt’s decision to send ever more regular regiments to America.
The army competed directly with other employers for labor but govern-
ment policy limited what they could offer recruits. The colonial provincial 
regiments in particular monopolized men of recruiting age because they 
offered better terms of employment. The provinces paid higher bounties 
Belonging to the inhabitants of Pennsylvania and taken into His Majesty’s Service, 21 April 1757, 
LO341/74.
105 William Eyre to Col Napier, 23 Jan. 1756, LO766/17; John Cosnan to Col Forbes, 9 Jan. 1758, 
LO5377/116.
106 Charles Lawrence to Loudoun, 19 Oct. 1756, LO2042/46; Off icers belonging to the Regiments 
in Nova Scotia upon Recruiting Duty, [9 Nov. 1756], LO2186/50; John Tulleken [to Loudoun], 29 
Jan. 1758, LO5486/118.
107 Pargellis, Lord Loudoun in North America, pp. 110-111; [Loudoun] to Maj. Gen. Hopson, 23 
Jan. 1758, LO5451/117; Arthur Nicholson, Return of Men found unf it for Service, 23 April 1757, 
LO3433, box 74.
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than the typical £3 inducement for regular recruits.108 The regular army’s 
term of service also played a role as well. As a rule, men enlisted for life 
during peacetime. The need for ever more bodies during wartime, however, 
forced the army at times to offer short-term service, usually three to f ive 
years, but sometimes fewer. Nonetheless, life enlistment remained the 
basic experience of regular troops in the Seven Years War.109 By comparison, 
provincial soldiers typically signed on for the campaign, usually spring 
through fall. Provincial service paid better wages as well. Regular soldiers 
received a daily wage of eight pence, two of which were deducted as “off-
reckonings” for payments to various off ices (the Exchequer, Paymaster 
General, Chelsea Hospital, the regimental agent), and to provide the troops’ 
annual regimental clothing, necessaries, and accoutrements (a further 
seven pence per week went to the regimental surgeon and paymaster, and 
to cover company expenses for a man’s “necessaries” like shoes, gaiters, arms 
repair, and barbering).110 Fred Anderson, for example, calculated the net 
income (wage, food, and lodging) of a Massachusetts soldier at 2s provincial 
currency per day, or roughly twice that of a regular.111 Virginia provincials, 
by comparison, received only 8d a day local currency (worth 40-70 per 
cent of sterling), which compared unfavorably to the 2-3s a day wages for 
unskilled labor or to the earnings of provincials in neighboring colonies, no 
doubt contributing to the need for the colony to conscript troops in the war’s 
early years and to offer higher bounties later on.112 The average wage for the 
provincials from the more northerly colonies who did most of the f ighting, 
however, was signif icantly more than their redcoated comrades in arms.
Many colonists did join the regulars despite all the conflict surrounding 
recruitment, especially in the f irst two years of the war. For the regiments 
that returned the nativity of troops in 1757, those born in the American 
colonies accounted for 755 of 14,166 men (5.3 per cent) and natives of Europe 
enlisted in the colonies for 803 (5.7 per cent), making more than one in 
108 For example, Massachusetts bounties inflated from £3-£4 in 1755 to a peak of more than 
£26 in 1760. See Anderson, A People’s Army, p. 225.
109 For example, the 45th Regiment, which had been stationed in Halifax since the previous 
war and had recruited extensively in North America, reported in 1757 that of its 955 soldiers: 819 
(85.8 per cent) had enlisted for life, 1 for twenty years (0.1 per cent), 1 for seven (0.1 per cent), 5 
for six (0.5 per cent), 2 for four (0.2 per cent), and 127 men (13.3 per cent) had signed on for three 
years. See Muster Rolls of the 45th Regiment, April 1757, LO6987/76.
110 Steppler, “The Common Soldier in the Reign of George III”, pp. 95-105.
111 Anderson, A People’s Army, pp. 38-39.
112 Titus, Old Dominion at War, pp. 4-45, 163 n. 87; Robert Dinwiddie to Loudoun, 24 May 1756, 
LO1175/26. 
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every ten soldiers an “American” recruit (Table 10.1).113 In recruiting such 
numbers, the British Army did not merely target the marginal but reached 
into the heart of colonial production. In a sample of sixty-six regular recruits 
mostly from the Boston area, forty-one (62.1 per cent) came from artisanal 
backgrounds (with shoemakers and tailors being most represented), eleven 
(16.7 per cent) came from agriculture, eleven (16.7 per cent) had performed 
manual labor, and three (4.5 per cent) clerical or professional work.114
An account of recruiting in America clearly reveals the army’s impact on 
colonial economies. Great differences existed between regions, most strik-
ingly between north and south because of the latter’s growing dependence on 
slavery. But in the mid-Atlantic region and New England, the two main areas 
of recruitment for the army, petty production based upon the household in 
the agricultural and the craft sectors, proved the norm, with familial labor 
playing an important role and, particularly in the mid-Atlantic, bonded 
labor making signif icant contributions.115 At the same time, labor scarcity 
prevailed throughout the colonies. Military recruitment exacerbated this 
situation and this clash between household production and state-sponsored 
enterprise on an Atlantic scale partly explains the fractious experience 
of mobilization. Its effect on indentured servitude f igured centrally. First 
without any explicit policy, then with the backing of a British parliamentary 
act, the army “freed” many servants from bondage and introduced them 
to paid military labor. Although it promised reimbursement for the loss of 
contract time, cash could not immediately replace scarce labor. Likewise, 
the recruiting of free men hit farm and craft households, where the young 
men targeted by the army performed important labor as family members, 
apprentices or journeymen, and servants. Their call to arms produced cries 
of concern as it meant a loss of labor, one reason why colonials looked more 
favorably upon enlistment to the provincial regiments, given the annual 
term of service and the fact that money earned tended to be expended 
locally. To the extent that the regular army (with the government’s backing) 
facilitated the recruitment of such men and their abstraction from family 
and village for longer periods, it had a direct impact on domestic economies. 
113 Stanley Pargellis estimated that 7,500 colonials enlisted in the British army in 1755-1757; Dan 
Higgonbotham, 11,000 during the war as a whole. See Pargellis, Lord Loudoun in North America, 
pp. 108-109; Higgonbotham, “The Early American Way of War”, p. 235.
114 For a full presentation of this data, see Way, “Rebellion of the Regulars”, pp. 768-769.
115 A voluminous literature exists on the colonial economy. See, for example, Henretta, 
“Families and Farms”; Salinger, “To Serve Well and Faithfully”; Kulikoff, The Agrarian Origins 
of American Capitalism; Schultz, Republic of Labor; Vickers, Farmers and Fishermen; Kulikoff, 
From British Peasants to Colonial American Farmers.
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British demands for support thus met with American recalcitrance and 
outright resistance to the effort to mobilize manpower in the Seven Years 
War. In the process of a massive mutual enterprise, feelings of difference 
sharpened, acquiring an edge that the infusion of funds from the British 
f iscal-military state and the shared military success of the later war years 
blunted, but the blade had been tempered and needed only another imperial 
crisis to whet the distinction between Briton and American.
Conclusion
Warfare in the eighteenth century operated according to the principles of the 
military revolution, the basic premise of which hinged on bringing as many 
men as possible onto the battlef ield. For every nation-state, mobilization 
occurred within a particular political economy at a particular moment in 
history. In the era of the Seven Years War, a rapidly commercializing economy 
spread across British dominions and created a surplus of labor that facilitated 
raising the army. England’s control of other political states, achieved through 
successive colonization of Ireland and union with Scotland, cemented by the 
repression of the Jacobite threat, enabled the expropriation of their wealth to 
fund military endeavors and the exploitation of their populations as sources 
of military labor, while commercialization of their economies along English 
lines freed individuals from ties to the soil and trades. The attempt to exer-
cise similar force in the American colonies, where labor scarcity prevailed, 
encountered more resistance from people less used to the yoke of British 
rule, whose economic activities relied upon the control of labor that could be 
sorely spared for soldiering. However, the financial might of Britain bought 
American compliance, particularly in the funding of the provincial regi-
ments, and colonists in the tens of thousands joined the fight against France 
either as regulars or colonial troops. Warfare for Britain thus required not a 
simple conjoining of state interest and military acumen, but rested upon the 
historical development of capital and ongoing class formation, enabling the 
fiscal-military state to colonize the resources and labor power of dependent 
polities. As a result, the nation could rely on volunteers to practice the art of 
war in its interests.

 Mobilization of warrior populations in 
the Ottoman context, 1750-1850
Virginia H. Aksan
Mustafa Vasfı Efendi of Kabud, a native of a village near Tokat, in Anatolia, 
Turkey, spent the years from 1801 to 1833 in Ottoman military service, 
f irst in Erzurum, as part of the troops under Dramalı Mahmud Pasha, 
then in Ağriboz (Euboia, Greece), where he signed on with Çarhacı (Chief 
Skirmisher) Ali Pasha, and then Ömer Vyroni Pasha, during the Greek 
Revolution. His simplistic, semi-literate description of battles, sieges, 
looting, and pillaging is one of the few pre-World War I Ottoman military 
memoirs we possess. The following passage is typical of the work, and is 
evocative of the life of one Ottoman irregular. Vasfı Efendi’s escapade here 
appears to have been a private enterprise, and evoked no discipline other 
than a scolding from his commander.
“The Janissaries, because they were on foot, soon fell behind”, he begins. 
“We, who had good horses, went on ahead. We were altogether eighteen 
horsemen. Anyway, we went off and arrived in an inf idel village.” They 
sat down under two mulberry trees, whereupon some local inhabitants 
approached them, and said: “We are afraid of you. We have wives and 
daughters on that mountain over there. If you give us protection, we will 
come down. We said: ‘the pasha has sent us and we have orders to protect 
you.’ The inf idels were extremely glad, went away and brought lamb and 
bread to us. About twenty to thirty women and girls came with them.” 
The cavalrymen grew afraid of being outnumbered, and isolated for the 
night, when they assumed the inf idels would slay them, so “[we] took the 
infidels, cut off their heads, captured these thirty women and girls, and took 
off.” They came upon a church, captured the inf idels who were inside the 
church, cut off their heads and hid in the church for the night. They found 
5,000 sheep beside the church the next day, and with sheep and captives, 
returned towards their camp. On the way back, an encounter with a troop 
of janissaries resulted in their losing captives and booty at gunpoint. “I had 
a girl and woman with me, and two mules. They [the janissaries] arrived, 
plundered all my possessions. I remained behind as a simple foot soldier.” 
Then, running into other janissaries, Vasfı pretended to be of their number 
and complained of his treatment by his comrades. A Kurdish servant of 
the janissaries addressed those who had abused him: “you have taken this 
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man’s possessions, slave girls, and severed inf idels’ heads. Things like this 
do not befit our corps. Now give this man his belongings.” Vasfı Efendi thus 
retrieved his booty, and returned to camp. His commander rewarded him 
with two coins for the heads, but chastised him that the deli horsemen 
(his regiment presumably) had no business advancing ahead of the main 
army corps.1
What was it to be employed as a hired gun, either enlisted irregular 
or mercenary, in the Ottoman military system? Embedded in Mustafa’s 
description is the problem that confronts us when we try to examine 
military labor in the Ottoman context. Inter-service rivalries, motivation, 
loyalty, and discipline – common problems for historians of all armies – are 
all evident in his account, which is predominantly a tale about military 
entrepreneurship. Over the long history of the empire, words such as 
deli, başıbozuk, sekban, sarıca, and levend, terms for bands of warriors, or 
semi-autonomous regiments, unpredictable and often lethal, have come 
to exemplify the breakdown of the Ottoman “classical” military after 1650. 
In the nineteenth century, the notorious başıbozuks (literally “broken-
headed” or “masterless” ones), Ottoman irregulars, were blamed for almost 
all disturbances, but especially the so-called Bulgarian atrocities which led 
to the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-1878. The extent to which the images of 
such irregulars are embedded in the public imagination of post-Ottoman 
national histories is one of the chief differences between the Ottomans and 
the other regions of our collaborative project.
This chapter will explore the ways in which the Ottomans conceptualized 
and utilized volunteer and contractual soldiers over time, especially for the 
period 1750-1850; I argue that, during one of the most diff icult periods for the 
survival of the empire, the Ottomans evolved from a largely commissioned 
state army (the janissaries and the timariots) into a federative military 
system that came to be dominated by semi-autonomous f ighters, f irst as 
auxiliaries to the traditional janissary/sipahi organization and then as 
entrepreneurial ethnic bands. This is John Lynn’s “aggregate contract army”, 
consisting of small numbers of state troops, mercenary bands, and private 
armies raised by provincial elites. Local off icials, in effect, had become 
military contractors, a system which empowered provincial households 
and sanctioned the perpetuation of a style and ethos of military life that 
1 Schmidt, “The Adventure of an Ottoman Horseman: the Autobiography of Kabudlı Vasfī 
Efendi, 1800-1825”, in Jan Schmidt, The Joys of Philology: Studies in Ottoman Literature, History 
and Orientalism (1500-1923) (Istanbul, 2002), I, pp. 284-285, quoted in Aksan, Ottoman Wars 
1700-1870, p. 298.
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persisted into the twentieth century. In what follows, I will schematize the 
kind of forces available to the sultans before 1700 and how they f inanced 
the system before turning to the changes evident after 1750 when the need 
for manpower became particularly acute in the northern frontier wars with 
the Russians. As the classical Ottoman military formations broke down, a 
large proportion of the Ottoman population became complicit in and tied 
to the Ottoman center through tax privileges and contractual obligations 
to supply the battlef ields of the empire.
Aspects of the pre-1700 Ottoman system
Prior to 1700, the Ottoman military system was based on three components: 
the janissary standing infantry, created in the fourteenth century and 
numbering some 20,000 in Süleyman the Magnif icent’s time (1520-1566); 
the f ief-based timariots, the sipahis, a cavalry class which could muster 
some 80,000 for imperial campaigns; and auxiliary troops raised locally, 
with well-def ined roles in skirmishing, guarding mountain passes, and 
garrison support for the Ottoman expansion, especially on the European 
frontier.2 The Ottoman strategy with newly conquered populations was 
to negotiate tax benefits based on the potential of local martial expertise 
and intelligence.3
The Ottoman Empire maintained such center/periphery relationships 
as a contractual, negotiated enterprise until the 1830s, a system which 
proved flexible as it accumulated new territories. While coercive in initial 
conquest, the extension of Ottoman power proved highly adaptive to widely 
diverse local situations, and attempted no real integration except as related 
to shari’a law and taxes. Using local systems of defense and awarding tax 
breaks were attractive instruments to frontier populations initially and, in 
the early days of empire, Christian as well as Muslim auxiliaries acquired 
2 The most recent assessments of the pre-1700 Ottoman military are by Ágoston, “Empires 
and Warfare in East-Central Europe”, and Murphey, “Ottoman Military Organisation in South-
Eastern Europe”.
3 Palmira Brummett, Nicholas Vatin, Gilles Veinstein, Hasan Karateke and Maurus Reinkowski 
have expanded our knowledge of Ottoman dynastic self-conception and projection as well, but 
there is much to do to put the Ottoman house in a comparative context as regards sovereignty, 
imperial designs, and military manpower. A recent work goes a long way to bridging the gap: 
Burbank and Cooper, Empires in World History. Birdal, The Holy Roman Empire and the Ottomans, 
is an example of new work on the eastern land empires. Also important are Brummett, “Imagin-
ing the Early Modern Ottoman Space”; Vatin and Veinstein, Le sérail ébranlé; and Karateke and 
Reinkowski, Legitimizing the Order.
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privileges based on their service in the military system. As time went by, 
“turning Turk” (becoming Muslim by conversion) was the route to power, 
whether you were Albanian, Bulgarian, or Serbian. Even then, apart from 
the devşirme, the slave tributary children destined for the janissaries, such 
conversions were largely voluntary.4
What motivated such populations? For the earlier centuries, the ghazi 
warrior, that is, the Muslim warrior whose motivation was solely ideological, 
was long argued as instrumental to the success of the Ottoman imperial 
drive for expansion of the Dar-al-Islam. Though challenged by new com-
prehensive views on the diversity of the ethnic and religious populations 
who collaborated with the house of Osman in the early years, the idea of 
the fanatical Muslim warrior remains prevalent in much of the literature.5 
The argument is made that the primary Ottoman social hierarchies and tax 
categories before 1750 were delineated around religion: Muslims and non-
Muslims. Non-Muslims were tolerated as second-class citizens who paid 
a poll tax (cizye) and were not allowed to serve in the military. The askeri 
(military) class, those who did f ight and achieved tax-exempt status, were 
nominally Muslim warrior populations. But it would be naive to insist on 
the Muslimness of men who surely were motivated by the same self-interest 
and social networks characteristic of all military environments. Self-interest 
is especially evident in the eighteenth century when the state came to rely 
more and more on irregular troops under the command of local provincial 
elites. Campaign headquarters on the European and Persian frontiers cer-
tainly operated as the Ottoman government-on-parade, and employment 
in the military was naturally a ritual of submission, an essential part of 
the Ottoman performance of sovereignty, but cash rewards, as indicated 
in Mustafa’s story, remained a constant incentive for participation in the 
Ottoman system until at least the 1820s.
In short, auxiliary or mobile warriors, Muslim and Christian, did have 
a fair amount of autonomy over their participation in imperial campaigns 
or postings at strategic fortress garrisons. Until the end of the eighteenth 
century, purging of the Ottoman forces of “infidels” was not part of Ottoman 
policy. That is to say, little systematic inspection about the “Muslimness” of 
4 This remains a much contested subject in the f ield. On conversion in the seventeenth 
century, see Krstić, Contested Conversions to Islam; David and Fodor, Ransom Slavery along the 
Ottoman Borders; Anscombe, “Albanians and Mountain Bandits”; Baer, Honored by the Glory of 
Islam; and Minkov, Conversion to Islam in the Balkans. 
5 Finkel, Osman’s Dream; Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650, 2nd edn; Barkey, Empire of 
Difference. See also Aksan, “Locating the Ottomans among Early Modern Empires”. For an as-
sessment of Barkey’s book and two others, see Aksan, “Turks and Ottomans among the Empires”.
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the Ottoman rank-and-file troops, whether in the janissaries, sipahi cavalry 
troops or the myriad auxiliaries, seems to have occurred. Declaring oneself 
Muslim often suff iced for certif ication and a piece of paper, such as the 
janissary esame (pay chit), or the six-month contract as part of a mercenary 
unit, guaranteed an attachment to the dynasty. This was particularly 
true of the provincial garrisons, where a web of military entrepreneurial 
networks coalesced around tax revenues and agriculture beginning in the 
mid-seventeenth century, which would have attracted local inhabitants in 
considerable numbers.
Call it Ottoman pragmatism or Ottoman secularism, there seems to have 
been a tolerance for notional Muslimness in these military milieus. Con-
versely, one of the great ironies of the Ottoman dynasty is that it expressed 
itself as most “Muslim” after the 1820s, precisely when shrinking territories 
made manpower shortages a potential problem, and put pressure on central 
Anatolia Muslim male populations. For the Ottomans, the need to mobilize 
volunteer warriors became paramount when empire-wide conscription 
or general mobilization was attempted in the nineteenth century, but the 
resistance to including Christians restricted the available population to 
Muslims, and the call to holy war ( jihad) seldom produced substantial 
numbers.6
The post-1700 environment
After 1700, the main obsession of the dynasty was the preservation of the 
Danubian, Black Sea, and Caucasus borders against the predations of the 
Russians, their chief and relentlessly successful foe. The need to defend the 
borders, which became a matter of survival, engendered different relation-
ships between the center and its warrior populations, two aspects of which 
are noteworthy: the mobility and utilization of diverse ethno-religious 
nomadic and warrior populations, and the expansion of the askeri (military) 
population via the redistribution of the wealth of the state. What is striking 
in this context, as compared to European armies of this later period, is 
the proportion of horsemen (cavalry) that continued to be available to 
the dynasty, either in state-f inanced auxiliary regiments, or as ethnically 
constructed warrior bands, as contrasted to the European battlefields where 
6 Hakan Erdem is very good on this: “Recruitment of ‘Victorious Soldiers of Muhammad’”. 
The year 1908 was the f irst time there was a mobilization of “citizens” regardless of religion or 
ethnicity. See also Aksan, “Ottoman Military and Social Transformations”. 
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warfare turned to armed confrontations of large numbers of disciplined 
infantrymen, and cavalry forces served very specif ic, increasingly limited 
functions. The obsession with the northern frontier battlefront arc also led 
in the Ottoman case to a neglect of the southern tier of the empire which 
allowed for the expansion of nomadic and mobile populations, such as the 
Bedouin and Kurdish tribes, who maintained autonomy by their original 
submission to Ottoman hegemony and payment of annual tributes to the 
central treasury.
Reşat Kasaba has recently theorized that the persistence of mobile popu-
lations was facilitated by the important roles they played, such as protecting 
the Hajj route caravans, and defending the Iranian border against Nadir 
Shah in the early eighteenth century. The failure to impose sedentarization 
on such tribal structures, however, ultimately caused the dynasty end-
less problems in the nineteenth century, especially in forging a modern, 
conscripted, and disciplined military force from such populations.7
By contrast, in both the Austrian and Russian contexts, f ixing the 
frontiers included efforts to settle what had once been zones of economic 
and cultural exchange where warrior societies dominated. As the work 
of Gunther E. Rothenberg and Carol B. Stevens has demonstrated, both 
Habsburgs and Romanovs strove to settle autonomous warrior populations, 
the former using Serbs and Croats for a military corridor, the latter engaging 
to tame frontier populations such as the Cossacks by establishing military 
colonies guarding the Russian territorial expansion to the south.8 The 
Ottomans faced a different problem. As the Ottoman Empire contracted 
after 1700, demobilized soldiers flooded across newly agreed-upon borders, 
and not all were absorbed, or could be absorbed, into the military environ-
ment. It is not insignif icant that all the Habsburg-Ottoman treaties from 
1699 on have specif ic clauses relating to how the two sides ought to deal 
with frontier-transgressing soldiers.9 The failure to settle demobilized 
populations such as the janissaries crossing into the homeland from Europe 
after 1700 is very signif icant, and virtually untouched in the research, the 
exception perhaps being Vidin, where Rossitsa Gradeva and her colleagues 
have ably described a city that shifted from being Ottoman hinterland to 
7 Kasaba, A Moveable Empire; Aharoni, The Pasha’s Bedouin, has interesting observations 
about the contrast between Ottoman (Mehmed Ali) and French attitudes to Bedouin tribesmen. 
8 Rothenberg, The Military Border in Croatia; Stevens, Soldiers on the Steppes; see also Stevens, 
Russia’s Wars of Emergence. 
9 Smiley, “The Rules of War on the Ottoman Frontiers”; Aksan, “Whose Territory and Whose 
Peasants?”
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Ottoman frontier garrison town after 1699.10 Thus, the Ottomans had both 
indigenous nomadic populations and unemployed, demobilized soldiers to 
contend with as they undertook to reform the military system.
The Ottomans attempted to change the rules regarding tribal/state rela-
tionships as the need for the manpower and revenues of Arab and Kurdish 
tribesmen became acute, especially in the long struggle with Mehmed Ali 
Pasha of Egypt over greater Syria from 1821 to 1841. Historians now generally 
allow that it is only then, when the Ottomans were trying to recover or 
integrate lost or tenuously held territories such as the mountainous frontiers 
of Albania or the Caucasus for the f irst time, that they can be said to have 
acted as an internal colonial power by civilizing such martial populations. 
The power of the tribal networks, paradoxically, is said to have expanded 
in direct proportion to the state’s interest in centralization and reform.11 
Stefan Winter’s project on the rural history of Ottoman Syria in the nine-
teenth century is particularly instructive about the Ottoman application of 
ethnographic labels to hitherto undifferentiated tribal groups as one aspect 
of Ottoman (re)centralization projects. These were the populations, not just 
Kurds and Bedouins, but also Albanians and Circassians, who remained 
f iercely martial and proudly autonomous until the early 1900s, upon whom 
the Ottoman dynasty came to rely for military labour.12
The expansion of the military population
How do we def ine an Ottoman subject of the askeri class at the turn of 
the eighteenth century? Recent, systematic work on the Ottoman idea of 
political households and the devolution of state wealth as tax farms has had 
10 Gradeva, “Between Hinterland and Frontier”. Géza Dávid and Pál Fodor have also edited two 
volumes on Hungarian-Ottoman military affairs: Hungarian-Ottoman Military and Diplomatic 
Relations in the Age of Süleyman the Magnificent and Ottomans, Hungarians and Habsburgs 
in Central Europe. A recent dissertation, by Tolga Esmer, “A Culture of Rebellion”, includes 
signif icant evidence concerning the breakdown of askeri-reaya categories following 1699, and 
especially in the long struggle between Selim III and Osman Pasvantoğlu of Vidin.
11 Kasaba, A Moveable Empire, especially ch. 4.
12 Makdisi, “Ottoman Orientalism”, discusses why the Ottomans should be seen as a colonial 
power in the second half of the nineteenth century; Winter, “The Province of Raqqa under 
Ottoman Rule”, forms part of an extended project underway: “Tribes and Voivodes of Ottoman 
Syria: A Rural History of the Early Modern Period”. See also Kühn, “Borderlands of the Ottoman 
Empire in the 19th and Early 20th Century”, with articles by Thomas Kühn, Isa Blumi, Ryan 
Gingeras and Charles Herzog. For the Yemen context, a late Ottoman colonial frontier, see 
Willis, “Making Yemen Indian”.
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a great deal to tell us.13 Tributary, clientage, and patronage relationships 
were essential to the initial conquests of Ottoman territories as well as to its 
later survival. In the seventeenth century, we see the expansion of elaborate 
and expensive household systems which often included military units that 
drew on the mercenary populations in the provinces. Such relationships, 
conceptualized as political households, were built on the ability to com-
mand coalitions of soldiers and slaves, led by charismatic families who 
acquired or wrested access to larger and larger parts of provincial revenues, 
and maintained networks of communication and influence in Istanbul 
as time went on. That the source of much of this manpower derived from 
captured slaves turned valued members of an extended family may be the 
unique aspect of the Ottoman context.
The greatest of the slave/political households was initially that of the 
sultan and his “sons”, the janissaries, and his harem. Emulating that 
household at the Ottoman center were “native” families of inf luence, 
organized similarly, and competing for the ranks of the ulema and the 
central administrative off ices. These could be made up of slaves (kuls) who 
might even establish their own slave household. Such was the household 
of Husrev Pasha, the notorious adviser of Mahmud II, whose Circassian 
slave household populated much of the late nineteenth-century Ottoman 
administration.14 All members of the ruling class derived some privilege via 
membership in these collectives, the askeri class largely writ, which meant 
an intensif ication of competition for access to the resources of the state.
Such political households, replicated on a smaller scale in the provinces, 
and including slave/client members, grew ubiquitous after the early seven-
teenth century. How this happened is just now unfolding as more and more 
regional archival studies are published. The redistribution of state revenues, 
from timars to tax farming, f irst annual and then life-term (malikane), as 
well as the widespread application of new, extraordinary taxes (avariz) 
to support lengthy military campaigns, empowered the growth of such 
local households who maintained representatives in Istanbul guarding 
the interests of the particular household. This trend most represents a 
similar devolution of state wealth in Bourbon France in the seventeenth 
century, as exemplif ied by the military f iscalism of the centralizing state, 
13 The most recent summary of the status of the research in Faroqhi, The Cambridge History 
of Turkey, III, The Later Ottoman Empire, 1603-1839, with articles by Bruce Masters, Christoph 
Neumann, Virginia Aksan, Carter Findley, Dina Khoury, and Fikret Adanir on the subject of 
political households and Ottomanization.
14 See especially C.A. Bayly’s introductory article, “Distorted Development”, in a volume of 
comparative essays.
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and the creation of a class of provincial off icials known as the intendants. 
In the Ottoman case, the beneficiaries of the new system appear to have 
been the janissaries. In other words, the sultans were forced to redistribute 
the right to collect the tax revenues of the empire in order to procure the 
large armies necessitated by the battlef ields of the late seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries.
To what extent this development accelerated the integration of the janis-
sary corps into provincial elites and/or caused the collapse of the sipahi class 
as a source of battle-ready manpower is still a question for debate.15 What 
is clear is that the eclipse of the sipahi class and the simultaneous loss of 
control over the size and discipline of the janissary forces diminished the 
Ottoman central capacity to organize warfare effectively. This required the 
introduction of other methods of raising manpower, which led gradually 
to the increased use of ethnically/regionally based autonomous bands as 
described above. Their loyalties lay with their patrons, their households, 
and their ethnic brotherhoods, but the source of their wealth ultimately 
remained tied to the continuation of the dynasty. Hence, many authors now 
refer to this period as the Ottomanization of the provinces, or the creation 
of the Ottoman-local class, or even as the reaya-ization of the janissaries. 
As Hülya Canbakal notes regarding the Ottoman seventeenth-century 
resemblance to European trends of the period: “modern state-formation 
now appears to have involved successive stages of centralism and provincial 
accommodation that resulted in the rejuvenation of the ruling class and 
allowed the state to capitalize on wider economic and political resources”. 
She adds, “In the Ottoman case, the acquisition of stipends, posts and tax 
farming contracts also made one an ‘askerī, as did claiming descent from 
the prophet Muhammad or entering a military corps. In other words, one 
dimension of the process characterized as Ottomanization overlapped with 
a formal transformation: the expansion of the ‘askerī.” 16
Canbakal’s askeri class, defined according to a survey of 1697, but rooted in 
long-time practice, included all those on stipends (preachers, prayer-leaders, 
scribes, trustees of charitable organizations, tax collectors and overseers, 
inhabitants of dervish convents, Quran reciters, and the like); semiprofes-
sional auxiliary troops; descendants of the Prophet; those providing special 
services such as falcon-raisers, mountain pass guards, bridge-keepers, mes-
sengers, share-croppers on state land, rice cultivators, sheep producers, 
15 As ably argued by Ágoston, “Military Transformation in the Ottoman Empire and Russia”.
16 Canbakal, Society and Politics in an Ottoman Town, pp. 62-63; Toledano, “The Emergence of 
Ottoman-Local Elites”; Raduschev, “‘Peasant’ Janissaries?”
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sheep and cattle dealers, copper miners, deputy judges, and city wardens; 
and f inally, janissaries and sipahis, that is, some 1,053 members or 36 per 
cent of all the households.17 The list reminds us of two things: that the askeri 
class was made up of far more than just “soldiers”, and that the competition 
for certif ication by the center, which in some cases required reapplication 
on an annual basis, must have been intense, necessitating the spidery webs 
of households and patronage connections described by Barkey.
What had happened to the f inancial status of the soldiers in the survey 
to move them to compete for local revenues as described? In brief, the 
timariot/sipahi cavalryman, the original free Turkic warrior who was 
essential to the success of the Ottoman dynasty, was rewarded by the as-
signment of noninheritable grants of land (dirliks) to support the soldier 
and his entourage on campaign. By the mid-seventeenth century, the yields/
tax returns on such assignments no longer suff iced to entice the sipahis 
away from their holdings to go on campaign, unless it was to preserve the 
holdings themselves, by responding to the command either to turn up at the 
battlefront or lose their entitlement. Their numbers averaged 50,000-80,000 
depending on the size of the campaign throughout most of the seventeenth 
and early eighteenth centuries, but clearly were on the decline. By 1768, the 
number of sipahis had become insignif icant in contrast to the numbers 
of temporarily hired troops, called levends, who were mobilized by local 
provincial families or off icials with central treasury funds. Orders for the 
mobilization of as many as 80,000 such troops were sent to provincial of-
f icials for the campaign on the Danube in 1769. Ahmed Resmi Efendi, on 
the battlefront at that campaign, noted that only a few old men claiming 
to be timariots appeared, and that the janissaries were demanding they be 
assigned a timar before they would f ight, yet more evidence of the competi-
tion over local resources.18
The janissary infantry system had emerged in the fourteenth century 
as a strategy aimed at creating a force totally dedicated to the security and 
perpetuation of the Ottoman house, in contrast to the voluntary commit-
ment of the sipahi cavalry. The janissaries added formidable matchlock/
flintlock f irepower to the Ottoman arsenal. The effectiveness of both the 
infantry and cavalry systems, however, diminished precipitously after their 
peak around 1650. In the 1560s, the janissaries numbered some 12,800; in 
1609 their ranks stood at 37,000, a number which remained fairly constant 
until it approached 70,000 in the protracted war with the Habsburgs from 
17 Canbakal, Society and Politics in an Ottoman Town, pp. 68-70. 
18 Aksan, Ottoman Wars, 1700-1870, pp. 53-57.
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1683 to 1699, and 61,000 a hundred years later in the 1768-1774 war with the 
Russians.19 We know of at least two instances when the janissary muster 
rolls were inspected: in 1688, 20,000 were struck from the registers; in 1771, 
some 30,000 names were removed.20
By the end of the eighteenth century, there may have been as many 
as 400,000 janissaries on the sultan’s payroll, but only 10 per cent of that 
likely exaggerated number could be described as campaign-ready. Sultan 
Selim III’s (1789-1807) encounter with the inflated registers is recorded in 
Ahmed Cevdet’s history. The sultan responded angrily when his advisers 
warned him that it would take decades to settle the claims and rectify the 
registers in order to accumulate salaries for new recruits: “My God! What 
kind of situation is this? Two of the barbers who shave me say they are 
members of the artillery corps! If we call for soldiers, we are told ‘What 
can we do? There are no salaried soldiers to go on campaign.’ Let others be 
enrolled we say, and we are told ‘There is no money in the treasury.’ If we 
say, there must be a remedy, we are told ‘Now is not the time to interfere 
with the regiments.’” 21 Cevdet, an admirer of Selim III, is clearly exculpating 
the sultan from complicity in the corruption evident in this story, but not 
those around him. The burden of janissary privileges and entitlements 
had become intolerable but resistant to reform because the entire ruling 
class was benefiting from the sultan’s largesse, much to Selim III’s chagrin.
Selim III abandoned the accession price (the gift bonus to his janissaries 
to secure their pledge of allegiance) because he had no money to pay for 
it. Certainly part of that had to do with central janissary salaries, most of 
which were paid out of the sultan’s treasury. The annual Ottoman budget 
of the later eighteenth century has been reckoned at somewhere around 
15,000,000 kuruş. I once tried to establish how much was handed out as 
salaries only to the Kapıkulu janissaries (infantry, artillery, armoury only) 
during the 1768-1774 war, and came up with an estimate for the war years 
1769 to late 1771 of 6,005,453 kuruş.22 That gives us at least an idea of what 
19 Ágoston, “Empires and Warfare in East-Central Europe”, pp. 128-129.
20 Aksan, Ottoman Wars, 1700-1870, p. 52.
21 “Looking at a recent register of ‘active’ artillerymen, in order to estimate the f inancing 
available for new recruits, he [Selim III] found that, of 1,059 troops listed, 33 were wounded, 90 
were assigned to the foundry, 90 to the rapid infantry corps, 76 to the f ire Ahmed Cevdet”: Tarih, 
1st edn, IV, pp. 265-266. The advisers, of course, were the chief benef iciaries of the corrupted 
muster rolls.
22 The two main defters (tax registers) are from the Prime Minister’s Archives in Istanbul, 
Maliyeden Müdevver MM5970 and MM11786. The payroll (in cash) was carted to the Danube 
battlefront in great caravans of oxcarts and counted when it arrived. 
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the largely dysfunctional f ighting force was costing the dynasty in wages 
during wartime, and does not take into account the provisioning of that 
same force which was, after all, just a portion of the assembled manpower 
estimated at 100,000 for that war.23
Such numbers do not generally include the janissaries assigned to the 
garrisons across the empire. These are the subject of our discussion here, 
as they are the least visible, often melting into the reaya and merchant 
classes and no longer able to be counted on as a f ighting force. We have very 
scattered information on the size and distribution of such forces, but a recent 
discussion of the problem gives one rather astonishing figure (from 1761-1762) 
of 55,731 central troops and 141,116 in the garrisons, for a total of 196,847.24
Garrison janissaries were normally paid out of the cizye tax, but the 
regiments in each of the garrisons had some autonomy over collection and 
management of their salaries. The ocaklık system (tax farms assigned to 
janissaries and local forces), while not universally applied, was certainly 
in play at the main garrisons in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
Tax revenues, such as the cizye, were organized as a tax farm for a particular 
garrison. Initially, it appears that the revenues were controlled by central 
off icials and the proceeds were sent for distribution to the regiment in each 
of the garrisons. Latterly, the collection and distribution of the revenues 
appear to have been in the hands of garrison off icers or other askeri of-
f icials. The janissaries and garrison regiments were self-governing, so it 
would be natural for them to acquire a certain f iscal autonomy as well, 
as is abundantly evident in the extant inheritance registers of the askeri 
class. By the end of the eighteenth century, such resources must have been 
considerably stretched, as Ottoman territories on the south shore of the 
Danube became the Russo-Ottoman battlegrounds, and the size of the 
garrisons increased. Belgrade, for example, had 4,917 janissaries in 1771, 
which cost 189,544.5 kuruş for wages and provisions. The cizyes in that case 
were drawn from fourteen different areas, among them Edirne, Sof ia, and 
Thessaloniki; by 1779, there were 6,036 janissaries, whose wages and provi-
sions cost 240,821.5 kuruş, again paid by cizyes drawn from all over Rumeli. 
Vidin, on the Danube, a true frontier fortress by 1700, had 7,863 janissaries 
in 1771, at a cost of 344,240 kuruş, drawn from nineteen cizye sources. By 
1779, there were 9,229 janissaries in the garrison, costing 416,813 kuruş, and 
the list of the cizye sources had climbed to twenty-f ive, with many of the 
places showing as unavailable (yok), an effect, no doubt, of the conditions 
23 Aksan, Ottoman Wars, 1700-1870, ch. 4.
24 Ágoston, “Military Transformation in the Ottoman Empire and Russia”, p. 304.
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of war.25 If, in fact, we accept the f igure of 5,440 janissaries at Vidin in 1750, 
recorded elsewhere, the evolution from a sipahi-based timariot force to the 
militarized population of janissaries is striking.26
By the end of the seventeenth century, the city of Aleppo, as another 
example, contained a large number of rank-and-file soldiers (beşes) engaged 
in all kinds of market crafts and transactions, including small amounts of 
money-lending, tax collection and market enforcement. Charles Wilkins has 
analyzed the ocaklık contracts of garrison members including one set up to 
pay the military unit stationed in the citadels of Kars and Ardahan, some 
considerable distance from Aleppo. Kars soldiers, mostly citadel guards, 
managed their assignments by subcontracting them as tax farms to resi-
dents of Aleppo, including janissaries and ulema, as a means of increasing 
their diminishing incomes.
Wilkins concludes that these soldiers could be likened to merchants of 
modest to middling wealth, who show up in the court records as property-
owners and money-lenders. The career of one Ali ibn Shabib (d. 1678) is 
instructive. He is f irst encountered in court records in 1640 as second-in-
command of a local garrison in the Aleppo region, probably of Arab origin, 
already involved in operating (renting) a watermill, and responsible for 
collecting certain fees his regiment owed to off icials in the city. By 1657, 
he is still recorded as the second-in-command of the garrison, is listed 
as a tax-collector with the high status rank of agha, but has also become 
a prominent member of the water miller’s guild of the city. As Wilkins 
notes, “The likelihood [is] that soldiers, as they took up trades and crafts, 
absorbed the cultural norms of their nonmilitary colleagues, thereby dis-
placing or weakening concepts of hierarchical command authority. This 
process was probably more important than the reverse, of merchants and 
artisans adopting military norms, since many of these made no pretense 
of pursuing military training and merely sent proxies when called to serve 
on campaigns.” 27
Damascus provides another example of the military diversif ication 
and expansion. In 1708, the Damacus governor was relieved of sending his 
usual contingent of janissaries (500) to imperial campaigns in exchange 
for charging the local military forces to serve as guardians of the Hajj 
pilgrimage caravans as described above, and sending a sum of money as 
an exemption fee (bedel), one more way the state might raise revenues for 
25 Prime Minister’s Archives D.BŞM 4274, dated 1185-1193 (1771-1779).
26 Gradeva, “Between Hinterland and Frontier”, pp. 340-341.
27 Wilkins, Forging Urban Solidarities, p. 197.
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military participation (or lack of it) from the provinces. The Damascus 
military population of the time included yerlis (local janissaries; elsewhere 
they might be designated as guards); the Kapıkulu or imperial janissar-
ies, ordered to Damascus after a major rebellion of the mid-seventeenth 
century; local mercenaries in the governor’s entourage, variously described 
as Anatolian levends, Kurdish musketeers, and North African mercenaries; 
and, f inally, the timariot cavalry, which had ceased to exist by the turn of 
the eighteenth century, with their estates likely reassigned to local ayans 
(warlords; provincial notables or elites) or janissaries. It is tantalizing 
to speculate that the mercenary population grew as the timariot/sipahi 
population declined.28
That the warrior populations came to be such a large part of actual cam-
paign forces testif ies to the Ottoman diff iculties with regulating military 
budgets, recapturing control over the monopoly on violence, and negotiat-
ing effectively with mobile, warrior subjects. As we have seen, there is 
much allusion to the problem in the literature, and signif icant work on the 
provincial families and economic factors contributing to their rise after 
1650. Very little empirical work has been published on the size, extent, 
and impact of the new means of mobilizing suff icient manpower for the 
battlef ields of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Janissaries 
consistently failed to show up for major campaigns and, when they did so, 
they clamored for lands vacated by sipahis as a means of support; bands 
of warriors, with regional and occasionally ethnic loyalties, increasingly 
replaced them as military labour. What is discernable in the information 
available to date is a further evolution from diverse, eclectic auxiliaries in 
1700-1750 and the increased reliance on ethnic warrior bands, for example, 
the Albanians, particularly during the f irst Russo-Ottoman War in 1768-
1774. The systems (janissary and levends, with the gradual disappearance of 
the sipahis) overlapped and intertwined until 1826 at least. The Ottomans 
moved to a conscript army in the mid-nineteenth century, but başıbozuk 
regiments were included as auxiliaries even then.
Auxiliary cavalry and infantry regiments 1700-1750
By the late seventeenth century, a provincial governor was expected to 
arrive on campaign accompanied by 200 of his private entourage and 1,000 
28 Uyar and Erickson, A Military History of the Ottomans, p. 108, based on the work of Abdul-
Karim Rafeq.
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to 2,000 levend recruits, both infantry and cavalry. By the 1720s, these latter 
were paid either by way of tax privileges (imdad-i seferiye, special cam-
paign taxes and/or cash) for the provincial governor or other local off icials 
(called kapı halkı); through tax farming; or directly out of the sultan’s purse 
(miri levendat). It was the local off icials, in other words, who had become 
military contractors. If statistics are to be believed, this system expanded 
a hundred-fold from the siege of Vienna in 1683 to the f irst Russo-Ottoman 
campaign of the 1768-1774 war. According to one estimate, 97,000 such 
soldiers participated in the 1769 campaign, meaning perhaps as many as 
100,000-150,000 levends may have initially been mobilized for the campaigns 
on the Danube and the Black Sea.29 Orders describing how they were to be 
mobilized, both infantry and cavalry, reveal the understanding of the state 
concerning their length of employment and salary, as well where they might 
come from and the problem of control over such troops.
For example, an order to the governor of the province of Anatolia is 
quite explicit. Beginning with the statement that their misbehaviour was 
the cause of much harm to the countryside, especially as they had not seen 
service and rations due to the lack of campaigns, the order announces 
the coming campaign with Russia, and the urgent need for manpower. It 
continues by extending an amnesty to any miscreants, and emphasizing 
the necessity of gathering them up for the spring offensive. Included in the 
order is the reference to the local provincial off icers (mutasarrıfs, governors 
of sancaks, subdivisions of a province) as responsible for the organization 
of the provincial troops.
Such orders were usually for companies (bölüks) of f ifty levends. Spelled 
out were the monthly salary, expressed in six months’ lump sums, or in 
two months for an extension, for passage to the battlefront, for fortress 
duty, etc.; a signing-on bonus (called a bahşiş, an incentive); a 10 per cent 
commission for the off icers; and a calculation of yevmiye, or daily rations. 
Except for their temporary status, these soldiers on paper were being treated 
in ways which approximated the janissaries. Exhortations were included 
that recruits be upright, handsome Muslims, and that they be guaranteed 
by their local communities, who would serve as their guarantors in the case 
of desertion. Local off icials were responsible for the selection of off icers 
(and often served in that capacity). There is no mention of arms in these 
documents, so one presumes that these recruits were to bring their own 
weapons, perhaps part of the explanation for the hefty signing-on bonus 
29 Aksan, “Whatever Happened to the Janissaries?”, p. 29, “Ottoman Military Recruitment 
Strategies in the Late Eighteenth Century”. 
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of 12 kuruş for an infantryman and 25 for a horseman, the difference likely 
to do with the possession of a horse. Monthly salaries ran at 2.5 kuruş. 
Equally interesting is the inclusion in these documents of expected rations. 
The levend infantryman at war was expected to need a daily intake of a 
double loaf of bread (100 dirhem or roughly 320 g), or 50 dirhem of biscuit 
(peksimed 160 g), and was allowed half an okka of meat (641 g); a half kile 
(12-13 kg) of fodder barley for the packhorses of f ifty men. The cavalryman 
was entitled to the same amount of bread, but only 100 dirhem (320 g) of 
meat, and additionally 100 dirhem of rice (320 g), 25 dirhem (80 g) of cooking 
oil or fat, and a yem of barley, roughly 6.5 kg per day per man.
In reality, most of this must have remained highly hypothetical, as the 
provisioning system for the campaign of 1769 broke down completely. 
Evidence at least of one effort to recruit such state commissioned regiments 
provides us with a good indication of the difference between expectations 
and reality. Historian Şemidanizade, serving as a judge in Tokat, in Anatolia, 
in 1771, was required to enlist 1,500 soldiers (he calls them janissaries, but 
they must have been levends) to be sent to Ochakov on the Black Sea. He 
picked 1,500 of 6,000 volunteers, rejecting both young and old, and organized 
some 1,500 for the battlefront. He later encountered some of the same troops 
in Sinop, and discovered that each company (of f ifty) had been reduced to 
eleven men and a commander. He was told that the Tokat governor had 
excused the men from service for a payment of 25 kuruş (the signing-on 
bonus given the men?), which they split and pocketed.30
On the battlefront in 1769, Ahmed Resmi observed the arrival of the 
troops from Anatolia. Clearly, he noted, the provincial governors recruited 
thieves and the homeless and then were held captive by them – at every 
hamlet or bridge-crossing, the men demanded salaries and bonuses and 
caused no end of trouble in the camp. While individual commanders arrived 
with enough men for a battalion, in three days, they could not raise even 
100 men. And even should the commanders bring the requested 500 or 1,000 
men, they continued to demand pay and rations for any participation in the 
war effort, and tended to wreak havoc on the countryside when left idle, 
especially as fodder and food became scarce.31
The reliability and loyalty of such troops were obviously acute problems, 
as determined by the financial stability and disciplinary control of the state, 
and whether it was able (or willing) to redistribute provincial revenues 
for the benef it of local off icials. By 1775, the term levend had assumed 
30 Aksan, “Whatever Happened to the Janissaries?”, pp. 31-33.
31 Ibid., pp. 34-35.
MobiLiZation oF Warrior popuLations in thE ot toMan contEX t, 1750-1850 347
such disrepute that it was expunged from the off icial vocabulary of the 
Ottoman documents but, as with other such labels, the term persisted into 
the nineteenth century. Other terms began to emerge, such as the older 
sekban, deli, and başıbozuk, which very often signified ethnic warrior bands.
Ethnic warrior bands 1750-1850
That is not to suggest that bands of levends could not just as well have 
been organized as local, ethnic, or regional companies. It is simply that the 
mobile populations discussed above start to appear in large numbers in 
the documentation after the 1770s as warrior ethnic groups such as Kurds, 
Albanians, and Circassians. While the levends, volunteer military labor, 
still have a whiff of the coerced about them, these warrior bands emerge 
as entirely autonomous guns-for-hire, like Mustafa Vasfı of Kabud cited at 
the beginning of this chapter, and are labeled with their ethnicity in an 
era when nationalism had begun to emerge as part of regional identities.
The f irst signif icant use of such warrior bands show up in the Morea 
Rebellion of 1770, when unrest and Russian instigation, along with the 
demands of the ongoing war, triggered a violent rebellion of the Greek 
Orthodox population of the Morea. The Peloponnese was yet another of 
the militarized frontiers I have described above, especially since it had 
been recovered by the Ottomans only in 1715. Vlachopoulou describes the 
emergence of a local class of Christian off icials, the kocabaşıs, who both 
collaborated and contested with the off icials of the new government and 
with the increased presence of the askeri class.32 The state records of this 
period indicate considerable unrest and a lack of stability around resources 
and tax-collection, much as we have seen elsewhere. In 1770, then Morean 
governor Muhsinzade Mehmed, charged with putting down the rebel-
lion of the Greeks, hired levends, most of who turned out to be Albanians 
previously destined for the Danube battlefront. Some 10,000-20,000 troops 
obviously disturbed the demographics of the peninsula, but also proved to 
be a disaster as, once they had brutally suppressed the revolt, they refused to 
leave and entered the contestation over local property and other resources. 
Muhsinzade Mehmed is said to have recruited some 75,000 troops from 
what Nagata calls mahalli kuvvetleri, or regional forces, to quell the revolt, 
32 Vlachopoulou, “Like the Maf ia?”
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and he did so by taking loans from the regional notables, which he off icially 
recognized as ayans.33
The 1787-1792 Russo-Ottoman war saw an increased use of such regional, 
contractual forces because the central janissaries were simply not prepared 
to f ight. For the 1790-1791 season, for example, Selim III reputedly could 
f ind only 6,000 combat-ready janissaries out of a reputed 30,000 in the 
city, and of those only 1,000 made it to the battlefront. The rest f led within 
a day’s march of Istanbul. The payroll records were packed with retirees 
and noncombatants, some 50,000 or more even after Selim III’s experiment 
with creating new troops, assembling perhaps 10,000 before the rebellion in 
1807 which removed him from the throne. Quite apart from the fraudulent 
records, the janissaries had legitimate complaints about arrears in their own 
pay, about the higher salaries given to the new troops, about the conditions 
of the barracks, about the insuff iciency of their rations, and about the state 
of the bread specially baked for the corps.34
Meanwhile, on the Danube, the blending of peasant and soldier con-
tinued apace, particularly during the 1787-1792 war. Demographic shifts, 
occurring multiple times in the long Habsburg-Ottoman-Russian struggles 
along the frontiers, had seriously altered the landscape of the Ottoman 
borderlands, and created large numbers of landless and masterless men 
as previously described. Serbian Orthodox peasants crossed into newly 
def ined Habsburg territories. Tatars and Circassians, chased from Crimea, 
moved into Romania and Bulgaria in the 1780s following the Russian uni-
lateral occupation of the former Ottoman territories, joining the janissaries 
already mentioned, who were in effect “coming home” after a hundred years 
of service in Hungary.
Selim III had little choice but to make use of such readily available 
manpower for the battlef ields of 1787-1793. He called upon the provincial 
power-brokers, such as Yanyalı Ali Paşa (of Iannina, Greece), Pasvantoğlu 
Osman Paşa (of Vidin), and Alemdar Mustafa Paşa (of Ruse, Bulgaria), to 
name but three, to defend the borders with their sekbans, the word which 
replaced levend. After peace was declared with Russia and Austria, these 
same locally raised armies were called upon to put down Pasvantoğlu’s 
ongoing bid for self-government in Vidin on three separate occasions, all 
of which failed. Pasvantoğlu died in his bed in 1807.
33 Nagata, Muhsinzade Mehmed Paşa ve Ayanlık Müessessi. The Albanians (Shkiptar) here 
described were likely Tosks of the mountainous region of Albania. 
34 Sunar, “Ocak-ı Amire’den Ocak-ı Mulga’ya Doğru”. 
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Tolga Esmer has vividly described the culture of anarchy and banditry 
– which had sekbans becoming kirca’alis (a place name that came to refer 
to particular bandits) and back to sekbans – that dominated the frontier 
from the 1750s onward. “[T]he borderlands allowed for new, alternative ways 
of making a living that spread like a contagion, eventually luring anyone 
from the humblest Rumeli Christians to the highest vezîr from Istanbul and 
Anatolia into Rumeli and into the networks of violence […]” 35
However one interprets the ethnicity of these troops, and f ixes their date 
of origin, the important aspect is that they are ubiquitous beginning in the 
Greek rebellion period (1821-1831). First and foremost, Mehmed Ali of Egypt 
derives from that context, and it was his own Albanian troops, sent to Cairo 
in the Ottoman f ight against Napoleon, who helped raise him to power in 
Cairo in the contest with the last of the mamluks. Jezzar Ahmed Paşa, com-
mander of the fortress of Acre, of Bosnian background and mamluk (Cairo) 
experience, was known for employing only foreign troops, and regularly 
hired, for multiple campaigns, mercenaries from the Maghreb, Albanian 
cavalry, and Bosnian infantry, as well as delis, who have been described as 
Kurds or Turkmen. He paid them well and with his army (perhaps as many 
as 4,000-5,000 troops of mixed origins) he successfully defended Napoleoǹ s 
assault on Acre as ally of the British. In cooperation with the imperial army 
that marched overland from Istanbul to Cairo in 1799-1801, Jezzar sent 
detachments of 500 Albanians from time to time to the imperial camp at 
Jaffa. William Wittmann, eyewitness to the British-Ottoman campaign 
to oust Napoleon’s remaining troops from Egypt, observed their comings 
and goings, commenting on how often the Albanians mutinied when the 
grand vizier tried to muster them, and how they frequently deserted. He 
notes particularly the ongoing quarrels between the Albanians and the 
janissaries, still very numerous, but impossible to recognize as the troops 
of old in a campaign which also introduced the f irst of Selim III`s reformed 
troops.36
The later extensive revolts of the Albanians derived, as suggested above, 
from the simultaneous effort to draw them into a recentralized state and 
conscript them for battles between Mahmud II and Mehmed Ali of Egypt. 
A f inal example of the persistence of the ethnic-band mentality and volun-
teerism is evident in documentation around the 1828-1829 Russo-Ottoman 
War where discussion among military planners indicates the ongoing 
35 Esmer, “A Culture of Rebellion”, p. 75.
36 Wittman, Travels in Turkey, Asia Minor, Syria and Across the Desert into Egypt during the 
Years 1799, 1800 and 1801, pp. 141-149.
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diff iculties of enrolling the Albanian Tosks in particular, of making them 
wear uniforms and of getting them to enlist either in the regular army or 
as basıbozuks. The many Albanian rebellions of the period are evidence of 
a resistance not just to the Ottoman effort to “colonize” them but also to 
the attempt to force them into a disciplined military environment. To what 
extent they might also have been national uprisings belongs to another 
discussion, but it is easy to see how the requirements of the besieged state 
and the last warrior populations of the Ottoman frontiers were inimical.37
The Fighting for a Living template
The Ottomans seemingly evolved from a slave/standing army/state com-
mission army to an aggregate contract to a conscript army. Can we assume 
that the countryside at large participated willingly (to the degree that that 
word can be allowed in early modern societies) in the war efforts, until the 
worsening of the economic capacity of the Ottomans to promulgate war 
made participation dangerous and unprofitable? So what made these bands 
continue to sign on?
Of our possible permutations for this project, I believe it is the entrepre-
neurial aspects, that is, the emergence of the world market economy in the 
seventeenth century, which drew much of the participation in this context. 
I think the Ottoman demand for manpower, and the easily accessible (and 
willing) labour market as the empire drew inwards are determinants of 
some of the policies and the behavior we can see. The records indicate that 
they were paid – in cash – or with rights to the tax revenues of the state, 
and found little to deter them from plundering their enemies or even their 
fellows.
To the list of our hypotheses for the emergence and dominance of state-
supported militias and warrior-band recruits in the period 1650-1850, I need 
to add another: because it was already a way of life which increased dramati-
cally with the shifting populations and worsening economic conditions of 
the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century. The political households 
that emerged were strengthened themselves by the system and reluctant to 
surrender whatever support (tax farms, extraordinary campaign taxes, and 
other privileges) that came with the military “contracts”. In other words, the 
37 Aksan, Ottoman Wars, 1700-1870, pp. 352-356; Anscombe, “Islam and the Age of Ottoman 
Reform”; Hakan Erdem discusses the thinking of the Ottoman commanders about how to engage 
Albanian chiefs and their soldiers in “‘Perf idious Albanians’ and ‘Zealous Governors’”.
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Ottoman need for manpower not only facilitated the emergence of powerful 
provincial notables, it also sanctioned the flourishing of a style of life for 
the individual warrior/soldier that persisted into the twentieth century.
I will leave you with a quote from a recent study of the early nineteenth-
century Greek/Albanian context. Lack of Ottoman systemic control over 
that region produced a particularly strong paramilitary culture, as we have 
seen, where “the development of strong patron-client relations seemed 
the only socio-political mechanism left for survival. Hence, despite their 
shortcomings as far as the maltreatment of the Greek peasants is concerned, 
men who bore arms in such diff icult times were highly respected by the 
agrarian population.” 38
In sum, post-1650 Ottoman military failures were largely administrative, 
not technological, and not so much organizational as economic. Just as 
Europe moved to social discipline and uniformity of its military forces, 
incorporating “native” troops in regimental fashion, the Ottomans went 
native, and came to rely on a federative, mercenary, or paramilitary force 
for the maintenance of its remaining territories on the Danube and in 
Greater Syria.
38 Karabelias, “From National Heroes to National Villains”, p. 266.

 Military employment in Qing dynasty 
China
Christine Moll-Murata and Ulrich Theobald
This chapter explores the military structures in China between 1650 and 
1900 from the perspective of labour history as devised by the Global Col-
laboratory on the History of Labour Relations 1500-2000. It will f irst present 
the basic structures of the Qing armies. There follows a discussion of the 
state of the art in research and the major issues and debates in this f ield. 
Finally, the authors assess trends and tendencies in the framework of the 
matrix of hypotheses developed within the research group Fighting for a 
Living.
The Qing armies, 1600-1911: a short overview
The Manchu Qing dynasty ruled China between 1644 and 1911. It originated 
from semi-nomadic groups of the Jurchen confederation who lived scattered 
across the today’s north-eastern Chinese provinces of Liaoning, Jilin, and 
Heilongjiang. These groups defined themselves as ethnically and cultur-
ally distinct from their mighty, numerous, and affluent neighbours in the 
south-west, the Chinese or “Han”, and began to refer to themselves as “Man” 
or “Manchus”.1 After 1600, their unif ier, Nurhaci (1559-1626), organized his 
followers into socio-military units or companies. Family members and 
dependants were also registered in the military households. As far as our 
knowledge goes, “followers” implies the entire population that had pledged 
allegiance to Nurhaci, voluntarily or by force. In 1615, these companies were 
off icially divided into the so-called Eight Banners. Not only the Manchus 
were grouped into these formations, but also Mongols, Koreans, and Chinese 
who had either lived in the areas north of the Great Wall or had submitted 
to the Manchus before they started their conquest of China proper in 1644. 
In 1635, Nurhaci’s son and successor Hong Taiji (r. 1626-1643) divided the 
Banners along ethnic lines, with a Manchu, a Mongol, and a Chinese (the 
latter also called the “Chinese-martial”) Banner assigned to each of the 
1 On the f luid and “inherently transactional” concept of ethnicity, see Elliott, The Manchu 
Way, p. 17. 
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eight, resulting in an actual number of twenty-four Banners. The Banners 
were assigned different colours, according to the flags and uniforms they 
carried into and wore during battle. Their organization was dissolved only 
after the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1912.
Precise and factual f igures are unavailable and are subject to much recent 
debate. Roughly speaking, the estimates for the entire Banner population, 
including men, women, children, elderly, and dependants (bondservants 
and slaves)2 range between 1.3 million and 2.4 million in 1648, and 2.6 
million to 4.9 million in 1720. The potential combat forces, that is, the entire 
male population between the ages of ten and sixty, may have been between 
300,000 and 500,000 in 1648, and 850,000 to 1.6 million in 1720. However, 
according to one source, only one in three men in a military company 
actually engaged in combat.3 The number of companies has been estimated 
as slowly increasing from some 200 in 1614, to around 500 at the time of 
the completion of the conquest and assumption of rule over the previous 
Ming Empire (1368-1644), and 1,155 by 1735.4 A competing estimate that 
assumes the higher f igures of companies given in the Qing statutes, 320 
Manchu, 131 Mongol, and 171 Chinese Banner companies in 1644, arrives at 
a total of 168,600 men, which can be broken down into 96,000 Manchus, 
39,300 Mongols, and 51,300 Chinese troops.5 The Banners also included a 
small number of Russians from the post of Albazin, of the peoples of the 
2 Bondservants (Manchu booi) were different from slaves (aha) in their status of being allowed 
to constitute special, hereditary bondservant companies attached to the Banners. Some of them 
played an important role in the management of the Imperial Household Department. Most of 
them were Manchus (in contrast to slaves, the larger number of whom were Chinese) and were 
aff iliated to other, socially superior Manchu households. Although part of the Manchu conquest 
group, they nevertheless occupied a marginal position that made them entirely dependent on 
the throne for their status. While slaves worked in the f ields, the booi were primarily used in 
domestic (and military) service. Evelyn Rawski and Susan Naquin are not so sure whether the 
bondservants were ethnically Manchu in their majority but instead say that they were Chinese 
captives from the period of conquest. See Elliott, The Manchu Way, pp. 81-84, 462 n. 95. See also 
Rawski, The Last Emperors, p. 167, as well as Naquin and Rawski, Chinese Society in the Eighteenth 
Century, p. 7.
3 Fang, “A Technique for Estimating the Numerical Strength of the Early Manchu Military 
Forces”, p. 204, based on statistics in the Baqi tongzhi. Late nineteenth-century observers speak 
of a strength of all Banner forces of 400,000 troops, 157,000 of them garrisoned in the provinces. 
See Heath, Armies of the Nineteenth Century: Asia, II, China, p. 28.
4 Fang, “A Technique for Estimating the Numerical Strength of the Early Manchu Military 
Forces”, pp. 208-209. Fang states that no new companies were established after 1735 (p. 204). 
Various estimates of the number of companies in the early period exist; most scholars agree 
upon the number of roughly 300 soldiers per company for the period before 1644; thereafter, 
one company was formed of 100 to 200 men of service age.
5 Luo, Luying bingzhi, p. 1.
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Solun, Daghur, Sibe, or Ölöd (formerly Dzungars), and troops of certain 
other Mongol tribes like the Chahar or Bargut. The Banner soldiers were 
mainly cavalry troops, but there were also infantry platoons and specialized 
musketeers and cannoneers, as well as a few garrisons of naval troops, 
both maritime and f luvial.6 The Banner troops displayed their highest 
eff iciency as combat troops in the initial phase of conquest of China proper, 
the territory south of the Great Wall previously ruled by the Ming dynasty.
The Ming armies, as David M. Robinson explains in this volume, were 
formally bound to hereditary service, but a variety of forms of mercenary 
employment existed as well. While it is diff icult to weigh the relative im-
portance of the two types of labour relations in military occupations, we 
can assume that such legal arrangements were not entirely superseded.7 In 
any case, the efforts of the Ming to hold out against the military challenges 
of the Qing and internal rebellions required large amounts of military pay, 
no matter whether the labour relations were tributary or commodif ied; 
or, rather, such efforts would have required large expenditures. According 
to the f iscal historian Ray Huang, even repeated tax increases after 1618 
remained, from a military point of view, a “slow and ineffectual mobilization 
of the empire’s f inancial resources”, which led to desertions to the bands of 
peasant rebels,8 or eventually to the Manchus. The garrisons of the capital 
Beijing had gone without pay for f ive months when the city fell in 1644.9
The initial phase of Qing conquest roughly corresponds to the period 
1600 to 1680. In a “second wave” of Qing conquest and expansion towards 
the north, west, and south-west (1680-1820),10 other – Han Chinese – armies 
became equally important as combat forces. This started out with the 
Kangxi emperor’s (r. 1662-1722) campaigns against the Russians in Albazin 
(1685-1686), against the Dzungars, a confederation of western Mongolian 
nomadic people in Central Asia (1696), and against Dzungarian influence in 
Tibet (1705-1706, 1720). In the middle and late eighteenth century, Kangxi’s 
grandson, the Qianlong emperor (r. 1736-1795) expanded the territory under 
Qing influence far into Inner Asia. Furthermore, he conducted military 
campaigns against what could be perceived as interior rebellions: in 1787-
6 Huangchao tongdian, p. 70.
7 Huang, “The Ming Fiscal Administration”, p. 153, points out that “In the early sixteenth 
century, mercenaries had already begun to outnumber regular members of the wei-so garrisons 




10 Crossley, “The Conquest Elite of the Ch’ing Empire”, p. 313.
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1788 against a rebellion of Fujian immigrants in Taiwan (which had been 
incorporated into the Qing empire in 1683), and in 1795 against the ethnic 
group of the Miao11 in the inland provinces of Hunan, Guizhou, and Yunnan. 
Although the emperor had styled himself “the old man of the ten completed 
campaigns”, “completion” implying “victory”, some of the campaigns against 
unruly border tribes and neighbouring tribute states ended in disaster 
or inconclusively, such as those against Burma (1766-1769) and Vietnam 
(1788-1791).12
After 1644, the Eight Banners were employed as garrison forces in most 
Chinese provinces, with the highest concentration in Beijing and on the 
northern and western borders and with the lower density in the east and 
south.13 The inland provinces of Jiangxi, Anhui, Yunnan, Guizhou, and 
Guangxi had no Banner garrisons.14 At all times, the Banner people were 
largely outnumbered by the Han Chinese, who by 1644 may have numbered 
between 100 million and 150 million, and by 1776 about 260 million15 as 
against a maximum of 4.8 million Banner people of all ethnicities.
For the defence of the Chinese interior, the Qing relied on an army of Han 
Chinese soldiers under the command of Han Chinese off icers subordinated 
to the Manchu superstructure of the provincial administration.16 This was 
the so-called Green Standard Army or the Green Battalions (luying bing).17 
Its f igures are usually assessed as three times higher than those of the Eight 
11 “Miao” is a rather general term for all non-Chinese ethnic peoples in south-west China.
12 Woodside, “The Ch’ien-lung Reign”, pp. 251ff., points out that the “ten campaigns” refers to 
the wars between 1747 and 1792, which were carried out, in chronological sequence in: 1747-1749 
against the Tibetan rebels in western Sichuan’s Gold River Valley (Jinchuan); 1755 and 1756-1757 
against the Dzungars in Central Asia; 1758 against Turkic Muslim rebels in eastern Turkestan; 
1766-1770 against the Konbaung dynasty in Burma; 1771-1776 once more in the Gold River Valley; 
1787-1788 against a rebellion in Taiwan; 1788-1789 against dynastic quarrels in Vietnam; and 
in 1790-1792 two expeditions against the Gurkhas of Nepal who had invaded Tibet. The 1795 
expeditions against the Miao in Yunnan and Hunan were not included.
13 Powell, The Rise of Chinese Military Power, p. 9, characterizes the garrison structure as 
semi-circles centring on Beijing; Elliott, The Manchu Way, pp. 94-96, describes four networks 
of garrisons guarding Beijing, the metropolitan area around Beijing, Manchuria, and the north-
western frontier, and the Chinese provinces as “defense chains”.
14 Elliott, The Manchu Way, p. 369, Appendix C.
15 Shepherd, Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier, p. 430, Appendix D3: “Area 
and Population of the Eighteen Provinces in the Late Eighteenth Century”, based on 1776 f igures 
in the historiographic work Qingchao wenxian tongkao, ch. 19 (1936 Commercial Press edn).
16 Powell, The Rise of Chinese Military Power, p. 12.
17 Luying is a special reading used for this term. The alternative reading is lüying. See Hanyu 
da cidian, haiwaiban (Hong Kong, 1993), IX, p. 924, and Xing, “ ‘Lü/luying’ de duyin”, p. 88.
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Banners.18 The role of the Green Standard Army is less well documented 
and researched than that of the Eight Banners. It is agreed that it drew its 
personnel from surrendered Ming armies,19 from volunteers, and from local 
corps.20 The Green Standards consisted of both marine and land forces. The 
main functions of the Green Standards were, besides f ighting in battle, 
those of a constabulary: patrolling on land and water, guarding government 
institutions such as granaries, capturing criminals and rebels, performing 
counter-insurgency activities, escorting important and precious convoys, 
such as copper for use in the provincial and capital mints or grain tributes 
for the capital, and transporting off icial mail and dispatches.21
The decline of this army commenced in the early nineteenth century and 
became sorely visible in the defeat during the First Opium War (1839-1842). 
This mid-century watershed stands at the beginning of the last phase of the 
Qing dynasty, which was marked by the struggle against internal enemies 
– the White Lotus, Taiping, Nian, and Muslim insurgencies, to name just 
the most important. In addition, the foreign intrusion that started with the 
First and was aggravated after the Second Opium War (1856-1860) led to a 
series of armed conflicts with the larger west European nation-states as 
well as the United States, Japan, and Russia, and culminated in the Boxer 
uprising (1900-1901), when the internal and the external problems of the 
Qing converged.
Already in the eighteenth century, village militia (xiangyong, “Braves 
of the Townships”) were occasionally recruited by the local magistrates 
of some regions. The permanent deployment of Green Standard troops 
to campaigns in the border regions had deprived these townships and 
districts of their constabulary forces. In order to keep up public security, it 
had become necessary to recruit additional personnel on an ad hoc basis. 
Not much information is available about the payment procedures and the 
level of payment for these militia troops during the decades around 1800. 
During the Taiping rebellion (1850-1864), this method was transformed from 
18 Luo, Luying bingzhi, p. 1; Elliott, The Manchu Way, p. 128; Crossley, Orphan Warriors, p. 117, 
who quotes the f igures 200,000 for Banner troops and 600,000 for Green Standard soldiers. 
This 1:3 ratio does not seem quite convincing in view of the more recent estimate by Elliott. 
However, with the important qualif ication that only one in every three Bannermen was actu-
ally called up to active service, this numerical relation seems to tally with reality. In the late 
nineteenth century, western observers quote the f igure of 400,000 Green Standard troops, as 
indicated by Prince Ronglu: Heath, Armies of the Nineteenth Century: Asia, II, China, p. 28.
19 Luo, Luying bingzhi, p. 13. 
20 Powell, The Rise of Chinese Military Power, p. 11.
21 Luo, Luying bingzhi, pp. 115-272.
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a temporary solution to standard practice to ensure the public safety of local 
regions, and another, new type of army came into being. These regional 
armies or yongying “Brave Battalions” (with a membership reckoned at 
about 300,000) were formed from several provincial armies that had stood 
under the command of powerful individual commanders, such as the 
Hunan army or the Anhui army.22 Western and Chinese scholars generally 
agree that these military organizations saved the Qing dynasty from an 
early demise – although they were supported by a small contingent of about 
3,000 mercenary European and US troops, the so-called Ever-Victorious 
Army, as well.23 Manifold attempts were made to reinvigorate the Qing army, 
combining Green Standard ranks and officers with Brave Battalion methods 
of recruitment and employment, and adapting to western weaponry and 
training methods. The increasing recruitment of non-military personnel 
to replace the traditional professional armies of the Eight Banners and the 
Green Standards led, in the eyes of some scholars, to a subtle militarization 
of the local government.24
Finally, as in the case of the Ming dynasty, arrangements with allied 
non-Han chieftains (tusi, “local administrators”) in the border areas who had 
accepted the suzerainty of the Qing emperors included that their soldiers, if 
necessary, would f ight for the Qing. This was less the case with the western 
Mongols and the Kirgiz who were generally held to be very strong and a 
match for the Manchus. In contrast, the native tribes of China’s south-west 
(the Miao), of Tibet, Taiwan, and the Muslim city-states of the Tarim Basin 
were dealt with in a time-tested method by “using barbarians against the 
barbarians” (similar to the tenet of divide et impera). This means that a 
submissive native lord or king (of “matured barbarians”) dispatched his 
own native troops to f ight against his neighbour or adversary (the “raw 
barbarians”). In many cases this was the preferable, because cheaper, method 
to pacify unruly tribes in the border regions. On the other hand, the col-
laborating native lord could enlarge his territory and probably would have a 
prestigious title bestowed upon him by the emperor. Yet this kind of indirect 
rule over the native tribes proved ineffective and thus was gradually given 
up in the course of the eighteenth century. Thereafter, the border regions 
conquered by the Qing were administered by imperial officials. The conquest 
wars in the south-western region were thus waged by three different types of 
22 Liu and Smith, “The Military Challenge”, p. 202; Heath, Armies of the Nineteenth Century: 
Asia, II, China, p. 28.
23 Liu and Smith, “The Military Challenge”, p. 202; Kuhn, “The Taiping Rebellion”, p. 305.
24 See Kuhn, Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China, pp. 211-225. 
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troops, namely Banner troops, Green Standard troops, and native or “ethnic” 
troops. A typical proportion between Banner troops, Green Standard troops, 
and native auxiliaries during an eighteenth-century war was about 1:10:3.25
State of the field and main debates
Though the study of Chinese military history is recently expanding in 
China as well as abroad, military labour during the Qing dynasty remains 
a relatively little-studied topic. The perspectives of ethicity, institutional 
history, military f inances, China’s frontier wars, and the debates on Chinese 
armies compared to armies worldwide offer important information and 
possible points of departure for the study of military labour in the early 
and mid-Qing dynasty armies.
Research into Manchu history has blossomed since the reopening of the 
First Historical Archives of China in Beijing, which houses the most impor-
tant collection of Qing central government documents. The Eight Banners 
as a social organization f igures prominently in this f ield. Important studies 
in English are Pamela Kyle Crossley’s Orphan Warriors (specif ically the 
chapter entitled “The Conquest Elite of the Ch’ing Empire”), Mark Elliott’s 
The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial 
China, and Joanna Waley-Cohen’s The Culture of War in China: Empire and 
the Military under the Qing. These scholars revise previous convictions 
about the Qing dynasty, which saw the Manchus as largely adapting to 
Chinese culture, especially to Chinese methods of civilian administration. 
The main intention of this new approach to Qing history is to demonstrate 
that a complex process of reciprocal influences continued throughout the 
Qing reign. In their analyses of the role of ethnicity within the Banners, 
this approach makes clear that the Manchus did not constitute a majority 
in the Banners, (and in some Banner garrisons in particular), so that it is 
not appropriate to simply equate “Banners” with “Manchus”. Crossley’s 
study on the conquest elite stringently analyses the fate of the Han Chinese 
or Chinese-martial within the Banners.26 The Chinese-martial, who had 
chosen to identify with the new rulers (but some of whom actually had 
Jurchen or Korean origins),27 were not treated as equals. Within the Banners 
they lost prestige and credibility when three powerful Chinese-martial 
25 Theobald, “The Second Jinchuan Campaign”, p. 108.
26 Crossley, “The Conquest Elite of the Ch’ing Empire”, pp. 321-326, 339-345.
27 Ibid., p. 321.
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generals, Wu Sangui, Geng Jingzhong, and Shang Kexi, who for their help in 
the conquest of the Ming empire had received large territories in southern 
China, later betrayed their allegiance to the Qing in order to establish 
independent dynasties of their own. The three generals were defeated in 
the War of the Three Feudatories (1673-1681).
Further armed resistance against the Manchus arose from several de-
scendants of the Ming dynasty who established the ephemeral Southern 
Ming Dynasty (1644-1662), and from Ming loyalist generals who wielded 
power in central and southern China. The last Ming loyalist polity under 
the rule of the Zheng clan was defeated on Taiwan in 1683. The incorpora-
tion of the island into the mainland province of Fujian marks the f inal 
consolidation of Qing rule in China.
Elliot in The Manchu Way makes important points about the reasons 
why the Banner people, although they were styled as “martial elites” by 
the emperors and the central government, became impoverished in the 
course of the dynasty. This was due to two reasons: the Banner population 
increased, and some Han Chinese falsely claimed to belong to the Banners 
in order to enjoy the support of the state.28 Therefore, the Qianlong emperor 
incrementally expelled the Chinese-martial Banner households from the 
Banner structure so that in the nineteenth century the equation of Banner-
man and Manchu corresponded to reality.29 The state shouldered increas-
ingly larger burdens for the upkeep of these warriors and their dependants. 
In a study on the military expenses in the Qing dynasty, Chen Feng cites 
f igures for the Xi’an garrison in 1735 that suggest that the expenses for 
the support of Banner families and horses were much higher than those 
for the soldiers and off icers.30 According to Elliott’s estimates, as much as 
one-quarter to one-f ifth of state revenues was used for the living expenses 
of less than 2 per cent of the population.31 In comparison, the expenses for 
the Green Standard Army, with about three times the personnel of the 
28 For the “genealogical turn” in the early eighteenth century, when stricter proof of Banner 
descent was demanded, see Elliott, The Manchu Way, pp. 326-333.
29 Ibid., pp. 342-344.
30 Chen Feng, Qingdai junfei yanjiu (Wuhan, 1992), p. 47, tables 2-12, cited in Elliott, The Manchu 
Way, pp. 310-311, calculated that 42 per cent of the expenses in silver went on the wages of soldiers 
and off icers, 20.5 per cent for household dependants, and 37.5 per cent for horses; 7.4 per cent of 
the grain disbursed was for off icers and soldiers, 90.5 per cent for household dependents, and 
2.1 per cent for the horses. 
31 Elliott, The Manchu Way, p. 311.
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Banner Army, were higher in absolute terms but, at 27 to 32 per cent of state 
revenue, much lower proportionally (if the 3:1 ratio is correct).32
More economical ways of maintaining the Eight Banners might have 
been possible. The options would have been, for instance, to relax the ban 
on Banner people taking up occupations other than serving the state, or 
to assign land in military colonies to the Banner people where they could 
have organized their own upkeep. But the Qing state had other priorities, 
so that the role of the Banners changed from being mainly f ighters to the 
display of the presence of the ruling elite in the capital and in the provincial 
garrisons.33
Monographs and studies on the Green Standard Army as an institution 
are much rarer than on the Eight Banners. In 1945, Luo Ergang (1901-1997), 
an eminent specialist on the Taiping rebellion, published a monograph 
which still is cited as authoritative in present-day scholarship. Since his 
focus is on the Taiping rebellion, the largest uprising in the Qing dynasty, 
his particular interest was in the decline of these armies, which proved to be 
quite ineff icient by the 1850s, and their replacement by the new provincial 
forces.
The differences between the Green Standard Army and the Eight Ban-
ners, and ultimately the question of why the Qing maintained two inde-
pendent armed forces, have long preoccupied military historians. Scholarly 
consensus exists that, by the time of the Taiping rebellion, both were in bad 
shape, poorly equipped, with low morale – with the qualif ication made by 
Crossley in Orphan Warriors that the British were amazed at the f ighting 
spirit which the Manchus displayed during the attack on the garrison of 
Zhapu near Shanghai in an episode of the First Opium War.34 The Manchus 
and the peasant population fought with “sticks, stones, rusted swords and 
wick-f ired matchlocks” against old-fashioned, but still functional British 
flintlock rifles; hence their resistance was doomed.35
As for the differences between the two kinds of armies, Luo Ergang points 
out that the Eight Banner Army was concentrated in fewer garrisons, while 
the Green Standards were widespread over the entire country, and unlike 
the Eight Banners they were present in every province. The tasks of the 
Green Standards were more varied, and lowlier than those of the Banners, 
so that there was a clear hierarchy, also and especially in the pay scale, 
32 Ibid., p. 310.
33 Ibid., p. 311.
34 Crossley, Orphan Warriors, p. 117.
35 Ibid., p. 118.
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between the two.36 Luo emphasizes that, nevertheless, the Green Standards 
served more important functions than the Banners: their numbers were 
greater,37 and they were the better f ighters.38 There is a certain tendentious-
ness in this assessment. It was made at a time when the prestige of the Qing 
dynasty and its ruling elite, the Manchus, was at a very low point. This 
also highlights what may seem, in contrast, the somewhat apologetic and 
perhaps romanticizing nuances in the great interest in the Eight Banners 
shown in present-day China. The Qianlong emperor had already perceived 
that there was a gap between the claim that the Manchus were warriors 
dedicating their life to hunting, sports, and battle, and the fact that fewer 
and fewer Manchus were able to hit the target in archery contests and to 
speak Manchu. Yet when it came to substantial failure in war, the blame 
was often shifted to the “cowardly” Green Standard units that deserted 
rather than to f ight the enemy.39
The native troops were even less reliable because they often had family 
relations with those they had to battle against. Most military successes of 
the Qing armies in the eighteenth century were made possible only by the 
massive deployment of elite Banner troops from Beijing (the Firearms and 
Scouting Brigades) and the garrisons in the north-east, the homeland of 
the Manchus. Also among the elite troops were the Ölöd Mongols who had 
submitted to Qing suzerainty during or after the conquest of the Dzungars. 
Thus, troops marching from Ili in the far west and from Aigun on the banks 
of the Amur River in the north-east covered thousands of miles to reach 
the battlef ields in Sichuan, Burma, Taiwan, or even Nepal. The wars of 
conquest in Dzungaria were predominantly waged by Banner troops. There 
is evidence that suggests that the Banner troops did not simply stay in the 
back while the Green Standard troops served as “cannon fodder”. While 
the proportion of Banner troops to Green Standard troops serving in a 
war was typically 1:10, some examples demonstrate that the proportion of 
36 Luo, Luying bingzhi, p. 6.
37 Ibid., p. 7.
38 Ibid., p. 9.
39 See, for example, the f irst assessment of the disaster of Mugom in 1773, when a large camp 
was surprised and conquered by the enemy. The blame was laid on the “faint-hearted” Green 
Standard troops. Instead of executing all of them (amounting to several thousand men), the 
emperor spared their lives as he realized that they had to be supported and induced to f ight 
by more contingents of Banner troops. See Pingding Liang Jinchuan fanglüe (Siku quanshu, 
Wenyuange edn, digital version Zhongguo jiben guji ku, 65, edict of Qianlong 38/7 [s. l. 6]/
dingyou=9 (this citation refers to the ninth day of the seventh lunar month in the year 38 of the 
reign of the Qianlong emperor, or 28 July 1773)). 
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deaths on the part of off icers in the Banners was 3:10 or even 7:10.40 If this is 
a representative sample, this would mean that proportionally many more 
Banner off icers died for their emperor and for fame and glory than their 
colleagues in the Green Standards.
Due to the enhanced accessibility of archival documents, issues of 
military f inance and logistics offer a large f ield for new inquiries into Qing 
military history. The ground-breaking study by Chen Feng has already 
been mentioned. Recently, important publications in English have been 
produced by Dai Yingcong.41 At least as much as the study on ethnicity, this 
monetary aspect relates to military labour in many ways. Dai Yingcong’s 
work on the Gold River (Jinchuan) campaigns is especially explicit about 
labour conditions. Her studies highlight two distinct trends that stand in 
close relationship to labour conditions and labour relations: the Qing state at 
least formally put an end to corvée obligations, although they could remain 
disguised below the surface of general tax duties. In the Gold River cam-
paigns, military employment was for the f irst time completely organized as 
large-scale hired labour. Dai Yingcong quotes a f igure of 462,000 military 
labourers recruited in the six years of the second campaign (1771-1776) as 
against 129,500 warriors. The workers were mainly porters, since the Qing 
armies carried all their provisions and the silver for the soldiers’ and officers’ 
wages with them.
The second trend was the increasing involvement of merchants or, in 
other words, the representatives of the market in military f inance. Alex-
ander Woodside has emphasized this on a much more general level, by 
labelling the Qianlong emperor as “the big merchants’ emperor”.42 Mer-
chants subsidized the Gold River campaigns and the later wars against the 
Gurkhas with millions of taels of contributions (a kind of tax equivalent 
to the regular taxation of entrepreneurship that was not levied),43 and this 
social group, much more than the imperial bureaucracy, organized the 
logistics of the second Gold River campaign. These two trends went hand 
in hand. Although this did not concern the warriors, it may well have been 
that the example of the Banner and Green Standard soldiers, who did receive 
wages, stimulated the recruitment of military labourers who were to receive 
40 Theobald, “The Second Jinchuan Campaign”, p. 137.
41 Dai, The Sichuan Frontier and Tibet, esp. ch. 6, and “The Qing State, Merchants, and the 
Military Labor Force in the Jinchuan Campaigns”.
42 Woodside, “The Ch’ien-lung Reign”: “the salt merchants’ emperor” (p. 240), “the big mer-
chants’ emperor” (p. 241), “merchant-loving emperor” (p. 267), or the Qianlong period as a “reign 
of plutocracy” (p. 239).
43 Ibid., p. 273. One tael of silver equals about 37.5 grammes at 95 per cent purity.
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wages and food provisions like the soldiers. The emperor, despite the im-
mense assistance the private hiring of porters provided the supplying of 
the troops, did not want to use the procedures of the Gold River campaign 
as a precedent for future wars. Off icially, the problem was not the price of 
labour, since the logistics managers learned soon that it was as expensive 
to have an entrepreneur ship the rice as to have this done by the local 
magistrates. The core of the problem was rather the professed systematic 
mistrust of private entrepreneurship from the central government, which 
was convinced that supplying the army should remain per definitionem a 
task of local government. Yet it is not easy to assess how many of this type 
of statement decreed by the emperor were purely rhetorical, or to what 
extent the emperor’s mistrust was instead targeted towards an eventual 
embezzlement of funds which, as the logistics managers claimed, were 
necessary to pay the “expensive” private entrepreneurs.
Perusal of specif ic cases, if they have generated as much paperwork 
as that of the Gold River campaigns, can shed light on processes in the 
organization of military labour. These would remain hidden if the normative 
statutes and regulations about military organization alone were studied. 
Most of the campaigns of the Qianlong emperor are well documented and 
have left information, including such about military labour and service, 
which can be applied for further research. For instance, one topic is whether 
the f irst Gold River campaign (1747-1749) really was the one in which hired 
labour was engaged for the f irst time.44
Recently, the conventional wisdom that Chinese civilization was dis-
tinctly civilian and anti-military in outlook is being revised by several 
authors, for instance by Harriet Zurndorfer, Rui Magone, and Hans van 
de Ven.45 It is correct that, for extended periods of time, it was centralized 
imperial power that prevailed in China rather than military competition 
between small states and polities, as in Europe. However, this does not mean 
44 The regulations for war expenditure in the Junxu zeli (Xuxiu siku quanshu edn), Hubu junxu 
zeli, ch. 5, claim that the two Gold River campaigns were the sole instances when merchants were 
hired to procure and transport grain for the troops. Yet there is some evidence that as early as 
1735 merchants were assigned to transport grain to the camps; see for instance Pingding Junggar 
fanglüe (Siku quanshu, Wenyuange edn, digital version Zhongguo jiben guji ku), Qianbian (First 
part) 39 (YZ 13/10/jiashen=19 [2 December 1735], 12/wuzi=23 [4 February 1735]), Qianbian 42 (QL 
1/6/dinghai=28 [28 January 1737]) or Qianbian 44 (QL 4/4/yiyou=9 [16 May 1739]). Merchants or 
owners of camel herds were apparently able to ship grain at a lower price than the government 
with its “off icial camels” (guantuo).
45 Zurndorfer, “What Is the Meaning of ‘War’ in an Age of Cultural Eff lorescence?”; Magone, 
“Die Dichotomie von Zivilem und Militärischem in der Qing-Dynastie”, pp. 18-23; van de Ven, 
“Introduction”.
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that military organization was unimportant at any time in Chinese history.46 
The idea that it was the prevention of warfare and “victory without war” that 
preoccupied the Chinese, rather than warfare aiming at decisive victory and 
the annihilation of enemy forces, is being discredited.47 At the same time, 
the often cited Chinese proverb that “a good man doesn’t become a soldier, 
good iron is not made into nails”, points to a preference for the civilian 
sphere that lasted for hundreds of years. It stands in conjunction with lesser 
prestige for military than for civilian occupations and leadership functions. 
Such ideas were overcome in periods of dynastic or systemic change as in 
the twentieth century. Yet in view of the present brush-up of the military 
image, it seems necessary to keep the focus on the actual priority that was 
given to civilian off ice until the twentieth century.
Labour relations in Qing dynasty military occupations
Military labour can occur in all of the three great categories described in 
the taxonomy developed by the Global Collaboratory on the History of 
Labour Relations: namely reciprocal, tributary, and commodified. Recipro-
cal labour implies that workers provide labour within the household and 
the community. In most parts of the world from 1650 to 1800, this consisted 
of agricultural labour and mostly unpaid household work. However, it can 
also apply in some hunter-gatherer village communities, where defensive 
and hunting duties might form part of the (mostly) male life cycle. At the 
borders of Qing China, such arrangements are known in the Taiwanese 
indigenous population, where boys and men between age six and forty were 
expected to serve their community in this type of occupation.
In larger polities that cannot be regarded as part of the extended family, 
the labour power of the populace is often considered to be the property of 
the state or feudal and religious authorities. This work is not commodif ied, 
and the respective labour relations have been designated as “tributary”. 
For military labour, this type of labour relation can be found in military 
conscription, military corvée, and obligatory supply services of all kinds. 
A third category consists of commodif ied labour. This is the case if an em-
ployer acquires labour power and usually pays for it. In the case of military 
labour, mercenary troops and commissioned armies belong to this type.
46 Van de Ven, “Introduction”, p. 11.
47 Ibid., p. 2, citing Geoffrey Parker.
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If applied to the armies of the Qing dynasty, the specif ic situations need 
to be assessed separately for the Eight Banners, the competitors to the 
Banner Armies in the Ming-Qing transition, the Green Standard Army 
supply services, specialists, civilian off icials, militia troops, the Taiping 
army and provincial armies, and the new armies established after 1865.
The Eight Banners constitute an example of polyethnic, tributary labour 
that was a “hereditary privilege”,48 rather than an onerous obligation. The 
court had taken the political decision to support this “conquest elite” in 
money and kind, even if they were not active in military or civilian service.49 
Banner people were not supposed or allowed to take up occupations other 
than service for the state. This could be military for combat or garrison duty, 
but also civilian.50 It was only near the end of Qing rule, in 1863, that the 
ban on market-oriented occupations was off icially lifted.51 In other words, 
this type of labour was not entirely free, since it was linked to descent, and 
formally options other than service were not allowed.
While the Green Standard troops also supervised the postal service, 
patrolled cities and spots of strategic importance, caught bandits, and sup-
pressed rebellions, the Banner troops were mainly deployed to wage war. Yet 
there were also exceptions like the Guards Brigade in the capital which had 
to provide personnel to protect the imperial palace. Banner troops were not 
generally used when a crisis erupted. Most wars began as a local problem 
of unrest or an imminent threat to a particular locality. Therefore, the f irst 
troops to be dispatched were Green Standard troops, not Banner troops. If 
a local crisis expanded into a war, it was still considered a local affair for 
which the governor-general of the respective region was responsible. In 
such cases Banner troops from the local Banner garrison(s) were dispatched 
to support the Green Standard units. Yet the Banner garrisons were quite 
small and could mobilize only a small number of troops. If not suff icient, 
Green Standard troops from other provinces were also sent for assistance. 
In contrast, elite Banner troops from the capital and the north-east were 
sent to the war theatre only if really necessary. Bannermen, although more 
expensive than Green Standard troops, also proved to be more effective. The 
designations of particular Banner platoons (like huoqiying “Firearms Bri-
48 Elliott, The Manchu Way, p. 308.
49 Compare ibid., p. 201, who points out that, if the Banner people failed to f ind work, it had 
to be found for them, “by way of pretext for the payment of a salary”.
50 Crossley, “The Conquest Elite of the Ch’ing Empire”, p. 318, who lists work as “salaried 
policemen, foot soldiers, scribes, teachers, porters, and accountants in the segregated urban 
garrison communities” as typical occupations of the Banner people.
51 Elliott, The Manchu Way, p. 311.
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gade”, pao xiaoji “artillerymen”, or niaoqiang canling “musketry regimental 
commander”) in the Qing statutes date from the early eighteenth century. 
Therefore it is not certain how many troops had muskets, cannons, and 
howitzers, and how many of them had to f ight with bows and arrows. The 
latter were seen as genuinely Manchurian and were of great use in the wars 
against the Dzungars. The copper-plate engravings52 depicting the victories 
of the Qing show a high number of mounted archers, but also musketeers, 
gunners, and sword-fighters. Gunnery seemed not to have been a monopoly 
of the Artillery Brigade in the capital. Guns or howitzers were in many cases 
cast on the spot, for which purpose experts had to be available.
When dispatched to the battlef ield, Banner troops were given so-called 
baggage pay (xingzhuangyin) that was different for each off icer rank. It 
was higher for Banner troops from the north-east than for those from the 
provincial garrisons elsewhere, but lower than the baggage pay for the 
troops from the capital. On the way to the theater of war and in the f ield, 
the troops were given a so-called salt-and-vegetable (or “salted vegetable”) 
pay (yancaiyin) to buy food. The regulations concerning the baggage pay, 
the salt-and-vegetable pay, and the number of menservants and horses an 
off icer versus a common soldier could dispose of were extremely complex. 
In the beginning, the regulations differed from province to province, 
and there were many imbalances so that by the late 1770s the emperor 
ordered the compilation of a nationwide code of regulations for military 
expenditure, the Junxu zeli. The level of payment in this code was generally 
somewhat higher than before. The baggage pay was a quite high amount 
and was roughly equal to one year’s salary. It could be paid out to the family 
that remained in the home garrison, but it could also be forwarded to the 
destination where it was paid out in the camp. From this money, the soldier 
had to acquire weapons, clothing, a tent, and a horse, but there also was 
suff icient money left over to pay back his debts.53 No wonder a war was 
seen as an ideal opportunity to make money. The salt-and-vegetable pay 
was not very high. It was meant to be just suff icient to still hunger and to 
regenerate physical strength. Alongside this, everybody was given a f ixed 
amount of rice (about one litre) per day. The distribution of rice was to 
prevent the tendency to save money instead of spending it on food. Yet 
there were also cases reported where troops sold their rice in order to earn 
52 Examples of monochrome battle pictures can be seen at: “The Battle Copper Prints”, owned 
by Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, electronic publication http://crossasia.org/digital/schlachten-
bilder/index/english-start (accessed 20 October 2013).
53 On the f inancial situation of the Bannermen, see Elliott, The Manchu Way, pp. 313-322.
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some cash.54 The duration of service is not easy to assess. Banner troops 
had a lifelong obligation to serve, but their actual service in war depended 
on the location of the garrison and the length of the campaign. Troops 
from the coastal provinces were very rarely involved in wars: only during 
those against Burma, Taiwan, and Vietnam. The garrisons with the highest 
potential to be activated for campaigning were located in Shaanxi, Gansu, 
Sichuan, Hubei, Hunan (the “belly of the empire”), the capital Beijing, and 
the north-east. The longest single campaign of the eighteenth century was 
the second campaign in the Gold River region, which lasted for f ifty months. 
Furloughs were totally unknown, unless a soldier was wounded. In this case, 
he was granted three months’ leave, and he could also return to his home 
garrison during that time. The Banner troops served thirty-one months 
on average, Green Standard troops thirty-eight months, and native troops 
forty months.55
The bondservants, who served, among other obligations, as supply forces 
for the Eight Banner soldiers and off icers, were less free than the warriors, 
but some among their ranks could gain great personal influence and wealth. 
For instance Cao Yin (1658-1712), the director of the Imperial Silk Weaveries 
in Nanjing and concurrently supervisor of salt production and distribution 
in central China, gained those important civilian positions due to his close 
personal relationship to the Kangxi emperor.56 Yet few bondservants rose 
that high. Most spent lives dependent upon their Banners and the household 
they were assigned to. Elliott gives f igures of the ratios of dependants per 
employed Bannerman as 10:1 in locations with lesser work opportunities, 
but for Beijing about 5:1.57
Not all dependants were bondservants. One group that stood even lower 
in the hierarchy were the slaves that were assigned to specific Banner house-
holds which they could not leave. However, social mobility was possible. 
Thus, many slaves could rise to the ranks of bondservants.58 The specif ic 
tasks of the dependants of Bannermen in warfare still need to be explored. 
However, a few words can be said about the special type of manservant 
(genyi, literally “follower servant”)59 that each warrior (off icer or common 
54 Pingding Liang Jinchuan fanglüe, 57, fols 25b-26b (QL 38/r3/dinghai=28). 
55 Theobald, “The Second Jinchuan Campaign”, pp. 130-132.
56 Hummel, Eminent Chinese of the Ch’ing Period, pp. 740-742.
57 Elliott, The Manchu Way, p. 117.
58 Ibid., p. 51.
59 The term yi is the same word as for unpaid corvée labour of ancient times, making it seem-
ingly a kind of slave labour, which is not correct. The Manchu term is dahaltu, which also means 
“following servant”.
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soldier) disposed of during wartime. The menservants were important for 
the everyday processes of a campaigning army. They served their masters 
in erecting the tents, cooking food, cleaning clothing and weaponry, guid-
ing the sumpter-mules, cutting grass for the horses, carrying letters, or 
forwarding information; some were used as translators. The menservants 
of the Green Standard troops could even be used as soldiers and therefore 
in some provinces were called “supplementary troops” (yuding). Although 
most sources speaking of menservants are related to campaigning, there is 
also evidence that they were used in peacetime and for civilian purposes. 
This circumstance and the fact that menservants to the Green Standard 
troops were automatically seen as part of the corps lead to the conclusion 
that they were not explicitly recruited for warfare but were permanently 
aff iliated to military households. In the case of the Banner households it 
has to be assumed that bondservants and slaves took over this role, while 
in the case of the Green Standard this function may have been performed 
by sons, youngsters, and new recruits (xinmubing). Even native off icers 
were allowed the privilege of maintaining menservants.
Menservants thus stayed with their masters in the war theatre as long as 
the latter had to f ight. If their masters died, they were obliged to bring back 
the coffins. Yet this applied only to Banner officers, not to common soldiers, 
and was not the case for the Green Standard off icers. Menservants were 
also paid out salt-and-vegetable money and were given a daily ration of rice. 
Moreover, menservants of the Banner troops received their own sumpter-
horses to transport luggage, tent, and weaponry. The common troops of 
provincial Banner garrisons had an allowance for one manservant per two 
soldiers. In Green Standard units, ten common soldiers were entitled to 
receive wages for three menservants.60 This means that between a quarter 
and a third of the f ighting corps were menservants and had a position, 
seen from their duties, somewhere between the status of labourers and 
ad hoc f ighters. The regulations in the code for military expenditure state 
only how much the government would pay for. If a soldier preferred to be 
served by his own manservant instead of sharing one with his colleagues, 
he would have to pay that manservant out of his own purse. Conversely, a 
lieutenant served by only two menservants could claim to have employed 
three menservants and receive the extra money.
The time period of the Ming-Qing transition corresponds to the cross-
section year of 1650.61 This transition was of relatively short duration. Mul-
60 Compare Junxu zeli, Hubu junxu zeli, chs 3-4.
61 See below and n. 100 for an explanation of this term.
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tiple arrangements occurred in military labour relations. On the whole, the 
situation is not as well documented as for the Ming and Qing dynasties, and 
military statutes or legislation are not available for the contending armies of 
the southern Ming, the Ming loyalists, and the Three Feudatories. The polity 
that lasted longest was that of the Zheng clan (1647-1683), founded by Zheng 
Chenggong (1624-1662), also known as Koxinga. Zheng Chenggong’s army 
and navy comprised people who were recruited in different ways. Based 
on textual evidence in the scattered sources on the Zheng government, 
the Taiwanese historian Shi Wanshou has pointed out that in the early 
stages Zheng’s troops, which he raised practically from scratch, were a mere 
300 men, whom he had recruited in a manner that suggests commodif ied 
labour. Additional f ighters joined him on their own initiative to defend the 
cause of the Ming.62 Zheng’s father Zhilong had been a freebooting trader 
who had already established an army and navy of his own, which at f irst 
he led into battle against the Manchus. When promised the governorship 
of two important south-eastern provinces, Zheng Zhilong defected to the 
Qing in 1655, but the Qing did not keep their word and took him to Beijing 
where he was kept under close supervision.63 His remaining soldiers were 
divided among other commanders of his family, and gradually joined Zheng 
Chenggong’s forces.
These three recruitment methods are referred to as “free recruitment”, 
“self-recommendation”, and “incorporation of allied troops”.64 Zheng Cheng-
gong succeeded in expanding his sphere of inf luence in south-eastern 
China, so that by its high point in 1658, according to contemporary sources it 
boasted 170,000 armoured men, 8,000 soldiers with iron [weapons?] (tieren, 
lit. “iron men”), and 8,000 battleships.65 However, after a grave defeat during 
an attack on Nanjing, Zheng had to take refuge on Taiwan in 1661 and died 
in the following year. In the expansionary phase between 1655 and 1659, 
troops who had f irst fought for the Qing defected or were made to surrender 
to Zheng’s army. This constituted a further manner of recruitment, the 
so-called incorporation of enemy troops after capitulation. After the large-
scale retreat to Taiwan, which involved a siege and the eventual expulsion 
of a contingent of Dutch colonialists in the service of the Dutch East Asia 
Company VOC, a relatively peaceful period continued until the mid-1670s. 
Military colonization was a matter of survival for the Zheng regime as a 
62 Shi, “Lun Ming Zheng de bingyuan” pp. 188-189.
63 Struve, “The Southern Ming, 1644-1662”, p. 676.
64 Shi, “Lun Ming Zheng de bingyuan”, p. 196.
65 Ibid., p. 193, citing Minhai jiyao for the year 1658.
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whole as well as for the individual soldiers. The Zheng government launched 
several land-cultivation campaigns in Taiwan, where soldiers were expected 
to clear the land in a labour arrangement that resembled tenancy.66 Due 
to the steady decrease in the Zhengs’ military manpower, military con-
scription and corvée labour were implemented as a matter of last resort. 
The latter was utilized especially for military labour, for transportation of 
provisions, and for the rebuilding of a fort.67 The era of the Zhengs is thus 
a case in point for a trend of changing from more commodif ied to more 
tributary labour for reasons of labour scarcity and lacking f inances at the 
end of a short-lived rule.
According to Luo Ergang, employment in the Green Standard Army 
was voluntary, but it was intended to last a lifetime. It was hereditary in 
the sense that at age sixteen the sons of soldiers had the right – but not the 
obligation – to present themselves for mustering and, if found acceptable, 
be admitted to the army as “apprentice” or “expectant” soldiers (yubing, 
literally “surplus” or “reserve” soldiers).68 These apprentice soldiers served as 
auxiliaries; apparently not all companies had them in suff icient numbers. 
The documents of the Gold River campaign provide for a particular number 
of hired labourers per hundred soldiers, which was higher (eighty) if those 
soldiers had no “apprentice soldiers”, and lower (f ifty) if they had.69
The troops of the Green Standard Army were reimbursed for the same 
items during war as the Banner troops, but at a much lower rates. Baggage 
pay, for example for a cavalry soldier of the Green Standards, was 10 taels, 
for infantry troops 6 taels, for a provincial Banner cavalry soldier 20 taels, 
for a provincial Banner infantry or artillery soldier 15 taels. Elite Banner 
soldiers from the capital were given 30 taels, yet native soldiers received 
only 3 taels. Part of the reason for this was that native troops normally were 
locals and did not have to cover a large distance to reach the war theatre. 
The salt-and-vegetable pay and the daily provision of rice were equal for 
soldiers of all types of troops and for all ranks. A colonel was not given more 
to eat than a common soldier.70 If he wanted to eat better, he had to pay for 
this from his salary.
66 According to Shepherd, Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier, pp. 94-96, 
30 per cent of the harvest was to be paid to the public treasury for the f irst three years, and 
thereafter was to be taxed regularly. Ploughs and seeds were provided for by the government.
67 Ibid., p. 103.
68 Luo, Luying bingzhi, p. 231.
69 Dai, “The Qing State, Merchants, and the Military Labour Force in the Jinchuan Campaigns”, 
p. 45.
70 Compare Junxu zeli, Hubu junxu zeli, chs 1-3. 
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Another important issue is that the baggage pay for the Green Standard 
troops was granted without conditions: the troops did not have to pay it 
back. For the Banner troops, it was usual in some provinces, at least nomi-
nally, that the troops had to pay back the baggage pay after the campaign. 
In the beginning, this seems to have been the common procedure, but over 
the course of time it became customary that the emperor, after a victorious 
campaign, waived the back payment and bestowed upon the troops the 
baggage pay ex post as a gift. According to the early local regulations for 
war expenditures and the later nationwide code for them, this was actually 
against customary usage, although there were also some precedents for 
such a practice in earlier wars. Yet the necessity to keep the troops in a state 
of permanent alertness for campaigning, and the desire of the Qianlong 
emperor to foster his most trusted and most eff icient military units, the 
Manchu Banners, led to the custom that baggage pay was a grant regardless 
of the legal situation. In other words, while in the early Qing period it was 
the duty of a soldier to make ready his equipment and to bring it to the site 
of military operations, the professional soldiers of the mid Qing period 
were well paid (baggage pay corresponded to one year’s wages) for their 
active service.
As Dai Yingcong has pointed out, the Qing state experimented with 
a large contingent of wage labourers in the f irst and second Gold River 
wars. These porters, workers, and militia were recruited f irst from the 
local population, sometimes including women and children, in completely 
free arrangements or as part of the corvée these people owed to their local 
off icials or chieftains (in case of the native ethnic groups) who had pledged 
allegiance to the Qing. In the latter case, one can speak of a kind of indirect, 
but paid, corvée service. In ancient China, three types of taxes had been 
paid: grain (the men’s duty), textiles (produced by the women), and corvée 
labour for the construction of dams, dykes, official buildings, tomb mounds, 
or – most famously – the Great Wall. In the sixteenth century, the system 
of corvée labour was f inally abolished. However, the household and tax 
registers were still an important source informing the government about 
the potential labour force of the population. If needed, labourers could be 
drafted based on the tax registers but, unlike before, their work had to be 
paid adequately with wages, which were regulated, but at least near the 
market price. For instance, the repair of dams was still done by labourers 
recruited from the peasant population, but they were paid, as were those 
who carried rice to the camps in the war theatre. The latter were recruited 
from the villages, marched to a predef ined logistics station, and carried 
rice from one station to the next in a kind of relay system. The difference 
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between the Gold River campaign and other wars is that the f irst as well 
as the second campaign resulted in static warfare in which troops had to 
be provided with rice over a long period of time. The recruited peasants, 
although paid, had to return to their f ields, otherwise the grain yield, and 
consequently the tax yield, of the district would decline. Labourers deserted 
in droves, even when they were allowed to return home after three, later 
f ive, months of service. The only way to keep them at their work was to pay 
them much more than the nominal 2.4 taels a month, plus a free daily rice 
ration. Labour cost for porterage in the steep mountain paths of the Gold 
River region skyrocketed (by a multiple of up to f ive).
The managers of the logistics apparatus had discovered that with such 
prices it was equally costly to have a private entrepreneur commissioned 
with the rice transport. The entrepreneur would then supervise the re-
cruitment and the replacement of deserters. The entrepreneurs did not 
have access to the tax registers, but recruited their labourers in the labour 
market. Immigration into the province of Sichuan and the increase in the 
local population had led to a growing surplus in the labour force in the 
eighteenth century. The chance to earn some money in the war logistics 
process even attracted people to immigrate into the respective provinces. 
When the war was over, the porters were set free again, leading to all the 
social complications that widespread unemployment causes. 71 The porters 
recruited by the government, as well as those hired by private shippers 
were short-term employees, some in a contract with the government, others 
with a private merchant. In the second case, there were no restrictions 
upon ethnicity or gender, but in the f irst case, the government recruited 
only registered males. There was, nevertheless, the possibility of having 
somebody else take over the duty to carry the rice. There were also rice 
porters from the native tribes who were mainly used on the paths of the high 
plateau. If employed by the Qing government, they were also regularly paid 
and given a daily ration in barley but, if delivering corvée (in the old sense as 
part of the tax liability) to their chieftain, they seem not to have been paid.
The Banner garrisons had a certain number of regularly employed profes-
sional craftsmen, such as arrow-makers, bow-makers, blacksmiths, bronze-
smiths, musket-makers, saddlers, and ship’s carpenters. The most important 
of these artisans were the bow- and arrow-makers and the blacksmiths. 
71 Dai, “The Qing State, Merchants, and the Military Labour Force in the Jinchuan Campaigns”, 
pp. 58-59.
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They were, similarly to the menservants, called jiangyi, “craft labourers”.72 
As an integral part of the army (called “off icial labourers”, guanyi), they 
could be called specialist troops, especially if entrusted to build palisades, 
wooden bridges, or pontoon bridges, or casting cannons in f ield foundries. 
Since many of them had to operate with a number of specialized tools 
and implements, they were given a baggage pay of no less than 10 taels. 
Physicians were even entitled to a certain number of menservants.
The Green Standard Armies did not have “off icial craftsmen” in their 
garrisons. The production of weapons was done by craftsmen on the private 
market. During war, when there was a need for new sabres, swords, dag-
gers, halberds, and all the fantastic range of polearms the Chinese used, 
blacksmiths were hired to produce new arms. The cost for the production 
of arms was f ixed locally and could be reclaimed according to certain 
rules about the lifespan and the overhaul of weapons.73 The cost lists also 
included, besides the material cost, an entry for the labour cost. Craftsmen 
of all types who were hired to serve the army in a campaign were treated 
quite generously. They were paid a baggage allotment which was geared 
to the distance to the war theatre (between 5 and 6 taels). Such craftsmen 
could also be granted a family allowance (anjiayin, literally “money to 
appease the family”) if living far away. On the way to their destination, they 
were paid a certain daily sum of money to buy food (0.06 taels), and outside 
the borders given 1 litre of rice. On the spot where the craftsmen had to 
work, they were paid monthly sums between 2 and 3 taels, depending on 
the physical demands of the work. Tailors, map-makers, wood-cutters, ship’s 
carpenters, and blacksmiths were paid less than cannon-casters. Both the 
men and their families at home were given daily allowances of 1 litre of rice. 
Yet these regulations became valid on a national level only during the late 
1770s. Previously, the regulations concerning their pay differed widely from 
province to province. Most of the specialists were hired for a longer period, 
at least several months. Otherwise their deployment cost would have been 
too high. References to physicians are very scarce, but it is known that they 
could either be recruited from the population or come from the Imperial 
Academy of Medicine. The members of the latter presumably treated only 
72 As in genyi, and as noted above, the word yi is derived from the designation of old, unpaid 
corvée labour. 
73 Junqi zeli (1791 edn), in Gugong zhenben congkan, 293 (Haikou, 2000): see regulations for the 
weapons of each particular garrison.
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the emperor or princes when out in the f ield, but not normal off icers, and 
even less the common soldiers.74
Civilian off icials played an important role in the organization of the 
logistics behind the battle lines. Naturally, they were, like the professional 
soldiers, paid their normal salary, but also received baggage pay, salt-and-
vegetable pay, and daily provisions of rice. As with the soldiers at the front, 
an excellent performance of their duties could result in rewards or even 
promotions. Yet service in the logistics branch was not a very popular task 
for someone who normally lived in a mansion in the district capital, for 
example, as a district magistrate. During wartime, they were obliged to 
leave the city where they were appointed and move to a logistics station 
somewhere on the way to the war theatre. Civilian off icials had to oversee 
logistics stations, and the number of stations they were responsible for 
depended on their off icial rank. Since it was not a very popular task, the 
logistics lines were mostly put into the hand of newly qualif ied off icials 
who had passed the state examinations but had not yet been appointed to a 
post. They were, during that time, not given a salary and did their job in the 
hope of being moved up in the line of waiting officials and being selected for 
appointment somewhat earlier than average. Another group of officials who 
served without monetary pay in logistics were those who had been demoted 
because of some offence. They were virtually enslaved and redeemed their 
offence (shuzui) with unpaid service in an unpopular position. Even very 
high off icials could be degraded to service in the military supply without 
f inancial payment, as the case of the previous governor-general of Sichuan, 
Artai, during the second Gold River campaign shows. The proportion of 
civilian off icials to troops was, in the case of this war, about 7:1,000.75
Depending on who led the campaign, a whole entourage of civilian 
off icials of the central government could participate, such as physicians, 
astronomers, members of princely households, scribes, secretaries, transla-
tors, edict drafters, members of the ministries (the Censorate, the Court of 
Imperial Sacrif ices, Imperial Entertainments, Judicial Review), and so on. 
All of them were granted baggage pay, salt-and-vegetable pay, daily rations, 
and a f ixed number of beasts of burden.
The highest-ranking civilian members of the central government who 
took part in campaigns were generals and marshals. This sentence must be 
stressed, because it points out the very important issue of the “amphibious” 76 
74 Junxu zeli, Hubu junxu zeli, ch. 6.
75 Theobald, “The Second Jinchuan Campaign”, pp. 136, 142.
76 Dai Yingcong, unpublished manuscript on the functions of civilian off icials in warfare.
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character of the Bannermen. As members of the Banners, off icials in the 
State Council or the Grand Secretariat were either by definition or by nature 
soldiers. However, if there was no war, they acted in civilian positions and 
performed civilian duties like those of salt supervisors, supervisors of the 
Imperial Canal, censors, provincial judges, or governors. The entirety of the 
military forces dispatched to the battlef ield was normally commanded by 
a governor-general. Yet if the campaign was so large that troops from other 
provinces were involved, command had to be assumed by a member of the 
central government, such as a grand minister commander ( jinglüe dachen) 
or a grand minister consultant (canzan dachen), and the respective persons 
transmuted back into real soldiers.
The bureaucracy of the Qing Empire thus involved many parts of the 
population and employed them for the purposes of war. In this respect, 
warfare was regarded as an aspect to be administered not very differently 
from any other day-to-day affair. At the end of the eighteenth century, all 
f inancial aspects of warfare were regulated bureaucratically, including 
the wartime allowances of professional troops and the labour corps. The 
amounts the state would spend on baggage pay, food, special clothing for 
specialists, family allowances, labour pay, and allowances on days when 
labourers were not working were regulated. Yet it is not known if the sums 
listed in the regulations corresponded to the real pay the labourers received. 
In many cases it might have been more, in order to induce them to remain 
in the job, but in other cases less, since a high rate of unemployment might 
have forced military labourers to accept lower wages. In the f irst case the 
off icials in control of logistics would have to f ind the extra money to pay 
the labourers. In the second case, they could embezzle a part of the funds 
allotted to the payment of the labour corps.
The 1790s mark the point from which the dynasty could no longer cope 
with the rebellions in the interior with Banner troops and Green Standards 
alone. During the uprising of the White Lotus (c. 1790-1805), an originally 
religious, later overtly political, group that harboured strong anti-Manchu 
feelings,77 the use of militia or “local corps” (tuanlian) to keep the insur-
rectionists out of the villages and prevent the villagers from joining their 
numbers, was introduced by representatives of the local elites. In Philip 
Kuhn’s analysis, in the militia system of the middle of the nineteeth cen-
tury, two strands of intentions and motivations were blended together: 
the bureaucratic efforts to keep control over the countryside and a kind 
of “natural” and more spontaneous militarization implemented by local 
77 Kuhn, Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China, p. 38.
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elites trying to defend their property and communities.78 Therefore, the 
militia structures were complex, since this was not a case of one centralized 
dynastic army, and norms set by regional and local administrations would 
typically differ in their realization in situ. Levels of armament, fortif ication, 
and professionalization could vary widely, depending on leadership and 
funding, both of which were organized locally by the elites. Co-operation 
between individual militia corps was possible, and the more complex the 
corps was, the better the options for funding and professionalization. While 
on the lowest level, and from the perspective of the local bureaucracy, an 
element of conscription or at least obligation prevailed, the larger corps 
could hire mercenaries, the so-called braves (yong). If funds permitted, 
these professionals usually were provided with better weapons.79 Kuhn 
cites an example of a complex militia corps near the city of Canton which 
consisted of more than 10,000 hired mercenaries and which could mobilize, 
if needed, a “reserve” force of several tens of thousands in the villages.80 It 
was active in the 1840s, when it operated against the British in the First 
Opium War.
While the White Lotus insurrection was subdued with the efforts of 
Banner Armies, Green Standards, and militias, militarization on a higher 
professional level, which had already set in earlier, was institutionalized 
in the course of the next great challenge, the Taiping rebellion. This was 
implemented in parallel structures: both the Taiping army and the provin-
cial armies were organized along similar lines, according to the degree of 
militarization, as conceptualized by Kuhn (see Table 12.1).
Table 12.1 Parallel military hierarchies in central and southern China, by descending order 
of level of militarization
Orthodox Heterodox
the regional army the community in arms
Yong (mercenaries) Gu (bandits) 
Tuanlian (local militia) Tang (secret society lodge)
Source: kuhn, Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China, p. 166.
The next large insurrection was a movement with its beginnings during the 
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as military formations that were similar to those of the militia. In Nanjing, 
where the entire Banner garrison population was wiped out, they estab-
lished one army for each of their leaders, but created no single Taiping army 
under unif ied command.81 The original eight Taiping corps and regiments 
included about 30,000 men.82 When the Taiping rebels reached Nanjing in 
1853, they were estimated at about 2 million people.83 Basically, the entire 
Taiping population was organized in military units, and units of female 
combatants existed as well.84
In reaction to the great danger of the anti-Manchu and anti-Confucian 
Taiping insurrection, which threatened the interests of the local elites 
whenever they passed on their trek to Nanjing and later to Beijing, provincial 
elites wove together individual militia groups to form large armies. Their 
structure was similar to that of the Taiping armies.85 Their soldiers were 
not confined, like the militia, to defence in their native or nearby localities. 
Furthermore, not the available, but specifically the able men were recruited 
from the local peasantry. The pay was said to be four times higher than that 
of the “regular army”, and the soldiers actually received it, which often was 
not the case in the standing army.86 The financial support came largely from 
the provincial sources, not from the central government. A particularity of 
these armies was that personal command played a decisive role. In contrast 
to the Green Standard Armies, where the higher-echelon off icers were not 
supposed to work in their own home regions,87 the soldiers at the level of 
the battalion (500 men) were expected to maintain personal loyalty to their 
commander. Battalions could be given the personal name of their leaders, 
and if due to death or retirement this off icer was no longer in command, 
rather than replacing him, the unit was dissolved and had to be replaced by 
a newly recruited one.88 Likewise, the armies owed loyalty to their found-
ers, with whom they were identif ied: for instance, Zeng Guofan and Zuo 
Zongtang with their Hunan armies, Li Hongzhang with the Anhui army, 
and Yuan Shikai with the Beiyang army. This was so prevalent that Luo 
81 Michael, “Military Organization and Power Structure of China”, p. 477.
82 Ibid., p. 476. Kuhn, “The Taiping Rebellion”, p. 273, quotes a f igure of some 20,000 by c. 1850. 
83 Kuhn “The Taiping Rebellion”, p. 275.
84 Ibid., p. 276.
85 Michael, “Military Organization and Power Structure of China”, p. 478.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid., p. 472.
88 Kuhn, Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China, p. 148.
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Ergang captured the phenomenon in the phrase “bing wei jiang you” (the 
soldiers belong to the general).89
The last phase of the Qing dynasty after the defeat of the Taiping rebellion 
in 1864 was characterized by efforts to ward off foreign intrusion and to 
quell interior rebellions that mushroomed all over the empire. Provincial 
armies were deployed for the latter purpose. Yet for the former aim an 
invigorated army and a navy under central command seemed necessary. 
For this reason, attempts were made in 1865 to reform part of the Green 
Standards that were stationed in the vicinity of Beijing, in the form of the 
“disciplined forces” (lianjun), which were to be trained in western military 
methods by Chinese and western instructors, and equipped with modern 
and unif ied weaponry and uniforms. They were to be organized and paid 
like the Anhui and Hunan armies. If we can trust western observers, this 
step toward an army reform did not have any great effect. Rather, it was 
the military reforms by the provincial armies, especially the modernization 
of weapons, ammunition, and military methods, which had convincing 
results. The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 triggered a series of further 
attempts at military modernization, among which those by Zhang Zhidong 
in Hubei and by Yuan Shikai in the northern provinces surrounding the 
capital were most successful and became the nuclei of the private armies 
of Republican warlords in the twentieth century.90
Both armies were known for good and regular payment.91 The north 
China army, which was established in 1895, was in fact intended as a f irst 
step towards a centralized army. With many halts and hindrances – and 
the Qing dynasty came as close as ever to abdication in the course of the 
Boxer uprising (1900-1901) – a systematic army reform was promulgated 
in 1905. The new f ield army (Lujun) was tightly modelled on the Japanese 
army and stressed not only the education of off icers, but also the qualif ica-
tions of ordinary soldiers. Interestingly, it provided for a kind of “voluntary 
conscription” or “selective service”, so that the idea of a conscript army was 
fostered, but at the same time the state retained the right to select the most 
able candidates. Provision was made, for instance, that one-f ifth of the 
enlisted men should be literate.92 Yet ambiguity remains about the degree 
of freedom in choosing a military occupation. As an American military 
attaché reported, localities were ordered to f ind a certain number of men, 
89 Luo, “Qingji bing wei jiang you de qiyuan”.
90 Powell, The Rise of Chinese Military Power, p. 56.
91 Ibid., p. 78.
92 Ibid., p. 176.
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and it was for the local off icials to decide whom to choose.93 Furthermore, 
the army reform provided for clear command structures and uniformity of 
weapons and apparel, and had a clear pay scale that ranged from 1,600 taels 
per month for a corps commander – a corps was to include 1,595 off icers, 
23,760 enlisted men, 4,469 horses and mules, 108 cannons – to a monthly 
4.2 taels for privates.94 The army was devised as a reserve army, with regular 
troops and first- and second-class reserves, as in European armies. Regulars 
were to serve for three years; after their regular service, f irst-class reserves 
were available for another three years, and second-class reserves for four. 
The reservists of the f irst class were to be paid 1 tael, while the second-class 
reserve men received half a tael per month, except when on active duty.95 
The plan foresaw that in the course of seventeen years (by 1922) the Chinese 
Field Army was to include thirty-six divisions, that is, more than 400,000 
men.
One pressing problem it did not solve or discuss was that the provinces 
still had more control over their divisions within the Field Army than 
the central government, because they f inanced the divisions that were 
stationed in their regions.96 The other was that the Eight Banners and Green 
Standards were retained, if in smaller numbers. Efforts had been made to 
train and drill part of the traditional armies in western ways, but change 
was slow, and the Manchu central government was not prepared to give up 
the Banner registration for good.
The numbers of the diverse armies were not precisely known to anybody, 
and the estimates vary widely, not only for the absolute number of men 
employed, but also for those who would, in the case of war, be able to actively 
defend the country. On the eve of the 1911 revolution, when a military mutiny 
ended more than two thousand years of imperial rule, the numbers of the 
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Table 12.2 Troop strengths of Qing armies around 1900





patrol and defence 
troops, Fangying 
(refers to the provincial 
armies)
334,000 French General staff 1908: 216,000; 
us military attaché 1909: 157,000; 
China Year Book 1912: 277,000
banner army, Qiying 263,000 1911: 255,000 men, of which 38,000 
trained in the Lujun; 37,000 trained 
in the patrol and defence troops 
or comparable units; the remain-




133,000 it is doubtful whether they could 
have mustered more than 50,000 
men
new army, Lujun 286,000
total 1,016,000 between 748,000 and 807,000
Sources:
* shen, “Xinhai geming qianxi woguo zhi lujun ji qi junfei”, p. 140
** powell, The Rise of Chinese Military Power in Late Imperial China, p. 295.
Trends over time
In the context of the Fighting for a Living project,97 the trends over time 
need to be interpreted by a six-layer matrix. In this matrix changes over time 
in six determinants of labour conditions and relations are described and 
correlated with each other. These determinants are, f irst, technology (hard 
and soft skills, such as technology of weapons and machinery, techniques 
of recruitment, or the inner structure of the army); secondly, political and 
socio-economic disruptions (often caused by war); thirdly, economic and 
financial factors (such as availability of funds or the rise of a monetized mar-
97 Erik-Jan Zürcher, “Fighting for a Living: Origins, Practices and Consequences of Different 
Forms of Military Employment in Europe, the Middle East and Asia (1500-2000)”, revised position 
paper for the Collaboratory “Fighting for a Living”, p. 2, https://projects.iisg.nl/web/f ighting-for-
a-living/results (accessed 10 July 2013).
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ket economy); fourthly, demographic factors (such as the sudden availability 
of new populations or a decline in population growth); f ifthly, conditions 
of supply and demand of labour (such as the army’s competition with other 
employers for labour); and, f inally, ideological factors (such as ideas on the 
suitability of military labour, or the ideal of nation-building as a common 
cause). Instead of presenting a matrix with quantitative, binary (yes/no) 
elements in which those determinants are described as “chronological 
vectors”, we prefer a qualitative description by which the particular scalar 
sizes and their change over time can be much better specified. The following 
large changes in labour relations in the Chinese military can be observed in 
the cross-section years 1650, 1800, and 1900. These are sample years which 
the Global Collaboratory on the History of Labour Relations chose for the 
comparative analysis of labour relations worldwide.98
The takeover of the imperial reign by the Manchus resulted in a transi-
tion around 1650 from the Ming corvée military service to the mercenary 
Green Standard Army, or – roughly – from tributary to commodified labour, 
with all the intermediary phases explained by David M. Robinson in his 
contribution in this volume, “Military Labor in China, c. 1500”. It remains 
to be discussed whether the transition from tributary conscripted, to com-
modif ied mercenary military labour is a process that occurred between 
1500 and 1650, or whether mercenary labour was, already by 1600, so f irmly 
established that no actual conscription occurred at all.
The ethnic composition of the conquest elite made the new formation 
of the Eight Banners necessary. With focus on the Manchus, this can be 
analysed as a transition from ethnic tributary to polyethnic tributary, 
which in the late eighteenth century comes back to a mono-ethnic model 
(Manchus only).
For the supply services of both Eight Banners and Green Standards, 
there was a rise in free wage labour for transport and specialist tasks that 
was largely organized by the market. This constitutes a change around 
1800 from tributary (as a tax obligation in kind, or corvée) to commodif ied 
labour remunerated with monetary wages. Wars, especially those against 
insurgents, were increasingly organized by the local governments in the 
districts. The organizational complexity of the labour corps decreased 
because of shorter distances and diminished need for labour services.
Militia and mercenary, proto-provincial armies took over defence 
tasks from the Eight Banners and especially from the Green Standards. 
98 See ibid. and “Global Collaboratory on the History of Labour Relations: Results”, https://
collab.iisg.nl/web/labourrelations/results (accessed 10 July 2013).
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If the transition from Green Standards to local militia is considered, this 
represents a change from commodif ied to tributary labour, since the local 
militia troops were originally conscripted from the peasant population. The 
ensuing transition from local militia to provincial armies in the second half 
of the nineteenth century reflects a change from tributary to commodified 
labour, since the troops were mercenaries hired by the proto-warlords. 
Here, change lay in the employing institution rather than in the labour 
relationship, namely the two-stage transition from the central government 
into the hands of the localities and then to the provinces.
At the end of the nineteenth century, a transition occurred from com-
modif ied labour in the lifelong mercenary Green Standards, and from 
tributary labour in the Eight Banners to de facto professional armies that 
were, however, established with the intention of introducing conscription. 
In actuality, the conscription was carried out in ways different from those 
envisaged. Rather than calling up all able-bodied male citizens to duty, 
localities decided how to f ill their quotas and, in case of emergencies, took 
recourse to conscription. The transition back from provincial to imperial 
employment, which the newly established Ministry of War had hoped for, 
was not fulf illed.
Explanations for transitions in the matrix of hypotheses
The matrix of hypotheses for the explanation of change in military labour 
relations developed by the Collaboratory Fighting for a Living project 
provides for six options. In the following, we discuss which of these fac-
tors carried the most weight in the given cross-section years. Before going 
into details, it is necessary to stress the very long-term trend of increasing 
monetization in China between 1500 and 1900. Its beginnings are discussed 
in Robinson’s contribution, which also makes clear that “tributary” labour 
could be remunerated with regular stipends and additional gifts and grants. 
Monetization certainly played a major role in the rise of hired military 
labour over conscript labour. Nevertheless, tributary military labour in 
China was not conf ined to conscription and, given the further increase 
in population between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries, the high 
amount of labour freely available for the military did not necessitate the 
use of conscription.
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Why did labour relations in military work change?
Military technology, with respect to both “hardware” (that is, weaponry and 
armour) and “software” (in the sense of military skills), did not signif icantly 
influence change around 1650 from tributary to professional labour rela-
tions, and thus the change from Ming hereditary military households to 
Green Standards, or from the rise of the new tributary labour relations in 
the Banners. Muskets and cannons were used, as before, yet the Manchus 
particularly valued the skills of mounted archers and considered bows and 
arrows as genuinely Manchu weapons. Banners armies (hence the tributary 
rather than the mercenary type of military occupation) were seen as elite 
troops mainly deployed for the great conquest wars in the border zones. In 
the initial phase of the naval campaigns between the Ming or Ming loyalists 
and the Qing, the former had a decisive technological edge over the latter. 
However, also from this perspective the identif ication of the naval off icers 
and mariners with the Han Chinese rather than the “foreign” Manchus 
determined whether people would join the Zheng or the Qing navy.
By 1800, gradual change had occurred in the supply services, in the form 
of a shift from tributary corvée to commodif ied hired modes of employ-
ment. As far as skills are concerned, the characteristics of the hired form 
of labour included the possibility of f iner specialization, since experts such 
as cannon-casters or tent-makers could be employed for the conquest wars. 
The change from the commodif ied mercenary labour in the Green Stand-
ards to the tributary modes in the form of early local militia organization 
were brought about not by change in the military technology, but again 
in the f ield of skills and organization. This type of warfare, which was 
concentrated in the rebellions in the interior, made the use of specialists 
and elite troops seem less essential. The technological level of the troops 
decreased generally during the nineteenth century until the period of self-
strengthening and military modernization.
By 1900, change from the mercenary Green Standards to professional, 
regional armies (which did not bring about a change in labour relations) 
and the change from Banner Armies to professional armies (which certainly 
did affect the labour relations, from tributary to commodif ied) were in 
full swing. The introduction of modern, western-style weaponry, military 
drill, and command structures signif icantly altered the relationship of the 
troops to their employing agency. With the purchase of new technology 
in the second half of the nineteenth century, craftsmen from among the 
population were either incorporated into the arsenals or became suppliers, 
especially in ship-building. The general trend was that technical expertise 
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in armaments and ammunition was more and more integrated into the 
organization of the modernized mercenary armies.
War and the ensuing political and socio-economic disruption played 
a role in the change in military labour relations as well. This was clearly 
the case in the integration of what had been the army of the previous rul-
ers and its new designation as the Green Standards, which represents a 
commodif ied type of labour relation. On one hand, this was necessary to 
bind the labour force to the new rulers, and on the other hand because the 
conquest of China by the Manchus called for a specif ic type of military 
unit, consisting of Chinese who could f ight against their compatriots and 
neighbouring peoples. The Manchu population was far too small to take 
over this task, and the Manchu troops with their cavalry units were not 
appropriate for battles in many parts of China. The conquest war of China 
by the Manchus was thus an opportunity to reorganize and reinstitute the 
previous troops of the Ming dynasty and other contenders.
The Manchus were a conquest elite who in the course of the seventeenth 
century gained supreme rule over the majority Chinese. The need for con-
stant vigilance of “resident aliens” 99 made them garrison their own people, 
and maintain and foster them as professionals who were theoretically 
forbidden to seek jobs as civilians. Thus, the working and living conditions 
of those in the garrisons, rather than labour relations, were modified by the 
eventual victory in the warfare between the 1630s and 1683.
The large conquest wars in the border regions in the late seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries brought about a change in labour relations since 
they necessitated the quick recruitment of labour to maintain eff icient 
logistical operations. Specialists were required to supply labour, expertise, 
and materiel to the military. Tributary labour was not suff icient to meet 
the demands of the army, so that labour had to be recruited on the market 
instead of from the population included in the tax registers.
This situation changed with the relocation of war into the interior of the 
empire. Military operations became less professionalized. War was still 
an omnipresent phenomenon in the f irst half of the nineteenth century, 
but instead of elite troops f ighting against enemies with the same level 
of f ighting skills, soldiers fought against inferior rebel troops. The social 
problems of China’s growing population contributed to the increasing 
internal rebellions, often inspired by millenarian religious ideas.
The change in 1900, from the declining Green Standards and Banners to 
professional armies, was influenced by the more eff icient warfare of the 
99 Elliott, The Manchu Way, pp. 268-271.
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imperialist powers. This stands in conjunction with a greater impact of 
naval warfare, an operational theatre that had been de-emphasized by the 
Manchus in the eighteenth century. Since the Opium Wars, the Manchus 
lost sovereignty over parts of their territory. These losses included, for 
instance, Hong Kong 1842/1898, the international concessions in the treaty 
ports since 1842, Taiwan 1895, the Jiaozhou Bay (in Shandong province) 1897, 
Lüshun/Port Arthur 1898, and dependencies in North Vietnam (1884) and 
the Ili River Basin in today’s Xinjiang, annexed by Russia in 1871 and partly 
restored to the Qing Empire in 1881. The military weakness on the part of 
the central government drove home the notion of how urgent military 
modernization was in terms of both armaments and military skills. Defeat 
in war was thus a trigger for change in military organization that also had 
effects on labour relations.
The perspective of economic and f inancial factors hinges on a series 
of interconnected questions. Was the availability of funds the cause for 
warfare, or its effect? In a recent study,100 Kuroda Akinobu cites f igures sug-
gesting that in a comparison of the Qing and the British Empires in 1783, 
the Chinese treasury possessed a surplus of about six times its yearly tax 
income of that year, while the public debt of the British Empire amounted 
to twenty times the annual tax revenue in the same year. According to 
Kuroda’s account, the total British debts amounted to an equivalent of 
twenty times the yearly expenditures of the Chinese state.
This implies that Chinese emperors and off icials of the central govern-
ment harboured the idea that wars could be waged only if funds were suf-
f icient. Again and again the Qianlong emperor persuaded the accountants 
of the Ministry of Revenue (hubu) that there were suff icient funds in the 
state treasury and that there was no need to be stingy in case of war. Yet 
any government spending had to be set off against the revenues.101 Following 
John Brewer’s persuasive argumentation, during the same period, the British 
Empire waged wars, for instance in the Seven Years War and the American 
War of Independence, in order to gain profit. The funds to wage these wars 
came from credits.102
Kuroda attributes the profit-oriented type of warfare to the fundamen-
tally different development path of currency-dependent versus credit-
dependent societies.103 For labour relations, the question is how the wealth 
100 Kuroda, “The Eurasian Silver Century”, p. 269.
101 Theobald, “The Second Jinchuan Campaign”, pp. 333, 381-382, 386-388.
102 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, pp. 30, 39, 114-126. 
103 Kuroda, “The Eurasian Silver Century”, p. 268.
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of the Chinese public treasury arrived in the hands of those working in 
the high-risk group of military labour, and whether more or less liquidity 
of the currency influenced the way in which soldiers were recruited and 
employed. Did the transition from tributary labour service, which was 
imposed or conferred on particular households, to mercenary, voluntary 
arrangements coincide with greater availability of monetary means to pay 
the soldiers and the supporting services? In other words: did the – mostly 
non-monetary – tributary labour diminish, or was it altogether abolished 
for commodified labour arrangements, when money to pay for the military 
wages was available in suff icient amounts?
The cases under discussion here open some perspectives on these ques-
tions. We see in the transition from the Ming to the Qing that both dynasties 
had two main types of military labour. In the Ming, this was hereditary 
registration as military household, and therefore legally bound and unfree 
labour, with a basic arrangement that provided land for the soldiers¸ but also 
wages. The labour arrangements for the mercenaries (that is, soldiers hired 
by individual commanders, the so-called housemen) were, at least legally, if 
not in actual practice, easier to change or leave altogether.104 Thus the latter 
may have constituted the better work opportunity, also because it offered 
more frequent intervals of wage payment than was the case for hereditary 
military households.105 In the Qing, the tributary kind of labour relations 
was not inflicted upon the Banner people as an onerous obligation; it was 
instead considered a privilege, both in terms of payment and regarding the 
social and status assets that came with it. The more commodif ied military 
labour in the Green Standards did not command the same dignity, nor 
was the remuneration as high as that of the Banners. As we have seen, the 
number of Green Standards may have been about three times as high as 
that of the Banner people. This shows that, from the perspective of the 
soldiers, a higher commodification of labour did not necessarily lead to more 
desirable and better-rewarded employment. From the perspective of the 
state, the hereditary character of the positions in the Banner structure made 
a constant supply of professional troops possible. In a kind of paternalistic 
relationship, the state would care for its elite troops: the Banner soldiers. The 
104 See Robinson’s contribution in this volume, “Military Labor in China, c. 1500”, especially 
where he points out that housemen could take on their employers’ surnames, and that their 
status was vaguely in between hired labourers and family members. The same occurred with 
bondservants in the large households of the Yangzi delta in the late Ming period. See McDermott, 
“Bondservants in the T’ai-hu Basin during the Late Ming”, p. 679. 
105 As Robinson points out, in comparison to the regular garrison soldiers, housemen were 
privileged in regards to their wages and other prerogatives.
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permanent availability of troops ready for combat was important enough 
to f inance such a costly group of specialists.
For the supply services in the eighteenth century, the advisers for military 
f inance understood that, ultimately, hiring people from the labour market 
was neither more expensive nor more diff icult to organize than levying 
the services of peasants for military service by means of tax registers. One 
reason was that the involuntary workers often absconded and had to be 
replaced. In a similar way, after 1800 it may have superf icially seemed 
cheaper to recruit peasant military service for bandit-suppression militia 
than to sustain a professional army for this task. Yet the problem here was 
that militias were worse trained, poorly equipped, and less motivated than 
the provincial armies that eventually fought the bandits and rebels. In 
order to achieve specialization of skills and armament for defence against 
internal and external enemies, nineteenth- and twentieth-century military 
reformers sought to attain increases in military budgets. China’s defeats in 
the manifold imperialist challenges of the nineteenth century are largely 
attributed to a lack of f inances for military modernization. In contrast, 
the case of the struggle between the Nationalist and communist armies 
in the 1945 to 1949 civil war shows that the military modernization of the 
Nationalist (Kuomintang) army did not suff ice if motivation of the soldiers 
and credibility of the commanders were lacking.
The demographic factor influenced changes in military labour relations 
mainly in two ways. First, with the Manchus, a new population became 
available as f ighters and garrison soldiers. A favourable tributary and elite 
status was conferred due to this ethnic self-definition. Secondly, the period 
between 1650 and the end of the Qing was one of population growth, with 
only a slight, temporary decline in the middle and late nineteenth century. 
Both the military and its supporting services gained an abundant labour 
force from a general increase in China’s population. This made conscription 
largely unnecessary. With respect to the tributary labour of the hereditary 
Banner households, this increase brought about a situation where only a 
minority of adult males could be engaged in military service. The solu-
tion to the economic problem of supporting the Banners was to lift the 
ban on non-military jobs and to virtually dissolve the Banners in the late 
nineteenth century.
The issue of competition for military labour between the regular state 
army and other “employers” is most evident in the last phases of the Ming 
and the Qing dynasty, as actual rivalry arose which could not be treated as 
mere peasant rebellions to be quelled easily, without posing serious threats. 
In 1650, such competition occurred between the Ming-loyal armies, local 
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rebel leaders, and the Qing Banners that gradually conquered the country 
from north to south.
Due to the professed intention of the Qing to provide a better livelihood 
for their subjects than the preceding Ming dynasty, military labour relations 
changed from the tributary household registration system of the Ming to 
the more commodif ied Green Standards in the Qing. In fact, the corvée 
obligations were also gradually abandoned in many sectors of civilian 
occupations for the state, such as in construction or textile production, 
and instead the workers were hired. For the supporting military labour 
in the eighteenth century, the permanent long-distance campaigns to the 
frontiers required a large labour corps, which was supplied by the increasing 
population. Around 1800, the demand for military labour forces decreased, 
leading to rising unemployment in border provinces such as Sichuan. The 
more militias that were set up, the less the regular armies, Green Standards 
and Banners, were occupied with campaigning, leading to lower motiva-
tion, poor training, and fewer opportunities to earn additional income by 
baggage pay and f inancial rewards for victories. For the militia troops, the 
recruitment of peasants for military service may have provided additional 
income for those living from agriculture, but also impeded them from 
engaging in their main occupation. The change to commodif ied labour 
by recruiting the unemployed can be seen as an inevitable consequence 
of the f irst attempts to apply corvée recruitment to cope with rebellions 
from within.
Finally, the factor of ideology, especially ideas on the suitability of mili-
tary labour, and the ideal of nation-building, also becomes perceptible in 
periods when radical change took place. Around 1650, this was the accession 
to power by the Manchus, who defined themselves as warriors who had 
inherited the “Mandate of Heaven” and thus the legitimacy of rule over 
the Chinese despite their non-Han descent. This, as has been shown in the 
preceding paragraphs, favoured a tributary kind of labour relations. On the 
other hand, the contending defenders of the Han Chinese Ming dynasty 
could mobilize a part of their armed forces precisely because loyalty to 
previous rulers formed an important element of the Confucian state ideol-
ogy. It is hard to assess whether the motivation of the anti-Qing f ighters 
was mainly rejection of the rulers from beyond the Great Wall or actual 
loyalty to the Ming. The voluntary nature of the arrangement, at least in 
its initial phases, probably played an important part in the relatively long-
lasting rule of the Zheng family. At the end of the Qing dynasty, the idea of 
nation-building combined with rising nationalism with racialist undertones 
that rejected the Manchus, who had proved ineff icient in warding off both 
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foreign aggression and internal challenges. The Manchu self-image of being 
a born group of warriors was disrupted by the warfare of the mid-nineteenth 
century; it seemed outdated in an atmosphere that strove for nationalistic 
modernization.
Conclusion
As a result of the discussion of possible causes for change in military labour 
relations, we have seen that military technology, war, financial and economic 
factors, demography, supply and demand of labour, and ideology all had an 
impact on military occupations between 1650 and 1900. Yet it is not easy to 
evaluate their impact in regard to the labour relations in question, which 
are of a tributary or commodif ied nature. The tributary mode corresponds 
to the Ming military household registration, the attempts at conscription in 
the Ming-loyal interlude of the Zheng clan in the 1670s and early 1680s, the 
Qing Banners, the supporting services in the period of corvée obligations 
before the expansionary warfare of the Qianlong emperor, and the militia 
in the early nineteenth century, as well as the efforts in the course of the 
1905 military reforms to introduce universal conscription. The commodified 
mode includes the initial phase of the Koxinga’s recruitments, the Green 
Standards, the nineteenth-century provincial armies, and the New Army. 
As this list shows, there is no unilinear trend suggesting that tributary 
arrangements necessarily precede commodif ied labour relations. Rather, 
the two coexisted for long periods in Chinese history. The two attempts 
at conscription originated from different motivations. The f irst, by the 
Zhengs, was initiated because of the imminent danger from a formidable 
adversary which was conquering all of China. Demographic factors stood 
in conjunction with defections from Taiwan to the mainland; in simple 
words: not enough men would voluntarily serve the cause of the Zheng 
clan. In the second case, universal conscription was not necessary because 
enough volunteers were willing to join the army, if it could pay. It is only 
from the middle of the twentieth century onward that both the Republic 
of China (after the exodus to Taiwan) and the People’s Republic of China 
have commenced conscription systems. On the mainland, this is realized 
as a selective service system; on Taiwan the draft is more universal, but is 
in the process of being lifted.
A perspective on the present situation can accentuate the fact that a 
change in military labour relations is a complex, multi-causal event that 
hinges on many factors. In addition to the factors discussed, what needs to 
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be taken into account in the case of Qing China, especially in the nineteenth 
century, and up until the foundation of the People’s Republic of China, 
is the tension between centralization and particularism. Superf icially, 
even if labour relations do not seem to change and (apparently) remained 
commodif ied, there are political aspects during the Republican era which 
affected the equation. It made a big difference for the command structures 
within the armies, the loyalty of the soldiers, and regularity of payment 
whether the employer was the central government or a provincial leader 
who might aspire, with the help of his army, to rule the entire country. The 
competition from outside – and thus the threat of war by foreign powers 
or, as in the case of Taiwan, against an overbearing competing polity – has 
also been a major ingredient in the combination of changes and continuities 
between the 1650s and today.

 Military service and the Russian social 
order, 1649-1861
Elise Kimerling Wirtschafter
From roughly the mid-fifteenth century, a centralized monarchy developed 
in the Moscow region of the Russian lands, and the building of the Russian 
service state got underway. Critical to the monarchy’s accumulation of 
powers was the linking of noble status, including the possession of land and 
serfs, with service to the prince. Although a core of great noble families held 
patrimonial lands in hereditary tenure, the majority of nobles possessed 
landed estates on condition of service. By the mid-sixteenth century, all 
nobles, including holders of patrimony, performed obligatory service and, 
following the conquest of the khanates of Kazan, Astrakhan, and Siberia, 
Muscovy joined the ranks of the world’s multiethnic, multiconfessional 
empires.
The process of political centralization, military consolidation, and 
imperial expansion came to a temporary halt due to Tsar Ivan IV’s reign 
of terror (the notorious oprichnina of 1565-1572) and the biological demise 
of the dynasty in 1598. A period of civil war, social rebellion, and foreign 
occupation known as the “Time of Troubles” ensued. Order returned after 
1613, when the “election” of a new tsar, Mikhail Romanov (r. 1613-1645), 
ended the troubles and inaugurated a period of institutional restoration and 
modern state-building. In the reign of Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich (r. 1645-
1676), the Law Code (Ulozhenie) of 1649 codif ied serfdom, the social ranks 
of Muscovite society, and the tsardom’s legal-administrative apparatus. 
Throughout Russia’s age of serfdom, until the emancipation of 1861, the Law 
Code provided the starting point for much of the legislation that def ined 
the relationship between social status and military service.
Alongside a centralized bureaucracy and legally def ined social groups, 
seventeenth-century Muscovy also produced a European-style military. 
Reform began between the 1630s and 1660s with the introduction of new-
model infantry and cavalry regiments, large-scale conscription levies, 
and lifelong service, all of which constituted signif icant steps toward the 
formation of a regular standing army.1 The acquisition of Left Bank Ukraine 
1 Keep, Soldiers of the Tsar; Stevens, Russia’s Wars of Emergence; Fuller, Strategy and Power 
in Russia.
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and the city of Kiev in the period 1654-1667 revealed that Muscovy had 
indeed achieved a degree of military effectiveness. Still, the process of 
reform remained tentative and the monarchy’s military capacity limited. 
The inability to sustain combat operations in distant theaters, illustrated by 
the failed Crimean campaigns of 1687 and 1689, led to a flood of innovation 
in the reign of Tsar Peter I (r. 1682/9-1725).2 Under Peter annual conscription 
levies, lifelong year-round service for noble off icers and peasant conscripts, 
unprecedented levels of taxation, tighter administrative controls, and the 
massive importation of European technology and cultural models set the 
stage for Russia’s rise to great-power status.3 The consolidation of Russian 
power in the Baltic and Black Seas, the partitions of Poland, the defeat of 
Napoleon, and Alexander I’s (r. 1801-1825) leadership in the Concert of Europe 
are just a few of the military and diplomatic successes that over the next 
century and a half exemplif ied the empire’s international stature.
Russia’s ongoing military strength has long baff led historians, given 
that well into the twentieth century society remained overwhelmingly 
peasant and the economy overwhelmingly agrarian. A critical reason for 
the effectiveness of Russian power has been the ability of successive govern-
ments, and forms of government, to mobilize human and material resources 
over the long duration. As early as 1630/1, decades before the reforms of 
Tsar Peter I, regular levies of recruits and lifelong terms of service began. 
During the Thirteen Years’ War (1654-1667) with Poland, military drafts 
swept up about 100,000 men and, although this was no small number, it 
paled in comparison to what would come in the early eighteenth century.4 
Historians estimate that inductees into the Petrine army numbered 205,000 
in 1700-1711 alone and at least 140,000 in 1713-1724. At the time of Peter’s death 
in 1725, the Russian army consisted of 130,000 regular troops; 75,000-80,000 
garrison troops; and 20,000 Cossack irregulars.5 In the post-Petrine era, 
the military continued to grow, along with the empire’s population and 
territorial expanse. By the mid-eighteenth century, the army numbered 
292,000 troops in a population of 23,230,000; and in 1800, 446,000 troops in 
a population of 37,414,000. Between 1705 and 1801, roughly 2.25 million men 
2 Between 1682 and 1689, Peter I and co-tsar Ivan V ruled under the regency of Sophia, Peter’s 
half-sister and Ivan’s full sister. In 1689 Peter and his supporters broke with Sophia, who was 
conf ined to a convent. Peter’s effective reign began in 1694, when his mother died, but he did 
not formally become sole ruler until the death of Ivan in 1696.
3 Cracraft, The Revolution of Peter the Great.
4 Moon, The Russian Peasantry, pp. 82-83; Keep, Soldiers of the Tsar, pp. 50-62, 80-92; Fuller, 
Strategy and Power in Russia, p. 7.
5 Fuller, Strategy and Power in Russia, pp. 45-46.
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were drafted; in the years 1796 to 1815, 1,616,199; and in the period 1816 to 
1855, 3,158,199. Just a few years prior to the outbreak of the Crimean War, a 
time of relative peace for the empire, the size of the army reached 859,000.6
The actual “burden of defense” imposed on Russian society is diff icult 
to calculate, and the f igures that are available should be viewed only as 
rough estimates.7 Russian data from the period are generally inadequate 
for sophisticated statistical analysis. Nor is it always clear which troops 
historians are counting. In addition to the empire’s regular standing 
army, the military establishment included garrison troops, veterans’ 
units, military colonies, Cossacks, and various irregular hosts manned 
by ethnic minorities. The point here is not to measure the burden carried 
by the Russian people – surely it was substantial – but to highlight the 
organizational effort needed to conscript, train, and maintain such a large 
military force. However ineff icient and arbitrary this effort sometimes 
appears, it was effective in sustaining costly military victories and ongoing 
imperial expansion.
Decades before the appearance of revolutionary France’s citizen army, 
Russia developed a system of mass conscription based on the institution of 
serfdom, the social arrangements set forth in the Law Code of 1649, and the 
reforms of Tsar Peter I. Both the Muscovite Law Code and Petrine legislation 
bound individuals to local communities and social categories that were 
defined by their privileges and obligations to the state. Beginning in 1719-
1728, periodic censuses identified male taxpayers liable for conscription and 
payment of the capitation. The combination of census registration, conscrip-
tion levies, and collection of the capitation facilitated resource mobilization 
and greatly increased state revenues. The groups counted in the censuses 
included all categories of peasants and townspeople who lacked the capital 
to qualify for merchant status. Sons of clergy and ecclesiastical ranks who 
did not have church appointments also could be conscripted by special levy, 
even though they were not inscribed in the census rolls and did not pay the 
capitation. Nobles likewise remained exempt from census registration and 
payment of the capitation, but they continued to serve in the military or 
in civil administration until the emancipation of 1762 made their service 
voluntary. With the exception of elite merchants, who paid an annual fee 
in return for specif ic socioeconomic privileges, all of these statuses, taxed 
and untaxed, were inherited from the father at birth. Changes of status 
6 Hartley, Russia, 1762-1825, pp. 10-11; Wirtschafter, From Serf to Russian Soldier, p. 3; Curtiss, 
The Russian Army under Nicholas I, p. 108.
7 Pintner, “The Burden of Defense in Imperial Russia”.
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could occur through service, marriage (for women only), or monarchical 
decree; however, such changes rarely affected peasants, who by most counts 
comprised 80 to 90 per cent of the overall population. Whether peasants 
were attached to seigneurial, state, ecclesiastical/economic, or crown lands, 
they remained bound to their village of origin, paid the capitation, and at 
age seventeen became liable for military service.8
Military service and the peasant commune
Russian military achievements from the reign of Tsar Peter I to the Crimean 
War of 1853-1856 cannot be understood apart from the history of serfdom, 
an institution, or social mechanism, that made possible the effective 
mobilization of human and material resources across a vast and sparsely 
populated territory. The imposition of legal restrictions on peasant move-
ment had begun already in the late f ifteenth century, when the Muscovite 
monarchy consolidated its authority in the central region of the Russian 
lands. For the next two centuries, the development of serfdom paralleled the 
development of noble classes that served the Moscow grand prince. A basic 
calculus emerged, according to which Russian peasants provided for the 
Muscovite elite so that the elite could in turn serve the tsar. From the outset, 
then, serfdom functioned as the means to support military servicemen and 
mobilize resources for the prince. These statist goals, more than the estate 
culture of noble landlords, determined the role that serfdom would play in 
Russian society and polity.9
The basic unit of peasant society was the commune, governed by a village 
assembly composed of the heads of member households. The origins of the 
commune remain obscure, but the institution most likely evolved out of the 
agricultural practices of the East Slavic tribes who, prior to the emergence 
of the Kievan polity in the ninth century, occupied what would become 
the Russian lands. When Muscovite state-building began in the f ifteenth 
century, the commune was already managing village relationships and 
access to resources. From that point onward, successive Russian govern-
ments linked monarchical and seigneurial authority to the commune in 
order to extract resources and exploit peasant labor. Controlled by village 
patriarchs and elected peasant off icials, the commune exercised economic, 
8 The Recruitment Statute of 1766 set the age of conscription at seventeen to thirty-f ive.
9 Hellie, Enserfment and Military Change in Muscovy.
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social, and judicial authority and acted as the intermediary between the 
peasant community and the landlord or government.
From the peasant perspective, the commune’s most important functions 
were to regulate production in open f ields and to guarantee that each 
household enjoyed access to common resources such as water, forest, and 
pasture. Although environmental conditions and agricultural arrangements 
varied across the empire, the communal structures that developed in the 
central and steppe regions of European Russia provided the foundation for 
Russian social and political arrangements.10 One of the key mechanisms 
that developed out of communal structures, particularly communal land 
tenure, was the periodic repartition or redistribution of arable f ields based 
on the number of husband/wife work teams in a household. The goal of this 
mechanism was to ensure that each household possessed suff icient land to 
support its members and meet its obligations to the community, landlord, 
and state. During both the Muscovite and the imperial periods, it was the 
commune that enforced the fulf illment of labor, monetary, and service 
obligations. Based on the principle of collective responsibility (krugovaia 
poruka), the entire peasant community assumed liability for the obligations 
of individual members. Whether the task at hand concerned the delivery 
of recruits, the performance of labor, or the payment of taxes and feudal 
dues, the commune guaranteed that government and seigneurial demands 
were met. If a household could not meet its obligations, fellow villagers 
took up the slack.
In addition to extracting resources, communal authorities, in cooperation 
with noble landowners, also policed the countryside. Communal authorities 
disciplined noncompliant peasants, and the village community provided 
assistance in times of illness, death, or natural disaster. When social order 
broke down, peasant off icials punished troublemakers or cooperated 
with the landlord to do so. In cases of collective disobedience or outright 
rebellion, the arrival of troops usually suff iced to restore calm. The peas-
ant commune most certainly did not embody the natural communism 
imagined by nineteenth-century Russian socialists, but it was a vibrant 
and deeply embedded institution that for centuries met the economic and 
social needs of Russian peasants. Ultimately, the commune proved more 
resilient than either the monarchy or the nobility. Weathering the storms of 
political centralization, foreign invasion, capitalist industrialization, social 
revolution, and wartime crisis, the commune adapted to changes in Russian 
society and economy. Through World War I, the February and Bolshevik 
10 Moon, The Russian Peasantry.
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Revolutions, and the civil war of 1918-1921, the commune continued to 
structure peasant life, disappearing only when the Soviet regime used 
violence and brutal repression to impose collectivization during the First 
Five-Year Plan.
In imperial Russia, the process of conscription, which started at the 
village level, highlighted key problems of social development resulting from 
the intersection of military service and the peasant commune. Although 
state-imposed social arrangements def ined conscription, particularly 
liability for service, realities on the ground also affected the official arrange-
ments. Whether the demands of the state or the organization of peasant life 
determined the parameters of conscription is not always clear. Orders to 
conduct conscription levies came from St. Petersburg, and off icials selected 
recruits based on units of 100 to 500 men. Usually, one man per unit would 
be taken, though in times of intensive warfare, the burden increased.11 Once 
recruitment orders reached the countryside, local off icials, landlords, and 
peasant communities assumed responsibility for delivering the specif ied 
number of individuals. At this point, the communal organization of peas-
ant life played the critical role. Because there was very little legislation 
pertaining to conscription before the early nineteenth century – only in 1831 
did a full codif ication of the rules for conducting levies appear – peasant 
practices determined the recruitment process. It is possible, therefore, that 
these practices provided the basis for the specific mechanisms subsequently 
prescribed by state law.
Like the distribution of land allotments, feudal dues, labor obligations, 
and capitation payments, the burden of conscription depended on the 
number of able-bodied males in a peasant household. Each recruitment unit 
of 100 to 500 men consisted of peasant families, usually extended families, 
organized in a rotational order def ined by the number and ages of adult 
male laborers. Peasants, landlords, and the state all sought to distribute the 
burden of service in an equitable manner that would preserve the ability 
of each household to sustain its members and meet its f iscal and labor 
obligations. In other words, the loss of a male laborer to the army was not 
supposed to undermine the economic viability of the household. For this 
reason, large households stood first in line to provide recruits, while families 
with only one laborer remained exempt. The recruitment regulation of 1831 
extended this exemption to include families containing a father and only 
one son. The regulation also specif ied that bachelors be chosen before mar-
11 In 1812, the year Napoleon invaded Russia and occupied Moscow, there were three levies of 
20 recruits per 500 men: Hartley, Russia, 1762-1825, p. 26.
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ried men and childless husbands before those with children. Both legislative 
prescriptions and the egalitarian principles of community justice aimed to 
minimize the social and economic disruptions caused by military service.
Despite efforts to distribute the burden of service in an even-handed 
manner, peasants viewed conscription as a tragedy. From the peasant 
perspective, the reality of conscription defied the egalitarian beauty of the 
“line system”. Hence the proverb “One son is not a son. Two sons are half a 
son. Three sons are a son.” 12 Indeed, the legal niceties of off icial regulations 
were not always observed in real life. Peasant practices varied signif icantly 
and, although many landlords and communes insisted that large households 
be f irst in line to provide recruits, others preferred to rid the community 
of economically weak peasants who were landless or had fallen behind in 
paying dues and taxes. Communities and landlords also used conscription 
for disciplinary purposes, sending off criminals, troublemakers, drunkards, 
and men deemed disobedient, unruly, or simply lazy. Nor was there much 
protection from the administrative arbitrariness of corrupt off icials or 
abusive landlords. Bribery always remained a possibility in the workings 
of tsarist administration, and wealthier peasants possessed the means to 
purchase substitutes or exemption receipts. Physical requirements likewise 
could undercut the equity of the line system. In 1850, for example, only 
66,544 out of 139,002 recruits delivered to the military were accepted into 
service. The rest were rejected because of height, age, physical disabilities, 
or chronic diseases.13 Physical inadequacies and the appearance of chronic 
disease might be staged or self-inflicted but, regardless of the reasons for 
rejection, unfit recruits had to be replaced by their respective communities.
Soldiers in society
The institution of serfdom and the relationship of individuals to local com-
munities created circumstances that gave to Russian conscription and 
the entire military system distinctive characteristics. As noted above, the 
Law Code of 1649 bound all Russian subjects, except for nobles and clergy, 
to their place of residence. Peter I’s government built upon this bondage 
in def ining socioeconomic privileges and service obligations to the state. 
Once a peasant (of any category) or a townsman was drafted, however – 
more precisely, once he took the oath of allegiance to the tsar – he became 
12 Wirtschafter, From Serf to Russian Soldier, p. 3.
13 Ibid., p. 24.
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legally free from the capitation, the mark of lower-class status, and from 
any obligations to the local community. Given the long term of service – life 
until 1793, twenty-f ive years after that, and twenty years with f ive years in 
the reserve beginning in 1834 – this legal freedom, which in and of itself 
constituted upward social mobility, could not be realized in everyday life. 
Only if a soldier survived the long term of service or became unsuitable for 
military duties did he have a chance to actuate his legal freedom by moving 
into a higher social rank or profession.
The ambiguity of the soldier’s social advancement was equally striking in 
the case of his wife. Because a woman’s social status depended on her father 
and, after marriage, on her husband, soldiers’ wives also became legally free 
at the moment of a husband’s induction into military service. Once again, 
however, the upward mobility represented by legal emancipation contrasted 
sharply with harsh social reality. No longer a legally bound member of the 
village community, soldiers’ wives became dependent on the generosity 
of relatives, communes, and landlords. Many villages provided land and 
assistance to support soldiers’ wives and their children, especially male 
children who would grow up to become able-bodied members of the peasant 
community. But given that soldiers served for life or for twenty-f ive years, 
and given that a woman could not remarry without proof of her spouse’s 
death, soldiers’ wives also produced illegitimate children and gained a 
reputation for loose morals. Needless to say, illegitimate children and unat-
tached women were not always welcome in patriarchal village communities.
Soldiers’ wives did have options, however. Most remained in the village, 
but if they chose or were forced to leave home, their legal freedom created a 
number of possibilities.14 Soldiers’ wives, when practicable, could live among 
the troops, or with the permission of their husbands, obtain passports that 
allowed them to settle in towns. Military commanders employed them in 
“female occupations” such as making tents; sewing, washing, and mend-
ing clothes; and working in hospitals. Because soldiers’ wives enjoyed the 
privileges of free social categories, they also could engage in urban trades, 
that is, in occupations and commercial endeavors preserved for the legal 
residents of towns. Women who became town-dwellers remained outside 
the formal urban community and therefore enjoyed exemption from the 
capitation and various labor obligations. There is limited information 
about the occupations pursued by soldiers’ wives, but they are known 
to have been active participants in prostitution and in the traff icking 
of unwanted children between the countryside and the Moscow and St. 
14 Shcherbinin, Voennyi factor v povsednevnoi zhizni russkoi zhenshchiny.
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Petersburg foundling homes. By the mid-nineteenth century, some also 
found employment in the factories that had begun to dot the landscape of 
central Russia. Although the loss of membership in an off icially recognized 
community gave soldiers’ wives legal tools for social advancement, it also 
deprived them of secure socioeconomic moorings. Both literary and official 
sources give the impression that soldiers’ wives struggled to f ind a place in 
society. Most continued to live as peasants, and some managed to achieve 
independence by establishing themselves in urban occupations, but others 
suffered endless exploitation and abuse.
The vulnerability of soldiers’ wives also affected their children, both 
legitimate and illegitimate. Family life could be complicated in the Russian 
army, especially outside the garrison towns. In general, the presence of 
retired soldiers and soldiers’ families created legal ambiguities and welfare 
problems that the government could not ignore. One response was to es-
tablish yet another legally def ined social category, the “soldiers’ children” 
(soldatskie deti).15 This category existed from 1719 to 1856 and included any 
children born to soldiers after their induction into active military service. 
The illegitimate children of soldiers’ wives, girlfriends, and daughters also 
belonged to the “soldiers’ children”. All of these children, regardless of origin, 
came under the authority of the military domain (voennoe vedomstvo), and 
the males among them were destined for a life of military service. Soldiers’ 
sons could live with parents or relatives until age eighteen, when they began 
active service, or they could enter special military schools at age seven. 
In 1797, 12,000 soldiers’ sons were enrolled in military schools and, by the 
time the category was abolished in 1856, the number had reached 378,000. 
Most became common soldiers or noncommissioned off icers, though some 
learned crafts, worked as copyists, or acquired technical and administrative 
skills needed by the military.
Unlike conscripted peasants and townsmen who began military service 
in the lowest unskilled ranks, soldiers’ children possessed a modicum of 
education that created opportunities for meaningful social mobility. They 
were especially important as a source of noncommissioned off icers. In 
the years 1836-1856, the schools for soldiers’ sons, which also could include 
students from other social categories, produced 15,634 noncommissioned 
off icers and 6,771 musicians for the army. Data from 1863 show that among 
off icers promoted from nonnoble social groups, 56 per cent or 365 of 654 
came from the soldiers’ children.16 Despite the chance of real upward mobil-
15 [Wirtschafter], “Soldiers’ Children, 1719-1856”.
16 Wirtschafter, From Serf to Russian Soldier, pp. 38-39, 166n.
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ity, the parents of soldiers’ children did everything possible to conceal their 
offspring from military off icials. Just as the fact of legal emancipation did 
not make military service desirable among peasants, so too the opportunity 
to receive an education and rise in the social hierarchy did not undermine 
the natural desire of soldiers’ wives to keep their sons at home. Landlords 
too proved eager to claim soldiers’ children as peasants in order to augment 
the population of their estates. No wonder the Decembrist leader P.I. Pestel 
described the status of soldiers’ children as bondage or slavery (kabal) to 
the state. Many parents obviously agreed. Separated from home and hearth 
at a young age, forced to endure harsh discipline and material privation in 
underfunded and poorly administered military schools, soldiers’ sons still 
faced twenty-f ive years of active service beginning at age eighteen.
The story of the serf Makei Aleksandrov, who sought recognition as an 
illegally enserfed soldier’s son, highlights the challenges faced by military 
families.17 Brought before the Bronnitsy district court in Moscow province 
in 1843, Aleksandrov was accused of striking a peasant off icial (starosta) 
and failing to extinguish a f ire. Aleksandrov denied the identity ascribed 
to him and instead claimed to be Makei Filipov, the illegitimate son of a 
soldier’s wife, a status that carried legal freedom. After several peasants 
testif ied to Aleksandrov’s disorderly and negligent conduct, the court 
sentenced him to f ifty blows with birches and returned him to his master. 
Aleksandrov denounced the judgement, and his case was forwarded to 
the Moscow criminal chamber, which approved the lower court’s deci-
sion. Undeterred, in September 1844, Aleksandrov petitioned the Moscow 
military governor-general, who immediately took steps to corroborate the 
serf’s self-proclaimed free status. Perhaps because the tsarist army always 
needed soldiers, the provincial-level authorities treated Aleksandrov’s 
assertions seriously. They instructed their subordinates to investigate his 
origins and ordered his master, Provincial Secretary Isakov, to present 
appropriate documentation.
In Aleksandrov’s appeal to the governor-general, he claimed that his 
birth to the soldier’s wife Nastas’ia Nikiforova could be verif ied in the parish 
registers of a village in Bronnitsy district. To support this story, Aleksandrov 
identif ied his godparents, an older sister (also illegitimate) who lived on 
another estate, and several additional relatives, including a son from a 
forced marriage. Aleksandrov admitted to being registered to the nobleman 
Isakov in the eighth census, and during the judicial proceedings he con-
17 Tsentral’nyi gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv goroda Moskvy, f. 16 (Kantseliariia 
Moskovskogo general-gubernatora), op. 13, d. 449.
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tinued to make quitrent payments. But, the serf proclaimed, he remained 
a wrongfully condemned free man, prosecuted for his alleged crimes only 
after he initiated a lawsuit seeking emancipation. Aleksandrov’s boldness 
notwithstanding, he did not expect to receive fair treatment at the hands 
of local off icials. His master, Aleksandrov declared, was himself an off icial 
and friendly with members of the district court. In light of such unjust 
circumstances, Aleksandrov requested the transfer of his case to another 
locality and written permission to live independently until authorities 
reached a f inal decision. These requests were denied; however, district 
off icials, under direct pressure from superiors, continued to seek additional 
information from Aleksandrov’s registered owner.
At this point the archival record falls silent, and the f inal resolution of 
the case is not known. Perhaps the governor-general’s interest produced 
documentation that corroborated the convicted serf ’s story. If Makei 
Aleksandrov was in fact the illegitimate son of a soldier’s wife then, earlier 
in his life, his mother or landlord, or perhaps he himself, had successfully 
hidden his identity from the military authorities. Maybe by 1843 he was old 
enough to think that he could avoid front-line duty if he entered military 
service. Regardless of how the case ended, and it is possible that no deci-
sion was reached, the tribulations or machinations of Makei Aleksandrov, 
self-def ined as Filipov, demonstrate how the legal freedom of soldiers and 
their families could become both a source of vulnerability and a tool for 
survival among the empire’s lowliest subjects. The telling point is that a 
serf understood the legal freedom associated with the status of soldier’s 
son, or a soldier’s son understood the illegality of his enserfment. In either 
situation, belief in the benefits of legal freedom, including the chance to 
escape the conditions of serfdom, led an individual to act.
The special condition of soldiers’ children resulted from the legal and 
socioeconomic realities of serfdom and from Russia’s broader social ar-
rangements based on inherited status. The intersection of serfdom and 
military service created a class of free individuals situated outside the 
peasantry and other widely recognized social categories. Soldiers’ children 
were not the only group that occupied ambiguous terrain in Russian society. 
Retired soldiers and soldiers’ wives were similarly placed, as were a variety 
of service, proto-professional, economic, and educated ranks. Built around 
the institution of serfdom, the Russian social order produced numerous 
small categories def ined, like the larger “estates” (sosloviia or sostoianiia), 
by specif ic privileges, obligations, and functions. These categories, referred 
to collectively as the “people of various ranks”, illustrate the uncertainties 
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of social status that were broadly characteristic of imperial Russia.18 In ad-
dition, their development shows how individuals, communities, and groups 
in society were able to use off icial categories and legislative prescriptions, 
precisely because of the ambiguities they produced, for their own purposes 
– in order to survive, prosper, resist authority, and negotiate position within 
the framework of the social order.
Soldiers in service
After a peasant or townsman entered military service, received appoint-
ment to a regiment, and underwent basic training, he became a soldier in 
the service of the tsar, but a soldier whose everyday life remained closely 
connected to civilian society. The modern standing army created by Tsar Pe-
ter I and repeatedly reformed by his successors – the army that established 
Russian power in the Baltic and Black Seas, secured Russia’s western and 
southwestern frontiers against Sweden and the Ottoman Empire, eliminated 
the threat posed by the Crimean Tatars, established a Russian foothold in 
Transcaucasia at the expense of Persia, and utterly destroyed Napoleon’s 
Grande Armée – this army was far from regular and only partially standing. 
Even if one disregards distinctly irregular troops such as the Cossacks, who 
played such an important role in Russian military history, and looks solely at 
the regular line forces, the Russian army is best described as semi-standing. 
Housed primarily in peasant huts and urban homes, Russian troops lived 
in a variety of conditions and remained economically dependent on local, 
often civilian, resources. In the spring and summer, military units came 
together in camps to train and perform state works (for example, building 
and maintaining roads, bridges, and fortresses), but for six to eight months 
out of the year, in peacetime of course, soldiers lived dispersed in private 
homes. As late as 1860, only 28 per cent of the tsar’s troops could be housed 
in barracks and other state buildings.19 State works and dispersed quarters 
limited the attention given to military training and kept soldiers in a civilian 
environment for extended periods of time.
The interconnectedness of military and civilian society reached deeply 
into the workings of the regimental economy and hence also into the eve-
ryday life of common soldiers. The army’s peacetime system of supply dated 
18 Wirtschafter, Structures of Society, Idem, “Legal Identity and the Possession of Serfs in 
Imperial Russia”.
19 Wirtschafter, From Serf to Russian Soldier, p. 81.
MiLitary sErvicE and thE russian sociaL ordEr, 1649-1861 405
from the reign of Tsar Peter I, when the central government began to assume 
responsibility for clothing, housing, provisioning, and equipping the troops. 
That said, in the underinstitutionalized administrative environment of the 
Russian Empire, the desire to centralize resource allocation could only go 
so far. The limits to bureaucratic regulation, even in conditions of absolutist 
monarchy, were readily apparent. Unit commanders retained immediate 
responsibility for the wellbeing of their subordinates and were often forced 
to acquire supplies locally. As late as the mid-nineteenth century, state 
resources remained inadequate, and the troops repeatedly faced shortages 
of food, clothing, and equipment. The solution to this dilemma was local 
procurement and economic self-sufficiency within military units. Although 
the government tried to regulate the norms of pay, provisioning, and supply 
for the individual soldier and his regiment, off icial standards were diff icult 
to enforce, especially when the troops were dispersed in peasant huts and 
economically dependent on civilian hosts. The need to concentrate troops 
in border regions and garrisons also meant that the burden of supplying the 
troops could not be evenly or fairly distributed among the civilian popula-
tion. Conflicts between soldiers and local residents inevitably erupted 
although, on average, the Russian people accepted the obligation to provide 
for the troops.
The economic improvisation required of the Russian army produced 
material uncertainty, administrative arbitrariness, social volatility, and 
effective solutions. To understand how the army functioned, it is important 
to look at how individual units coped with the concrete conditions they 
faced. In September 1822, for example, soldiers from the Second Battalion 
of the Thirty-Second Jäger Regiment complained of not receiving money 
for cartage in 1818 or for meat and liquor during eight months of guard duty. 
In addition, the men of the Second Carabineer Company claimed that in 
1818-1819 they had earned 560 rubles, presumably at outside work, but did 
not know the whereabouts of the money or how it had been spent. They also 
complained that 800 rubles belonging to their artel’, a collective soldiers’ 
fund, had been sent to the treasury without their permission. Whereas the 
soldiers’ complaints revealed detailed knowledge of their economic rights 
and resources, as well as suspicions about the good intentions of their com-
manders, the response of the battalion commander highlighted deficiencies 
in the supply system that repeatedly produced these and similar disorders.
An investigation ordered by the commander-in-chief of the Second Army 
showed that in 1818 a regimental order had reallocated funds assigned for 
transport to the repair of equipment. The soldiers had in fact received money 
for meat and liquor to cover two months of the May trimester. But because 
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the regiment had not received any funds for the September trimester, com-
manders had withheld allocations for the remaining two months of the 
previous trimester. The units in question also had not received provisions for 
January because the Kiliia magazine, located in Bessarabia, was empty. As 
a result, it had been necessary to insist that hostile local residents feed the 
men. Finally, the corps commander had ordered the battalion commander 
to put 800 rubles that belonged to the soldiers’ artel’ in a loan bank to earn 
interest. In the end, the commander-in-chief accepted the explanations of 
the battalion and company commanders, requiring only that they pay the 
expenses of the three off icials sent to investigate the soldiers’ complaints.20
As conditions in the Second Army illustrate, commanders repeatedly 
provided for their subordinates by rearranging allocations and demanding 
that civilians supply food. Another response to inadequate state supplies 
and monies was to purchase goods from private contractors using regi-
mental funds. Soldiers also sometimes produced items such as uniforms 
and footwear for themselves, assuming they had the necessary materials 
on hand. In any of these circumstances, unoff icial outside work might be 
a critical source of supplementary income used to f ill the gaps in state 
supplies. Archival documents from the f irst half of the nineteenth century 
describe four types of outside work. First, soldiers worked directly for su-
periors and theoretically received payment for their labor. Second, parties 
of f ive to ten men worked under contracts concluded between company 
commanders and outside parties. Third, soldiers with special skills – for 
example, artisans and tailors – used their free time to produce goods for sale; 
and fourth, among stationary regiments located in fortresses and garrison 
towns, it was sometimes possible to establish economic enterprises such 
as gardens and shops that provided supplies and profits for military units.
Private enterprise among the troops could be mutually benef icial for 
commanders and soldiers, though such activities did little to promote 
military eff iciency or effectiveness.21 Conditions in the Kinburn Artillery 
Garrison in the reign of Nicholas I (r. 1825-1855) illustrate the point. Ac-
cording to a report from August 1850, submitted by the commandant of 
the Kinburn Fortress, the commander of Artillery Half-Company No. 1, 
Lieutenant Colonel Loman, managed a farm where he kept up to twenty 
head of cattle, pigs, and geese. The farm was not in itself regarded as illegal, 
though the extent of Loman’s enterprise raised concerns. The stench and 
f ilth produced by the farm were considered harmful to the health of the 
20 Ibid., p. 94.
21 Ibid., pp. 89-90.
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troops. The commandant’s report led to an investigation, and in December 
1851 three bombardiers testif ied that soldiers willingly worked for Loman, 
who paid them 75 paper kopecks a day. Of this, 25 kopecks went into the 
soldiers’ provisioning artel’ and the rest belonged to the individual men. 
The result was a mutually satisfying relationship between Loman and his 
subordinates.
Other off icers in the Kinburn Garrison told a different story. Critical of 
Loman, they complained that he freed soldiers from service obligations and 
training if they worked for him without pay. When, moreover, the off icers 
ordered the soldiers to work, they responded with disrespect, coarseness, 
and outright disobedience. The military judicial authorities agreed that 
Loman’s attitude toward unoff icial work had begun to interfere with the 
fulf illment of service duties, but the archival record does not indicate that 
he was punished or that his farm was shut down. Military performance 
aside, Loman’s activities may have been motivated by the need to provide for 
his men. As long as state supplies remained inadequate, off icials could not 
effectively combat economic corruption and abuse. In many circumstances 
corruption was born of necessity.
Just a few years before the Kinburn investigation, on 9 March 1846, the 
commander of the Southern Artillery Region had informed all garrison 
commanders that, if state monies were not suff icient to produce munitions 
for their soldiers, they should release three privates from each half-company 
to engage in outside work. The men sent to labor would receive a quarter 
of their earnings, and the rest would go to the economic resources used to 
purchase material for uniforms and other equipment that the state was 
supposed to fund. Citing the Military Code of 1838 (book 1, part 3, article 
438), the regional commander justif ied the order by noting that the Com-
missariat continued to issue munitions monies for the artillery based on a 
table of 1809. Given that the allocated sums were no longer adequate, the 
garrisons had no choice but to release soldiers for outside work. Military 
training was important, but physical survival came f irst. Despite the legal 
separateness of Russia’s military ranks, soldiers remained dependent on 
the civilian economy, and many of their routine activities would have been 
familiar to any peasant.
The flexibility of Russia’s socioeconomic and legal-administrative struc-
tures surely helped the army to function; however, the vulnerabilities of the 
military economy also could be socially explosive. This is illustrated by an 
1857 court-martial of twenty-one soldiers from the Åland fortif ications, who 
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were accused of disobedience against their commander.22 On 28 September 
1856, Ensign Shchetinin had informed his men that provisions were low and 
that supplies would be obtained from Åbo. The men, agreeing to provide 
for themselves with state funds until provisions arrived, received money 
for food through 8 October. In addition, for the period 7-14 October, the 
soldiers reportedly were able to buy beef, which was supposed to last until 
21 October. Although the defendants claimed that half the meat was spoiled, 
they also had received funds for meal and potatoes.
On 14 October, when the expected supplies did not arrive, the situation at 
Åland began to deteriorate. The soldiers again received money on the 14th, 
but when they requested additional funds on the 15th, Shchetinin told them 
they would have to wait. On the 15th and 16th the men carried on with their 
duties, but then on the 17th a noncommissioned officer informed Shchetinin 
that the men of Company No. 4 were demanding money. Shchetinin had 
run out of state funds, so he distributed his own money for the 15th and 
16th. He also questioned the men of Company No. 4, who complained that 
they had nothing to eat and already owed local residents money for the 
past two days. Shchetinin doubted their story, believing that the soldiers 
did have adequate provisions. He also insisted that local residents could 
wait until supplies arrived to be reimbursed. Ensign Shchetinin therefore 
ordered his men back to work.
At this point, soldiers from other companies also started to complain. 
A few men from Companies No. 5, 6, and 7 obeyed the order to work, but 
eighteen men from Company No. 4 refused and returned to their quarters. 
Shchetinin responded by giving them more of his own money for 17 October. 
Meanwhile, soldiers from other companies refused to work. Why are we 
going to work, they asked, when Company No. 4 refuses to go? “Hardly so 
that they [alone] will be guilty.” In the end, on 17 October, only Company 
No. 7 and some men from Company No. 6 complied with orders. Supplies 
arrived soon after this incident, and Shchetinin took steps to restore his 
authority. A complete breakdown of discipline had been averted. But then 
on 18 October, when Shchetinin tried to punish three “instigators”, the 
men of Company No. 4 refused to allow the punishments. “They did not 
steal anything”, the soldiers proclaimed. Nor, as one gunner put it, did the 
tsar “order us to starve”. With that the entire company walked off, and 
Shchetinin initiated a judicial process.
22 Rossiiskii gosudartsvennyi voenno-istoricheskii arkhiv, f. 801 (Auditoriatskii departament 
voennogo ministerstva), op. 73, d. 32. The case is discussed in Wirtschafter, From Serf to Russian 
Soldier, pp. 145-147.
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In the eyes of the military authorities, the events at Åland represented 
a clear case of insubordination. Military judicial off icials condemned the 
men of Company No. 4 on two grounds. First, the testimony of some soldiers 
indicated that the men had suff icient supplies of food. Still, the archival 
record does not indicate that Shchetinin actually inspected Company No. 4, 
which was quartered at some distance, so it is possible that this unit did 
not have enough to eat. One also has to wonder why Shchetinin continued 
to give out his own money, if he was convinced the men had adequate 
provisions. The second point raised by off icials of the Military Judicial 
Department was that the men of Company No. 4 could obtain food on credit 
from local inhabitants. In general, commanders assumed that when state 
supplies were unavailable, military units would acquire provisions from 
local residents. Moreover, even when this proved impossible, the lack of 
food and funds did not justify disobedience. Clearly, the situation at Åland 
resulted from circumstances beyond Shchetinin’s control.
The soldiers’ testimony tells a different story. In their eyes, the “crime” 
of Company No. 4 consisted of demanding money allotted to them by law. 
They knew their commander was responsible for feeding them and thus 
refused to work when they did not receive their daily allowance. They also 
refused to allow their comrades to be punished: the soldiers had a right 
to the money, which meant that no one was guilty and no punishment 
justif ied. Repeatedly, in the f irst half of the nineteenth century, Russian 
soldiers committed acts of disobedience when their rights were violated 
– when their commanders abused them, neglected to provide for them, or 
punished them unjustly. Although in the eyes of the government disobedi-
ence could never be justif ied, if a commander’s negligence or abuse caused 
the disobedience, he would be punished along with his subordinates. In 
this case, Ensign Shchetinin faced two weeks of arrest for “ineff iciency” in 
provisioning his unit. Eighteen men from Company No. 4 were found guilty 
of “overt disobedience” and sentenced to run the gauntlet two to four times 
through 100 men, followed by three to f ive years of service in a convicts’ 
company. Four of the men were judged medically unfit to undergo corporal 
punishment and so avoided that part of their sentence. Other men from 
Companies No. 5 and 6 faced milder punishments, and two noncommis-
sioned off icers were demoted and transferred for failing to ensure that their 
subordinates returned to work. As this and many other court cases show, 
the system of military justice afforded soldiers a measure of protection. 
In theory and practice, military justice sanctioned expectations of decent 
treatment and economic security.
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The unrest at the Åland Fortress highlights the extent to which local 
circumstances determined the army’s ability to maintain the troops. Al-
though the details of concrete cases differ, local commanders repeatedly 
had to improvise in order to provide for their men. Soldiers cooperated in 
this effort, as did civilians who made “donations” to nearby military units. 
In addition to seeking donations – the alternative to which might have been 
food riots by armed soldiers – commanders put their men out to work in 
the local economy. Improvisation and nonmilitary work represented key 
tools in the arsenal of physical survival. Of course, local self-sufficiency also 
produced significant variations and chronic irregularities. Outright corrup-
tion likewise played a role, and it is no surprise that economic crimes were 
among the most common for which off icers faced courts-martial. Some 
officers exploited the labor of their men in the manner of noble serf-owners; 
others abused or seriously neglected their subordinates. Even when soldiers 
and their commanders cooperated to achieve economic security, or if, from 
the state’s perspective, they colluded to rob the treasury, the vagaries of 
the supply system produced endless conflicts, both between off icers and 
soldiers and between the military and civilian populations. These conflicts 
created disorders, but they did not undermine the overall effectiveness of 
Russia’s military system. To understand this effectiveness, it is important to 
consider how the monarchy sustained its legitimacy, how the government 
wielded social control, and why soldiers and their commanders remained 
loyal servicemen.
Political culture and social integration
Given the interdependence of military and civilian life, it is no surprise 
that the Russian monarchy governed the army in the same way it gov-
erned society at large – through direct personalized relationships between 
subordinates and f igures of authority. These relationships reached from 
the village, town, or military unit to community and local authorities; 
to landlords, provincial governors, and military commanders; then on to 
high-level off icials and off icers, and most importantly to the monarch. 
“For Faith, Tsar, and Fatherland” may have been an off icial mantra, but it 
accurately represented important features of Russia’s enduring political 
culture. Throughout Russia’s age of serfdom the cement of society remained 
widespread acceptance of social hierarchy, absolutist monarchy, and church 
authority. The threat of repression invariably hung in the air, but without 
reference to the belief in church, monarch, and country, it is impossible to 
MiLitary sErvicE and thE russian sociaL ordEr, 1649-1861 411
explain how until the 1860s, the Russian Empire – an empire built upon 
human bondage – sustained great-power status in Europe and Asia. Only by 
addressing questions of motivation and morale is it possible to understand 
how the Russian government consistently mobilized material and human 
resources for military service.
Across the Russian Empire, ordinary people expressed themselves, and 
now speak to historians, through judicial proceedings. Although judicial 
speech acts do not take scholars into the recesses of social consciousness, 
they do shed light on how individuals negotiated the social order and 
became integrated into society and polity. To determine whether judicial 
testimony represented genuine conviction or clever dissimulation designed 
to achieve a specif ic goal is frequently impossible. In the military judicial 
records of the early nineteenth century there are numerous instances of 
what could have been dissimulation. As the cases already discussed il-
lustrate, disobedient soldiers, deserters, and reluctant recruits knew what 
they needed to say in order to gain a sympathetic hearing from off icials. 
For this reason, despite concerns about reliability or truthfulness, judicial 
records reveal much about political culture and the functioning of author-
ity relationships. Time and again, in judicial testimony, Russian subjects 
described their life experiences and circumstances in terms that they 
assumed to be not only permissible but also capable of eliciting sympathy 
and a favorable outcome. Clearly, formal justice offered people a measure 
of protection against abuse and exploitation. Equally important, it allowed 
individuals and communities to manipulate legal prescriptions for personal 
and collective gain.23
In the Russian army of the early nineteenth century, soldiers correctly 
assumed, and sincerely believed, that they were entitled to food, clothing, 
and fairness. They also knew that cruelty and negligence on the part of 
military commanders represented punishable offenses. For this reason, 
they used accusations of abuse to justify disobedience and desertion. 
Even if neglect or cruel treatment did not excuse such behavior, it might 
gain soldiers a sympathetic hearing before higher authorities. There was, 
however, a problem with the soldiers’ understanding of cruelty. Unlike the 
economic crimes of commanders, which could be identif ied with relative 
ease, the meaning of cruelty remained amorphous and changeable. Official 
and popular notions of what constituted cruelty did not always coincide.
23 Wirtschafter, Structures of Society, Idem, “Legal Identity and the Possession of Serfs in 
Imperial Russia”.
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The ambiguity surrounding accusations of cruelty can be seen from an 
investigation of 1818, during which soldiers from the Astrakhan Grenadier 
Regiment complained of abusive treatment at the hands of their former 
commander, Major Kridner.24 The investigating off icer, General Adjutant 
Baron I.I. Dibich, commander of Main Headquarters of the First Army, found 
that some of the soldiers’ claims were indeed justified. Kridner had subjected 
decorated soldiers to corporal punishments, which, while not excessive, did 
violate legal prohibitions. In addition, some men also testif ied that they 
had received 500 blows with sticks and 100 to 150 blows with broadswords. 
These punishments may have been illegal, although, according to Dibich, 
the soldiers’ claims were exaggerated: every time he questioned the men, 
they reported a higher number of blows. Most of the soldiers’ complaints 
concerned punishments of twenty-f ive to f ifty blows with sticks for neglect 
of duty. These punishments rarely occurred more than once a month, and, 
while they were frequent and severe, in Dibich’s judgment, they did not 
exceed legal norms. To the contrary, the men of the Astrakhan regiment 
were lazy and insubordinate, and because the regiment’s performance 
lagged in comparison to other units, strict measures were in order. Baron 
Dibich therefore cleared Major Kridner of any wrongdoing.
In other judicial cases off icers were found guilty of cruel treatment and 
punished accordingly, but the def inition of cruelty remained imprecise 
and dependent on circumstances. What might be regarded as cruelty in 
one situation became justif ied severity in another. The losers in this ar-
rangement were of course the soldiers, who were left to develop their own 
understanding of what constituted cruel or unjustif ied punishment. That 
soldiers frequently did not have their way in judicial proceedings is no 
surprise. Russia remained a monarchical polity, hierarchical society, and 
aggressive empire. Although many high-level off icials and commanders 
did try to uphold the law, the preservation of order always took precedence 
over legal rights. Still, despite def inite, though not necessarily clear, limits 
to the redress available to regular people, there was just enough justice 
in the Russian system of government to perpetuate the myth of the tsar. 
Soldiers, like peasants, continued to believe that individual landowners, 
state off icials, and military commanders were responsible for corruption 
and abuse, and that, if only the ruler could be informed of the abuses, he or 
she would intervene to address grievances and make just amends.
Absolutist monarchy persisted in Russia long after the empire became 
integrated into the European state system, and long after the court, nobility, 
24 Wirtschafter, From Serf to Russian Soldier, pp. 132-136.
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and educated classes became culturally Europeanized. One explanation for 
the strength of the monarchy is that, contrary to present-day misconcep-
tions, absolutism in Russia (and elsewhere in Europe) never meant absolute 
control of state, society, or economy, and certainly not of local communities 
or individual lives. It did mean, however, that the monarch represented 
the highest judicial and legislative authority and that at any moment he 
or she could overturn the decisions of administrative off ices and courts. 
Divinely anointed and answerable to God alone, the monarch was bound 
to obey the law, though he or she also could change the law at will. Equally 
signif icant, Russia did not possess time-honored institutions or legally 
constituted corporate bodies that mediated the monarch’s relationship to 
individuals, communities, and groups in society. The peasant commune 
can be counted as a collective “institution”, but the commune embodied a 
set of peasant practices that were not legally or contractually constituted. 
The self-suff iciency of the commune, and likewise of military units, high-
lighted the fact that, despite the tsar’s absolutist political power, the empire 
remained undergoverned and underinstitutionalized. The remoteness of 
effective state power, and the de facto freedom it allowed, kept authority 
relationships personalized and abuses individualized. In these conditions, 
the tsarist myth could be perpetuated, and people could manipulate laws 
and institutions to meet their own needs.
The monarchy’s relationship to Russia’s service classes, including the 
nobility, represented another critical element in the calculus of political 
legitimacy. Beginning in the late f ifteenth century, a “place system” or rank 
ordering of noble families (called mestnichestvo) regulated relations within 
the Russian elite and between that elite and the tsar. The place system 
determined precedence in service appointments and at court, ensuring that 
no individual received an appointment or occupied a position above another 
whose family held a higher place in the genealogical hierarchy. Mestnich-
estvo disputes undermined the corporate power of Muscovy’s upper nobility 
and kept many a family and off icial busy with time-consuming litigation. 
But mestnichestvo also encouraged social cohesion based on shared notions 
of family honor and represented a formal limit on the power of the tsar. 
This formal limit did not, however, produce contractual or constitutional 
arrangements. During the seventeenth century, mestnichestvo eroded and, 
even before its abolition in 1682, the ruler acquired suff icient power to ap-
point favorites and men of undistinguished lineage to high office, especially 
in the military. The process of modern state-building meant that not only 
favorites, but also Russia’s noble ranks as a whole, benefited from the service 
and educational opportunities created by a growing bureaucracy and army. 
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Even with the rise of new nobles, there was suff icient room in the service 
class and sufficient demand in the service hierarchy for established families 
to preserve their power and privileges. The result was a lack of opposition 
to abolishing the traditional order of families protected by mestnichestvo 
and a strengthening of the individual serviceman’s dependence on the tsar.
In the early eighteenth century, a new set of institutions began to regulate 
the noble service classes and their relationship to the monarchy. The new 
arrangements came to fruition in the Petrine reforms, which agglomer-
ated the noble ranks of Muscovy into an hereditary nobility. This meant 
in principle that all nobles (lineal and service) enjoyed the same rights, 
privileges, and obligations, though in practice economic stratif ication and 
family ties continued to determine access to education and the rewards of 
service. The Russian nobility’s character as an open “class” also endured, 
becoming codif ied in the Table of Ranks, which from 1722 regulated and 
bureaucratized the relationship between lineage, service, and noble status. 
The Table of Ranks consisted of fourteen classes or grades, each of which cor-
responded to specif ic titles and off ices in the service hierarchy. In military 
service, the attainment of rank fourteen, the lowest commissioned off icer 
rank, granted noble status, and in civil service, the attainment of rank eight 
brought ennoblement. Well-connected nobles, and increasingly men of 
education, continued to enjoy advantages in receiving service appointments 
and promotions, but, along with lineage and the tsar’s favor, a measure of 
merit had been written into the legal mechanism of social advancement.
The Table of Ranks did not transform the Petrine service state into a 
meritocracy, but it did regularize and institutionalize promotions based 
on education, talent, and zeal. As in the seventeenth century, the ongoing 
expansion of the military and bureaucratic establishments, combined with 
the demand for educated servicemen and technical specialists, increased 
the opportunities for men of humble birth to rise. Over the long duration, 
social origin became less important in def ining service careers, though 
elite birth and high position still tended to go hand in hand. Even when 
opportunity truly depended on education, nobles, and to a lesser degree the 
sons of nonnoble off icials, possessed greater access to education and thus 
could more readily be identif ied as men of talent. The goal of Peter and his 
successors was not to dislodge Russian grandees from positions of social and 
political dominance, but rather to ensure that nobles acquired the education 
and skills needed to compete in the modern European world. For nobles, as 
for peasants and townspeople, the burden of service increased significantly 
in the Petrine era. Russian nobles accepted this burden, just as they accepted 
the abolition of mestnichestvo, with surprisingly little resistance. As the 
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power of the state increased, so too did their own power, privileges, and 
status, not just in Russia, but also on the larger European stage.25
From the late seventeenth century, it can be said, the Russian nobility, 
a service nobility from the outset, bought into the Russian state project. 
Equally important, throughout the eighteenth century, Russian elites 
continued to lack a political language or set of shared ideas that would 
have allowed them to conceptualize political arrangements outside the 
serviceman’s personal relationship to the monarch or to superiors and 
patrons. At no time during Russia’s age of serfdom did the authority of noble 
landowners extend beyond the boundaries of their patrimonial estates. 
Russian nobles held no off ices or military commands, and they sat in no 
corporate bodies – noble assemblies were created by monarchical decree 
in the reign of Catherine II (r. 1762-1796) – simply because they were born 
noble or possessed landed estates. All offices and commands in the imperial 
system represented appointments by the monarch or royal representatives. 
To be sure, patronage, clientage, and family connections played a role in the 
political economy, but these factors could always be overridden by the will 
of the tsar. Although the 1785 Charter to the Nobility guaranteed that the 
deprivation of noble status would not occur outside court proceedings, when 
it came to state off ices and military commands, the ruler could disgrace or 
elevate any individual at any time, regardless of his or her family position. 
Russia’s nobles, including military off icers and higher-ranked civil serv-
ants, comprised a service class, not an autonomous corporation. Whatever 
“corporate” rights or privileges they acquired were granted by the monarch 
and could be taken away by imperial decree.
Of course, this did not happen in practice, except arguably in 1861 when 
Alexander II (r. 1855-1881) deprived nobles of their human property by 
emancipating the serfs. In most circumstances, the ruler’s disfavor affected 
individuals or small groups of conspirators, and not until the Decembrist 
Rebellion of 1825 did the monarchy face any overt political opposition. 
In eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Russia, social and political 
ideals stayed within the bounds of the moderate mainstream Enlighten-
ment, which sought to reconcile equality, rationality, and freedom with 
established political and religious authority. The democratic principles of 
the radical Enlightenment did not begin to affect Russian thought, much 
less actual social and political arrangements, before the 1820s. Dissident 
voices did arise in the eighteenth century, but few called for radical social 
or political change. Instead, enlightened thinkers focused on the moral 
25 Wirtschafter, Russia’s Age of Serfdom, pp. 19, 27.
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self-reformation and perfectibility of the individual human being, and 
because of the emphasis on the individualized pursuit of enlightenment, 
as opposed to the institutional realization of democratic principles, the 
Russian version of European Enlightenment appeared fully compatible 
with absolutist monarchy and the teachings of Orthodox Christianity.26
Throughout Russia’s age of serfdom, the strength of the monarchy 
remained closely intertwined with the strength of the Orthodox religious 
tradition. The Russian Orthodox Church preached a concept of Christian 
rulership that based both authority and obedience on morality and love. By 
the late eighteenth century, state-builders, preachers, and poets had concep-
tualized the personalized authority relations between the Russian monarch 
and his or her individual subjects into an explicitly moral relationship in 
which virtuous rulers deserved to be obeyed. Although the monarchy’s 
f irst concern was state power and the church’s the salvation of souls, the 
means to these ends overlapped. Subjects who lived an enlightened life, 
a life of civic and Christian virtue, both served the monarch and obeyed 
God’s commandments. Historians who find it diff icult to explain how in the 
face of inequity, injustice, and abuse, Russian subjects, including educated 
and enlightened individuals, accepted social and political arrangements 
based on serfdom should listen carefully to the empire’s religious teach-
ers. Until the 1820s, church, monarchy, and educated service classes alike 
understood the social order to be natural or God-given, and few imagined 
that traditional relationships built upon patriarchy and hierarchy might be 
incompatible with modern progress. As monarchists who believed in the 
power of Christian love, they combined Enlightenment universalism with 
belief in the unity of God’s creation. The result was a holistic conception of 
the relationship between society, polity, and church. All were of a piece, all 
had a role to play, and all belonged to the harmonious universal order that 
underlay Enlightenment aspirations and the modern idea of progress – the 
idea that the condition of humanity could and should be ameliorated.
Russian intellectuals could be highly critical of their society, yet before 
the 1820s this criticism tended to produce reconciliation rather than re-
volt. Echoing legislative projects and church teachings, literary works and 
personal correspondence revealed a desire to live within existing institu-
tions, despite awareness of their costs. Because Russia’s laboring people 
and common soldiers rarely expressed themselves in writing and almost 
never revealed their thoughts or feelings about the social relationships that 
def ined their lives, historians cannot know if they subscribed to the ideas 
26 Israel, Revolution of the Mind; Wirtschafter, Russia’s Age of Serfdom, pp. 144-165.
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and ideals expressed in religious, legislative, and literary sources. Prior to 
the abolition of serfdom in 1861, peasants and townspeople appeared to 
accept conscription, taxation, and a host of labor obligations, and soldiers 
appeared to go obediently into battle. The pages of Russian history may be 
f illed with repressive coercion, but there is considerable evidence that the 
integration of society and polity, and hence also the obedience of Russian 
soldiers, hinged on more than fear of punishment.
Until the beginning of the twentieth century, large numbers of Russian 
subjects either accepted absolutist monarchy or remained convinced that it 
could not be altered. On average, belief in the tsar’s goodness and desire for 
justice held firm. When an individual ruler behaved tyrannically or violated 
rightful order, he or she could presumably be removed – not because anyone 
questioned the legitimacy of monarchy, but because the person occupying 
the throne had turned out to be a false tsar. That peasant conscripts obedi-
ently entered service, that peasant soldiers bravely marched into battle, 
that noble and educated elites did not rebel against the monarchy until the 
second quarter of the nineteenth century – these circumstances suggest 
that long after secularism, materialism, deism, and atheism had become 
firmly established in western and central Europe, most Russians continued 
to believe in God, tsar, and church.
Conclusion
The outstanding feature of imperial Russia’s serf army was its economic, 
social, and cultural f lexibility – a flexibility that emanated directly from 
the mechanisms connecting the Russian service state to the structures of 
society. With a social order based on unfree labor and a political system 
rooted in absolutist monarchy, the Russian Empire competed effectively 
in military and diplomatic arenas that stretched across Europe and Asia. 
Sharing borders with Europe, the Ottoman Empire, Persia, and China, the 
empire encompassed multiethnic, multiconfessional territories inhabited 
by nomadic, peasant, and “modern” European peoples. Precisely because 
the Russian army depended for its survival on local resources and com-
munities, it proved capable of responding to diverse needs and challenges. 
The adaptability of Russia’s social and political institutions, including 
military institutions, is often overlooked in discussions of the autocratic 
monarchy and centralized state apparatus. Political arrangements may have 
been absolutist and sacred, but social arrangements were amorphous and 
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changeable. It can therefore be diff icult to describe the Russian military 
system with reference to a specif ic typology of variables.
As a system of labor, the Russian army combined serfdom with mass 
conscription, and until 1762 even hereditary nobles, the bulk of the off icer 
class, were bound to serve. Within the regimental economy, monetary pay-
ments played a role, but remained inadequate, and so the need to improvise 
produced free, unfree, commodif ied, and noncommodif ied forms of work. 
The long term of service and the change in legal status that accompanied 
conscription turned common soldiers and nonnoble specialists into a 
distinct class of military ranks and families whose labor could be exploited 
but whose social welfare needs also had to be addressed. During the pe-
riod under study, despite technological progress and population growth, 
fundamental socioeconomic and institutional change did not occur. Only 
after the general emancipation of the serfs in the Great Reforms of the 
1860s could universal liability for conscription, a shorter term of service, 
and effective combat reserves be established. Already in Muscovite times, 
and with greater precision and comprehensiveness from the reign of Peter 
I until the emancipation of 1861, the Russian monarchy governed a service 
state in which every social group performed specif ic functions. Nobles, 
clergy, and merchants, not to mention peasants, lesser townspeople, and 
nonnoble servicemen, occupied legally def ined social statuses that at once 
granted privileges and imposed obligations. Even among the most elite 
social groups, the acquisition and preservation of privileges depended on 
service. When privileges became hereditary and independent of service, 
as occurred with the nobility in 1762, they still represented a grant from 
the monarch, def ined in state law – a grant that he or she could rescind at 
any time. If military service in the age of serfdom constituted a system of 
labor, so too did every other social status and occupation.
 The French army, 1789-1914
Volunteers, pressed soldiers, and conscripts
Thomas Hippler
According to a common belief, modern military conscription was invented 
during the French Revolution. Subsequently it became a cornerstone of 
republicanism in the French understanding. Without any doubt, there is 
some truth in this view; however, there is also much confusion about the 
terms of the debate. If we have a closer look at actual recruitment practices 
in France in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and if we compare 
these to practices in other historical periods or geographical contexts the 
distinctions quickly become less clear. The f irst question to be addressed 
is thus how to distinguish in a historically convincing way different forms 
of military labour, which are enslavement, professionals, mercenaries, 
and conscription. It will actually turn out that these distinctions have 
necessarily to be linked to systems of social representation, and they are 
inseparable from social norms and values, as well as from representations 
of social justice and of legitimate social orders. Things get worse if we keep 
in mind that historical scholarship in itself is always and necessarily linked 
to and indeed involved in the construction of these normative and symbolic 
orders themselves. To stick to the French case: there has been a constant 
tendency to link the setting-up of the cadre/conscript system during the 
last third of the nineteenth century to the legacy of the French Revolution 
and, more particularly, to the category of “national volunteers” f ighting 
for liberty. In the light of this imaginary genealogy, recruitment practices 
of the ancien régime have been dismissed as military “enslavement” by a 
despotic state. The outcome was obviously the construction of a normative 
dichotomy between legitimate and illegitimate forms of recruitment. If we 
take a closer look at what had actually been going on in terms of recruitment 
practices, it appears in many cases that the differences between the earlier 
and the later practices were less important than commonly believed. On 
the contrary, there is a great deal of continuity between the ancien régime 
and the modern republic.
However, the analysis should not stop there. It is obviously not the same 
thing to serve in the military as a pressed soldier or to accomplish one’s civic 
duty through military service, although the concrete practices, of military 
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drill for instance, may, from another point of view, be strictly the same.1 
This example clearly shows that it is impossible not to take into account the 
historical construction of the meaning that is attached to these practices. 
In other words: looking at different forms of recruitment with a historian’s 
eye implies of necessity adopting a historical perspective with regard to 
the taxonomic categories that we employ to describe and to distinguish 
between different forms of military labour.
There are many studies of the military history of, and of mobilization 
efforts during, the French Revolution and the Prussian reform period, but 
comparative or transnational approaches are still rare. I will focus the 
discussion of the state of the art on recent works and those that appear to 
contribute to the theoretical discussion. Generally speaking, French histori-
ography has never abandoned the f ield of military history in general and of 
the revolutionary levies in particular. With regard to the wider perspective, 
Eugen Weber’s Peasants into Frenchmen deserves to be mentioned, since 
it considers the inner colonization of the French countryside in the period 
between 1871 and 1914 exclusively and positively from the point of view of 
the central power.
The general problematique of how to conceive the role of military service 
in a democracy has been posed chiefly by Torsten Holm2 and Eliot Cohen3 
– but in a rather aporetical perspective4 – from the point of view of the 
rational-choice theory of democracy by Margaret Levi,5 from a military 
point of view by Richard Challener6 and Maurice Faivre,7 and from the point 
of view of moral philosophy by Michael Walzer.8 For a historical inquiry, 
however, these works may be regarded as not very helpful.
On the methodological level, the study Le corps militaire by the French 
sociologist Alain Ehrenberg is, by contrast, very useful, even if its topic is not 
military service as a institution in itself. The specif ic interest of Ehrenberg’s 
work lies in the correlation he seeks to establish between military drill 
and democratic citizenship, thereby questioning the validity of traditional 
1 Hippler, Citizens, Soldiers, and National Armies, p. 6.
2 Holm, Allgemeine Wehrpflicht.
3 Cohen, Citizens and Soldiers.
4 Cohen’s expression may be considered as symptomatic for this interpretative dilemma: if 
“military service touches the very essence of a polity” this is because it “incorporates some of 
a liberal-democratic society’s most precious values and some values utterly repugnant to it”: 
ibid., pp. 33 and 35.
5 Levi, Consent, Dissent, and Patriotism.
6 Challener, The French Theory of the Nation in Arms.
7 Faivre, Les nations armées.
8 Walzer, Obligations, esp. “The Obligation to Die for the State”, pp. 77-98.
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dichotonomies such as autonomy and power, liberty and constraint, self-
government and obedience. Democracy, according to Ehrenberg, sets up a 
particular type of political relationship that goes beyond traditional distinc-
tions between those who command and those who obey and execute, in 
favour of a “tactic that aims at the power and the obedience of everybody”. 
The autonomy of the individual is not to be considered solely as an obstacle 
to the exercise of power, but at the same time as its “intermediary” (relais):
Autonomy and its double wording (intermediary and obstacle) ought 
to be reinscribed into the mechanisms of power, into the practice 
of authority. One should look for their common matrix and cease to 
perceive it from the angle of the f igure of the Other, for it is not what is 
outside that would necessarily and objectively do harm to power, but a 
form of government of human beings, where human beings are incited 
to govern themselves. Neither disciplinary nor liberating by nature, it 
is an element in a system of relations.9
The essential historical work of the armies of the French Revolution remains 
Jean-Paul Bertaud’s La revolution armée. Inspired by this fundamental 
work, Bertaud’s followers, such as Annie Crépin,10 Jean-Michel Lévy,11 Pierre 
Jacquot,12 or recently Bruno Ciotti,13 have studied the revolutionary levies on 
a regional level more closely, providing an essential basis from which the 
perspective can eventually be geographically enlarged. Moreover, the factor 
of desertion may said to be well documented, mainly due to the works by 
Alan Forrest14 and Frédéric Rousseau.15 The German and the French Offices 
for Military History published both collective volumes on the history of 
conscription, giving a very large chronological overview on the topic. The 
French volume, edited by Maurice Vaïsse, contains foremost a contribution 
by Jean Delmas, who gives a useful summary of the French debates on 
compulsory military service and the lottery draft during the nineteenth 
century.16
9 Ehrenberg, Le corps militaire, p. 173.
10 Crépin, “Levées d’hommes et esprit public en Seine-et-Marne”.
11 Lévy, “La formation de la première armée de la Révolution française”.
12 Jacquot, “Les Bataillons de volontaires en Haute-Marne”.
13 Ciotti, Du volontaire au conscrit.
14 Forrest, Conscripts and Deserters.
15 Rousseau, Service militaire au XIXe siècle.
16 Delmas, “L’armée française au XIXe siècle”.
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Some recent publications deserve a closer discussion. Being not a schol-
arly historical study but rather an essay – relying exclusively on secondary 
literature – Michel Auvray’s book L’âge des casernes analyses military 
service as being in historical continuity with much older obligations to 
the state, and its revolutionary origin nothing more than a “myth”. Annie 
Crépin’s book La conscription en débat, on the other hand, is essentially 
based on “macro-sources”, such as parliamentary debates, proposals for 
laws, and newspaper articles. The same author has recently broadened 
the perspective with the publication of Défendre la France, which takes 
into account the reactions and attitudes of civil society towards military 
obligation, and Histoire de la conscription which sums up the author’s work 
of many decades and widens the chronological horizon to the twentieth 
century. Crépin is the most accomplished expert on the matter in France 
and provides a very useful framework of the political debates of the period. 
There are, however, also decisive shortcomings in her analyses, inasmuch 
as she remains f irmly grounded in the tradition of French republican and 
“Jacobin” historiography and thus has a tendency to accept too readily the 
conceptual grounds of this tradition. With the methods of the historical 
anthropology, Odile Roynette has analysed the “experience of the barracks” 
in France at the end of the nineteenth century with an impressive mastery 
of source material and according to an interesting problematique, insisting 
on the conscripts’ processes of adaptation to the social microcosms of the 
army and the impact of the institution to the shaping of national and gender 
attitudes.17
Recruitment practices of the ancien régime
At least since 1583 the right to raise troops has been codif ied as a royal 
prerogative.18 The construction of a centralized state in France went hand 
in hand with the nationalization of the armed forces; private armies and the 
personal possession of weapons gradually disappeared, to the advantage of 
central power. In the case of eighteenth-century France, the institutional 
situation of recruitment was extremely complex; different and even con-
tradictory practices coexisted over a long period. Three different stages of 
recruitment policy in pre-revolutionary France, however, can be roughly 
distinguished: (1) feudal recruitment, (2) “touting”, and (3) militia incor-
17 Roynette, “Bons pour le Service”.
18 The following paragraphs rely mainly on Hippler, Citizens, pp. 13-27 and 46-76. 
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porations and “national recruitment”. However, chronological boundaries 
between these stages were by no means clear and are distinguished here 
only for the sake of clarity.
Despite the 1583 act, the king did not raise his troops directly. Character-
istically, having f irst deprived the aristocracy of the right to keep troops, the 
central power delegated the raising of troops back to them.19 The military 
administration chose the colonels – generally nobles – who were charged 
with raising and maintaining regiments. In principle, the central power 
thus did not provide regiments with soldiers; instead, enrolment was the 
task of the off icers, who were virtually “proprietors” of their corps. Recruit-
ment was thus a “private” contract between a soldier and an off icer, relying 
on existing feudal bonds, which meant that soldiers generally came from 
among the officer’s dependent peasantry. This kind of personal recruitment 
had certain advantages. The military hierarchy and social structure exactly 
reflect the social relations between local lords and their peasants. They 
knew each other and they were bound by a system of mutual obligations. 
And, last but not least, the desertion rate was comparatively low with this 
kind of recruitment system.20 However, this feudal recruitment also had 
certain limits. In times of war, in particular, it appeared to be impossible 
to signif icantly increase the strength of the army without other methods 
of enrolment.
Having exhausted the resources of personal recruitment, off icers were 
forced to enlist soldiers they did not personally know and with whom 
they had no relation in civil society. This kind of recruitment is generally 
called “touting” (racolage). The difference between feudal recruitment and 
racolage can be summarized in the following way: in the case of feudal 
recruitment, the soldier was enlisted by an off icer, whereas in the case of 
touting he was hired as a soldier. The procedure, however, was not different 
in form, since drafting was still the affair of the commander of the unit. 
In contrast to the procedure of feudal recruitment, the off icers usually 
touted outside their home towns or regions. In contrast to personal and 
feudal staff ing, “touting” allowed enrolments to be increased considerably; 
this kind of practice, however, turned out to be problematic, too. The more 
diff iculty the recruiters had in f inding soldiers, the more they were forced 
to compete with each other, and the more they were tempted to use violence 
or tricks in order to f ind recruits.
19 See André, Michel Le Tellier et l’organisation de l’armée monarchique.
20 Corvisier, L’armée française de la fin du XVIIe siècle au ministère de Choiseul, I, p. 736.
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There was, however, another military institution, one that truly came 
under the control of the central government: the Royal Militia. The militia 
had been established as a regular institution under the Marquis de Louvois, 
the minister of war, in November 1688. In reality, militia systems had existed 
since the Middle Ages under various labels; their principle was the mobiliza-
tion of peasants under the command of the lord in wartime.21 A militia 
system, in the traditional sense of the term, thus involved the duty to f ight 
for the defence of the community in the case of danger; it did not involve, 
however, a regular military service. The feudal militia was disbanded as 
soon as a war was over. Moreover, a certain number of particular militia 
institutions coexisted until the end of the eighteenth century. There were, 
in the f irst place, the milices bourgeoises formed by inhabitants of towns. 
Their f irst purpose was to maintain public order, i.e. they were a municipal 
police force. Occasionally, however, they were used as auxiliaries for the 
regular army. By the end of the century, though, the burghers tended in-
creasingly to pay a substitute instead of themselves serving in the militia; 
they were, however, opposed to any attempt to abolish the institution that 
they considered as the expression of the cities’ political liberty. When the 
Royal Militia came into being in 1688, its organization differed considerably 
from these predecessors. First, it was raised in the name of the king and not 
by local lords. Secondly, it was conceived of as a kind of standing auxiliary 
army that gathered even in peacetime and was regularly employed in wars, 
and not only at particular critical moments. The Royal Militia was recruited 
by a conscription system, which was very unpopular. As a result of the 
opposition of public opinion, compulsory conscription in the militia was 
abolished in 1697, re-established in 1701, abolished once again in 1712, and 
then, in 1726, def initively institutionalized.22
Only a small proportion of those who were potentially subject to the 
militia were actually conscripted, and the choice of those who had to serve 
was obviously subject to serious quarrels. In most cases a lottery system 
was adopted, but large segments of society benefited from legal exemptions, 
both personal and statutory. Moreover, in the course of the eighteenth cen-
tury the legislation on exemptions became increasingly complex. Service 
in the militia being not a personal, but a communal duty, it became normal 
to collect money in the parish before the lottery day; this was then handed 
over to the chosen militiaman. This money was, on the one hand, a kind of 
compensation for serving the community and, on the other, a contribution 
21 Corvisier, Armées et sociétés en Europe, pp. 36-57.
22 Gébelin, Histoire des milices provinciales (1688-1791).
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to the costs of the uniform and equipment. The existence of this kind of 
practice induced the government to make this contribution obligatory.
Another development needs to be highlighted. Traditionally, the militia 
and the line army were strictly separate organizational institutions. From 
1701, though, when military service in the militia was re-established, the 
government gradually changed its military policy towards assimilation 
between the militia and the line army. From then on, each militia battalion 
was attached to a regiment of the line army. The militia units were now 
labelled “second battalion” and designed to assist the “f irst battalion” in 
tactical matters. The militia thus increasingly became a recruitment pool 
for the regular army. With regard to the kind of recruitment, the difference 
between the “volunteer” recruitment of the line army and the “conscription” 
of the militia was eroded by the actual situation on the ground: militiamen 
and soldiers of the standing army were pressed. The line army was recruited 
to a great extent among conscripts, while the newly raised militia units 
consisted exclusively of “touted” volunteers. In this way, the dissimilarity 
between the conscripted militia corps as auxiliary military forces, on the 
one hand, and the regular army with volunteer recruitment, on the other, 
gradually faded away.23 Simultaneously, the functions of the state’s military 
administration increased, which meant that recruitment became directly 
governed by state authorities and not by relatively autonomous army of-
f icers.
The ultimate step towards a centralized system of military recruitment 
before the French Revolution can be dated to the ordinance of 10 December 
1762 stating that “the king charges himself with recruiting”. The basic 
characteristic of these “national” or “royal recruits” was that they were 
enlisted not for a particular unit, or by a particular off icer, but as soldiers 
for the army in general. Centralized state apparatuses like the intendances 
of the provinces were charged with recruitment, and a ref ined system of 
bureaucratic control was set up in order to co-ordinate large-scale recruit-
ment operations.
The French Revolution and the Napoleonic period
Confronted with these eighteenth-century developments, the innovations 
in matters of military recruitment in the early years of the French Revolution 
seem rather insignif icant. From July 1789 the bourgeoisie had reorganized 
23 Corvisier, L’armée française de la fin du XVIIe siècle au ministère de Choiseul, I, p. 247.
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their own militia troops as the National Guard, partly in order to back 
the National Assembly in its struggle to impose its own political agenda 
against the monarchy, and partly in order to uphold domestic security.24 This 
second role, however, was rather dubious, since National Guardsmen took 
part in popular uprisings and in looting.25 In theory, only “active citizens” 
and sons of active citizens – that is, those who had a material interest in 
public affairs – should be allowed to be armed as members of the National 
Guard, but the practice was much less clear-cut.26 In some regions, the 
Guard’s social composition was much less bourgeois than it should have 
been according to the legal dispositions.27 In other cases, the legal disposi-
tions were politically challenged by excluded social groups, such as the 
Parisian servants who in 1789 claimed a universal human right to serve in 
the National Guard28 or the feminist Société des citoyennes républicaines 
révolutionnaires who addressed a petition to the National Assembly in 1792, 
demanding the creation of a “female national guard”.29 In short, service in 
the National Guard was intimately linked to the question of civic rights and 
as such became a subject of political quarrel.
In December 1789, the National Assembly rejected a request made by 
republicans to establish a system of universal conscription. After a week 
of passionate debate the Assembly decreed, on 16 December 1789, that 
“French troops, of all kinds, other than National Guards and Militia, will be 
recruited by voluntary engagement.” 30 Conscription was rejected in favour 
of voluntary recruitment. The general structure of the regular army was to 
remain more or less the same: executive power over the army was in the 
hands of the king, military service was rejected, and the term of service 
clasted eight years with the possibility of extending that period. More 
particularly, the age limit for enlisting was f ixed at sixteen. Furthermore, 
the actual procedure of recruitment was revised: recruiters were to work 
only in their home district so that they were under the control of their 
fellow citizens, which was supposed to prevent the notorious disorders of 
24 Soboul, La Révolution française, p. 152.
25 Devenne, “La garde nationale”, p. 49.
26 Arches, “Aspects sociaux de quelques gardes nationales”, pp. 255-266.
27 For a detailed regional analyses see the contributions in the third part (pp. 267-409) of 
Bianchi and Dupuy (eds), La Garde nationale entre nation et people en armes.
28 Petition des Personnes en état de Domesticité du District de l’Isle-Saint-Louis à messieurs 
les Représentans de la Commune, Paris, 1789. See also Genty, “Controverses autour de la garde 
nationale parisienne”, p. 65.
29 Léon, Adresse individuelle à l’Assemblée nationale. See also Godineau, Citoyennes Tricoteuses, 
p. 119.
30 Le Moniteur no. 116, vol. 2, p. 400.
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traditional recruitment. Another important point was the nationalization 
of the army: only Frenchmen were to be recruited into the French corps.31 
This principle, however, did not include the foreign corps of the army, but 
French and foreign corps had to be separated. Finally, soldiers would lose 
their civic rights for the duration of the engagement.
The outcome of the debate was thus an attempt to make recruitment into 
the army morally acceptable, without changing its structure or the general 
patterns of staff ing. The long term of service, the possibility of joining the 
army at the age of sixteen, the maintenance of foreign corps, and the loss of 
civic rights for soldiers explicitly kept the armed forces at a certain distance 
from civil society. The third estate, furthermore, did not try to destroy the 
supreme power of the king over the state and the army, and contented itself 
with the recognition of the National Guard as the expression and guarantee 
of bourgeois participation in political matters.
It was war, or the imminence of war, that brought about an evolution 
in the patterns of recruitment. After having tried in vain to enlist 100,000 
volunteers into the regular army, the Assembly decided, in June 1791, to or-
ganize battalions of “national volunteers” from the members of the National 
Guard. The decree aff irmed clearly that these measures were limited to the 
time in which “the situation of the state required extraordinary service”.32 
Being such an extraordinary military force obviously meant that the forms 
of organization and military discipline had to differ considerably from 
those in use in the line army. In this respect the most important feature 
was certainly the question of off icers. The way off icers were chosen was the 
same as in the National Guard: that is, soldiers had the right to elect their 
commanders. The government issued various calls for volunteers during 
the following years, and the whole culminated in the 1793 levée en masse, 
which has become a myth in French national historiography.33 In theory 
each citizen was liable, but the exceptions were so numerous that the levée 
en masse by no means established general conscription.34 Moreover, this 
civic call to the colours was clearly presented as an extraordinary event that 
was not meant to be translated into permanent institutional reality. The 
word “levée” has several meanings: it connoted the ideas of both “levy” and 
31 Bouthillier, Rapport sur le recrutement, les engagements, les rengagements et les conges, 
pp. 10-15.
32 “Décret relatif à une conscription libre de gardes nationales de bonne volonté dans la 
proportion de un sur vingt”, printed in Déprez, Les volontaires nationaux (1791-1793), p. 101.
33 On the myth of the “national volunteers”, see Hippler, “Volunteers of the French Revolution-
ary Wars”.
34 Auvray, L’âge des casernes, p. 42, and Jean-Paul Bertaud, La révolution armée, p. 100.
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“uprising”. The recruitment of troops, which is one of the main prerogatives 
of central power, and revolt are put on the same level. The oxymoron both 
aff irms and denies state power. The idea for a levée en masse occurred 
during the spring of 1793 in the highly politicized milieus of the Parisian 
sans-culottes,35 and it was part of their plan for political terror.36 Sébastien 
Lacroix, one of the main ideologists of the levée en masse, recommended 
a vast political programme that involved stockpiling food in Paris, f ixing 
prices for foodstuffs, monitoring public opinion, and co-ordinating a huge 
propaganda effort. This particular situation which would “decide the fate 
of the world” imposed a general mobilization of a very short duration: “eight 
days of enthusiasm may be more eff icient for the fatherland than eight 
years of battle”.37
The idea of a levée en masse and the politics of terror were only reluc-
tantly adopted by the Jacobin government under popular pressure, and the 
concrete measures taken differed considerably from the intentions of the 
promoters of the idea. Most importantly, the levée en masse was transformed 
into a requisition: instead of an anarchic seizure of sovereign power by 
insurrectionists, it was, on the contrary, the state that “seized” individuals 
for service in the army. In this respect, the mythical levée en masse actually 
pref igured some of the constitutive paradoxes of republican conscription.
Most of the “national volunteers” were very young men.38 A majority of 
them came from urban areas.39 In terms of their social origin, the petty and 
lower bourgeoisie were well represented, and artisans and journeymen were 
over-represented.40 What actually happened during the following years was 
that the soldiers who were already enlisted were kept under the colours for 
many years, in most cases against their will. On the other hand, the turnover 
of the military personnel was particularly high in these years – in 1792, for 
instance, more than a third of the soldiers had served less than one year. 
Moreover, the emigration of off icers, most of them nobles, enabled those 
who were left to make very quick career progression.41 People from lower 
social origins could attain positions of command that had been almost 
35 Soboul, Les sans-culottes parisiens en l’an II, p. 110.
36 Guérin, La lutte de classes sous la Première République.
37 Lacroix, Pas un moment à perdre, pp. 12-13.
38 In their ranks, 79 per cent were younger than twenty-f ive. In the Ain department, 249 of 544 
soldiers raised in 1791 were younger than twenty (Lévy, “La formation de la première armée de 
la Révolution française”, p. 115).
39 Jacquot, “Les Bataillons de volontaires” pp. 84-94.
40 Bertaud, La revolution armée, pp. 67-68.
41 Ibid., p. 77.
thE FrEnch arMy, 1789-1914 429
exclusively reserved for nobles a couple of years earlier: the armies of the 
French Revolution and of the Napoleonic empire were thus a very powerful 
mechanism for upward mobility.
Nonetheless, in 1798, the needs of the war effort induced the government 
to issue a law on conscription.42 According to the deputy – later Marshall 
– Jourdan who presented the proposal in parliament, the law aimed less at 
creating new political forms than at institutionalizing the experience of 
the Revolution.43 The project, however, was also quite moderate and tried 
explicitly to avoid a militarization of society. There were thus two contra-
dicting goals to be achieved: on the one hand, Jourdan advocated “universal 
service”, essentially because partiality would have had a negative impact on 
the social acceptability of military service; on the other, he strived to limit 
the burden of conscription by enlisting only the number of soldiers that was 
necessary for the army and not all available individuals.44 The solution to 
this conundrum was found in the distinction between “conscription” and 
“military service”: conscription meant that the individual was registered as 
a potential conscript, but this did not imply that that all these conscripts 
had to do military service. “Many will be destined to serve, but in reality few 
will probably serve”, as Jourdan put it.45 The criterion by which the soldiers 
were chosen from the mass of conscripts was their age, which meant that 
the youngest of a class were enlisted f irst. The law, however, did not f ix the 
length of service, and decisions about the discharge of soldiers were left to 
the government.
Unsurprisingly, opinions were divided about the conditions for exemp-
tions and about the question of whether conscripts should be allowed to 
hire a substitute instead of doing military service personally. The 1798 law 
did not actually allow substitution, since the goal was that “the law pen-
etrates the thatched cottages of the poor as well as the sumptuous palaces 
of opulence”.46 This settlement, however, was discussed again two years 
later and substitution allowed. What is interesting about this discussion 
was the fact that similar arguments, which had been brought forward in 
1798 to justify the act of conscription and the interdiction of substitution, 
now served as arguments for substitution. What is more, the adjustment of 
military duties to the needs of “arts, commerce, and agriculture” in Jourdan’s 
42 On the 1798 legislation, see Crépin, La conscription en débat, pp. 24-30. 
43 See Laveaux, Rapport fait par Et. Laveaux, p. 12.
44 Jourdan, Rapport fait par Jourdan, p. 4.
45 Ibid., p. 6.
46 Porte, Opinion de Porte sur le projet de résolution, p. 8.
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project was translated into a criticism of “those lovers of a chimerical 
equality” who wanted to “force all the members of a big nation strictly to 
do the same work”.47 The “general interest” could serve as an argument not 
only for an equal obligation for everybody, but also for a differentiation of 
social tasks, that is, for the possibility for the rich to buy themselves out 
of the obligation by hiring a substitute. The privilege, however, was also 
justif ied as salutary for the poor: “the option of substitution will allow 
the poor to receive money”.48 The legislative basis for French recruitment 
policy was rather elastic: on the one hand, military obligation was conceived 
as a consequence of citizenship, and the recruitment model can thus be 
described as conscription; on the other hand, the law could be interpreted 
as authorizing the forced recruitment of a selected number of individuals 
with the possibility given to the wealthy to buy themselves out.
The 1798 law was the legislative basis for the recruitment of Napoleon’s 
army. As regional studies have shown, the rates of desertion and refusal of 
military service (insubordination)49 were extremely high: up to 90 per cent 
in many cases.50 Socially, deserters and insoumis came mainly from rural 
regions, and were well integrated into society. Families and rural communi-
ties helped deserters and insoumis escaping from the military. It was easier 
to enforce conscription in urban areas, and in this respect the social pattern 
of staff ing remained the same during the Revolution and the Napoleonic 
period. In order to fulf il the military needs, Napoleonic authorities set up 
specific military corps for searching the countryside and hunting deserters. 
Moreover, many of the peace treaties during the period obliged Napoleon’s 
“allies” to contribute to the war effort of the empire. As a result, about a 
third of the soldiers in the Russian campaign were not French.51 Finally, 
from 1808 onwards, “extraordinary levies” were organized in order to meet 
the enormous manpower needs of Napoleon’s campaigns. In the ten-year 
period 1804-1814, between 2,000,000 and 2,400,000 Frenchmen were enlisted 
47 Jaucourt, Opinion de Jaucourt Sur le projet de loi, p. 3.
48 Delpierre, Opinion de Delpierre ( jeune), p. 4.
49 Deserters are those who, after becoming soldiers, leave the army without permission, 
whereas insoumis means those who refuse enlistment altogether.
50 See Rousseau, Service militaire au XIXe siècle.
51 On German soldiers in Napoleon’s army, see Hippler, “Les soldats allemands dans l’armée 
napoléonienne d’après leurs autobiographies”.
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by conscription,52 and many of them died or were injured.53 Among those 
enlisted, only about 52,000 were actual volunteers.54 Unsurprisingly, the 
social impact of twenty-f ive years of revolutionary and imperial mass 
warfare was enormous.55
The constitutional monarchies and the Second Empire
After Waterloo, and the massive desertions that had followed Napoleon’s 
ultimate defeat, King Louis XVIII disbanded the remainder of the army and 
on 3 August 1815 decreed the formation of one “legion” in each department. 
Between 1814 and 1818 the recruits for the royal French army were exclu-
sively volunteers, many of them in reality veterans of the old imperial army. 
The “Constitutional Charter” of the reformed French monarchy stipulated 
that “conscription is abolished”. A couple of years later, however, in 1818, a 
form of compulsory military service was re-established. The reason was 
that the military authorities failed to enlist more than 3,500 men a year, 
which was insuff icient to meet manpower needs.56 On the other hand, it 
was argued that the diff iculty of f inding recruits on the labour market 
was mainly due to the government’s unwillingness to provide adequate 
funding.57 Conscription was viewed as a cheap way of manning the army. 
Amended in 1824 and in 1832, the 1818 legislation remained the basis of 
French recruitment policies until the Third Republic.58 Beyond the purely 
military concerns, the question of recruitment was linked to a whole series 
of uncertainties about the nature of the political regime, about political 
culture, and about the relationship of the re-established monarchy to the 
revolutionary past. This relationship to the past was particularly diff icult in 
post-1815 France, and two quite different sets of memory politics confronted 
52 Girardet, La société militaire de 1815 à nos jours, p. 19. See also Smets, “Von der ‘Dorf idylle’ 
zur preußischen Nation”, p. 717. Quantitative aspects of the social impact of conscription can be 
found in the “Compte general de la conscription” by Antoine-Audet Hargenvilliers, published 
in Vallée, La conscription dans le department de la Charente (1798-1807). More recent scholarship 
has shown that the f igures given by Hargenvilliers are sometimes f lawed; see Rousseau, Service 
militaire au XIXe siècle, and Dufraisse, Napoléon, p. 69.
53 See Houdaille, “Le problème des pertes de guerre”.
54 Girardet, La société militaire, p. 20.
55 On the social impact during the nineteenth century see Petiteau, Lendemains d’Empire.
56 Monteilhet, Les institutions militaires de la France, p. 5.
57 Vidalenc, “Engagés et conscrits sous la Restauration 1814-1830”, p. 240. See also Vidalenc, 
“Les engagements volontaires dans l’armée de la Restauration”.
58 Porch, “The French Army Law of 1832”.
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each other: an off icial effort to forget the Revolution and the empire (unité 
et oubli, “unity and forgetting”, was the imprint on off icial papers) and a 
discourse of atonement, promoted by the “ultras” of the Restoration.59 The 
military in general and conscription in particular were universally viewed 
as cornerstones of the republic and of its continuity in Napoleon’s empire.60
According to a proposal by Laurent de Gouvion-Saint-Cyr, an annual 
contingent of 40,000 men would be raised by voluntary recruitment or, if 
not enough volunteers were forthcoming, by a draft operated through a 
lottery. The duration of active service being six years, the general strength 
of the army would be 240,000 men. These numbers, however, were only a 
maximum, which was subject to budgetary constraints; that is, the actual 
strength of the army and the annual levies could in reality be lower and the 
effective duration of service shorter. In 1824 the duration of active service 
was increased to eight years from six, which further contributed to the 
professionalization of the conscript system: after many years in the army 
many conscripts had no other professional choice than to “voluntarily” 
remain soldiers. In this sense, and in the eyes of many contemporaries, 
“conscription” was little more than a legal framework for forced enlistments 
into a professional army. Moreover, the system allowed the possibility of 
hiring a substitute, which was obviously a possibility offered to the wealthy 
to buy themselves out of the military obligation.
In terms of the social origins of the soldiers, the army of the Restoration 
comprised two rather different sections. The bulk of the soldiers were 
veterans of the Napoleonic army, in particular those who had lost any 
contact with their home communities. In contrast, those who were recruited 
after 1815 came to a very large extent from poor rural backgrounds. This led 
to quite an unusual ideological configuration: the political right and the 
liberal bourgeoisie were suspicious of the military, whereas those who were 
nostalgic about the Revolution and the empire upheld the image of France’s 
past military glory. In contrast to the social habits of the ancien régime, the 
aristocracy of the Restoration and the July Monarchy was reluctant to follow 
military careers. According to the 1818 law and similar stipulations in 1832, 
two-thirds of the off icers should have been recruited through the military 
colleges of Saint-Cyr and Metz. However, the number of those who passed 
the entrance exams of these colleges and who were able to pay for tuition 
and equipment was notoriously lower than the military needs. As a result 
59 See Elster, Closing the Books, pp. 24-47.
60 See Hippler, “Conscription in the French Restoration”.
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of this, nearly two-thirds of off icers were in reality non-commissioned 
off icers and thus former rank-and-f ile.61
The army, in other words, still functioned to some extent as a mechanism 
of upward mobility during the f irst half of the nineteenth century.62 How-
ever, in contrast to the revolutionary and Napoleonic periods, this upward 
mobility was extremely slow and of little attraction in f inancial terms. It 
usually took seven to eight years to get promoted from second lieutenant to 
lieutenant and the same amount of time to get promoted from lieutenant 
to captain. Most off icers ended their military careers ended as captains 
after some twenty years as lieutenants. As a result of this, very few young 
bourgeois enlisted; instead they preferred careers in civil administration, in 
the liberal professions, or in business. During the mid-nineteenth century 
non-commissioned off icers earned between 75 centimes and 1 franc a day, 
whereas the average daily salary of industrial workers was about 2 francs, 
which was itself already notoriously insuff icient. As for lieutenants, their 
salary was between 4.5 and 5.5 francs a day and their pension between 
2 and 3.2 francs. In other words, the military held no attraction for the 
bourgeoisie, and salaries hardly allowed a man to ensure a decent life for his 
family. Moreover, the cultural image of the military was of little attraction.
The spirit of the time being understood as pacif istic and commercial, 
military life was depicted in contemporary literature as tedious waiting 
in some provincial garrison for a war that was never to come. Apart from 
colonial expansion after 1830, the main task for the military was actually 
domestic counter-insurgency. Given the social composition of the army, 
it was obviously necessary to prevent fraternization between soldiers and 
insurgents. From the point of view of recruitment, care was taken to enlist 
primarily in rural areas and to keep the urban working classes out of the 
army in order to maintain a cultural distinction between soldiers and 
potential insurgents. From the point of view of “military education” care was 
explicitly taken to separate the army from civil society: the geographical 
mobility of units was extremely high, and contacts with civil society were 
viewed with suspicious eyes and could seriously harm careers.
In terms of labour relations, the outcome of this pattern was twofold. 
On the one hand, the army increasingly became a social microcosm with 
its own rules and separated from the rest of society. On the other hand, 
solidarity and even a certain sense of equality developed within this 
closed microcosm. This was due to the facts that a majority of off icers 
61 Serman, Les Officiers français dans la nation.
62 The following relies on Girardet, La société mililitaire, pp. 13-63.
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were former rank and f ile and that even those who came from bourgeois 
or noble backgrounds had somewhat lost their former social status. Dif-
ferences in rank came thus foremost down to duration of service and the 
progressive incorporation of the values of military society. In this sense, 
the military was a self-reproducing system. It was, however, almost utterly 
incapable of attracting recruits and was thus in need of forced enlistments 
by the means of the lottery-draft. Another aspect needs to be highlighted: 
it was during the nineteenth century that a certain model of “off icialdom” 
( fonctionnariat) became hegemonic and grew into one important aspect 
of military labour relations. In terms of careers the soldier was a model 
of what later became a “civil servant”: as a state employee ideally he did 
not change his profession during his lifetime, and his relative comfort in 
retirement was guaranteed by a state pension. Careers, though slow, were 
stable and foreseeable; payment, though barely suff icient, was guaranteed.
In this sense, there was an important difference between the French 
army during the Revolution and the Napoleonic period on the one hand 
and after 1815 on the other. Revolutionary soldiers were considered to be 
lacking discipline but to be superior to the military of the ancien régime 
in terms of motivation. They embodied indiscipline and the animalistic 
force of the rabble but, at the same time, also a heroic sense of honour 
which stemmed from their quality as defenders of the fatherland. The key 
concept was “enthusiasm”: revolutionary soldiers had a goal to identify with, 
whereas soldiers of the ancien régime were considered to be indifferent 
about the outcome of the f ight. Some of these characteristics continued 
to exist during the Napoleonic period, and ego-documents from foreign 
soldiers under Napoleon suggest that the relations between off icers and 
rank and f ile were perceived as much better than they were in other armies 
of the time.63 Moreover, Napoleon inherited one of the basic features of 
revolutionary warfare, which is the logistical principle that the army live 
off the countryside.64 In many cases this in practice meant looting, but also 
the possibility for the soldiers to supplement their pay. According to the 
cultural imagination of the time, the French soldier of the revolutionary and 
Napoleonic period was the mirror of “the people”: undisciplined, violent, 
and uncultured, but also passionate, even enthusiastic, and, above all, of 
impressive strength. Rarely wearing proper uniforms, Napoleon’s armies 
were viewed by his adversaries as hordes of rabble, and by his followers as 
63 Schehl, Mit der großen Armee 1812 von Krefeld nach Moskau, p. 35.
64 See Blanning, The French Revolutionary Wars, 1787-1802, and Lynn, The Bayonets of the 
Republic.
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the emanation of the heroic strength of the nation. The post-1815 army was 
the perfect antithesis of this image. Pedantic discipline, subordination, 
patient military labour, and slow careers were the distinctive features of the 
new army after Napoleon. The Diary of Marshall Boniface de Castellane is 
perhaps the most explicit source for this return to an older “military spirit”: 
“a soldier should not even think about the possibility to act otherwise than 
he is ordered to”.65
The European revolutions of 1848 were an essential turning point with 
regard to the cultural representation of soldiers in France. Around 1848 
the military was progressively assimilated to the maintainance of social 
order, rather than with revolutionary uprising. This is obviously linked 
to the role of the military in crushing insurrections and revolts all over 
Europe. A complete reversal of the cultural and political signif icance of the 
military was the result of this. The military became progressively part of the 
defence of social order, of civilization, and of religion, and the miseries of 
military life were now glorif ied as the necessary renouncement of worldly 
pleasures. The military, in short, was depicted as disciplined, invigorated, 
and healthy, and was thus the perfect antithesis of the corrupt urban and 
working-class life:
Ce qu’il y a de plus grand, de plus beau, de plus digne d’admiration 
dans nos sociétés modernes, c’est certainement le paysan transformé 
par la loi en soldat d’infanterie. Pauvre, il protégé la richesse; ignorant, 
il protège la science. [...] Ce soldat est l’expression la plus complete, la 
plus noble, la plus pure de la civilisation créée par le christianisme, car 
il met en pratique la pensée chrétienne: le sacrif ice.66
This renewed image of the military came to a peak under Napoleon III. 
Attempts were made under the Second Empire to get closer to a “real” 
conscription, as had been realized, according to many French observers, 
in Prussia. Napoleon III actually adhered very closely to the Prussian re-
cruitment system. In a series of articles he had written for the newspaper 
Progrès du Pas-de-Calais in 1843 – thus before coming to power – he had 
called for the abolition of substitution and the organization of a strong 
military reserve. According to him, “the Prussian organization is the only 
one which is adapted for our democratic nature, for our egalitarian habits”. 
In Prussia, Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte went on, the whole nation was armed 
65 Cited by Girardet, La société militaire, p. 75.
66 Ibid., p. 31.
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for defence, whereas in France “only the bourgeoisie is armed for the defence 
of private interests”.67 When he became emperor his rhetoric became less 
democratic, but he still admired the Prussian way of identifying the citizen 
and the soldier. What was even more important, however, was the fact that 
the Prussian system promised a decisive increase in numbers in the French 
army, especially by the means of the formation of a strong reserve which 
could be incorporated in times of war. The project of the new conscription 
law was published by the emperor himself in a notice that appeared in Le 
moniteur universel on 12 December 1866. However, Napoleon’s nephew faced 
serious resistance, both from the officers for whom the “quality” of “military 
spirit” – which needed long years of military education to be acquired – mat-
tered more than the quantity of conscripts. The attitude of the republican 
party towards conscription was ambiguous: on the one hand, they strongly 
approved of the idea of a universal military service; on the other, they were 
against the regime, and the law was not radical enough in their view.68 In 
this political situation, the emperor did not succeed in imposing his will: 
the law of 4 February 1868 was significantly modified by the Corps Législatif, 
and its main achievement was to forbid private contracts of substitution in 
favour of a procedure of replacement according to which, instead of hiring 
a substitute, the wealthy could directly buy themselves out.69
The Third Republic
The period following the French defeat in 1870-1871 was characterized 
by what French historiography has termed the “German crisis in French 
thought”.70 The defeat was attributed to a feeling of lack of attachment on 
the part of individuals to the fate of the nation and the state, and relief was 
sought by a partial adaptation of German models. This concerned, most 
importantly but not exclusively, the patterns of military recruitment.
The new recruitment law, issued on 27 July 1872, was a compromise 
between quite different, and indeed even antagonistic, political expecta-
tions. Professional soldiers highlighted, on the one hand, the need to instil 
a “military spirit” which necessitated long years of habits of subordina-
tion and obedience, and on the other, the need to train a large number of 
67 Napoléon III, Projet de loi sur le recrutement de l’armée, p. 23.
68 See Casevitz, Une loi manquée.
69 See Schnapper, Le remplacement militaire en France.
70 Digeon, La crise allemande de la pensée française.
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conscripts to be incorporated in time of war. However, the most important 
change concerned the attitude of the political right towards compulsory 
military service. Conservatives invoked the role of the military in 1848 
and, more recently, during the Paris Commune of 1871, when the army 
had saved “civilization”: “nous nous demandons si ce n’est pas là l’école où 
il faut envoyer ceux qui paraissent l’avoir oublié, apprendre comment on 
sert et comment on aime son pays. Que tous nos enfants y aillent donc et 
que le service obligatoire soit la grande école des générations futures.” 71 
On the political left, compulsory military service was traditionally linked 
to the republican heritage. If the army had been instrumental in crushing 
uprisings and revolutions, this was due, according to the republicans, to the 
fact that the army was not recruited through universal conscription and 
that it had been maintained at a distance from civil society.
In 1872, the lottery system was maintained and those with “bad numbers” 
were obliged to serve f ive years on active service, and another four years 
in the reserve, whereas those holding “good numbers” received a basic 
military training of only a year. The goal was to provide military training 
for every male, and a proper military education – the development of the 
specifically military virtues – for a minority. This law, however, was inspired 
by the idea of the obligation of personal and universal service. Beyond the 
military necessity of this form of recruitment, the topic of the educational 
function of military service was stressed very much to justify universal 
military service. Military service as an educational project was actually a 
programme that had been developed since the Restoration. According to 
Captain Louis Pagézy de Bourdéliac, time under the colours could most 
usefully be spend by providing an intellectual and moral education for the 
soldiers: reading and writing, but also patriotism, honesty, and a cult of 
honour should be on the military agenda.72 Towards the end of the Second 
Empire, General Louis-Jules Trochu had argued for a military service of 
short duration: this kind of conscription has “le triple effet de donner du 
ressort à l’armée, de moraliser la population, de faire pénétrer les habitudes 
et l’esprit militaires dans le corps social tout entier”.73 If this kind of thinking 
was marginal before 1870, it became hegemonic after the Franco-Prussian 
War and it obviously affected labour relations within the military.
71 Cited by Girard, La société militaire, p. 122.
72 Pagézy de Bourdéliac, De l’emploi des loisirs du soldat français en temps de paix, and Anony-
mous, Essai sur l’état militaire en 1825.
73 Trochu, L’armée française en 1867, p. 278. 
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The growing influence of republican positions in French political life 
after 1871 could not but have an impact on the subsequent legislation, and 
the 1889 law may be considered an institutionalization of the republican 
conception of military service and of the relationship between the indi-
vidual and the state. It also remains true, however, that a genuinely equal 
obligation of the individual to the state never existed, not even after the 1905 
legislation, which revoked the exceptions granted to certain categories, such 
as priests, thus establishing a theoretical equality of service. In practice, 
however, the well-educated sons of the bourgeoisie still benef ited from 
certain advantages in terms of employment, career prospects, and even 
the duration of actual service. France adopted the Prussian model of the 
“one-year volunteers” (Einjährig-Freiwillige) which permitted the educated 
classes to be discharged after a single year of service and to be promoted 
as off icers in the reserve.74 Later on, holders of university degrees could 
be employed entirely in civilian duties while being in theory members of 
the army.
On the social level, the changing pattern of recruitment had enormous 
consequences. First of all, there is a tendency towards the “gentrif ication” 
of the military profession. This movement started under the Second Empire 
but accelerated with the advent of the Third Republic. The proportion of 
those who were made off icers after having attended military colleges rose 
signif icantly in contrast to the promotion of non-commissioned off icers 
and thus the former rank and f ile. The social origin of those alumni of 
military colleges was predominantly the mid-level bourgeoisie, but there 
are also, along with sons of the petty bourgeoisie and of low-ranking civil 
servants, young men of noble descent and those stemming from the higher 
bourgeoisie. Moreover, the only way for non-commissioned off icers to be-
come off icers was to be admitted to a staff college. These measures were 
intended to raise the level of education of military personnel, but they had 
also the side effect of considerably altering the social composition of the 
army. Among the professional cadres two distinct classes emerge: on the 
one hand the high-ranking off icers, usually from higher social origins, who 
rapidly became officers after graduating from military colleges; on the other 
hand, non-commissioned off icers and low-ranking off icers, usually from 
lower social origins. Military hierarchies, in other words, now mirrored 
the hierarchies in civil society and the army lost its role as a mechanism 
of upward mobility.
74 See Frevert, Die kasernierte Nation, esp. “Bürgerliche Arrangements: Einjährige und Reser-
veoff iziere”.
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Labour relations within the army were also altered by the educational 
role of the military. Before the Third Republic off icers and the rank and 
f ile largely shared a common background of social origin and manners. 
From the last third of the nineteenth century onwards, off icers and 
non-commissioned off icers were charged with morally and intellectually 
“improving” the recruits. The latter were no longer part of the same “family”, 
since their presence under the colours was of limited duration. The more 
egalitarian recruitment of universal conscription thus had the paradoxical 
consequence that social relations within the army became less egalitarian 
on all levels. During the first years of the republic, religious instruction was a 
pivotal part of the moralizing mission. Moreover, the army was charged with 
eradicating bad behaviour such as alcoholism – only, however, among the 
rank and f ile and not among professional cadres.75 The army being charged 
with delivering basic instruction to all recruits, the social inequalities 
became even more accentuated. Upon arrival, the recruits had to pass 
exams in reading, writing, and basic mathematics. The results of these 
exams were important in the future differentiation of labour within the 
military. The fact that those who held degrees could be discharged after a 
shorter period of actual service created a somewhat paradoxical situation: 
in contrast to those who benef ited from a shorter term of service, very 
few among the regular conscripts fulf illed the necessary conditions and 
had the requisite skills to be promoted to the rank of non-commissioned 
off icer. The non-commissioned off icers’ proverbial stupidity was a result 
of this situation. However, the social hierarchies were also perceptible on 
other levels. There is some evidence that recruits from higher social origins 
were less subject to the physical violence which was often part of the rites 
of passage in the army.76
Variables and taxonomies
This short overview of the evolution of recruitment policies leads to the 
striking conclusion that the evolution of military recruitment over the “very 
long nineteenth century” should above all be read in terms of different 
approaches to state construction and nation-building and that the changes 
from one pattern of recruitment to others were but consequences of the 
overall political and cultural processes. There was a slow shift away from a 
75 Roynette, “Bons pour le Service”, pp. 93-106.
76 Ibid., p. 269.
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military obligation in the name of the community towards its encoding as 
an obligation to the nation-state, that is, military duties as a civic obligation. 
This shift in scale was accompanied by a change in meaning of the military 
obligation in general and of conscription in particular. In this sense, the four 
basic variables of the general taxonomy of the project (payment, duration, 
legal constraints, and cultural factors) were constantly under debate during 
the period.
The general outcome of the evolution of French recruitment practices 
from the late eighteenth until the end of the nineteenth century is the 
declining importance of payment. Traditionally soldiers received a quite 
significant amount of money when signing the recruitment contract (prime 
d’engagement). Once they were soldiers, their normal pay was notoriously 
too low to enable them to live a decent life. Originally, the “proprietor” of 
the regiment had to pay this money but, as pointed out earlier, there was a 
tendency in the eighteenth-century militia system to transform this into 
a pecuniary contribution by the recruit’s home community. This means 
on the one hand that military obligations were conceived of as the local 
community’s duty; on the other hand, this practice implied that the pat-
terns of manning both the militia and the regular army became those of a 
“professional” army, which implies military service for payment. There is, 
however, a double diff iculty. The f irst diff iculty lies in the fact that staff ing 
was both “professional” and a communal duty, inasmuch as each parish 
had to furnish a certain number of recruits. The second diff iculty lies in 
the fact that the prime d’engagement was given only once and, by accepting 
this money, the future soldier had, so to speak, “sold himself”.
Enlightenment critics thus denounced “military slavery” and called 
for a system in which citizens “freely” defended their fatherland. This 
debate continued for virtually the whole nineteenth century. Against the 
government’s argument that it was impossible to f ind enough volunteers, 
the adversaries of conscription regularly replied that this was mainly due 
to the authorities’ unwillingness to grant primes d’engagement that were 
substantial enough to attract people to the army. Conscription, in this sense, 
was clearly a means of saving public money.
During the French Revolution and the Napoleonic period, payment 
does not seem to have played a predominant role in enlistment. The older 
practices of communities collecting money for their recruits continued 
to exist for a while; however, this served more as compensation for the 
f inancial losses that the soldier would face compared to what he could have 
earned in other employment. However, the government’s unwillingness to 
provide adequate funding was partly compensated for by an ideological 
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justif ication of the extended military obligations. As pointed out, the poor 
payment was probably the main reason why the restored monarchy decided 
to re-establish a selective draft on the basis of a lottery system in 1818. 
In any event, during the whole period, payment was never suff icient to 
attract the necessary number of recruits. On the contrary, there is a very 
clear trend towards a delegitimization of military labour for payment. 
Apart from the f inancial aspect of the matter, payment was considered as 
intrinsically immoral. The only morally legitimate motivation for f ighting 
was the attachment to the nation and the fatherland.
The question of the duration of service is handled quite differently in 
periods of war and in periods of peace. The French Revolution and the Na-
poleonic Empire were characterized by nearly permanent war, and soldiers 
were not normally released during wartime. This meant that desertion 
was the only way to quit the service, and the desertion rate was actually 
extremely high.77 In reality, the legal duration of service thus became an 
issue only with the Restoration, and the early nineteenth century saw a 
return to the pre-revolutionary practices, that is, a long term of service of six 
to eight years. In both cases, the debate essentially focused on the question 
of “military spirit”. Professional off icers and conservatives argued that long 
years of service – and ideally enlistment at a very young age – were needed 
to instil a “cult of subordination” and military discipline. Republicans, 
on the other hand, argued that the necessary military training could be 
achieved in a very short time. The example of the armies of the French 
Revolution has proven that a quite effective military could be trained very 
quickly. It was not the technical skills that took time to develop but rather 
the personal dispositions of a disciplined soldier who was used to obeying. 
Revolutionaries and republicans were opposed to a long term of service, 
precisely because they contested the necessity of a “military spirit”. On the 
contrary, what was needed, according to them, was a “civic spirit” which 
included a sense of military duty, but which was not opposed to the values 
of civil society. It was thus necessary to ensure a high turnover of personnel 
and thus to limit the time of service to a strict minimum. In the words of 
French republicanism, this was a “national army”, i.e. an army that was 
an emanation of the nation, i.e. of civil society. However, a limited term 
of service led to some paradoxes of the cadre/conscript system in which 
professional soldiers with lifelong military careers commanded short-term 
recruits and in which the military culture was essentially defined by profes-
77 See Forrest, Conscripts and Deserters.
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sionals. In short, conscription led to the militarization of society rather than 
to the socialization of the military.
As to legal constraints, they seem to be subordinated to f inancial con-
siderations, to social change, or, more importantly, to changes in political 
culture. The most important feature in this respect seems to be the changing 
understanding of nation and nationality. Matters of ethnicity were for the 
most part debated as matters of nationality, and we need to pay attention 
to the shifting meaning of the term “nation” during these years. During 
the eighteenth century, the term could be employed in the sense of “civil 
society” or even as a synonym for the third estate, as in Abbé Sieyès’s famous 
1789 pamphlet Que’est-ce que tiers-état? The answer to this question is well 
known: the third estate is of right the “nation”, and this latter is def ined as 
the part of the population that does useful work and that produces wealth. 
In contrast to many other European languages, the English language has 
kept this meaning. Famous examples are Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Na-
tions, in which “nation” designs something that we would probably term 
“society” today. In Disraeli’s Sybil or the Two Nations, or in the “One-Nation 
Tory” movement during the 1980s, the “nation” designates one part of the 
population within a given territory, and indeed within a constituted nation-
state. The French language lost these meanings almost completely during 
the nineteenth century. During the Revolution, however, concepts such 
as the nation and la patrie (and similar notions like patriot, patriotic, etc.) 
had a clear social and political background, rather than a “nationalistic” 
understanding in the modern sense.
A clear illustration of this can be found in the military realm: foreign 
corps – and most famously the Swiss – were assimilated to “satellites of 
despotism”, i.e. to adversaries of the cause of the nation in both senses of the 
term. Foreign units were foreign to the nation in the sense that they were 
not a part of the revolutionary community, and also in the sense that they 
did not belong to the French community of descent. The consequence of 
this, however, was not the disbanding of foreign corps but an institutional 
separation between units of French nationals and of foreigners. The same 
logic was employed during the Napoleonic campaigns, when France’s allies 
had to furnish large contingents of the Grande Armée, and with the founding 
of the Foreign Legion in 1831. The tension remained palpable, and the nation, 
however undefined, became the ultimate source of legitimacy. In the case 
of the foreign units in Napoleon’s army, it can be argued that their presence 
underpinned an ideological orientation of the First Empire, that is, the idea 
of a European federation under French leadership. In the case of the Foreign 
Legion it is certainly not by coincidence that the reward for long years of 
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service for France consisted of the naturalization of the legionnaires, that 
is, to their becoming French nationals.
The most important issue, however, is certainly the renegotiation of 
the meaning of liberté. The French language does not distinguish between 
freedom and liberty, and both issues were discussed under the term of 
liberté. Liberté has indeed become a Grundbegriff in the sense of Reinhart 
Koselleck’s conceptual history, that is, a concept that all parties were obliged 
to use in order to defend legitimate social claims. But the meaning of the 
concept was constantly under debate. Enlightenment criticism of military 
obligation regularly used the term “military slavery” to denounce militia 
obligations or peasant conscription. The military obligation was thus 
criticized in the name of liberty.
A conceptual reversal occurred with the French Revolution. Regarding 
conscription, it was striking that both its supporters and its opponents 
underpinned their claims with references to liberty. The conceptual quarrel 
is clearly displayed by the words of the Count of Liancourt who declared, 
during the 1789 debate on conscription, that he was “astonished to see 
that liberty is invoked to support the hardest and the broadest of slavery”, 
adding that “it would be a hundred times better to live in Constantinople or 
in Morocco than in a country in which laws of this kind are in force”.78 And 
indeed, the task was obviously easier for the adversaries of conscription, 
since they could argue that liberty implied that people ought not to be forced 
into the military against their will. The promoters of conscription had thus 
to redefine the concept according to their needs: they held that liberty was 
not so much a personal as a political matter, closely linked to the existence 
of the “public force”; that is, to a strong state, liberty “is a chimera if the 
stronger one can with impunity oppress the weaker one”.79 No real liberty 
was conceivable if not in a republic, and the absence of state power equalled 
the oppression of the weaker one by the stronger one and was therefore 
understood as “slavery”. The real issue was thus access to civic rights, and 
a whole republican tradition had linked civic rights to military obligations. 
Modern conscription is unthinkable without this ideological link.
The debate over the link between liberty, freedom, and citizenship on the 
one hand and military obligations on the other went on under the Restora-
tion. At the moment when the 1818 military legislation was discussed, this 
link became particularly problematic.80 The reason for this was that it was 
78 Liancourt, Opinion sur le mode de recrutement pour l’armée, p. 7.
79 Dubois-Crancé, Discours sur la force publique, p. 8.
80 For the following, see Hippler, “Conscription in the French Restoration”.
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diff icult to separate the meaning of these concepts from their revolutionary 
legacy. The defenders of limited conscription underpinned their claims 
with a reference to citizenship: it was the duty of each citizen to defend 
their polity. Conservative critics made use of the same arguments as in 
1789: Bonald, for instance, depicted conscription as “a law that confiscates 
my personal liberty prior to any misdemeanour”.81 Liberals, on the other 
hand, made use of the reference to liberty to argue for the possibility for 
the wealthy to buy themselves out of the obligation. Military obligations, 
according to them, were comparable to f inancial contributions, that is, to 
paying tax. Each one should thus have the possibility to contribute to the 
safety of the state in either f inancial terms or by means of personal service. 
This parallel between taxes and military service was quite clearly expressed 
in the popular name given to conscription: l’impôt du sang, blood tax.
On the other hand, this possibility to buy oneself out of the obligation 
was denounced by both conservatives and republicans as illegitimate 
commodif ication. The conservative deputy Cardonnel thus depicted in 
1818 the image of “the French youth becoming a commodity […] object 
of a humiliating traff ic and a shameful trading and sordid interest and 
infamous cupidity triumphing over all feelings and over all laws of nature”.82 
The interplay between the developing capitalist structures of the economy 
and the possibility of replacement led to insurance companies being set 
up against the risk of the draft; they became a flourishing business dur-
ing the f irst two-thirds of the nineteenth century.83 During the Second 
Empire, “substitution” superseded “replacement”, the difference being that 
the buying-out was no longer a private transaction since drafted soldiers 
could pay a certain amount of money directly to the state in order to be 
exempted. The main argument advanced for substitution was that it was a 
more “moral” procedure than replacement.84 As pointed out above, f inancial 
aspects were dubious per se, and they were even more so if they took place 
in the capitalistic civil society, whereas a mediation by the state conferred 
some legitimacy on the buy-out. The reason for this is certainly to be looked 
for in the fact that the state is as such the sphere of the common interest, 
in contrast to the private interests that confront each other savagely in a 
market economy.
81 Bonald, Opinion de M. de Bonald, député de l’Aveyron, p. 4.
82 Cardonnel, Opinion de M. le président de Cardonnel, député du Tarn, p. 10.
83 See Schnapper, Le remplacement militaire en France.
84 Auvray, L’âge des casernes, p. 91.
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The above discussion of the key concepts in which military obligations 
were historically understood and thus culturally and politically constructed 
as legitimate obligations made clear that taxonomies are always and of 
necessity a fragile endeavour. Taxonomies always run the risk of an ahistoric 
– and thus in the last instance teleological – understanding of the historical 
material. The only way to escape from this seems to be to historicize the 
terms of the taxonomy itself. The above discussion of the uncertainties 
about the concept of liberté is part of this endeavour to historicize the key 
concepts.
As to the catalysts of change, it appears that the experience of revolu-
tionary war was of crucial yet only temporary importance. Contemporary 
military observers were surprised or shocked by the “regressive” nature of 
the tactics of armies of the French Revolution, which differed from the very 
sophisticated tactics of traditional eighteenth-century armies. The same 
holds true for weaponry, since the most striking fact for foreign militaries 
was that the French used the long-superseded pike. The basic lesson that 
foreign observers learnt from this experience was that the motivation of 
the soldiers was of crucial importance for military success. As a f irst step, 
this lesson was conceptualized in terms of “enthusiasm” and in a second 
step in terms of the legitimizing force of nationalisms.
In this respect, the most important operator of change is certainly to be 
found in the realm of political representations and ideologies, that is, in the 
now overwhelming importance of the nation as a source of legitimacy. And 
the uncertainties in terms of military recruitment that are characteristic for 
important periods of nineteenth-century French history can without too 
much diff iculty be linked to the uncertain nature of the post-revolutionary 
nation.
Perhaps the most important outcome of the French Revolution in terms 
of military policy was the defeudalization of the French army. Backed by 
republican ideology and by social turnover in the positions of command in 
the army, the state succeeded in establishing its supremacy on a permanent 
basis. It was only under the Third Republic that nobles sought military 
employment en masse, however, not without submitting to republican, 
and thus ultimately bourgeois, modes of selection. Economic and f inancial 
factors played a paradoxical role. As pointed out above, f inancial considera-
tions were certainly one of the main motivations for the restored monarchy 
not to reintroduce the form of military recruitment that its ideologists 
considered f it for a constitutional monarchy, that is, a strictly voluntary 
recruitment. On the other hand, in many cases f inancial considerations 
also prevented conscription from becoming truly universal, for the simple 
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reason that the overall strength of the army was subordinated to f inancial 
constraints and not to the amount of the potentially available manpower.
The most general conclusion about French recruitment policies concerns, 
without any doubt, the ideological link that was established between mili-
tary obligations and citizenship. However, the theoretical principle that 
each citizen ought to be a defender of the fatherland was never universally 
applied, not even during the French Revolution or under the Third Republic. 
One had always to cope with f inancial constraints on the one hand, and 
with social acceptance – especially by the upper classes – on the other. This 
is why the boundary between conscripted soldiers and pressed soldiers is 
sometimes diff icult to draw. This point becomes particularly visible under 
the constitutional monarchies and the Second Empire, when only a very 
small proportion of the potential conscripts were actually enlisted.
 The Dutch army in transition
From all-volunteer force to cadre-militia army, 1795-1830
Herman Amersfoort
In 1748, the last year of the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748), 
the army of the United Provinces had a strength on paper of 126,000 men, 
the actual strength being approximately 90,000.1 This was an impressive 
number and by and large the equivalent of the complement during the War 
of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714).2 Over the peacetime years after 1748 
numbers declined to just over 40,000. This still constituted a considerable 
force. As a rule of a thumb eighteenth-century political-military leadership 
considered an army equivalent to 1 or 1.5 per cent of the population accept-
able to secure the safety of the state in time of peace. Given a population 
of 1.9 million inhabitants around 1750 the United Provinces mobilized an 
army of 2.1 per cent of the population. However, the actual strength of the 
army of the Batavian Republic (1795-1806) and the Kingdom of Holland 
(1806-1810) sank to numbers ranging from only 22,000 men to 37,000. This 
is remarkable taking into account that the second half of the eighteenth 
century saw a slow growth of the population, reaching a total of just over 2 
million inhabitants in 1795 and considering that during those years Holland 
was fully engaged in the war effort of revolutionary and Napoleonic France.3 
These decreasing numbers reflect the persisting f inancial exhaustion of 
the United Provinces after the War of the Austrian Succession. From 1810 
onwards things were hardly any better. During the period of the annexation 
of Holland to the French Empire (1810-1813) in all an estimated 35,000 Dutch 
military served under Bonaparte’s colours.4
The shift came after the restoration of Dutch independence in November 
1813. As from January 1814 the peacetime establishment of the army of the 
newly founded kingdom of William I called for a total of 52,000 men. On 
this basis, after a f ive-year period a wartime strength of 145,000 would have 
been within grasp.5 For the f irst time since 1748 the Dutch army on a war 
1 Van Nimwegen, De Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden als grote mogendheid, p. 103.
2 Van Nimwegen, “Deser landen crijchsvolck”, p. 421. 
3 Zwitzer, “De militie van de staat”, pp. 175-178; Gabriëls, “Tussen Groot-Brittannië en Frankrijk”, 
p. 160.
4 Joor, De Adelaar en het Lam, pp. 340-342.
5 Amersfoort, Koning en Kanton, pp. 62-90.
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footing as well as on a peace footing would have exceeded the f igures of the 
days of the old republic, when the country was considered a power of the 
first rank in Europe. These 145,000 soldiers, however, are a theoretical f igure 
since the system of army formation as it had been designed in January 1814 
was superseded by new legislation the next year and since the demographic 
resources were dramatically expanded to 5.4 million inhabitants after 
the union of the Northern and Southern Netherlands in June 1815. But 
the 145,000 f igure unmistakeably indicates that William I’s army was of 
a completely different nature than its eighteenth-century predecessor.6
This transformation had needed only the twenty-f ive years between 
1795 and 1820 to come about. The most sweeping change had been the 
introduction of military conscription. After 1820 the army of King William 
I was a cadre-militia army. When on a war footing some three-quarters of 
the complement consisted of conscripts and only one-quarter of volunteers. 
The army of the United Provinces, the State Army (Staatse Leger), had 
been an all-volunteer force. The introduction of conscription also led to a 
totally different national composition of the army. In the second half of the 
eighteenth century some 50 per cent of the rank and f ile of the State Army 
was made up of soldiers of national birth.7 The Dutch labour market simply 
could not sustain a higher proportion of nationals. Since the Eighty Years’ 
War (1568-1648) the army of the United Provinces had recruited in Germany, 
Scotland, Switzerland, and the prince-bishopric of Liège. However, in the 
second half of the eighteenth century these recruiting areas gradually 
ran dry.8 Due to booming business in agriculture and industry as well as 
restrictive and protective governmental measures in Prussia, the Austrian 
Netherlands, and Britain the captains commanding the companies of the 
State Army met increasing diff iculties in their recruiting efforts. Moreover, 
the bounties and soldiers’ pay had not kept pace with rising wages. The 
States-General now had to resort to so-called seigneurial recruitment.9 
They contracted with petty German princes for ready-made regiments 
recruited by these princes from among the population of their states.
The Royal Army of William I from 1820 onwards was of predominantly 
national composition. In the beginning two regiments from the principality 
of Nassau and four regiments from the Swiss cantons reinforced the army, 
6 Ibid., pp. 88-90, 97-105.
7 Zwitzer, “De militie van de staat”, pp. 39-61.
8 Suter, Inner-Schweizerisches Militärunternehmertum im 18. Jahrhundert; Bührer, Der Zürcher 
Solddienst des 18. Jahrhunderts.
9 Zwitzer, “De militie van de staat”, pp. 50-52, 184-187.
thE dutch arMy in transition 449
echoing eighteenth-century recruiting practices. However, the f irst two 
returned to their homeland in 1815 and 1820 respectively, and the Swiss 
regiments were disbanded in 1829 since they no longer fitted in with the new 
army with its militia-like nature. Had these foreign regiments been at full 
strength in 1815, which incidentally they were not, some 25 per cent of the 
rank and file of the infantry, the mainstay of the army, would have consisted 
of foreign volunteers.10 What this f igure does indicate is that the king during 
the first years of his reign was ready to accept a considerable foreign element 
in his army and that this element was rapidly diminishing. By 1820 the 
remaining foreign regiments were already of marginal importance. As the 
army had lost its Swiss regiments in 1829, its foreign element was reduced 
from then on to practically nil.
The transition from the eighteenth-century all-volunteer force to the 
early nineteenth-century cadre-militia army also entailed a change in 
the foundations of the military power of the state. Until 1795 the military 
power of the United Provinces, like most other states of the ancien régime, 
in the end depended upon the f iscal eff iciency and the credit-worthiness 
of the state, military manpower being for sale on the national as well as 
international labour market and war being too expensive to be exclusively 
f inanced out of the annual revenues of the state. This is why the rich and, ac-
cording to contemporary standards, f inancially and f iscally well-organized 
republic, in spite of its very limited population, could afford the army (and 
navy) it needed to play a key role in all anti-French coalitions from the War 
of Devolution (1667-1668) up to the War of the Austrian Succession. And 
this is why the republic could no longer play this role after this last war 
had exhausted it beyond repair. From 1814 onwards the military power of 
William I’s kingdom was a function of both national demography and the 
weight of the conscription burden the national population was willing to 
bear. The introduction of conscription in large parts of Germany and the 
subsequent introduction of restrictions on recruitment by foreign powers 
brought Dutch recruitment in Germany to a halt after 1814. The two regi-
ments from Nassau in fact marked the end of seigneurial recruitment.11 
Given the limitations of the national labour market the army increasingly 
had to rely on conscription to f ill its complement, thus limiting the military 
10 Amersfoort, Koning en Kanton, pp. 65-66.
11 Ibid., pp. 97-105; Japikse, De geschiedenis van het huis Oranje-Nassau, II, pp. 127-155; de Bas, 
Prins Frederik der Nederlanden en zijn tijd, III-1, pp. 127ff., 409; Wüppermann, De vorming van het 
Nederlandsche leger na de omwenteling, p. 4; correspondence in National Archives [henceforth, 
NA] of the Netherlands, Archives of the Algemene Staatssecretarie 1813-1840 [henceforth, ASS] 
no. 6564.
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power of the Dutch kingdom to the rather modest demographic resources of 
the Netherlands. Only the union of the Northern and Southern Netherlands 
(1815-1830) masked this otherwise inescapable conclusion for the time being.
Two further consequences of the introduction of conscription were 
that one of the plagues of the Staatse Leger – namely the ineradicable gap 
between the strength of the regiments on paper and the actual strength 
after 1820 – under normal conditions ceased to exist, the other consequence 
being that in times of crisis the army could be brought onto its war foot-
ing by simply calling to arms the reservists and integrating them in the 
companies of the existing peacetime regiments. Conscription freed the 
wartime army as well as the peacetime army from the volatility of supply 
and demand on the labour market, the conscript serving for the f ixed and 
low pay he simply had to accept by force of law.
Another important change was that the Royal Army was primarily 
a military instrument of the state, intended to provide for internal and 
external security. During the reign of the last Stadtholder Prince William 
V (1766-1795) the off icers’ commissions had increasingly been granted to 
members of the aristocratic governing families who supported the House 
of Orange.12 Because of the Stadtholder’s intention to buttress his clientele, 
in many cases political loyalty and reliability of the off icer corps prevailed 
over professional attitude, knowledge, and expertise. By doing this the last 
Stadtholder had transformed the off icer corps into an instrument for the 
maintenance of internal political stability. It is true that King William I 
in many instances treated the army as his personal, dynastic instrument 
of power, managing the army by royal decree rather than legislation as 
much as possible, but conditions had changed since 1795. The kingdom 
was a constitutional monarchy governed by the rule of law. Article 59 of 
the Constitution of 1815 invested the king with supreme authority over 
the armies and navies of the state, but not with their supreme command. 
The army and navy now belonged to an abstract entity separated from the 
person of the sovereign and his court, namely the government and the 
state, embodied in the Department of War and the Department of the Navy. 
Here management and control were centralized on the national level and 
lay in the hands of professional civil servants: the administrative legacy of 
the Kingdom of Holland and the years of the annexation to the empire. It 
was only natural that the civil service, now that it had come into existence, 
12 Gabriëls, “Tussen Groot-Brittannië en Frankrijk”, p. 153. For the United Provinces as a 
clientele state in the closing decades of the eighteenth century, see Gabriëls, De heren als dienaren 
en de dienaar als heer.
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would try to develop policies of its own designed to serve the interests of 
the state; such policies might even run counter to the interests of the king.13
A further contrast between the army of the United Provinces and that of 
the kingdom of William I, and related to the previous one, was the changing 
political control over the army. The Constitution invested the king with 
supreme authority over the armed forces and, as far as the king himself 
was concerned, he considered the armed forces as belonging to his royal 
prerogative. But since the Constitution introduced the separation of powers, 
the king shared power with the States-General, even with respect to the 
army. The States-General had the right to vote the state’s budget and the leg-
islation that controlled the weight of the conscription burden. Although in 
both matters the initiative was with the king, the States-General possessed 
a certain countervailing power. The Liberals in the parliament quickly 
learned to use this right to lay the royal military prerogative under siege.
The creation of the modern state also had sweeping consequences for the 
rank and f ile. The army of the United Provinces had been a typical product 
of the ancien régime. The companies, squadrons, and regiments were owned 
by the captains and colonels who commanded them. They exploited their 
units as pieces of private property on the basis of the commission that had 
been granted to them by their paymaster, the States-General. The rank and 
f ile swore an oath of allegiance to the States-General, but otherwise had no 
direct relationship whatsoever with the sovereign they served. They were 
recruited, enlisted, equipped, armed, and paid by their captain and had to 
deal only with him. This system was abolished in 1795. Private ownership of 
the companies and regiments ceased to exist. The task of recruitment now 
devolved upon the state. Henceforth the soldiers and non-commissioned 
off icers (NCOs) were all directly enlisted by the state as represented by the 
regiment and subsequently distributed over the companies. The activities 
this entailed were carried out by a captain appointed specially for the 
purpose. All the expenditure this involved was f inanced out of the corps’ 
recruitment fund, which was itself f inanced centrally by the Ministry of 
Finance. A similar arrangement was introduced for the clothing, equipment, 
and armament of the NCOs and soldiers.14 Now, this new system was here to 
stay. It survived all political changes of the 1795-1813 period and was adopted 
by the Royal Army in 1814 without major modif ications.
All these changes in the military domain reflect the modernization of 
state and society that is so characteristic of the transition from the ancien 
13 Amersfoort, “De strijd om het leger (1813-1840)”.
14 Hardenberg, Overzigt der voornaamste bepalingen, I, pp. 182-209.
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régime of the closing decades of the eighteenth century to the centralized 
bureaucratic national state and modern society of the nineteenth century, 
not only in Holland but in large parts of the Atlantic world as well. In the 
Netherlands the foundations of the nineteenth-century cadre-militia army 
were laid in the years 1795-1813.
The army of the Batavian Republic and the Kingdom of Holland
The army of the Batavian Republic was an all-volunteer force, like the army 
of the old republic. This may come as a surprise since the founding fathers 
of the new state were democrats and since they were the direct heirs of the 
Patriot movement. This political opposition movement had its origins in 
the third estate, the burghers, and had fought a short civil war (1786-1787) to 
overthrow the régime of the Stadtholder and the aristocracy that supported 
him.15 Before the outbreak of hostilities they had organized themselves into 
Free Corps and ‘exercise societies’ of citizen volunteers and had effectively 
taken control in a number of towns in Holland, Utrecht, and elsewhere. 
The Stadtholder had hesitated to throw his army against them, and in the 
end it was the intervention of the Prussian king that subdued the uprising, 
the Patriot armed citizens being no match for the Prussian professional 
regiments.16 The most radical Patriots and their families (totalling some 
40,000) thereupon fled the country and found refuge in France and the 
Southern Netherlands. They returned to their fatherland in the victorious 
French army that conquered the United Provinces in 1795. These radicals 
gained power after two coups d’état in 1798. So why did they not rebuild 
the Batavian army out of a mixture of professionals from the old army, 
volunteering soldats-citoyens, and a National Guard like the revolutionary 
French Republic had done? In fact they tried, but failed.
Already in 1795 the political leadership of the Batavian Republic had 
started to reorganize the army and had discharged all Orangist partisans 
in the army to assure its political reliability. The new army was to be an 
all-volunteer force with a strength of 35,000 men. However, this strength 
was soon reduced as it entailed too heavy a f inancial burden. The Batavian 
Republic was also charged with all expenses for the 25,000-strong French 
Auxiliary Corps that was garrisoned in the Netherlands. Since it was evident 
15 Schama, Patriots and Liberators, pp. 64-106; Roegiers and Van Sas, “Revolutie in Noord en 
Zuid”; van der Capellen, Aan het volk van Nederland, pp. 10-13.
16 Schama, Patriots and Liberators, pp. 107-132.
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that even the combined Batavian Army and French Auxiliary Corps were 
not strong enough to defend the borders and man the garrisons in case of a 
two-front war against Prussia and Britain, the Batavian political leadership 
planned to reinforce the army with a National Guard of volunteer citizens. 
However, enthusiasm among the population and local elites proved to 
be low. In 1786-1787 citizens had been willing to join the Free Corps and 
local militias to defend their political ideals in an internecine struggle for 
political power. After 1795 they were not prepared to serve in a National 
Guard that was to be organized into regiments and trained for warfare 
against the professional armies of foreign powers. So the initiative for a 
National Guard came to naught. Reinforcing the professional army with 
units of armed citizens would have required a full-blown conscription 
bill that made armed service compulsory, after the example of the French 
Loi Jourdan-Delbrel of 1798, but this the Batavian leadership apparently 
considered a bridge too far at the time.
After the demise of the Batavian Republic in 1806 and the foundation of 
the Kingdom of Holland under Bonaparte’s younger brother, Louis Napo-
leon, the potential introduction of some form of armed service reappeared 
on the scene. Bonaparte brought heavy pressure to bear upon his brother 
to follow the French example and promulgate a Conscription Act in order 
to raise the numbers he needed for the never diminishing war effort of the 
empire, but Louis Napoleon wanted to avoid this at all cost. He clung to the 
existing all-volunteer force and hoped to satisfy the emperor by revitalizing 
the National Guard.17 All towns of more than 2,500 inhabitants were told 
to establish a local militia, organized into companies and battalions, in 
which all men in the range of eighteen to f ifty years old would have to be 
enrolled. One-fifth of them performed active service, the remainder forming 
a reserve. Their task was to protect against unrest and to perform local guard 
duties, operational command lying in the hands of the local authorities. But 
from the very start they were also expected to fulfil full-time garrison duties 
in the event that the regiments left for the mobile f ield army. In 1809, after 
the outbreak of the War of the Fifth Coalition, service for the National Guard 
was extended to all inhabitants irrespective of their residence, and the king 
proclaimed himself general and supreme commander of the National Guard. 
Furthermore, he intended to transform the National Guard into a military 
force by organizing it into regiments. However, when this plan provoked 
serious disturbances among the population he drew back, with the result 
that the position of the National Guard remained rather ambiguous. On 
17 Joor, De Adelaar en het Lam, pp. 283-298.
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the one hand, they were part-time local militias, tasked with local policing 
duties under local operational command. On the other hand, they were 
supervised by the Department of Home Affairs, stood under the nominal 
command of the king, and could be tasked with full-time military duties, 
even outside their home towns.
However, all this was not enough to save the Kingdom of Holland as 
an independent ally of the empire. Bonaparte wanted more troops than 
Louis Napoleon was able to muster. In July 1810 Louis Napoleon abdicated 
in favour of his son and Holland was annexed to the French Empire. The 
army was immediately reorganized and fully integrated in the French force 
structure.18 French conscription, the Loi Jourdan-Delbrel, was introduced 
to f ill the complement of the Dutch regiments in French service, and the 
enlistment of volunteers came to a halt. The French National Guard was 
introduced in the Dutch departments which meant that time and again 
units of the National Guard were transferred to the army and incorporated 
in the Grande Armée. Over the years 1811-1813 some 35,000 Dutch conscripts 
and National Guardsmen served in the French army. Many of them died or 
simply vanished somewhere on the road from their hometown to Moscow 
and back.
This sad conclusion also marks a turning point in the system of Dutch 
army formation. In the 1786-1787 civil war the Patriot movement had dem-
onstrated that corps of citizens volunteering for armed service embodied 
a viable alternative for professional forces, provided that their political 
motivation was strong enough. For them soldiering and political participa-
tion as citizens were just two sides of the same coin. At the same time it must 
be admitted that the sorry fate of this bottom-up army against the seasoned 
Prussian regiments also proved that armed citizens could supersede the 
professional army only if they were organized, led, armed, and trained as 
professional soldiers. This, of course, was a sensitive matter and encountered 
resistance. Only the state possessed the f inancial and organizational means 
to ensure that armed citizens would be a match for professional soldiers. 
Inevitably, this entailed that the citizen’s right to bear arms in this bottom-
up army remained f irmly rooted in the local community and in which the 
citizen served under the command of off icers elected among the local elite, 
18 Ibid., pp. 317-342; Geerts, Samenwerking en Confrontatie, pp. 115-191; Sabron, Geschiedenis 
van het 124ste Regiment Infanterie van Linie, Geschiedenis van het 33ste Regiment Lichte Infanterie; 
ten Raa, De uniformen van de Nederlandsche Zee- en Landmacht hier te lande en in de koloniën, 
I, Tekst, pp. 107-130; Homan, Nederland in de Napoleontische Tijd, pp. 138-146; Colenbrander, 
Inlijving en Opstand, pp. 8-9, 22-23, 46-51; de Moor and Vogel, Duizend miljoen maal vervloekt 
land.
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was transformed into a duty laid from the top down upon him by the state, 
especially so since the citizen’s political rights evaporated as time wore 
on. In contrast to the democratic constitutional nature of the Batavian 
Republic, the Kingdom of Holland, not to mention the French Empire, was 
an authoritarian non-democratic monarchical regime. This explains why 
the attempts of the Batavian leadership, as well as those of Louis Napoleon, 
to transfer the National Guard from the local level to the central state and to 
the army provoked serious unrest and disturbances among the population. 
In France, similar doubts had been swept away by the need to protect the 
republic and the revolution when they faced the intervention of reactionary 
foreign powers, as was testif ied by the famous levée en masse of 1793. In the 
following years the strength of the French army dropped as revolutionary 
fervour faded away. It needed the conscription act of 1798 to pave the way 
for the mass armies Napoleon needed to realize his political ambitions. 
In Holland it needed the annexation to the French Empire to break the 
stalemate. In both countries revolutionary and Napoleonic warfare were 
the driving forces behind the disappearance of the professional army of the 
ancien régime and the birth of cadre-militia army of conscripts.
These developments were part and parcel of the more comprehensive 
process of the modernization of state and society. At the heart of this process 
was the break-up of the self-contained local community, by making the 
common man and woman part of a greater entity, namely the state and 
its ideological counterpart, the nation. In the Netherlands the Batavian 
Revolution of 1795 abolished the estates as intermediate powers between the 
individual and the state as well as the right to govern as the attribute or even 
personal property of a restricted circle of aristocratic families. The 1795-1813 
period saw the transfer of political power to an abstract impersonal entity, 
the centralized bureaucratic national state. This transformed the subjects of 
the ancien régime into the citizens-in-the-making of the nineteenth century. 
At least legally and in theory, every single man and woman now had an 
individual direct relationship to the state. It is a well-established fact that 
the introduction of conscription played a major role in the construction of 
the nineteenth-century nation and nation-state. Conscription tore young 
men away from their families and local community. It brought them in 
contact with brothers-in-arms from other parts of the country, subjected 
them to the formal and informal rules of the military world, and tied up 
their personal fates with the interests of the king and the state. It goes 
without saying that this was not brought about overnight. Moreover, it must 
be admitted that such conclusions are partly products of hindsight: the 
historian’s reconstruction of events endows them with a meaning for the 
456 hErMan aMErsFoort 
future that was not always understood or even desired by contemporaries 
at the time. So let us return to these events and explore the driving forces 
behind the Dutch cadre-militia army and conscription that emerged from 
the seven eventful years between 1813 and 1820. It is a historical paradox 
that the hated French conscription in fact laid the foundations for this army.
Bouchenröder’s army
When in November 1813 the French administration and the French army left 
the Netherlands in great haste, a triumvirate took power as a provisional 
government. At that time there was no such thing as a Dutch army. Dutch 
conscripts raised for Napoleon were scattered all over western Europe, 
incorporated in the retreating French armies. Meanwhile the rebuilding 
of an army was a matter of urgency. Although most of the French garrison 
troops had retreated to France to avoid being cut off, a number of them had 
stayed behind and continued to occupy several garrison towns across the 
country, constituting a threat to Dutch independence. At the same time 
there was the danger that – should the tide of war turn – French troops 
left behind in Germany would invade the Netherlands to occupy the coast 
against Britain. Finally, the war against Napoleon had not yet been decided. 
A Dutch contribution to the allied war effort would certainly improve the 
bargaining position of the new state vis-à-vis the allies after the defeat of 
the French emperor.
The triumvirate, as far as the military was concerned, now did two 
things. In the f irst place it began stimulating the creation of local militias 
comprising volunteers and commanded by local “men with military ex-
perience”, that is to say, off icers from the former Dutch army or from the 
town militias.19 These volunteer forces were to defend their town if the 
French returned. In the second place the triumvirate appointed as colonel 
Frederick Baron von Bouchenröder to organize these local volunteer forces 
into a national army, f it to lay siege to the towns still in French hands and 
ready to take part in the continuing war against Napoleon. Bouchenröder 
was a German off icer from Mannheim who had served in the army of the 
19 Staatsblad van het koninkrijk der Nederlanden (The Hague: Van Stockum, 1813-present), vol. 
1813-1814 [henceforth, Staatsblad with year], no. 1.
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United Provinces and who was a close friend of one of the members of the 
triumvirate, G.K. van Hogendorp.20
The army Bouchenröder came up with had a complement of 25,560 men 
and 6,462 horses.21 It consisted of infantry, cavalry, and artillery. The local 
militias were to be organized and trained for war by bringing them together 
in companies, battalions, and regiments of this army. To quicken the pace of 
his plans he also proposed to engage existing military units in a number of 
small states in Germany on a temporary basis, as had been common practice 
in the second half of the eighteenth century: the system of seigneurial 
recruitment. Although the national element of Bouchenröder’s army was a 
volunteer force it implied no return to the army of the eighteenth century. In 
peacetime this army would exist only on paper since the volunteer citizens 
would remain in their hometowns as a sedentary force at the disposal of 
and under the authority of the local government. Only in times of crisis or 
imminent war would they march and be incorporated into the regiments of 
the national army, commanded by the head of state as supreme commander 
and his General Staff. And only then would they be trained as soldiers f it 
for real warfare. This meant that, quite intentionally, in peacetime the 
volunteers serving in this army would have to deal only with their local 
masters, the well-respected aristocratic families who had governed the city 
within living memory. Their hometown, where they would also do their 
initial training, would be the garrison base. In fact Bouchenröder’s plan 
aimed at the transformation of the former town militias into a national 
volunteer force, while retaining the upper hand for the local elites in the 
debates with the sovereign that would inevitably unfold in times of crisis. As 
a matter of fact this corresponded beautifully with the state Van Hogendorp 
had in mind at that time: one in which the traditional estates would have 
suff icient countervailing power against the king and the centralization of 
the administration.
Bouchenröder’s project was short-lived, however. On 30 November 1813 
Prince William Frederick, the eldest son of the last Stadtholder, returned 
to the Netherlands and assumed power as sovereign prince. It goes without 
saying that he was not pleased with this rather complex project when it was 
presented to him on 7 December 1813. In his eyes Bouchenröder’s army was 
certainly too weak to wage war against the French. But, above all, to have 
20 NA Stamboek off icieren van de Landmacht 1813-1924, 204-124; de Bas, Prins Frederik, III-1, 
p. 198.
21 His plan is to be found in NA Archives of the Generale Staf van de Koninklijke Landmacht 
1813-1918 (1939) 543 and NA ASS 6591.
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no proper army at his disposal in peacetime and to be dependent on the 
collaboration of the local communities for the creation of one in times of 
crisis, simply was beyond anything he was ready to consider. He dismissed 
Bouchenröder, disbanded his administrative off ice, sent him on a mission 
into Germany, and f inally granted him a pension. The shelving of Bouchen-
röder’s army closed an era since it was the last time that the army of the 
state was conceived of as a bottom-up force. It intended to recruit volunteer 
citizens for the state’s army without resorting to top-down conscription. As 
such, his project was to be the last in the tradition of the Patriot Free Corps 
and exercise societies as well as the Dutch- or French-style National Guard. 
From now on, organizing, forming, training, and commanding the army were 
the business of the state, even if this involved calling up citizens for the army.
The only place where armed service in local units lived on was outside the 
army: the so-called Schutterijen. These local militias were reintroduced as a 
police force at the disposal of the local authorities and were supervised not 
by the Department of War, but by Home Affairs. Sure enough, the Schutterij 
Act contained provisions that permitted the Schutterijen to serve as a citizen 
force of last resort alongside the army in times of crisis, but after the War 
of the Belgian Secession (1830-1839) military experts considered this an 
increasingly unsatisfactory arrangement.22
The army William Frederick wanted for himself was an eighteenth-
century-style all-volunteer professional, standing army. This was to be a 
royal army, with off icers commissioned by him and soldiers committed to 
him. It would be a symbol of his dignity, shore up his throne and his dynasty, 
represent the central state on the local level in the garrison towns, and be 
an instrument of his foreign policy. It was to be ready to wage war within as 
well as beyond the borders. Once enlisted, the soldiers would in fact quit civil 
society and their local community. They would enter a separate sphere, that 
of the state and national interest as embodied by the king. On the other hand, 
22 Schutterij Act of 27 December 1815, Staatsblad 1815 , no. 20, and Recueil Militair, bevattende 
de wetten, besluiten en ordres, betreffende de koninklijke Nederlandse landmagt 1813-1914 (The 
Hague: Van Cleef, 1815-1914), vol. 1815 [henceforth, Recueil with year], I, pp. 382-431; Schutterij 
Act of 11 April 1827, Staatsblad 1827, no. 17; Sickesz, Schutterijen in Nederland, pp. 215-216; van 
Dam van Isselt, De ontwikkeling van ons krijgswezen sedert 1813, p. 10; Schoenmaker, Burgerzin en 
soldatengeest, pp. 396-397. The ideal of an army completely made up of amateur soldiers, trained 
in their free time outside the barracks and meant to be “polder-guerrillas”, re-emerged at the turn 
of the century, stimulated by among other things the Swiss example and the Anglo-Boer War. 
This people’s army (Volksleger) concept was supported by left-liberals and social democrats. It 
was heavily opposed by the military establishment and never developed into a serious threat to 
the cadre-militia army concept. See Klinkert, Het vaderland verdedigd, pp. 209-216; Amersfoort, 
“Lodewijk Thomson, militair waarnemer”, Dienstplicht, draagvlak en democratie.
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William Frederick very well understood that an all-volunteer force would 
be slow to come into being. Given the limits of the population – some 2.2 
million at the time – and foreign recruitment sources drying up, conscription 
would inevitably have a part to play as well. But this implied that at some 
time a conscription bill would have to be passed by the parliament, giving 
it ample opportunity to meddle in a domain William Frederick considered 
his prerogative. This explains why from 1813 onwards army recruitment 
was pursued along two parallel lines, namely voluntary enrolment and 
conscription. They raised the complement for two different, even separate 
parts of the army, the so-called Standing Army and the national militia, 
each of which had its own function in the country’s defence.
William Frederick’s army
In early 1814, the formation of a volunteer mobile army was William Freder-
ick’s priority. Alongside the on-going war against France and the participa-
tion in the allied war effort, William Frederick had another reason to make 
his army as strong as possible. Britain coveted a ‘special relationship’ with 
William Frederick and his kingdom.23 In Britain’s strategy the Netherlands 
were an advance post for the deployment of the British army on the continent 
in case of future French expansionism. This was a rehabilitation of the role 
the United Provinces had played in the coalition wars against France up 
to 1748. Before and after the battle of Waterloo, Wellington urged William 
Frederick to be relentless in his efforts to build up an army strong enough 
to withstand an initial French invasion. This army was to buy time for the 
British expeditionary force to join the war.24 As from September 1815 Britain 
supervised and co-financed the construction of a series of fortif ied towns in 
the Southern Netherlands (the ‘Southern Frontier’) which represented the 
re-establishment of the old barrière that had been demolished by the French 
in the course of the War of the Austrian Succession.25 For his part William 
Frederick was eager to play the role assigned to him by London. For some 
time he even aimed at the union of the Netherlands and his Nassau posses-
sions in Germany, by including the Rhineland in his kingdom. This would 
23 Van Sas, Onze natuurlijkste bondgenoot.
24 See, for example, Wellington to Castlereagh, 29 April 1816, in Colenbrander, Gedenkstukken 
der algemeene geschiedenis van Nederland, VIII-1, p. 31; William Fredrick to Clancarty, 4 April 
1814, ibid., VII, p. 756.
25 Uitterhoeve, Cornelis Kraijenhoff 1758-1840, pp. 289-363.
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have made his state a power of the middle rank and would have restored the 
pre-1748 position of the United Provinces in the European balance of power.
Now all this pointed in the same direction: the creation of a strong, 
all-volunteer f ield army. To enable it to operate independently, all arms 
were included in this force, which came to be called the Standing Army. The 
f irst organization (January 1814) provided for six rifle battalions, sixteen 
line battalions of infantry, four regiments of cavalry, four foot battalions of 
artillery, one corps of horse artillery, one battalion of pontonneers, miners 
and sappers, and one support (train) battalion. It had a total strength of 
30,241 men, of whom 21,884 were in the infantry.26 When after Waterloo 
and the Treaty of Paris the threat of war receded, the Standing Army was 
given a more general task. It was conceived of as the operationally ready 
unit of the army, permanently under arms, out of which a mobile army 
could instantly be drawn and despatched to the borders to ward off at-
tacks. Moreover, the king (on 16 March 1815 William Frederick proclaimed 
himself king of the United Northern and Southern Netherlands) could at 
any time send a corps of the Standing Army to the colonies – a necessary 
provision since there was no separate colonial army until the early 1830s. 
Hence the Standing Army carried on the eighteenth-century tradition of 
recruitment and organization: enlistment of volunteers, the possibility of 
conducting operations beyond the country’s borders and in the colonies, 
and a comprehensive organization with the inclusion of all arms.
Table 15.1 Annual salary of officers







The off icers in the Standing Army were appointed and promoted by the 
sovereign and engaged for an indefinite period of time.27 Moreover, their 
26 Hardenberg, Overzigt der voornaamste bepalingen, II, p. 14; Sovereign Decree of 9 January 
1814 in Recueil 1813-1814, I, pp. 74-83.
27 Hardenberg, Overzigt der voornaamste bepalingen, II, pp. 7-27, 53-60, 63-73, 76-83, 100-104.
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engagement ended by royal decree as well, whether at the off icer’s request 
or not. The pensions off icers enjoyed after their resignation were granted to 
them as a royal favour and came at the charge of the treasury, no contribu-
tions being due by the officers concerned during their engagement. Officers 
enjoyed a salary calculated as an annual sum which was paid to them in 
twelve equal terms. Infantry salaries are shown in Table 15.1, all expenses for 
lodging, clothing, food, and personal armament being at their own charge. 
NCOs and soldiers were engaged and if they wished, re-engaged on two-, 
four-, or six-year contracts, the f irst contract always starting in the rank of 
soldier. The minimum age of the recruit was eighteen years (or seventeen 
with parental consent) with the maximum being forty. Preferably they were 
unmarried. Minimum height was 1.596 metres. For a two-year contract the 
soldier received a bounty of DFL 10, which was considerably lower than the 
bounties paid before 1795 when sums ranging from forty to sixty guilders 
had been normal. Soldiers and NCOs were paid a sum calculated on a daily 
basis, depending on the position they were in (in the barracks, on leave, in 
hospital, in detention, etc.). Apart from that, they received a pound of bread 
every three days. Lodging, clothing, armaments, and equipment were at the 
charge of the regiment. Soldiers and NCOs ate their meals together in their 
chambrées, the room they lived and slept in.28 Meals (a stew of vegetables, 
beans, rice or potatoes, and meat, f ish or bacon) were at their own expenses. 
To this end the pay of all soldiers in a company was put into a common fund 
and used to purchase ingredients for the meals, the so-called ménage system. 
Every f ive days any remaining cash was distributed among the soldiers 
according to their rank as their pocket-money. To protect the rank and f ile 
against rising food prices, the regiment guaranteed minimum pocket-money 
of DFL 0.25 every f ive days, which left the soldier DFL 18.25 on a yearly basis. 
When in the barracks the NCOs’ and soldiers’ pay were as shown in Table 15.2.
Table 15.2 Annual pay of non-commissioned officers and soldiers





28 The lodging of the garrison was provided for by the local town authorities. Since the 
Netherlands had few purpose-built barracks, old schools, factories, and so on were used.
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At virtually the same time as the inception of the new standing army, 
regulations were introduced to raise troops by means of conscription. These 
were to be the militia units of the army. To avoid association with conscrip-
tion during the Napoleonic period, the militia, although an integral part of 
the army, was initially quite separate from the mobile operational part. To 
begin with, until 1817 the militia consisted almost exclusively of infantry. In 
January 1814 the infantry of the militia had a complement of 21,920 men, of 
whom 18,840 were organized in twenty infantry-battalions and 3,080 men 
organized in four battalions of supporting artillery.29 The earliest regulation, 
the Reglement van Algemene Volkswapening (20 December 1813), conceived 
of the militia (the so-called Landmilitie) as a force recruited out of the 
so-called Landstorm, a home guard, which can best be compared with the 
town militias (Schutterijen) that had existed before 1795.30 The Reglement 
assumed that the Landmilitie would be made up mainly of volunteers, i.e. 
Landstorm-men who offered to do their period of service on a voluntary 
basis. Only if the numbers of volunteers fell short of that required would civil 
registration be used to select by lot the additional men needed. Needless 
to say, the reality was the other way around, with hardly any Landstorm-
men willing to serve voluntarily (some of them were even pressed or paid 
by local government wanting to get rid of their undesirable subjects and 
avoid conscription for others) and the great majority of them being forcibly 
recruited.
The fact that the Landmilitie was recruited from the Landstorm may at 
f irst sight be interpreted as a continuation of the line of thought behind 
Bouchenröder’s force. But in contrast to Bouchenröder’s project the local 
origins of the Landmilitie had no practical implications, as this provision 
in the December 1813 Reglement was a meaningless phrase to sugar the pill 
of the f irst form of Dutch conscription. Bouchenröder’s force would have 
been f irmly rooted in the local town community. Only in times of crisis it 
would have been organized as a national army under the command of the 
sovereign. Certainly, the word Land in the name of the Landmilitie referred 
to the local community and its task was territorial defence, i.e., the protec-
tion and defence of their own areas. But, in contrast to Bouchenröder’s 
force, from the very start the Landmilitie was perceived by the sovereign 
29 Sovereign Decree of 21 January 1814; Van Dam van Isselt, De ontwikkeling van ons krijgswezen 
sedert 1813, pp. 2-3.
30 “Proclamatie tot aanmoediging der vrijwillige wapening”, 6 December 1813: Van Dam 
van Isselt, De ontwikkeling van ons krijgswezen sedert 1813, pp. 2-3; Hardenberg, Overzigt der 
voornaamste bepalingen, II, pp.  20-21, 25; for the Reglement van Algemene Volkswapening 
(20 December 1813), see Staatsblad 1813-1814, no. 14.
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as force at his disposal, separate from but parallel to the army: a means to 
free the Standing Army from garrison duties and territorial defence, now 
that a mobile army had to be formed. As such it was a force somewhere 
halfway between Bouchenröder’s project and conscription. In hindsight it 
was in many respects a temporary arrangement and a typical product of 
the turbulent last months of the war against Napoleon.
The Reglement had been promulgated by the sovereign prince without the 
consent of the States-General. In fact it was no more than a one-time requisi-
tion to meet the urgent manpower demands of the moment. It contained 
no provisions for the future. These defects were remedied by the Conscrip-
tion Act of 27 February 1815.31 Like the Reglement, the act conceived of the 
militia, now renamed the National Militia, as an independent organization, 
separate from the Standing Army. The act went even further by separating 
the national militia from the Landstorm as well. The concept that military 
service for the state was rooted in some local force was now a thing of the 
past. As from 1815 the militia rested upon conscription, comparable to the 
French system of the Loi Jourdan-Delbrel of 1798.
It was now also possible for the militia to take part in the operational 
tasks of the Standing Army. In this instance, the militia was called to arms 
and made mobile, that is to say, divorced from its local ties and dispatched 
to the Standing Army. The Dutch troops at Quatre-Bras and Waterloo in 
June 1815 consisted partly of line battalions, from both the Northern and 
Southern Netherlands, and partly of militia battalions from the Northern 
Netherlands. Actions beyond the country’s borders, however, could be 
ordered only with the consent of the parliament; hence, special legislation 
had to be introduced to enable the militia to take part in the campaign of 
1815. Militia conscripts could only be asked to serve on a voluntary basis 
with the navy, and under no circumstance were militia units to be sent to 
the colonies.
Contrary to the requisition-based Landmilitie, the National Militia now 
rested upon true conscription, every new yearly cohort being registered by 
the local authorities. There was to be a maximum annual intake of 1 per 
cent of the population, making 22,000 men available for the militia. After 
f ive yearly levies, the militia would thus reach a wartime total strength 
of 110,000 men in the age range of eighteen to twenty-two years old. For 
recruiting purposes, the kingdom was divided into ten militia districts 
of 100,000 inhabitants, each district consisting of ten militia cantons. 
All twenty-four battalions of the militia were attached to a district from 
31 Staatsblad 1815, no. 19. See also Recueil 1815, I, pp. 382-431.
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which they drew their recruits. In March all eighteen-year-old men had to 
present themselves before the Militia Council of their district for physical 
examination and had to take part in the loting, the drawing of numbers. 
The lowest numbers (the “bad numbers”, as the conscripts used to say) 
were then enlisted to f ill the contingent of the district and sent to their 
regiment no later than 1 April. Wage-earners and theological students 
were exempted from conscription. Conscription was further mitigated 
by allowing substitution and the exchange of numbers in the draw. This 
was subject to two conditions: the substitute must have lived in the same 
province as the conscript for f ifteen months preceding the f irst day of 
service and, secondly, it would only be possible to exchange numbers with 
someone in the same intake and from the same municipality. The consider-
able sums (100 Dutch guilders, the equivalent of a year’s pay for a private, 
being typical) needed to f ind someone willing to serve as a substitute or 
after an exchange of numbers meant that this mitigation extended only 
to the well-to-do and well-educated sections of society. Within a couple of 
years of the introduction of conscription, insurance and broker companies 
appeared on the marketplace to match those offering to serve as substitutes 
and those wanting to avoid serving in person. Over the nineteenth century 
some 15-20 per cent of the militia normally consisted of substitutes.32
After initial training in the depot of the regiment, from 1 April onwards 
the fresh conscripts were joined by reservists of previous years in May 
and trained with them as well as with battalions of the Standing Army 
during the “summer exercises” until 15 June. After the summer exercises 
one-quarter of the total militia (125 per cent of the yearly intake) returned 
to barracks to perform garrison duties during the winter and to provide for 
the trained nucleus of the battalions when the new conscripts arrived in 
April the following year. All others were sent home to enjoy their leave. The 
so-called remaining part of the militia was composed of different kinds of 
conscripts. In the f irst place those who had tried to evade conscription by 
not appearing before the Militia Council were tracked down and sent to 
their regiment to serve for the full f ive years. Ipso facto, they were allotted to 
the remaining part. Secondly, every conscript had the right to volunteer for 
the remaining part as a way of earning a living. Thirdly, all substitutes were 
incorporated in the remaining part since they served the full f ive-year term 
of their conscription. The remaining part was then completed by having all 
other conscripts draw numbers, with the exception of those who had been 
in the remaining part in previous years.
32 Bevaart, De Nederlandse Defensie, p. 197.
thE dutch arMy in transition 465
Given the peculiarities of this system the time a conscript had to spend 
in the barracks could vary signif icantly.33 Those who proved to be physi-
cally unfit, those drawing a “good number” and those whose parents could 
afford a number-swapper or a substitute did not enter the barracks at all. 
Those serving in person spent two-and-a-half months in the barracks 
and the training facilities, while conscripts in the remaining part spent 
fourteen-and-a-half months in the army. Punished conscription-evaders, 
substitutes, and volunteers soldiered for the full f ive years. As from the 
summer exercises of 1820, the conscription burden was increased, since from 
then on the annual exercise was held in September and October, adding 
a four-month period to the terms mentioned above. All conscripts served 
under the same administrative regulations as the volunteers in the Standing 
Army and received the same daily pay. The off icers and NCOs who com-
manded the militia battalions technically belonged to the Standing Army. 
Conscripts had the right to opt for promotion to the rank of NCO, provided 
they met the qualif ications (mastering the basics of reading, writing, and 
basic mathematics) or, in case of illiteracy, were prepared to attend the 
courses in the company’s school.34
Over the years following 1815 the importance of conscription and the 
National Militia increased. As regards the standing army, soon after its 
inauguration it proved to be impossible to reach the required numbers by 
voluntary recruitment. The number of men obtained from the French army, 
or returning from Prussian, Austrian, Russian, and British captivity, was 
insufficient to meet demands, even when the six rifle battalions and sixteen 
line battalions of infantry were reduced to four and twelve respectively in 
September 1814. In April 1814 the combined actual strength of the Standing 
Army (the two regiments from Nassau included) and the militia amounted to 
a meagre 28,232 men. And in spite of all efforts in February 1815 the situation 
was only slightly better. Now 34,094 men were in William Frederick’s pay.35
For a while it was hoped that the recruitment of foreigners, for which 
considerable funds were available, would make up the full complement 
of men but, as has been shown, this proved an illusion. This naturally in-
creased the reliance on conscription and explains among other things why 
the Militia Act of February 1815 had to supersede the Reglement. With the 
f irst volunteer contracts for the Standing Army expiring from 1817 onwards 
33 Amersfoort, Koning en Kanton, pp. 78-79.
34 Snapper, “Het negentiende eeuwse Nederlandse leger”.
35 Wüpperman, De vorming van het Nederlandsche leger na de omwenteling, pp. 4-6; NA ASS 
no. 6568, Exhibitum, 24 March 1815, no. 12.
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the standing army gradually lost men to the militia, with former volunteers 
re-engaging as substitutes with the militia.36 The considerable desertion 
from the ranks of the standing army, which had the same background, 
further increased this effect. The repeated pardons for deserters are an 
indication that the problem was in fact insoluble.37 The king’s bounty of 10 
guilders for service in the standing army was much less than that of the 
conscripts who wanted to avoid service.
Already towards the end of 1815 it appeared necessary to f ind a solution 
to the shortage of manpower in the army. The only way out seemed to be 
the expansion of the army’s militia element. A f irst step in that direction 
was the formation in October 1815 of seventeen new, larger units, the so-
called Afdeelingen, which were later to be called Regiments.38 Each of these 
consisted of three battalions of National Militia and one line battalion of 
the Standing Army. The hope of the Department of War that the closer 
contact between volunteers and conscripts would tempt the latter to opt 
for voluntary service was soon dashed. The next step was an increase in 
the number of arms and branches in the organization of the militia. In 
1817, cavalry and logistic support (train) corps were added to the militia’s 
infantry and artillery. Finally, in 1819, a reorganization was started which, 
in effect, amounted to the complete merging of the Standing Army and 
the National Militia, the so-called amalgame.39 Within each Afdeeling the 
battalion of the standing army was spread over the three militia battalions. 
As a result, each company from then on consisted of 25 per cent regular 
personnel and 75 per cent conscripts. This reorganization, beginning in the 
infantry with the other arms and branches following suit, was completed 
in 1828. In the same period, all foreign regiments were removed from the 
army’s organization. The consequences for the strength of the army and the 
numbers present in the barracks in autumn 1819 are shown in Table 15.3.40
36 Keyzer to d’Aubremé, 28 May 1818, no. 10, Archives of the Ministerie van Oorlog [henceforth, 
MvO] Geheim Archief [henceforth, GA] 11.
37 Mollerus to Soeverein Vorst, 15 June 1814, in Colenbrander, Gedenkstukken der algemeene 
geschiedenis van Nederland, VII, pp. 598-599; Sovereign Decree of 25 June 1814, no. 59A, in 
Staatsblad 1814, no. 71; Mollerus to all corps of the army, 30 June 1814, no. 13, in Recueil 1813-1814, I, 
pp. 353-354; Janssens to all corps of the army, 4 August 1814, no. 105, ibid., II, pp. 461-465; Janssens 
to all corps of the army, 11 August 1814, no. 14, ibid., II, pp. 468-469; Mollerus to all corps of the 
Landmilitie, 20 December 1814, no. 1, ibid., II, pp. 678-680.
38 Royal Decree, 8 October 1815, in Recueil 1815, II, pp. 93-98.
39 Law of 28 November 1818, in Noordziek, Handelingen van de Staten Generaal gedurende de 
vergaderingen van 1814-heden, 1818-1819, pp. 6-8, 29-47, and Annexes, pp. 18-23; Recueil 1818, II, 
pp. 121-141; Staatsblad 1818, no. 41.
40 Hardenberg, Overzigt der voornaamste bepalingen, II, pp. 139-140.
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Present in the bar-
racks
numbers 112,818 62,894 49,924
proportion in % 100 55.7 44.3
Source: hardenberg, Overzigt der voornaamste bepalingen, ii, pp. 139-140
The importance of these rapid developments can hardly be exaggerated. 
Originally, in 1813, William Frederick had intended to rely on the partly 
foreign, partly Dutch regular personnel of the Standing Army to make 
up the operational f ield army. The militia would see to territorial defence 
and security at the local level. Moreover, it was expected that voluntary 
enlistment would provide a portion of the manpower for the militia. The 
hated conscription could thus be restricted as much as possible. Within a 
few years, however, conscription had become the foundation on which army 
manpower rested, and it was clear that the bulk of the mobile army, in the 
eventuality of war, would have to consist of conscripts, while the off icers 
and NCOs would be made up of regular personnel from the Standing Army. 
So after a rapid succession of events the Dutch population accepted, albeit 
grudgingly, the transformation of armed service on a voluntary basis in the 
local community into full-blown conscription for the army of the state. The 
road for this remarkable development had been paved by foreign rulers, King 
Louis Napoleon and the French emperor. After 1813 the Dutch population 
put up with the national conscription system as it had done before with 
French conscription: it was a very unpleasant, even hated interruption of 
normal civilian life but this sentiment would never disrupt the smooth 
working of the system. In the end each year in March the new conscripts 
responded to the call-up to appear before the Militia Council and underwent 
the administrative logic of the Conscription Act. Certainly, some conscripts 
tried to evade military service, by not appearing before the Militia Council, 
or by deceit, self-mutilation, or desertion; some escaped conscription thanks 
to administrative errors. But it is important to note that these acts of resist-
ance and their underlying sentiments remained strictly individual and 
personal.41 They never reached levels of organized, let alone political or 
violent, resistance. Middle-class and upper-class conscripts would certainly 
41 Even French conscription had been accepted by the Dutch as a detested but unavoidable 
fact of life: Joor, De adelaar en het Lam, pp. 451-454; Welten, In dienst voor Napoleons Europese 
droom.
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have been able to articulate their objections in the political arena, but 
they had other means of staying out of the barracks: number-swapping 
and substitution.
However, this is not to say that the introduction of conscription was 
without political consequences. On the contrary, already in 1813 the abrupt 
dismissal of Bouchenröder and his proposed army by William Frederick 
and his decision to opt for a royal all-volunteer force raised an important 
political-military question: to whom would the army belong? If the army 
was segmented into local militias, only to be brought together under royal 
command in times of crisis and after the consent of the local elites, for all 
practical purposes it belonged to the local aristocracies. They and nobody 
else would have a f irm grip on the local military labour market. In this 
case, in peacetime, the central state and the king would have no direct 
access to the manpower hidden in the population from which to raise an 
army. If, however, the army belonged to the state and the king, it would be 
a true national army. In this case, the state would be given direct access to 
individual citizens, be it via voluntary enlistment on the military labour 
market or by force of law, the Conscription Act. As William Frederick did 
not hesitate to choose the latter option, this implied that, as far as the 
military was concerned, the local community was in fact broken up in 
favour of the state. Conscription – being technically speaking a tax-levy in 
kind, irrespective of the sweet words spoken of citizenship and voluntary 
conscription – was only added to the list of already existing taxes from the 
central government. This, of course, required the co-operation of the same 
local elites, since they dominated the States-General that had to pass the 
Conscription Bill. But here they were ready to grant their consent, given 
the provisions, among others, for substitution and number-swapping which 
favoured them more than anybody else.
So, at the heart of question was the fact that, in the end, the modern state 
and its conscripted army on the one hand and the local community on the 
other, were mutually exclusive. This was visible not merely in the National 
Militia and the growing importance of conscription. The same problem 
presented itself in the other part of the army, the Standing Army. Here the 
problem focused upon the four Swiss regiments that were part of the army 
organization from 1814 to 1829. It took some time for the problem to surface 
but, when it did appear, it soon proved insoluble. The Dutch state simply 
did not have the means to break up the local communities in the Swiss 
cantons the way it had done at home. After f ifteen troublesome years, the 
same regiments that had been essential to the army when they arrived on 
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Dutch soil in 1814 and following years had to be dismissed. Their fate thus 
confirms the conclusions arrived at above.
The Swiss regiments 1814-1829
In December 1813 William Frederick was informed by envoys he had sent 
to Allied headquarters in Frankfurt that the Swiss cantons were willing to 
resume raising regiments for service in the Netherlands, as they had done 
in the eighteenth century. This prompted him to send Elie van der Hoeven, 
an offspring of an aristocratic family from Rotterdam, on a mission to the 
Swiss cantons, giving him orders to conclude contracts (capitulations) with 
the governments of, if possible, all Swiss cantons for no fewer than 12,000 
troops and no later than May 1814.42 Although the conditions in Switzerland 
were by no means as favourable as The Hague had been led to believe and Van 
der Hoeven had to go through much hard bargaining over the years 1814-1816, 
he managed to conclude capitulations with a sufficient number of cantons 
to enlist three regiments with a complement of some 2,000 men each and 
a fourth regiment (no. 32) of 3,000 men from the Roman Catholic cantons 
in central Switzerland, adding a total of 9,000 professional Swiss soldiers to 
the king’s service.43 They were incorporated in the Dutch army as Regiments 
no. 29, no. 30, no. 31, and no. 32.44 They served under the same financial and 
administrative conditions and regulations as the national regiments, with the 
notable exceptions of the bounty the recruit received on his enlistment, the 
travel expenses, and the provisions for regular leaves. To cover the expenses 
for recruitment the Treasury paid the funds of the Swiss regiments DFL 67.20 
42 Van Hogendorp, Brieven en gedenkschriften van Gijsbert Karel van Hogendorp, IV, pp. 206, 283-
306, V, pp. 46-49, 216-220, 227, 260-261, 267-278, 282-292, 472-474; Van Spaen to Van Hogendorp, 
28 December 1813, NA Archives of the Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 1813-1870 [henceforth, 
BuZa] 4; Van Spaen to Van Hogendorp, 29 December 1813, no. 1, NA BuZa 4; Van Hogendorp to 
Van Spaen, 3 January 1814, NA BuZa 24; Van Hogendorp to Van Spaen, 5 January 1814, no. 3, NA 
BuZa 24; Memorandum by Van der Wijck, 7 January 1814, NA MvO GA 1; Van Hogendorp to Van 
Spaen, 7 January 1814, no. 4, NA BuZa 24. The Instruction for Van der Hoeven can be found in 
Sovereign Decree 31 January 1814, no. 216, NA ASS 5.
43 The capitulation with the Canton of Bern, concluded 23 September 1814, was the model for 
all other capitulations: NA Archives of the Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 1813-1870, Eerste 
Supplement Ratif icaties 1814-1900 [henceforth, BuZa Ratif icaties] 4. See also Amersfoort, Koning 
en Kanton, pp. 312-321.
44 Amersfoort, Koning en Kanton, pp. 109-141. A complete overview of the distribution of all 
companies over the capitulating cantons in the 1814-1829 period is given in NA BuZa Ratif icaties, 
as well as in Amersfoort, Koning en Kanton, pp. 322-324.
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for each soldier signing a four-year contract and DFL 95.20 for a six-year 
contract. National corps were credited with DFL 28 for a six-year contract. 
Bounties paid in Switzerland on average amounted to between DFL 35 and 
DFL 70: much higher than the DFL 10 offered to Dutch recruits enlisting 
for the national corps. As part of the Standing Army and benefiting from 
the time-honoured excellent reputation of the Swiss soldier, the regiments 
were given vital garrisons in the border areas of the Northern and, after 1815, 
Southern Netherlands. Van der Hoeven had indeed performed his duty well.
However, over the years after 1816 inspections by Dutch military au-
thorities indicated that, in violation of the capitulations, non-Swiss soldiers 
served with the regiments. Other soldiers were too old or too young to serve. 
Certain companies proved to be severely under strength, probably due to 
massive desertion, with their off icers being absent, spending long leaves 
in their canton, allegedly to recruit. At f irst the Department of War was 
inclined simply to ignore these problems, given the existing diff iculties 
of recruiting for the Standing Army from the Dutch labour market.45 But 
other problems came to the fore as well. Over the years the Department 
of War saw itself confronted with seemingly never-ending complaints and 
requests from the governments of the Swiss cantons and members of the 
aristocratic families from which these governments were elected. Most of 
them concerned some pretended injustice that had befallen their relatives, 
serving as an off icer in the Netherlands. These letters invariably asked for 
promotion, better pay, longer leaves, appointments of cadets, and other 
personal advantages or benefits for the sons, cousins, nephews, and other 
relatives of the cantonal governing families or the families with which they 
were aff iliated in business. In some cases a whole regiment was concerned. 
In 1818 the government of Bern requested the transfer of its regiment from 
the town of Breda to Antwerp, claiming that Breda was an insupportably 
parochial place in which to live – and Roman Catholic at that – and that 
only a vibrant city such as Antwerp could offer the pleasures and cultural 
diversions Bern considered its native sons entitled to.46
45 Tindal to Von der Goltz, 28 December 1816, no. 188, NA Archives of the Ministerie van Oorlog 
1795-1844; Collectie Van Thielen, Archief van de eerste Inspecteur Generaal der Infanterie 
lt.gen. W.G. Tindal 1816-1818 [henceforth, IGI] 8; Von der Goltz to Tindal, 3 February 1817, no. 
4, NA IGI 2; Von der Goltz to Van der Hoeven, 23 November 1816, no. 1942, NA Archives of the 
Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, Inventaris van de Legatiearchieven in beheer bij de Tweede 
Afdeling, Legatie Zwitserland 1814-1918 [henceforth, Leg Zw] 16; Von der Goltz to Van der Hoeven, 
20 January 1817, no. 38, NA Leg Zw 16; Von der Goltz to Tindal, 15 March 1817, no. 112, NA IGI 2.
46 Amersfoort, Koning en Kanton, pp. 179-182, 201-204; D’Aubremé to the King, 17 September 
1824, La. E9 NA MvO GA 27.
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The most serious problems were revealed in Regiment no. 32. In the 
eyes of the Department of War, the commanding off icer of the regiment, 
Major-General Louis d’Auf der Maur from the canton of Schwyz, proved to 
be nothing less than a fraud. From the very start Auf der Maur had behaved 
not as a responsible off icer, respecting the regulations of the Department 
of War, nor as a loyal servant to the king, but as a sixteenth-century-style 
military enterpriser.47 He had sold commissions to the highest bidder and 
had offered extremely low bounties (some DFL 15), which had led him to 
enlist vagabonds, criminals, and ne’er-do-wells, in a word the scum of 
Europe. Since neither the Department of War nor Major A.L.W. Seyffardt 
(the Dutch muster commissary in Switzerland) had been too inquisitive, and 
since Auf der Maur had covered up his acts with forged documents provided 
to him by an accomplice in the bosom of the government of Schwyz, both 
practices had gone unnoticed and had brought Auf der Maur considerable 
profit.48 The most lucrative source of income had been desertion. As the rules 
were, every time an individual enlisted the regiment received a payment, 
the level of which was f ixed in the capitulation. This might be higher or 
lower than the real cost of recruitment, depending on the conditions of the 
labour market of the time. Moreover, every enlisted soldier the regiment 
lost due to illness, death, or desertion was a charge against the Treasury. 
This was the logic of the modern state in which the regiments of the army 
were the property of the state. In the logic of a military enterpriser like Auf 
der Maur these rules had been an incentive to be lenient to desertion, even 
to foster it. Moreover, he had managed to implicate most of the regiment’s 
off icers in his enterprise by offering them a share in the profits.49
After all this had been revealed to the Department of War in The Hague, 
August count of Liedekerke, a nobleman from the Southern Netherlands 
47 Van der Hoeven described him as someone “que je connais pour un homme à projets et 
entreprises”. In 1814 this was to be considered a recommendation: Van der Hoeven to Van Nagell, 
7 April 1814, no. 15, NA BuZa 5; Van Liedekerke to Von der Goltz, 28 August 1817, no. 17, NA Leg 
Zw 16; Van Liedekerke to Von der Goltz, 1 January 1818, no. 26, NA Leg Zw 16; Van Liedekerke to 
Van Nagell, 30 January 1818, no. 44, NA ASS 6343; Wagenaar to D’Aubremé, 25 August 1819, T4 
NA MvO GA 16.
48 The accomplice was Landammann F.X. Weber. Auf der Maur appointed him as recruit-
ment off icer in his regiment, in which capacity Weber also shared in the prof its of Auf der 
Maur’s enterprise. Seyffardt was frequently invited to stay in the house of Auf der Maur in the 
Strehlgasse in Schwyz. Nowadays the house is known as the Hotel Hediger, after the Hedinger 
family who had owned it previously.
49 The contract concluded to this effect between Auf der Maur and the Council of Off icers of 
the regiment can be found in Hauptarchiv Archiv 1 Akten bis 1848 B Kanton Schwyz, Staatsarchiv 
Schwyz Switzerland, 554.
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and permanent envoy to the Swiss Confederation since April 1817, was given 
orders to lodge off icial complaints against the cantons concerned and to 
urge their governments to respect the capitulations conscientiously. Van 
Liedekerke, however, reacted half-heartedly. On the one hand he executed 
his orders, but on the other he began writing a series of long dispatches 
explaining to the Department of War things it should have known about 
the Swiss Confederation or apparently had forgotten since 1795.
To begin with, Van Liedekerke explained the peculiarities of the Swiss 
labour market.50 In the second half of the eighteenth century Switzerland had 
developed a flourishing textile industry and textile trade. As a consequence 
wages had gone up considerably. Already in the eighteenth century this had 
meant that even rising bounties and wages for foreign service had only been 
able to attract soldiers of declining quality. Van Liedekerke pointed out that 
the normal determination of prices by the interplay of supply and demand 
no longer applied to foreign recruitment in the Swiss cantons. Due to the 
behaviour of the ruling aristocracy supply and demand in the cantons,
s’y exercent en raison inverse de ce qui se passe à cet égard dans les 
entreprises d’industrie. Quant à elles celles-ci font ordinairement 
baisser les prix, perfectionner les fournitures. Pour les cantons, car ces 
capitulations appartiennent un peu au domaine des spéculations, ils 
les font hausser en multipliant les prétentions de la partie qui livre la 
matière première bien qu’elle soit devenu de moindre qualité.51
The common Swiss farmer and labourer, when offered a choice between 
his spinning jenny and power loom or the uncertainties of service abroad, 
preferred to stay in his own valley. Napoleon’s Continental System had 
temporarily cut Switzerland off from its overseas markets, and 1816 and 
1817 had seen serious food shortages and rising food prices due to crop 
failures. The ensuing unemployment and poverty had stimulated many 
Swiss farmers and labourers to follow the Dutch recruiting drums. But after 
1817 these incentives subsided. From then on, the Netherlands, France, and 
the Kingdom of Naples competed in Switzerland for military manpower 
in a contracting market.52 For a typical canton government, foreign service 
amounted to an opportunity to get rid of their poor and destitute subjects in 
50 Van Liedekerke to Verstolk van Soelen, 25 June 1826, no. 132, NA ASS 6344; Suter, Inner-
Schweizerisches Militärunternehmertum im 18. Jahrhundert.
51 Van Liedekerke to Verstolk van Soelen, 25 June 1826, no. 132, NA ASS 6344.
52 Maag, Geschichte der Schweizertruppen in neapolitanischen Diensten 1825-1861, pp. 1-22.
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the f irst instance. The other side of this coin was that, under the influence 
of the Enlightenment, military service abroad was now seen differently in 
Switzerland. Traditionally it had been a honourable occupation, something 
to be proud of. Now liberal politicians and intellectuals criticized it as a 
social evil and morally wrong: the selling of the skins of one‘s citizens to 
foreign rulers instead of caring for them and protecting them.53 In the case 
of Regiment no. 32 it came as no surprise to Van Liedekerke that Tessin 
had been a coveted recruiting ground for Auf der Maur since this canton, 
bordering Italy, was a traditional hub of seasonal labour.54
In the face of this situation, not very much could be done, other than 
accept the changing structure of the labour market, Van Liedekerke argued. 
The same advice applied as far as the never-ending stream of requests 
for benef its and advantages from the governing families of the cantons 
was concerned. The government of a canton and the families behind this 
government in 1814-1816 had been prepared to conclude capitulations only 
because of the commissions for their relatives these contracts entailed. The 
military service in itself or the quality of the troops, let alone their f ighting 
power, were of secondary importance. Clinging to traditional values, these 
families viewed foreign service as a means to provide profitable positions 
as off icers for their offspring, as a means to shore up the resources of the 
family but above all as a means to buttress their well-respected position, 
honour, and reputation at the head of their canton. Their foremost concern 
was keeping up with the other governing families and commanding the 
respect of their clientele and their subjects. For them, their scions serving in 
the Netherlands were part of their personal network of power, like any other 
member of their family. Increasingly, these immaterial prof its came to the 
foreground and overshadowed the already diminishing f inancial returns of 
foreign service, which became a status symbol for them instead of a way of 
earning a living.55 Moreover, in a traditional state the distinction between 
state interest and family interest had been blurred as a matter of course 
since ancient times. Auf der Maur had stressed this to the extreme. For him 
53 Aellig, Die Aufhebung der schweizerischen Söldnerdienste im Meinungskampf des neunzehten 
Jahrhunderts; Dubler, Der Kampf um den Solddienst der Schweizer im 18. Jahrhundert.
54 Quadri and Lotti to Van Liedekerke, 28 December 1819, NA Leg Zw 19; Van Liedekerke to 
Van Nagell, 13 March 1820, no. 180, NA Leg Zw 18.
55 See, for example, Van Liedekerke to Van Nagell, 10 April 1820, no. 184, NA Leg Zw 18; Van 
Liedekerke to Van Nagell, 3 August 1820, no. 209, NA Leg Zw 18; D’ Aubremé to Van Nagell, 
9 September 1820, La C10 NA MvO GA 19; Van Liedekerke to Van Nagell, 17 October 1820, no. 223, 
NA MvO GA 19.
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Regiment no. 32 had been a cash-cow to provide the funds he needed to run 
for the highest off ice in Schwyz, that of Landammann.
If, Van Liedekerke warned, the Department of War refused to grant them 
the benefits they expected, these families would inevitably lose any interest 
in their regiment whatsoever. And this would rapidly bring recruitment to 
a standstill, as no Swiss farmer would be prepared to enlist when he could 
not follow a member of a well-respected family. So the battle between 
the king and the Swiss cantons would terminate “faute de combattans”.56 
Six years later, when discussing similar problems in Regiment no. 31, Van 
Liedekerke underlined the same point by invoking “the authority of the 
facts”, as he phrased it.57
It is important to note that the analysis of Van Liedekerke has been 
conf irmed by modern historical research, not only for the years under 
consideration here, but even for the second half of the eighteenth century.58 
However, there is no indication whatsoever that the Dutch Department of 
War was aware of the changing conditions in Switzerland. As a consequence, 
the dispatches of Van Liedekerke were unpopular in D‘Aubremé‘s off ices. 
Since the fall of the ancien régime and especially since the introduction of 
the principles of modern government in a centralized, bureaucratic state 
over the years 1806-1813 this department had learned to act as a guard-
ian of national interests in its own right, under or, if necessary, even in 
opposition to the king. The interest of the state was, among other things, 
to dispose of reliable well-trained regiments on which the security of the 
state could depend. Hence the decision to garrison the Swiss regiments 
on the borders. In the eyes of the department a flawless execution of the 
capitulation was the cornerstone of Swiss service. Family power networks 
56 Van Liedekerke to Van Nagell, 17 October 1820, no. 223, NA DvO GA 19. Another calculation, 
reaching the same conclusion, can be found in the Koninklijke Huisarchief Archives of Prins 
Frederik VII b41: Nota betrekkelijk het Regement Zwitsers no. 32. The document is undated but 
the content indicates that it was written in October 1819.
57 Van Liedekerke to Verstolk van Soelen, 25 June 1826, no. 132, NA ASS 6344. After having 
explained the nature of Swiss society and politics one more time, Van Liedekerke continued 
by arguing: “nous n’avons pas mission pour la changer. Prétendre donc que ces capitulations 
vivent et se soutiennnent sur leur propre fond, c’est vouloir l’impossible, elles doivent f léchir 
devant les circonstances locales et s’associer surtout aux intérêts privés des Magistrats qui ont 
de l’influence et ici on se permettra d’abondonner ses raisonnements pour invoquer l’autorité 
des faits.” See also D’Aubremé to the King, 16 February 1822, NA Leg Zw 14.
58 Suter, Inner-Schweizerisches Militärunternehmertum im 18. Jahrhundert, pp. 64-68; Aeber-
sold, Die Militärpolitik des Kantons Solothurn in der Restaurationszeit, pp. 296-297; Bührer, Der 
Zürcher Solddienst des 18. Jahrhunderts; Kälin, “Die fremden Dienste in gesellschaftsgeschichtli-
cher Perspektive”.
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crossing national borders, as the Swiss aristocracy deployed them, were of 
no concern to an administration that had to function within the limits of 
a modern, territorial state. Swiss off icers and soldiers were no different to 
their Dutch counterparts, with the exceptions of their Swiss nationality 
and the stipulations of the capitulation. Concluding a capitulation meant 
that the process of bargaining and negotiations was over. The department 
refused to accept, as Van Liedekerke seemed to imply, that a capitulation 
was a kind of entrance fee to the service of the Netherlands, with bargaining 
and negotiations only starting afresh. And what about Auf der Maur? In the 
department, scornful and scandalized remarks were heard of public money 
being spent on buying votes in a faraway Swiss canton instead of on the 
hiring of good soldiers for the defence of the country.59 Needless to say, the 
general was dismissed dishonourably and chased over the borders in 1820.
But this was not enough. Since the capitulations had been concluded, 
the political and administrative control of the Swiss regiments had fallen 
to the Department of War as a matter of routine. Confronted with the 
above-mentioned problems the department began to inform the king and 
to exercise influence on him to look for a more drastic solution. As early 
as March 1819 the War Department calculated that the average national 
soldier was considerably cheaper (17.5 respectively 23 per cent) than those 
from Nassau and Switzerland, as is shown in Table 15.4.60
Table 15.4 Average cost of a soldier per annum (1819)
average swiss soldier per annum dFL 213.32
average nassau soldier per annum dFL 201.63
average national soldier per annum dFL 164.77
Source: d’aubremé to the king, 29 March 1819 La y2 na Mvo Ga 15.
From 1820 on it began considering the possibility of a complete dismissal 
of all four regiments, as it became increasingly evident that these corps, as 
remnants of the ancien régime, no longer f itted in with the characteristics 
of the Dutch state and its army. To change the nature of the cantonal back-
ground of the Swiss regiments was beyond the power of the Department of 
War, so the regiments had to go. At f irst the king showed no inclination to 
59 D’Aubremé to Van Nagell, 4 November 1820, La C14, NA MvO GA 19; Van Tengnagel to 
D’Aubremé, 11 August 1825, no. 20, NA MvO GA 30; Van Tengnagell to D’Aubremé, 11 August 1825, 
no. 19, NA MvO GA 30.
60 D’Aubremé to the King, 29 March 1819, La Y2, NA MvO GA 15.
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follow the argument of the department. But over the years he was losing 
ground. In the f irst place the Standing Army, of which the Swiss regiments 
had been an integral part, in fact had ceased to exist since the amalgame. 
Now the army relied on conscripts to f ill its ranks. In the second place, 
liberal representatives in parliament, especially those from the Southern 
Netherlands, began to object to the presence of the four corps. They also 
were aware that these corps were far more expensive than normal Dutch 
regiments, made up of conscripts. Moreover, they saw them as the symbols of 
the very royal prerogative those liberals objected to.61 So in the end the king 
had to give in, to save his already threatened kingdom. In 1829, after difficult 
negotiations, doing ample honour to the reputation of the Swiss as hard 
bargainers, the capitulations were denounced, the regiments disbanded, 
off icers, NCOs and soldiers dismissed and sent home. To demonstrate that 
different times had arrived indeed, they were replaced by three national 
regiments, saving 300,000 Dutch guilders on a yearly basis.62
Conclusion
Although at f irst sight the birth of the Dutch cadre-militia army and the 
sorry fate of the Swiss regiments are quite different stories, they bear a strik-
ing resemblance. In the end they both underline that the Netherlands in 
the 1795-1830 period went through a systemic change as far as the army was 
concerned. Both stories can be seen as a clash between the traditionality 
of the ancien régime and the modernity of the centralized, bureaucratic, 
territorial state: the former losing and the latter winning. The state wanted 
to have direct access to the manpower contained in its domestic population 
and no longer wanted to deal with a labour market that was in the hands 
of a aristocratic elite at home or abroad, especially if the foreign elite tried 
to extend its patronage networks across the borders of the Netherlands. In 
this process the age-old all-volunteer force of the ancien régime disappeared 
from the scene to be superseded by a cadre-militia army
Now the question that needs to be answered is this: what were the driving 
forces propelling this profound transformation as far as the Netherlands 
are concerned? The f irst and foremost driving forces were the changing 
61 Amersfoort, Koning en Kanton, pp. 227-276.
62 This is my own calculation; see ibid., pp. 262-265. These cuts were soon overshadowed in 
the budget by the extra high expenditures as of 1830 as a result of the Belgian secession and the 
drastic reorganization of the army and its mobilization up to 1839.
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conditions on the Dutch, German, and Swiss labour markets in the second 
half of the eighteenth century. The Dutch labour market was too small 
to provide for the numbers of volunteers the army needed. Traditionally 
these shortages had been met by foreign recruitment. However, due to the 
combined effects of booming agriculture and industry, restrictive measures 
by the Prussian and Austrian authorities and the introduction of conscrip-
tion in many German states, these foreign labour markets gradually dried 
up. On top of that, liberals in the Netherlands, Germany, and Switzerland 
opposed to foreign recruitment and the all-volunteer force argued that 
the security of the state was the concern of every individual citizen and 
that military service as a conscript was a national duty. In their opinion 
the Standing Army was an oppressive instrument of royal power that had 
to be curbed by the countervailing power of the militia. These already 
powerful forces coincided with the exigencies of Napoleonic warfare and 
the ensuing revolutionary growth in army size. The new Dutch sovereign 
William Frederick from 1814 onwards readily followed this trend. The 
special relationship with Britain as well as his own ambitions to restore 
the Netherlands as a power of the middle rank or even the f irst rank pointed 
in the same direction: an army of substantial strength. Events would soon 
prove that this army increasingly had to rely on conscripts.
Over the years 1813-1830 these driving forces manifested themselves 
in three simultaneous conflicts. In the f irst dispute, the one between the 
king and the Second Chamber, control over the army and over its f inancing 
were at stake. The second controversy between the Department of War 
and the Swiss cantons centred upon the question of whether the army was 
purely an instrument of the modern, bureaucratic, territorial unitary state 
or whether the private interests of foreign aristocratic families and their 
internal rivalries should be allowed to interfere with the administration 
and control of the army. The third conflict between the king and his own 
Ministry of War was about the question of whether the public service would 
be able to develop itself into an autonomous keeper of the national interests, 
independent of the court. Taken together, these driving forces and conflicts 
explain the profound transformation the Dutch army underwent in the 
decades between 1795 and 1830.

 The draft and draftees in Italy, 1861-1914
Marco Rovinello
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, conscription is “compulsory en-
listment for state service, typically into the armed forces”, while a conscript 
and a volunteer are respectively “a person enlisted compulsorily” and “a per-
son who freely enrolls for military service rather than being conscripted”.1 
Seemingly straightforward terms like these become, however, much trickier 
in the eye of the historian, who is always striving to historicize and compare 
apparently ubiquitous taxonomies and phenomena.
This chapter faces both challenges starting from the nineteenth-century 
Italian conscription experience. It will briefly analyze the draft system of 
pre-unif ication states, and then will reconstruct the evolution of Italian 
recruitment laws and practices from La Marmora’s draft act (1854) to the eve 
of World War I. On the one hand, attention will be paid to the supposed shift 
from a professional-dynastic militia toward a draft-based army, in order to 
verify its linearity and the universality of Italian conscription. The chapter 
will show in particular how much the draft changed according to current 
political concerns and internal security needs. At the same time, it will 
highlight some constants in Italian conscription, such as the discriminatory 
nature of the system and the government’s ambiguous attitude toward 
draftees. On the other hand, the chapter will approach military service in 
terms of labor relations between the army and reenlisted people. From this 
perspective, it will investigate who opted for soldiering as a form of employ-
ment and why, while trying to establish to what extent forced/voluntary 
and commodif ied/noncommodif ied military labor can be identif ied and 
disaggregated in the experience of nineteenth-century Italian soldiers.
A nation-state in progress: the long road to unification 1814-1858
Although most pre-unif ication Italian states relied on semiprofessional 
dynastic militias and mercenary troops, the postunif ication draft did not 
start from scratch, and its history is inseparably linked to that of the previ-
ous recruitment systems in force on the peninsula.
1 See http://oxforddictionaries.com (accessed 23 March 2011).
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Starting in 1815, roughly 30,000 Italian-speaking subjects from Lombardy 
and Venetia were recruited yearly into the Habsburg army (8.5-10 per cent 
of the peacetime force), and normally served for eight years in Italian gar-
risons.2 In the Duchies of Modena and Parma, the law stated that young 
men were obligated to fulf ill their military service in person. In practice, 
however, the armies were composed primarily of volunteers and substitutes 
– namely, men paid to replace draftees in the service.3
Leopold II’s Tuscany conscription also theoretically involved every male 
subject, but in practice most youngsters were exempted and the limited 
needs of the army were easily fulf illed by volunteers.4 In the Papal States 
one-third of the army consisted of two Swiss mercenary regiments, and 
the rest of the annual contingent (10,000 men in 1816-1831, about 7,500 in 
1852-1859) was raised through volunteerism and reenlisting, even if military 
service had been nominally compulsory and universal since 1822.5 After its 
temporary abolition in the f irst stages of the restoration, the draft worked in 
the continental part of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies too. However, as only 
10-20 per cent of the eligible men from each class were actually recruited, 
the annual contingent was small (8,000 men until 1848, 12,000 between 
1849 and 1858, and 18,000 after 1858) and mostly composed of volunteers, 
since the Bourbons also employed four regiments of Swiss mercenaries 
(altogether 6,000-8,000 men) and the 1834 conscription law excluded a good 
twenty-two exempted categories.6
Therefore, almost all pre-unif ication Italian regimes kept the draft alive 
on paper, but in practice preferred to limit recruitment to a small percentage 
of their populations, mostly chosen from among the classes dangereuses. 
This happened for the same reasons explored by Thomas Hippler in the 
case of France: from the perspective of the restored sovereigns, universal 
conscription still looked like both a dangerous revolutionary heritage and 
a very expensive way to set up their militias.7. Moreover, no Italian state 
was a f irst-rank power, in need of an army large enough to back its foreign 
2 Sondhaus, In the Service of the Emperor.
3 Zannoni and Fiorentino, Le Reali Truppe Parmensi.
4 Giorgetti, Le armi toscane e le occupazioni militari in Toscana.
5 Biagini, “La riorganizzazione dell’esercito pontif icio e gli arruolamenti in Umbria”.
6 Fiorentino and Boeri, L’esercito delle Due Sicilie; Battaglini, L’organizzazione militare del 
Regno delle Dite Sicilie. On the Napoleonic era, see Ilari, Crociani and Boeri, Storia militare del 
regno murattiano. On the Swiss mercenaries, see Maag, Geschichte der Schweizertruppen in 
neapolitanischen Diensten.
7 Hippler, “Conscription in the French Restoration”. 
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policy; Italian states were not equipped to handle even internal troubles, as 
the revolutions in 1820-1821, 1830, and 1848-1849 would clearly demonstrate.
The only country with a real desire to play a major role in the postrevo-
lutionary European balance of power, and to leading the Italian unification 
process, was the Kingdom of Sardinia. Thus, Piedmontese conscription 
history followed a very different pattern to those of the other states. Vittorio 
Emanuele I had abolished conscription immediately after regaining the 
throne in 1814. However, the unexpected outbreak of the War of the Seventh 
Coalition and the subsequent urgent need for men led the king to reintro-
duce a slightly modif ied draft system which mixed the French and the 
Prussian models, and essentially relied upon professional soldiers integrated 
with a very small call-up contingent. This hybrid solution remained in place 
until the 1830s, when Carlo Alberto modif ied it extensively in order to face 
the Habsburgs on the Lombard border with around 100,000 men. Therefore, 
the new system was expected to be a “perfected version of the Prussian 
one” 8 with part of the army composed of volunteers or substitutes and the 
other portion raised through one-year long compulsory service followed by 
periodic training camps in the seven years that followed.9
Although the new system involved no more than 25 per cent of those 
who were technically eligible, and provided, wealthy citizens with several 
ways to escape enlistment, conscription faced serious resistance: volunteers 
were fewer than in the Napoleon era, and many youngsters tried to escape 
enlistment by deserting, simulating disease, self-mutilating, and corrupt-
ing the local civil servants who made the conscription lists. The Savoy 
government, whose “infrastructural development” had not yet enabled it 
to effectively compel citizens to fulf ill their duties,10 had to compromise by 
drastically reducing the annual contingent, but it refused to eliminate the 
draft completely. In this way, Carlo Alberto’s army was weakened – and 
would be defeated by the Habsburg forces in 1848 – but an important goal 
had been achieved: both Piedmont subjects and military authorities had 
already become familiar with conscription.11
8 Pieri, Storia militare del Risorgimento, p. 171.
9 Ales, L’armata sarda e le riforme albertine.
10 I borrow this concept from Weiss, “Infrastructural Power, Economic Transformation, and 
Globalization”. 
11 Pischedda, Esercito e società in Piemonte.
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The Piedmontese-Italian case: some essentials about conscription 
laws and army features before and after unification
When in the 1850s the new minister of war – General Alfonso La Marmora 
– was asked to reorganize the armed forces, the parliamentary debate 
on the military reform was substantive. However, the distance between 
the backers of the “the army of quality” and the supporters of “the army 
of quantity” had been much reduced in comparison to the past. Both the 
majority and the minority agreed on the necessity of considerably enlarging 
the peacetime contingent, both supported the extension of service time at 
least up to three years, and it is signif icant that no one – not even the most 
traditionalist faction – called for the abolition of conscription and for the 
reintroduction of the prerevolutionary all-volunteer army.12 Nearly forty 
years of the draft represented a shared background among the Piedmontese 
ruling class.
La Marmora’s draft system of 1854 adapted its guidelines from the 
French recruitment law of 1818,13 with the aim of correcting the weaknesses 
demonstrated by the previous German-style system in 1848. In theory, the 
Piedmont peacetime army (50,000 men) was mostly composed of career 
soldiers who had started as volunteers. If not enough men volunteered to f ill 
the annual contingent determined by the government (about 9,000-10,000 
men), twenty-year-old male subjects were drafted into a two-tiered system, 
through a lottery. Men who picked “bad numbers” were enlisted into the first 
category and had to serve actively for f ive years. Those who picked “good 
numbers” were enrolled under the second category and received periodic 
basic training over forty to f ifty days, but they were allowed get married 
and entered active service only in times of war.
In practice, 75 per cent of the peacetime army was composed of draftees 
because of the lack of volunteers. Moreover, most conscripts came from 
the poorest classes14 because of the extensive system of familial and reli-
gious exemptions, and because the upper classes could – in practice – buy 
themselves out of their obligations. At least forty-six articles detailed “how 
12 The debate is reconstructed by Pieri, Le forze armate nella età della Destra, and Del Negro, 
“Garibaldi tra esercito regio e nazione armata”.
13 On French conscription laws, see Crépin, Défendre la France. In contrast, Ilari has asserted 
that La Marmora’s model was the Prussian post-1848 system: Ilari, Storia del servizio militare in 
Italia, I, p. 333. On Prussian recruitment practices, see Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army.
14 The contingent recruited in 1860 from the former Piedmontese territories was composed 
mainly of peasants (54 per cent) and herdsmen (in charge of cattle) (16 per cent), while landown-
ers were only 1 per cent. See Torre, Relazione sulle leve eseguite in Italia, pp. 89-91.
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enlisted people can be exonerated from the service”. Realistically, the sons 
of the richest bourgeoisie had two ways of legally escaping enlistment. The 
f irst was substitution (surrogazione) – namely, f inding a substitute who 
would voluntarily complete the service on behalf of the draftee. The second 
was liberation (liberazione/affrancamento) – that is, paying a higher sum 
directly to the state in order to gain exemption, and then letting military 
authorities f ind a substitute.
Substitution could involve either brothers (surrogazione tra fratelli) or 
unrelated people (surrogazione ordinaria), and the requirements for the 
substitute were more or less the same: Italian citizenship, a clean record, 
age eighteen to twenty-six, being physically f it and unmarried or widower 
with no children.15 The most important difference between those two types 
of replacement was that the f irst was free, while the latter cost 700 L. until 
1862, and 1,200 L. thereafter. This difference stemmed from the Piedmont 
government’s acceptance of Hegel’s idea that family – not the individual – 
was the smallest component of society. Therefore, at least in theory, each 
family had to offer the fatherland one of its members.
Liberation was much more expensive. The fee was f ixed each year by a 
royal decree, but it always cost nearly three times substitution – 3,100 L. in 
1861, 3,200 L. in 1863, and 4,200 L. in 1866, as the war against the Habsburgs 
was breaking out. It was a huge sum with respect to the average Italian’s 
income in the 1860s and to the liberation fees paid elsewhere.16 Nevertheless, 
many men were able to buy their freedom before the off icial unif ication, 
and even more so afterwards (see Table 16.1), when Piedmont conscription 
law was extended to include the whole national territory. As the number 
of applications overwhelmed the number of available volunteers by a large 
margin, the government had to reject most applications. Otherwise, in 1864 
nearly 20 per cent of the f irst-category conscripts would have managed to 
legally escape military service. The percentage of liberated draftees was 
even higher after 1866, when a new law allowed conscripts to be liberated 
15 The main difference was that an unrelated substitute should be at least 1.60m tall, whereas 
a brother substitute had no minimum height and also could replace the conscript after his 
enrollment. See Recruitment law n. 1676, 20 March 1854, articles 130-145. All Italian recruitment 
laws are available in Raccolta ufficiale delle leggi e dei decreti del Regno d’Italia, which was 
published annually by Stamperia Reale in Turin.
16 The average annual salary in 1860s Italy was about 300 L. See Rosselli, Mazzini e Bakunin, 
pp. 10-18. Under Napoleon III the exoneration fee amounted to 2,000-2,500 francs (Kovacs, 
“French Military Institutions before the Franco-Prussian War”, p. 222), that is, an average of 
2,430 L., according to the 1866 exchange rate suggested by Frattianni and Spinelli, “Italy in the 
Gold Standard Period”.
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through the payment of fees even in the absence of enough volunteers. To 
complicate things further, the government did not simply tolerate this prac-
tice; it actually encouraged liberation for both economic and disciplinary 
reasons. In fact, the liberation fee supplied the army budget with precious 
extra income (see Table 16.2).17 This income enabled military authorities to 
employ f it and well-trained men by granting an extra monthly sum (sopras-
soldo) to the most disciplined conscripts already serving under the colors 
(affidati anziani) instead of enrolling the substitutes provided by draftees, 
about whom complains of low quality were often voiced by off icers.18
Table 16.1 Liberations in the Italian army in the 1860s
Year Annual contingent Liberations %
1863 45,000 1,030 2.29%
1864 55,000 2,254 4.10%
1865 46,000 1,936 4.21%
1866 51,000 2,592 5.08%
1867* 40,000 1,009 2.52%
1868** - - -
1869*** 40,000 1,500 3.75%
Source: substitution and liberation data were published annually in torre’s reports. see torre, Della 
leva sui giovani nati nell’anno (1864-1870).
Notes:
* From 1867, data include also recruits from venetia.
** conscripts born in 1847 were drafted one year late for economic reasons.
*** therefore 1869 data concern conscripts born in 1847 and 1848.
17 The annual expenses of the Ministry of War are reported in Rochat and Massobrio, Breve 
storia dell’esercito italiano dal 1861 al 1943, pp. 67-68. The role of exemption and replacement 
fees in the army’s balance was a largely shared feature of the European nineteenth-century 
recruitment systems and a major factor in preventing governments from eliminating socially 
based discriminations from the draft. On France, see Schnapper, Le remplacement militaire en 
France; on the Ottoman Empire, see Zürcher, “The Ottoman Conscription System in Theory and 
Practice”.
18 Even La Marmora complained about this drawback of his draft system. See Ilari, Storia del 
servizio militare in Italia, I, p. 345.
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Ministry of War 
expenses %
1863 3,296 252,500 1.3%
1864 9,110.4 256,000 3.6%
1865 6,195.2 192,700 3.2%
1866 8,294.4 510,800 1.6%
1867* 3,228.8 145,000 2.2%
1868** - - -
1869*** 6,889.6 149,500 4.6%
Source: torre, Della leva sui giovani nati nell’anno (1864-1870).
Notes:
* From 1867, data include fees paid by venetian draftees.
** conscripts born in 1847 were drafted one year late for economic reasons.
*** therefore, 1869 data concern conscripts born in 1847 and 1848.
Moreover, substitution and liberation were common institutions in 
nineteenth-century European armies.19 Therefore, La Marmora had to 
face very little resistance when he submitted his reform to the Piedmont 
parliament. More criticisms arose after unif ication, when many off icers 
and civilian observers accused the government of enabling its f ittest and 
most educated citizens to refuse “the holiest duty, serving and defending 
the fatherland”.20 Many pamphlets described liberation as the most evident 
signal of the bourgeoisie’s indifference to the destiny of the state and the na-
tion. Conversely, some off icers stressed that “draft f ills the gaps in the army 
only through the poorest classes”.21 However, these complaints were not 
suff icient to induce the Ministry of War to question one of the cornerstones 
of Piedmontese-Italian military organization.
The continuity in the recruitment law unquestionably contributed to the 
stability of the army structure and social composition in the crucial transi-
tion from the pre-unif ication militias to the national army. Naturally, the 
new Italian army was much larger than the Savoy one (about 200,000 men), 
but the militarization rate was more or less the same: generally speaking, 
19 In the f irst half of the nineteenth century, replacement and/or liberation were in force at 
least in Napoleon III’s France, in post-1840 Belgium, in Saxony, Baden and Württemberg, and 
in the tsarist, Ottoman and Habsburg Empires, as well as in most Italian pre-unif ication states.
20 Errani, Re e patria, p. 47.
21 Miaglia, Sull’ordinamento delle forze militari del Regno d’Italia, p. 211. See also Marselli, Gli 
avvenimenti del 1870, and Monti, Osservazioni sulla legge 7 luglio 1866.
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it was slightly lower (one recruit out of every three twenty-year-old men), 
but it was slightly higher (one out of f ive) if we consider men enlisted in 
the f irst category only.22 The army’s enlargement had no effect upon its 
sociological composition: most recruits still were peasants and shepherds, 
whereas landowners, students, doctors, and lawyers together composed 
5.5 per cent of the contingent raised between 1863 and 1869 (see Table 16.3).
Table 16.3 Italian draftees’ professions (1863-1869)
Profession Number of 
draftees
%
peasants / shepherds 282,471 56.1%





students / lawyers / civil servants 14,938 3.0%
Joiners 14,805 2.9%








veterinarians / farriers 1,141 0.2%
doctors 1,062 0.2%
Total 503,453 100.0%
Source: the data concerning the professional status of the 1860s recuits are synthetically reported 
in torre, Della leva sui giovani nati nell’anno 1870, pp. 82-83.
As Bruce Porter has pointed out, the outcome of wars always affects military 
systems, of both winners and losers.23 Therefore, it is not surprising that 
the 1866 defeat represented the f irst important turning point in Italian 
22 In 1861, there were about 25 million Italians, more or less f ive times the number of the 
subjects of the King of Sardinia in 1859: Ilari, Storia del servizio militare in Italia, I, p. 368.
23 Porter, War and the Rise of the State.
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conscription history. The disappointing performance on the battlef ield 
along with the evident limits of mass nationalization led several observers 
to criticize the entire military organization.24 Most military experts claimed 
that the Prussians’ crushing victory over the Habsburg forces (1866) had 
shown the superiority of the “army of quantity” over the out-of-date French-
style semiprofessional army. On the other hand, civilian critics stressed 
that La Marmora’s draft had not signif icantly contributed to the creation 
of a solid Italian national identity.
While few dared to defend the status quo publicly, the debate did not 
rapidly lead to a new arrangement. This was due to the clash between the 
two major schools of thought and the challenges the government still had 
to face in order to complete the unif ication process and bring the whole 
territory under the control of the central power. It is no coincidence that 
parliamentary discussion about conscription reform started in December 
1870,25 after Rome had fallen and the Prussian victory at Sedan had swept 
away all remaining doubts about the German model’s eff iciency. Actually, 
the proposal made by the new minister of war, General Cesare Ricotti 
Magnani,26 was largely inspired by the German draft system, not only from 
a technical viewpoint but, more generally, also regarding the tasks that the 
army was expected to perform.27 At the international level, after French 
power had been scaled down, Italy wished to be recognized as a middle- to 
high-ranking power; therefore, the army was required to back this new for-
eign policy objective, mostly through an increase in the annual contingent.
On the internal level, once “Italy was made”, the army had to cooper-
ate more actively with the other nationalization agencies in “making the 
Italians” and, simultaneously, in keeping the political claims of the lower 
classes under control.
Therefore, it is not surprising that Ricotti’s reform (which actually 
consisted of several acts promulgated between 1870 and 1875) not only 
increased the number of men recruited yearly in the f irst category (from 
24 See for example Villari, “Di chi è la colpa?” The concrete result of the army’s nationalization 
effort is still under question. Among those who tend to underestimate it, see Del Negro, “L’esercito 
italiano da Napoleone a Vittorio Veneto”. More optimistic is Mondini, “La nazione di Marte”.
25 For a detailed reconstruction of the parliamentary debate, see Ilari, Storia del servizio 
militare in Italia, II, pp. 115-128.
26 On Ricotti as minister of war, see Berger Waldenegg, “Il ministro della guerra Cesare Ricotti 
e la politica delle riforme militari”, and Labanca, Il generale Cesare Ricotti e la politica militare 
italiana.
27 The same attitude toward the German system characterized the 1872 French recruitment 
law. On the general awe of the German system on the part of the French military establishment, 
see Digeon, La crise allemande de la pensée française.
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40,000 to 65,000) and reduced to three years (four for cavalry) of active 
service time,28 but also radically changed the concept of military service 
itself: serving evolved from a general responsibility, to be fulf illed only 
by those who were enrolled,29 to a “personal duty” everyone had to fulf ill 
themselves.30 The percentage of men recruited in the f irst category rose 
from 17 per cent (1870) to 25 per cent in the early 1870s and those who were 
enlisted in the second category were forced to train periodically anyway, 
thanks to “good numbers”.31
Additionally, if the army was to be “the true school of the Nation” as the 
new discipline regulations stated,32 keeping the sons of the elite outside of it 
no longer made sense, especially after the Paris Commune had shown how 
dangerous it was for the social order to rely on an army almost exclusively 
composed of proletarians. Therefore, Ricotti abolished both replacement 
and liberation. This decision generated f ierce protest. Both bourgeois and 
Catholic forces launched powerful and harsh media campaigns against 
Ricotti. Additionally, many old-fashioned off icers commented ironically 
on the pedagogical task assigned to the military institution and strongly 
stressed the negative influence of enlisting undisciplined seminarians and 
bourgeoisie on the discipline of the rank and f ile.33
However, the Italian conscription system was still far from egalitarian, 
despite the fears of the upper classes and off icers. As in France, substitution 
and liberation were replaced by an adapted version of the German “one-year 
volunteerism”, which allowed students and some other eligible parties to 
pay a sum (about 1,500 L.) to avoid some of the most unpleasant aspects of 
military service. In fact, one-year volunteers could delay their enrollment 
until they were twenty-seven, serve for a single year in the regiment of 
their choice, and then be promoted to off icer after discharge by passing 
an easy exam.
Off icially, one-year volunteerism had two major goals: f irst, it was 
thought to be the best way to involve the bourgeoisie without angering 
28 Nominally, service time was three years. Nevertheless, the minister was allowed to discharge 
old classes in advance, and he usually discharged them after thirty to thirty-two months of 
active service.
29 Recruitment law n. 1676, 20 March 1854, article 4.
30 Law n. 2532, 7 June 1875, article 1.
31 Ilari, Storia del servizio militare in Italia, II, p. 213.
32 Ministero della Guerra, Regolamento di disciplina militare del 1. dicembre, article 8, § 33. The 
regulations represented another key issue of the reform. See Rovinello, “‘Giuro di essere fedele 
al Re ed a’ suoi reali successori’”.
33 La Marmora, Quattro discorsi del generale Alfonso La Marmora.
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them, and thus ensure the army of a suff icient number of skilled auxiliary 
off icers. Secondly, the fees of one-year volunteers were supposed to replace 
the liberation and substitution fees in the Ministry of War’s depleted coffers. 
Both of these attempts failed dismally. The high fees and other factors 
discouraged many youngsters from applying for one-year volunteerism. 
Consequently, from 1875 onwards, the number of one-year volunteers was 
70-80 per cent lower than the government had predicted (about 1,000-1,500 
a year, instead of 5,000) and the average income for the state dropped from 
about 7,000,000 L. to about 1,750,000 L.34 Simultaneously, one-year volunteer-
ism did not make military life any more appealing; on the contrary, it rapidly 
became a way for the richest classes to escape service by exploiting this 
“heritage of an ancient and hateful privilege”.35
The Italian bourgeoisie was very different from the German one.36 Most 
well-educated young men from good families aspired to join the liberal 
professions and had little interest in the military as a career. As General 
Emilio De Bono wrote, “It is well known that to become a one-year volunteer 
the f irst requirement was not to wish to be a soldier […] and three months 
spent in regiments certainly did not make them perfect soldiers or even 
familiar with the army […] also because they were considered as useless 
and transitory pleonasms.” 37
Although the Italian universal and disinterested duty to serve the father-
land was still largely discriminatory, the 1870-1875 reform was a milestone 
in the evolution of Italian conscription. Actually, Ricotti’s draft system 
was repeatedly modif ied up until the eve of World War I according to the 
technical assumptions and political frameworks current at any time.38 
Nevertheless, these reforms disputed none of the founding principles, such 
as one-year volunteerism, nor the basic assumption that every citizen should 
personally contribute to the destiny of his own country.39
34 Del Negro, “La leva militare in Italia dall’Unità alla Grande Guerra”, in particular pp. 193-195.
35 Ministero della Guerra, Quarta relazione della Commissione d’inchiesta per l’esercito, p. 95. 
Moreover, each one-year volunteer provided exemption from service to all his younger brothers. 
On one-year volunteerism, see Del Negro, “La leva militare in Italia”, pp. 192-195.
36 A classical comparative analysis of European bourgeoisies is Kocka, Bürgertum im 19. 
Jahrhundert.
37 De Bono, Nell’esercito nostro prima della guerra, p. 48.
38 For a synthetic reconstruction of post-1870 Italian political framework, see Seton-Watson, 
Italy from Liberalism to Fascism. 
39 A more detailed picture of the late nineteenth-century Italian recruitment systems is offered 
by Ilari, Storia del servizio militare in Italia, II, pp. 128-194. On the f irst decade of the twentieth 
century, see also Botti, “Note sul pensiero militare italiano da f ine secolo XIX all’inizio della 
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A difficult transition: from the pre-unification militias to the 
Italian army (1859-1863)
In order to better understand the advent of the Piedmont draft system as 
the forerunner of the f irst Italian conscription law, it is necessary to under-
stand the political and military framework in which the transition from 
the dynastic Piedmont militia to the Italian national army occurred. The 
Italian unif ication process was a quite lengthy one. It started in 1848, with 
the unsuccessful war against the Habsburg Empire, and ended only after 
World War I with the annexation of Trento and Trieste.40 However, the route 
to unif ication was composed primarily of sudden events with unexpected 
outcomes, such as the conquest of Lombardy, the Mezzogiorno, and the 
ex-Papal territories (apart from Lazio) between 1859 and 1861. Therefore, 
after its formal unif ication in 1861, the newborn Italian state was still not 
only a jigsaw puzzle which the government had to assemble as quickly as 
possible, but also a country still at war against both internal and external 
enemies.
After the end of the Second War of Independence (November 1859), the 
government considered France to be the most dangerous external enemy 
they faced, and fear of an invasion from the west deeply affected Italian 
military policy in the early 1860s.41 However, the internal threats would 
prove to be much more compelling. In the south, the new Italian army had to 
continue the long war against the Brigantaggio. Moreover, the unexpected 
conquest of the southern regions and the central role played by Garibaldi’s 
all-voluntary Southern Army in defeating the Bourbons became deeply 
problematic when the political expectations of those people had gone 
unmet. Fulf illing the liberal-monarchic-sponsored plan under the Savoy 
f lags, rather than marching on Rome, had disappointed the remaining 
members of the Risorgimento movement and further solidified the divisions 
between the volunteers and the regular army. The liberal establishment 
considered republicans such Mazzini and Garibaldi to be internal enemies 
prima guerra mondiale. Parte I”, and “Note sul pensiero militare italiano da f ine secolo XIX 
all’inizio della prima guerra mondiale. Parte II”.
40 The most important steps in the Italian unif ication process were: the Third War of Independ-
ence which obtained Venetia (1866), the gunf ights against Garibaldi’s followers in Aspromonte 
(1862) and Mentana (1867), the Brigandage in the southern regions (1861-1865), the revolt in 
Palermo (1866), and the conquest of Rome (1870). An overview of the Italian Risorgimento is 
provided by Riall, The Italian Risorgimento.
41 The influence of the French threat on the territorial distribution of the Italian army in the 
1860s has been analyzed by Bertinara, “Lo stanziamento dell’esercito italiano in età liberale”.
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because of their critical attitude toward the new monarchic state, and the 
Piedmont General Staff was coming to seriously mistrust the spontane-
ous “militarization from below” 42 that they considered to be the military 
expression of antimonarchy sentiment.
The government had to reconcile a compelling need to defuse the 
republican and anti-unif ication threats with the military necessity to 
rapidly integrate different forces into a larger national army, able to face the 
challenges posed by any kind of enemy. This double necessity led the liberal 
establishment to opt for a short-term solution, to postpone the systematic 
and effective reformation of the body of the military, and to deal with the 
problems one at a time through ad hoc measures.
According to this approach, the 1854 conscription law was extended 
tout court to Lombardy in June 1859. Shortly afterwards, a provisional draft 
system, modeled on the one previously established in Piedmont, was set up 
in Tuscany. In both Lombardy and Tuscany, conscripts easily made up the 
required numbers. Drafting southern youngsters was much more diff icult 
and politically unprofitable; therefore, only 2,311 (out of 3,600) ex-Bourbon 
commissioned off icers (COs) were allowed to join the national army and 
most rank-and-file soldiers were automatically discharged. Only the young-
est ones (those who were born between 1837 and 1840) were reenrolled, 
according to local conscription law because they were considered by the 
Piedmont establishment to be the only part of the former Bourbon army 
not yet “corrupted by the education they had received”.43 In other words, 
they were young enough to embrace the Savoy cause. However, this proved 
to be an illusion, since most of the ex-Bourbon soldiers failed to report to 
the corps when called up, and the military authorities had to use extreme 
measures even to enlist fewer than 48,000 men over approximately three 
years. This was certainly “not a satisfying result”.44
Regardless, the most delicate question was how to handle the approxi-
mately 50,000 volunteers enlisted in the Southern Army. In the fall of 1860, 
the minister of war, General Manfredo Fanti, had complained about the 
volunteers’ scanty military experience, but the issue of maintaining the 
integrity of the army clearly overwhelmed this military concern. In actual-
ity, this was a purely political matter, since the Piedmont establishment 
was not concerned by the volunteers’ lack of technical know-how and 
experience. Rather, they were worried about the volunteers’ republican 
42 Del Negro, “Introduzione: militarizzazione e nazionalizzazione nella storia d’Italia”.
43 Guarnieri, Otto anni di storia militare in Italia, p. 451.
44 Mazzetti, “Dagli eserciti pre-unitari all’esercito italiano”, p. 574.
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sympathies and their blind obedience to their charismatic leader – General 
Garibaldi – instead of to royal authority.
From the liberal-monarchic point of view, Garibaldi’s explicit acceptance 
of the king’s leadership and the f ierce Italian nationalism of the Southern 
Army’s soldiers clearly did not suff ice. Moreover, it was quite complicated 
to integrate people with such different loyalties, expressed by very different 
battle cries, into the same army. While Garibaldi’s volunteers went to battle 
shouting “Viva l’Italia!” (“Long live Italy!”), thus making no reference at all to 
the monarchy, the traditional battle cry of the Piedmont army was “Avanti 
Savoia!” (“Let’s go, Savoy!”). Even more importantly, before receiving a gun, 
soldiers had to swear “loyalty to the King and His Royal Successors”.45
It should be noted that the moderate government largely misunderstood 
the complex nature of volunteerism, especially regarding the motives of the 
southern volunteers. In actuality, the liberals failed to fully appreciate how 
differently the many components of the voluntary forces felt about the new 
state; rather, they mechanically linked any kind of military volunteerism 
with republicanism. As the framework on which the newborn kingdom was 
built was very fragile, arming thousands of potential enemies of the crown 
was a risk no government wanted to take.
Therefore, it was no surprise that, as early as November of 1860, Minister 
Fanti formally disbanded the Southern Army, vastly underestimating the 
ramif ications that this decision would have upon the Brigantaggio’s rising 
in the Mezzogiorno and the attitudes of former volunteers toward the new 
state.46 These people were severely disappointed: they had risked their lives 
in the f ight for national unif ication, but now were paradoxically discrimi-
nated against. Meanwhile, the state they had fought to build welcomed into 
its armed forces men who had fought against it, and then had been accepted 
as “brothers in arms” simply by changing their uniform and swearing the 
oath.
45 Ministero della Guerra, Regolamento di disciplina militare e di istruzione e servizio interno 
per la fanteria, article 1.
46 In the 1860s the southern provinces of the Italian new state were the theatre of a diffuse 
(albeit mostly uncoordinated) antistate resistance resulting from a mix of political, social, 
economic, and purely criminal motives. Termed the Brigantaggio already by contemporaries, 
it resulted in a veritable though low-intensity civil war, in which the new state prevailed also 
thanks to “exceptional” laws and other repressive measures. On this, see Hobsbawm, Primitive 
Rebels, and the more recent work of Lupo, “Il grande brigantaggio”.
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Moreover, many were forced to resign from their posts after the imposi-
tion of humiliating enrollment conditions; furthermore, many applications 
to the ministerial commission for reenlistment were summarily rejected.47
In sum, the liberal establishment preferred the discipline and political 
indifference of the regular soldiers from the former armies (especially 
those from northern regions) to the patriotic enthusiasm of the genuine 
volunteers. Evidently, the key concepts of this selection were political reli-
ability and “Piedmontness”, not patriotism and a sense of belonging to the 
national community. These guidelines led Garibaldi himself to give a very 
polemical speech in the parliament and further increased the strong ten-
sions between liberals and republicans outside the parliament. This, in turn, 
prevented a constructive debate on the draft, and the dichotomy between 
the standing army/nation in arms was rapidly transformed into one of the 
postunif ication rhetorical battlef ields where the different factions of the 
Risorgimento fought to achieve their conflicting versions of the Italian state.
In fact, Italian liberals and republicans did not just propose two conscrip-
tion models, as the Conservatives and the political Left and Right had done 
in revolutionary and postrevolutionary France or in Prussia.48 Since the 
institutional outcome of the 1859-1860 military victories was clearly provi-
sional and there was a serious possibility that the institutional framework of 
the new state would soon be modif ied, both parties backed a specif ic kind 
of army, linking it (albeit implicitly) to a particular institutional framework. 
Moderates wished to incorporate hand-picked members of Garibaldi’s army 
into the small Savoy standing army and disband every all-volunteer force, 
in order to strengthen the monarchy and to decisively defeat its antagonists; 
on the other side, republicans were not particularly interested in building 
up the newborn Italian army, since they considered any standing army to 
be an obstacle to the creation of a nonmonarchic state. Therefore, the only 
common factor between the various republican suggestions was replacing 
the regular army with an all-volunteer force.49
47 Only a few were discharged after being granted an extra allowance. See Molfese, “Lo 
scioglimento dell’esercito meridionale garibaldino”.
48 On the French case, see Crépin, La conscription en débat. On the Prussian case, see Militär-
geschichtliches Forschungsamt, Militärische Reformer in Deutschland im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert.
49 A brief synthesis of the alternative military models proposed by the Italian political Left 
during the nineteenth century is in Ilari, Storia del servizio militare in Italia, I, ch. 7. On the 
National Guard, see Francia, Le baionette intelligenti. On the shooting societies as a part of the 
nation-in-arms project, see Pécout, “Les sociétés de tir dans l’Italie unif iée de la seconde moitié 
du XIXe siècle”.
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Military historians have stressed the decisive role of this quarrel in 
the formation of the postunif ication draft system,50 but there was no real 
debate on this topic. Rather, this was a confrontation between two (or more) 
incompatible concepts of the nation-state and of the role played by a specific 
model of military draft. Neither really wanted to concern themselves with 
the features of the conscription system to be adopted after unif ication, and 
nor did they want to compromise on this crucial matter. It is most likely 
that a compromise could have be found regarding the particular features 
of the conscription system, but it was not possible to reconcile the opposing 
goals that moderates and republicans wanted to achieve through the draft.
Despite the worldwide fame of some of their opponents,51 the liberals 
won the f ight on the main substantive issues. The 1859-1861 extension of 
the Piedmont draft law to other northern regions and the strict selection 
of the volunteers and former Bourbon soldiers to be allowed to serve in the 
new Italian army provide ample evidence for such an assertion.
Drafting a nation, making a state: conscription in the 1860s
The polemics on the nation-in-arms did not signif icantly influence Italian 
military policy in the first years after unification, or in the second half of the 
1860s. After facing the 1859-1861 challenges by extending the Piedmont draft 
to temporarily include the annexed territories, the government continued 
to follow a conscription policy based on La Marmora’s system until the early 
1870s. A new recruitment act was issued in 1862. Nominally, this was the first 
Italian conscription act. However, it drew substantially upon the 1854 act, 
and it did not introduce significant innovations or adapt the draft system to 
accommodate the traditions and the needs of the recently annexed lands.52 
This choice cannot be explained just by stressing the incapability of the 
ruling class to shape a new draft system, nor can it be analyzed simply in 
terms of political opportunity or of an increase in the supply of military 
manpower.
If the 1859-1861 measures had successfully resolved some of the most 
urgent problems stemming from the sudden unif ication, conf irming La 
50 See for example Mola’s, Del Negro’s, and La Salvia’s essays in Mazzonis, Garibaldi condottiero. 
For a long-run analysis of the Italian route to the nation-in-arms, see Conti, “Il mito della ‘nazione 
armata’”.
51 On Garibaldi’s image as an international myth, see Riall, Garibaldi. On Mazzini, see Smith, 
Mazzini.
52 Ilari, Storia del servizio militare in Italia, I, p. 367.
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Marmora’s draft was above all the second phase of the broader, coherent, 
and mostly successful strategy which enabled the Italian state to defeat 
all remaining threats to its own existence. In fact, some aspects of the 
pre-unif ication conscription system perfectly matched both political and 
technical needs of the new state. In 1863-1865, Italy was still experiencing 
a true civil war in the south and a centralized modern bureaucracy had 
yet to be created. In that context, the draft had two main goals. From a 
military point of view, conscription had to provide the regular army with 
the manpower it needed to sustain the military effort. From a political 
point of view, it was an important way of imposing the state’s presence in 
peripheral provinces53 and acquainting the new subjects with their status 
as Italian citizens.54
The Ministry of War tried to achieve the first of these goals by conforming 
the new national army’s recruitment system to the best one available. As 
mentioned above, the Piedmont army was largely based on the French 
model, and the Second Empire’s army was still the most feared war machine 
in early 1860s Europe.55 Therefore, maintaining La Marmora’s draft did 
not mean the adoption of an outdated military model, nor was it a merely 
conservative policy; on the contrary, following the most imitated European 
example of the time seemed to be both the most obvious and the most 
effective option.56
Politically speaking, La Marmora’s law seemed to be the best answer to 
the urgent demand for “statehood”. In fact, Piedmont draft’s mechanisms 
were already familiar to at least a part of the national civilian and military 
bureaucracy, and they had been already tested – successfully – in some other 
regions, such as Lombardy and Tuscany. Quite paradoxically, imposing the 
53 Although the Italian territory was much smaller and its populations were ethnically 
homogeneous, Italy’s attempt in the 1860s to effectively control its territory through the draft 
shared some features with the attempts made by some multiethnic states such as the Russian 
and the Ottoman Empires. On Nicholas I’s Russia, see Kagan, The Military Reforms of Nicholas 
I. On the Ottoman Empire, see Beşikçi’s contribution in this volume and the bibliography.
54 Almost all books for conscripts contained basic info about civics. See Sacchi, Primo libro di 
lettura ad uso del soldato.
55 Actually, Napoleon III had started doubting the eff iciency of the French army already in 
the 1850s. See Kovacs, “French Military Institutions before the Franco-Prussian War”. For a 
contemporary Italian judgement stressing the French army’s superiority shortly before the 
Franco-Prussian War, see Calà Ulloa, Guerra tra Prussia e Francia.. 
56 It is important to bear in mind that the competition among the European powers and 
the traditionally supranational nature of military science contributed to the standardization 
not only of warfare, but also of many aspects of the peacetime military. On this, see Posen, 
“Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power”.
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Piedmont draft system upon the southern part of the country helped the 
former Bourbon and Papal civil servants, too. Since, realistically, no draft 
was in operation in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies and Papal States, most of 
the southern bureaucrats had almost no expertise in enlistment operations. 
Consequently, they had to learn how to use the basic instruments of the 
so-called révolution identitaire57 for this new task. Therefore, the continuity 
in legal framework was a precious asset, since it enabled the Piedmont civil 
servants and off icers to better assist their inexperienced colleagues.
In other words, opting for the extension of La Marmora’s law, instead of 
creating a conscription system ex novo, enabled the Italian authorities to 
rapidly establish a clear rule regarding one of the most constraining and 
unpopular obligations that the new state imposed on its citizens. Naturally, 
given the fragile administrative framework, national conscription could 
not immediately be put into effect, and the f irst call-up actually happened 
in 1864. Nevertheless, establishing a shared legal framework was a neces-
sary prerequisite and the f irst goal to achieve. Enlisting Italian subjects 
according to the pre-unif ication rule played a decisive role in this effort. 
Moreover, exporting the Piedmont draft model was a viable continuation of 
the strategy adopted by early Italian governments in several other critical 
f ields.
Actually, replacing the previous laws and institutions with the Piedmont 
ones was the main way in which the liberal establishment was able to build 
the new national state.58 Furthermore, if forcibly maintaining the previous 
regulations was seen by the national governments to be the best solution 
to quickly standardizing the legal framework within which Italian citizens 
lived, imposing La Marmora’s draft system all over the country was even 
more profitable, since it successfully dealt with three other very sensitive 
questions: defending the upper classes’ privileges with respect to military 
duty, funding the enlargement of the armed forces while respecting the 
postwar budgetary constraints, and keeping most key positions in the 
army under the control of the Piemontese military establishment even 
57 On the “culture of identif ication”, see Noiriel, La tyrannie du national. For an example of 
the manuals addressed to draft councils to enable inexperienced mayors to execute the draft 
correctly, see Bernoni, Manuale del Consiglio di leva.
58 The Piedmont penal code was slightly changed in 1865 and kept in force in all national courts 
(apart from the Tuscan ones) until 1889; the Piedmont school system was imposed on all Italian 
regions and the f iscal system as well. On Italian state-building in the 1860s, see Romanelli, 
L’Italia liberale.
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though one-third of the potential draftees hailed from the Mezzogiorno.59 
La Marmora’s draft system met all of those requirements.
First, the 1854 act detailed an extensive system of exemptions and al-
lowed the richest draftees to buy themselves out of the obligation by hiring 
a substitute or paying a fee. Secondly, a small semiprofessional army was 
relatively cheap, as it was partially f inanced by liberation and replacement 
taxes. Thirdly, the long term of service enabled military authorities to “Pied-
montize” southern recruits. Obviously, there was no ethnic dimension to 
Italian conscription,60 nor was the preference for Piedmont soldiers a purely 
punitive measure aimed at the defeated former enemies. In the eyes of 
the liberal establishment, “Piedmontness” was not an ascribed, culturally 
based category, but rather a synonym for “political reliability”. What is more, 
many high-ranking off icers of the former Neapolitan and Tuscan armies 
had already gained this qualif ication by demonstrating their unconditional 
loyalty to the Savoy cause on the battlef ields in 1820-1821 and 1848.61 After 
the extension of the draft to non-Piedmontese people, even simple soldiers 
had to “learn to be Piedmontese”, not in cultural but in political terms. 
Although several ex-Bourbon soldiers perceived this process as in reality a 
forced assimilation,62 “Piedmontizing” recruits actually consisted of trans-
forming potentially untrustworthy provincial populations into disciplined 
and loyal subjects. The government was confident that this requirement 
would be met once the recruits had served f ive years under the command 
of mostly ex-Savoy COs.
This kind of long-term service was one of the reasons national conscrip-
tion had to face very strong resistance in early 1860s Italy, mostly in those 
areas where the draft had previously involved just a few youngsters.63 Even 
59 Italian census data from 1861 to the present are available at http://www.istat.it (accessed 
15 April 2011).
60 Ethnically based draft policies were adopted in some nineteenth-century multiethnic 
states. On Russia, see Keep, Soldiers of the Tsar. On the Ottoman Empire, see Aksan, “Ottoman 
Recruitment in the Late Eighteenth Century”. See also Beşikçi’s contribution in this volume.
61 During the Crimean War, three of the f ive Savoy brigades were led by non-Piedmont off icers 
(Manfredo Fanti, Enrico Cialdini, and Rodolfo Gabrielli di Montevecchio) who had previously 
joined the Piedmont army. See Mazzetti, “Dagli eserciti pre-unitari all’esercito italiano”, p. 564.
62 An example of ex-Bourbon soldiers’ negative perception of their integration into the new 
national army is Fondazione Archivio Diaristico Nazionale [henceforth, ADN], Michele Musella, 
Nacqui nella notte de’ 20 Febbraio, MP/96. Rochat and Massobrio also underlined that “The new 
unitary army’s ‘Piedmontization’ was carried out in too rigid a way, and it caused resentments, 
misinterpretations, and crises”. Rochat and Massobrio, Breve storia dell’esercito italiano dal 1861 
al 1943, p. 23.
63 Del Negro, “La leva militare in Italia”, pp. 183-187.
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if local communities often helped their own deserters by hiding and feeding 
them, desertion and reluctance were generally individual, spontaneous, and 
apolitical phenomena both in the Mezzogiorno and in the northern regions. 
In other words, draft-dodging did not always stem from indifference to the 
new nation-state, nor did it necessarily express the rejection of military 
service itself.
As military court sentences conf irmed, many draft-evaders artlessly 
ignored what kind of duties the draft implied and failed to report for military 
service in good faith: some because they had emigrated for seasonal work, 
others because they had misunderstood the enlistment procedure, and still 
others even because in the countryside “These men […] lived in a world in 
which the passage of time escaped their grasp” 64 and basically they did not 
know that they were twenty years old!
Nevertheless, many other youngsters consciously escaped the draft. 
Some of them were scared of such an unknown experience; some others 
had been told about hard military life by ex-draftees;65 most draftees did not 
want to leave their home villages, not only because the village community 
was the only one to which they felt they belonged,66 but also because their 
f ive-year-long absence deprived their families of a much-needed source of 
labor and income.67
If military service was a long, unpleasant parenthesis in the lives of 
most Italian conscripts, some youngsters approached the experience in a 
more positive way. Cultural and economic factors helped those men make 
sense of military service. The draft’s symbolic meaning as a rite of passage 
to adulthood played a decisive role, since most young men wished to be 
declared f it for the army as a public certif ication of their masculinity.68 
64 Bloch, Feudal Society, I, p. 73.
65 Like Corselli, Letture educative compilate pei soldati del 57 reggimento fanteria, several other 
books for recruits stressed the negative influence of fellow villagers’ and ex-soldiers’ stories 
about military service on conscripts’ approach to service and tried to balance them through 
rosy descriptions of military life, such as De Amicis, La vita militare. On the opposition between 
antimilitarist and militarist literature, see Del Negro, “De Amicis Versus Tarchetti”. 
66 On the relationship between village community and national community in Italy, see 
Cavazza, Piccole patrie. The Italian situation can be compared to the German one, analyzed by 
Conf ino, The National as Local Metaphor. 
67 The attitude of Italian youngsters toward the draft has been little studied. Some information 
is provided by literature. See, for example, Verga, Cavalleria rusticana. On the reasons for 
reluctance in nineteenth-century Italy, see Oliva, Esercito, paese e movimento operaio. Italians’ 
refusal to enlist shared many features with desertion in other countries, such as France and 
Egypt. See Rousseau, Service militaire au XIXe siècle, and Zürcher, “The Nation and Its Deserters”.
68 Oliva, “La coscrizione obbligatoria nell’Italia unita tra consenso e rif iuto”. This seems to be 
another aspect of conscription that enables international comparison, since such an ambiguous 
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Therefore, Italian men shared the ambiguous attitude toward enlistment – a 
mix of fear, resignation, and curiosity – of many other rural communities 
all over Europe. Economically speaking, enrollment could even represent 
a profitable employment opportunity.
As the government pointed out frequently, the goal of substitution and 
liberation was not just to allow the sons of the richest classes to pay for their 
liberation, but also to employ people who would otherwise be considered 
unproductive and socially dangerous. Several European governments justi-
f ied their socially discriminatory systems by paternalistically presenting 
the exemptions as the prerequisite for employing lower classes in the 
military.69 Also, in Italy – according to the liberal establishment – long-term 
service and replacement had to be considered two sides of the same coin, 
since both acted in the “general interest” of a society in which each class 
had to fulf ill its own role.
On the one hand, replacement strengthened the social equilibrium, since 
it prevented military obligations from damaging the careers of members 
of the future ruling class. As La Marmora pointed out, f ive years in the 
barracks “would force with excessive strictness [the draftees] to renounce, 
very often forever, liberal careers and professions, suffering a destiny much 
unluckier than that of other classes of citizens who are not affected by 
the military service in their arts or jobs”.70 On the other hand, although 
liberation was perceived to be a hateful privilege by most of the lower-
middle-class conscripts, the supplementary income from the liberation 
fees was redirected to the reenrollment fund, thereby perpetuating the 
cycle of increased employment and decreased crime and social unrest. 
Consequently, as the army would not have had enough money to employ 
volunteers without the liberation fees, it is probable that liberation was 
also seen by unemployed young men as the major means by which the 
state could provide them with a military employment opportunity. In the 
nineteenth-century Italian labor market, voluntary enlistment and even 
conscription could also be (or become) a professional choice.
attitude is part of the picture in almost any nineteenth-century European country. On France, 
see Bozon, Les conscrits, and Hopkin, Soldier and Peasant in French Popular Culture. On Germany, 
see Frevert, A Nation in Barracks, and Pröve, Militär, Staat und Gesellschaft im 19. Jahrhundert.
69 On France, see Hippler’s contribution in this volume.
70 La Marmora’s talk is quoted by Massobrio, Bianco, rosso e grigioverde, p. 42.
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“Conscripts by choice”: substitutes, volunteers, and reenlisted 
soldiers in the 1860s
Despite the double role of replacement as the means permitting the so-
called “bourgeois reluctance”71 and as an employment agency, most studies 
have focused on the former aspect of the system of exemptions, whereas 
the latter has been largely neglected. This section deals with this question 
by briefly analyzing those who escaped the draft, their substitutes, and the 
reasons some youngsters preferred becoming soldiers to doing other jobs, 
as long as (re)enlistment in nineteenth-century Italy could be considered 
the outcome of a free choice.
If we look substitutions by unrelated people,72 one fact is particularly 
noticeable: draftees and their substitutes did not just share the same resi-
dential area, but also belonged to socially divided networks located in the 
same territory. In most cases, it is actually impossible to describe precisely 
what kind of relationship linked those people, and nor can we quantify how 
many conscripts knew their substitutes personally. Nevertheless, patronage 
relationships were sometimes evident, since the surrogates had worked for 
the conscript’s family before enlisting on his behalf. Therefore, replacing 
could even be considered as the continuation of that work relationship, and 
it remained, substantially, a family affair, at least according to the wider 
Latin meaning of the word “family”.
Sometimes, the conscript-substitute relationship was not so obvious. 
However, the overlapping of everyday life-space and a different social status 
suggests a previous asymmetrical relationship, which made substitution 
quite similar to the old regime’s recruitment practices: the state restricted 
itself to ratifying a private contract between the soldier (now the substitute), 
who was led to accept by his socio-economic subordinate status, and his 
“proprietor” (the substituted), whose exemption from serving personally 
roughly renewed the hierarchical superiority of ancient local lords with 
respect to their own peasants. Several memoirs and testimonies justify 
voluntary enlistment as a substitute by resignedly stressing the impossibil-
ity of denying a “favor” to a local notable.
71 Del Negro, “La leva militare in Italia”, p. 175.
72 If analyzed in terms of labor relations, brother and unrelated-person replacement cannot be 
confused, since they took place within quite different legal frameworks. Moreover, the agency 
of men involved in brother substitutions was probably much more limited, since the voluntary 
enrollment of one member instead of another could be part of a family strategy to minimize 
the damage the draft did to the ménage familial. 
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In other cases, there was no direct link between the draftee and the 
substitute, and a broker paired the interests of the elite with the urgent 
needs of jobless youngsters. Theoretically speaking, John Lynn described 
a “conscription army” 73 as a kind of military organization in which labor 
relations are strictly limited to the volunteers and the public authorities. 
Nevertheless, in practice very often the broker’s action deeply affected the 
equilibrium between supply of and demand for manpower by indirectly 
helping the army employ involuntary instead of voluntary labor. The broker 
also had an impact on the relationship between these people and central 
power, as he had to speak positively of military careers and even provide 
potential substitutes with some essential cultural and behavioral attributes 
in order to make serving the state as appealing as possible and convince 
them to opt for a career that involved killing and risking death on the 
battlef ield in the Mezzogiorno or elsewhere. In other words, brokers acted 
as middlemen in two ways. On the one hand, they connected two socially 
different worlds; on the other, they acted as a true cultural mediator both 
between the local culture and the national one, and between the military 
set of values and the civilian one.
When brokers had to overcome resistance, they did not hesitate to use 
extreme measures to carry out their business: threats, blackmail, and cor-
ruption were common practices, at least according to penal court papers. 
Actually, moral suasion was probably the most commonly used method of 
leaning on potential surrogates, but it was informal and has left very few 
documentary traces. Therefore, it is diff icult to state when substituting 
was a substantially free choice and when it mostly was the outcome of 
external pressure.
However, hiring a substitute was not very diff icult, especially in the f irst 
postunif ication years. Annual substitution data suggest a declining trend, 
but confirmed that substitution remained a fairly common practice until the 
early 1870s: in 1863, the Ministry of War allowed 1,654 ordinary substitutions 
(surrogazione ordinaria) and 394 substitutions between brothers; in 1864-
1865, 428 substitutes were enlisted (188 unrelated people and 240 conscripts’ 
brothers). Obviously, the number dropped in 1866-1868 because of the war 
against Austria: the Ministry of War allowed only 204 ordinary substitutions 
and 152 replacements performed by draftees’ brothers. In 1868-1869, the 
replacement number rose slightly (142 unrelated surrogates and 176 brothers 
were allowed to serve under the colors on behalf of other men).74
73 Lynn, “The Evolution of Army Style in the Modern West”.
74 Torre, Della leva sui giovani nati nell’anno (1864-1870).
502 Marco rovinELLo 
From the perspective of the richest families, substitution was affordable75 
and – at least in some cases – allowed them to exploit their local influence to 
force even unwilling fellow villagers to accept replacement and to fulf ill the 
obligation on their behalf. From the surrogate’s perspective, a f ixed salary 
was a tantalizing prospect, and the most common reason why both civil-
ian courts and military authorities had to deal with dozens of fraudulent 
reenlistments every year.76
Although substitution was cheaper and easily accessible thanks to wide 
networks, many elite members preferred paying a higher fee and letting the 
state f ind a substitute for them. The liberation tax was so expensive that 
some people who had applied for it then rejected because they could not 
actually afford it.77 However, only liberation secured the replaced draftees 
against the many substitutes who deserted shortly after taking the f irst 
payment installment. The richest Italian families did not want to risk both a 
signif icant loss of money and – especially – the forced personal enlistment 
imposed on the draftees whose substitutes then deserted, should they be 
unable to send a suitable substitute to the corps within a few weeks.
Consequently, in 1860s Italy, substitution was a local phenomenon, mostly 
involving both the middle and the upper bourgeoisie, whereas liberation 
was truly elite. Therefore, liberation data can be considered a reliable index 
of the upper class’s attitude to military obligation.
First, the applications’ geographical distribution confirms that the ex-
Bourbon subjects were the ones most reluctant to join the military, whereas 
only a few former Piedmont citizens used their money to avoid being drafted 
(see Table 16.4).78 Actually, this is not surprising: several scholars have already 
emphasized the ex-Piedmont subjects’ stronger attachment to the new state’s 
destiny.79 Secondly, liberation was predominantly an urban phenomenon: in 
75 As replacement looked more affordable, many provincial middle-lower bourgeois families 
contracted debts to hire a substitute and then went bankrupt. See Briante, “L’esercito e le polizie”. 
The same happened in France, as suggested by Kovacs, “French Military Institutions before the 
Franco-Prussian War”, p. 221.
76 Some examples are available in Archivio di Stato di Napoli [henceforth, ASN], Questura di 
Napoli, Gabinetto, I parte, reati comuni-camorra. 
77 In 1863-1864, for instance, a good 340 draftees rejected liberation after having applied for 
it. See Torre, Della leva sui giovani nati nell’anno 1843, p. 55. 
78 More detailed data are available in Torre, Della leva sui giovani nati nell’anno… (annually). 
Although the author was biased, in a letter addressed to Lord Rokeby in August 1864 General 
Calà Ulloa underlined that “in the past four years only fourteen people from crowded Naples 
enlisted voluntarily” and def ined Neapolitans’ lack of inclination to enroll a “plebiscite of 
reluctance”: ASN, Questura di Napoli, Gabinetto, I parte, f. 17.
79 See, for example, Ilari, Storia del servizio militare in Italia, I, p. 371.
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1867, for example, Naples, Palermo, Florence, Milan, and Turin supplied about 
20 per cent of the annual contingent and 40 per cent of liberated draftees.80
Table 16.4 Origins of liberated draftees and reenlisted soldiers (1867-1870)








Papal States 13.1% 10.8%
Kingdom of Sardinia 11.0% 37.1%
Grand Duchy of Tuscany 10.2% 14.5%
Others 2.9% 3.4%
Total 100.0% 100.0%
Source: torre, Della leva sui giovani nati nell’anno (1867-1870).
On the other side, liberation data also supply scholars with precious infor-
mation about the other two actors involved in replacement: the military 
authorities who selected the substitutes and the men who replaced their 
richer countrymen. Since, in liberation, military authorities acted as a broker 
by encouraging (re)enrollment and matching the conscripts’ applications 
with the volunteers’ enlistments, the draftee-broker-substitute triangle 
was independent from the conscripts’ networks. Therefore, the surrogates’ 
origins reflected not only the people’s attitude toward the draft, but also 
the government’s attitude toward the draftees. In fact, the ruling class’s 
mistrust of potential anti-Savoy plotters played a decisive role in keeping 
the number of southern substitutes low. Consequently, northern citizens 
were overrepresented within the volunteers’ group.
As in the f irst postunif ication stages, the government also tried to keep 
the army’s composition under control with respect to the percentage of 
volunteers. La Marmora’s law allowed volunteers with six months of experi-
ence to apply for reenlistment, giving explicit preference to all draftees 
80 The data concerning the origins of the liberated draftees must be read in light of the data 
on the whole Italian population. According to the 1861 census, only 14.2 per cent of the Italian 
population lived in cities with more than 15,000 inhabitants. See Malanima, Italian Urban 
Population, 1300-1861; paper available on http://www.paolomalanima.it/default_f ile/Page646.
htm (accessed 28 May 2011).
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serving for their last year, on the condition that they had a clean record and a 
good-conduct certificate from their previous regiment, were single, and were 
f it for service.81 The preference for regular soldiers led military authorities 
to frequently hire men who were already under the flag as conscripts. In 
fact, most substitutes were affidati anziani,82 that is, they simply extended 
their service time after discharge. In other words, when those men replaced 
their liberated comrades, they were neither true volunteers nor conscripts. 
They voluntarily signed on to the army after having previously been forced 
to join it. In short, we could call them “conscripts by choice”. In 1870-1871, for 
example, 76.5 per cent of the substitutes were twenty-five to thirty years old 
and 81 per cent had already served for at least f ive years, whereas volunteers 
under twenty-five were just 10 per cent, and only 19 per cent had not yet spent 
f ive years in the army. In the previous years, the picture had been more or 
less the same: in 1869, 802 of 1,131 (71 per cent) twenty-five- to thirty-year-old 
men were enlisted, every one of them having served for at least f ive years.83
Again, the main criteria for selection was not the applicants’ patriotism 
and military prowess, but their discipline and respect for authority. In 
1870-1871 only 933 men of 2,460 reenlisted men (38 per cent) had fought for 
Italy at least once (798 once, 124 twice, and only 11 three times), while 1,527 
had taken part in no campaign (62 per cent) and just 23 (0.9 per cent) had 
gained a medal for valor.84 In 1869, veterans constituted 647 of 1,131 (57 per 
cent), but 574 of them (89 per cent) had fought only once, despite the several 
wars Italy had engaged in between 1859 and 1868.
Although the selection process was not particularly strict, and most 
reenrolled men were no more than disciplined soldiers, applying for reen-
listment was a demanding choice, since reenlisted soldiers had to serve 
for f ive more years and could not abandon the army if they changed their 
minds. However, reenlistment could seem a good bargain for many reasons, 
especially economic ones.85 From that point of view, the Piedmont-Italian 
law followed the traditional pattern which assured that the reenrolled men 
81 Recruitment law n. 1676, 20 March 1854, articles 109-113, 116-125, 128, 129.
82 According to Torre, Della leva sui giovani nati nell’anno (1867-1870), reenlistments were 1,324 
out of 1,466 in 1864-1865 and 587 out of 653 in 1865-1866.
83 Torre, Della leva sui giovani nati nell’anno 1847 e delle vicende dell’esercito dal 1 ottobre 1868 
al 30 settembre 1869, p. 140.
84 Torre, Della leva sui giovani nati nell’anno 1845 e delle vicende dell’esercito dal 1 ottobre 1870 
al 30 settembre 1871, p. 115.
85 According to Alan Ramsay Skelley, “economic pressure was the principal impetus to recruit-
ment” also in the nineteenth-century British army. See Skelley, The Victorian Army at Home, 
p. 248.
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received quite a high sum immediately after entering the corps and then 
extra monthly pay of 12 L. along with the interest (4-4.5 per cent) on the 
whole amount deposited by the liberated conscript.
Both reenlisted soldiers and scholars pointed out that the salary was too 
low to live a respectable life86 – indeed this was a very common complaint 
among European war professionals. Nevertheless, the Italian rank and f ile 
did not get by badly, mostly because the government handled a progressive 
decrease in available affidati by making a military career more and more 
appealing with respect to monthly salary, which was doubled (from 12 to 25 
L.), and other benefits, such as the pension increase to 300 L./year and the 
automatic liberation from service of all the volunteer’s brothers.87
Altogether, the professional soldiers’ salaries were more or less equivalent 
to those of other low-ranking public employees and basically in proportion 
to the modest skills they had to offer in the labor market, their human 
capital.88 Moreover, the military option assured them of a certain and 
predictable career, a guaranteed income, and some comforts most of them 
would not be able to afford otherwise: decent accommodation, clothes and 
shoes, three meals a day (with meat at one meal) within a controlled diet 
with limited alcohol consumption, and even medical care, not to mention 
the beneficial effects on their health from the familiarization with some 
elementary sanitary practices imposed by discipline regulations.89 In other 
words, signing on in the army could be somewhat appealing because it could 
be paradoxically perceived as a “routine job” like those in the bureaucracy, 
at least with respect to the benefits attached.90
Some long-term benefits accompanied the short-term ones. First, once 
definitively discharged, reenlisted men received a state pension which was 
86 For contemporary complaints, see ADN, Giuseppe Tiezzi, Ricordi di come ho trascorso la 
mia vita, MP/93; Giovanni Viarengo, Memorie varie, Mp/Adn. On Italian off icers’ income, see 
Caciulli, “La paga di Marte”.
87 Reenlistment law n. 3062, 7 July 1866, articles 9 and 11. The law is quoted and commented 
by Torre, Della leva sui giovani nati nell’anno 1845 e delle vicende dell’esercito dal 1 ottobre 1865 al 
30 settembre 1866, pp. 3-30. It is interesting that Torre explicitly looked at the 1866 act under the 
light of the direct competition for manpower between the army and other employers, whereas 
scholars have analyzed it almost exclusively in terms of organizational and draft policy. See, 
for example, Ilari, Storia del servizio militare in Italia, I, pp. 282-283. 
88 On civil servants’ income, see Melis, La burocrazia.
89 Some classical well-being indexes suggested the quality of life in the army was better than 
outside. For example, soldiers usually put on weight during their service. See Livi, Antropometria 
militare. On Italian soldiers’ everyday life, see Quirico, Naja. On Italian peasants’ everyday life, 
see the interviews collected by Revelli, Il mondo dei vinti. 
90 From this point of view, Italian reenlistment had much in common with the French system. 
See Hippler’s contribution in this volume.
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quite low, but was still a privilege in a country where a welfare system did 
not exist yet. Secondly, as reenlisted men could not marry while serving, 
they saved much money by delaying marriage and consequently reduc-
ing the number of future mouths to feed: not a minor issue for poor rural 
households whose marginal propensity to consume was very low and whose 
consumption composition was dominated by basic commodities.91 Thirdly, 
all men who reenlisted as soldiers had a good chance to be promoted as 
noncomissioned officers (NCOs) and some possibilities even to become COs. 
Despite the low salary and the relatively modest social status of lower ranks 
in the military, reenlistment could thus be a mechanism of upward social 
mobility for former peasants and shepherds with few, if any, other chances 
to improve their conditions within the static Italian society of that time.
Although the appeal of a military career mostly consisted of its economic 
advantages, some nonmaterial benef its also encouraged men to enlist. 
Probably the f irst one was their families’ gratitude for automatically freeing 
all their brothers from service (after 1866); the second one consisted of 
their own subjective perception of their new status; the third stemmed 
from the social prestige linked to their job, at least in the small towns 
and the countryside. Psychologically, being part of a self-referential male-
only society marked both inside and outside by its own habits, dress, and 
slang was, for most of these youngsters, a source of pride in and of itself.92 
Furthermore, the literate soldiers could even imagine themselves as those 
patriotic warrior heroes that Romanticism had made famous worldwide 
and that schoolbooks described as models of virtue.93
Socially, wearing the uniform during parades provided these uninfluen-
tial youngsters with people’s admiration,94 despite their social background 
and current economic conditions. In addition, the liberal ruling class 
promoted an intensive media campaign to minimize the contribution of 
a democratic military to the unif ication process and to stress “the role the 
army had played in the founding myth of the national community, namely, 
91 Scarpellini, L’Italia dei consumi.
92 For a recent sociological analysis of group dynamics mostly focusing on the Italian army, 
see Battistelli, Ammendola, and Greco, Manuale di sociologia militare.
93 Patriotic soldiers and their heroic deeds constituted the most common plot of the novels 
addressed to both soldiers and students. See Rigotti Colin, “L’âge d’or” de la littérature d’enfance 
et de jeunesse italienne.
94 Italian military parades perfectly ref lected George Mosse’s idea of mass ceremonies as 
nationalization and legitimizing means. See Porciani, La festa della nazione. For a coeval example 
of soldiers’ pride deriving from taking part in parades, see Repetto, Rimpatrio.
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war”.95 Therefore, the habitual fascination with uniforms was boosted by 
periodic celebrations in which reenlisted soldiers proudly led the rank and 
f ile thanks to their long experience in the regiments.
Altogether, both material and nonmaterial benefits could explain why 
some men reenlisted, despite long marches, hard training, and the strong 
appeal of and opportunitie in paramilitary professions, such as Custom 
and Forrestal guards, where many ex-conscripts found “more present 
advantages and good pensions for the future”.96 Nevertheless, a major role 
in encouraging conscripts to reenlist was likely played by the very fact that 
they were now senior soldiers. As briefly mentioned above, several men 
refused to enlist voluntarily because of the fear of a sudden and radical 
lifestyle change. And, according to the draftees’ memoirs, the f irst steps as 
a junior recruit were effectively an ordeal. On the one hand, recruits were 
forced to redef ine their networks in a hostile environment whose rules 
deeply affected sociability even among peers. On the other hand, some 
of the typical military rites of passage (hair cutting, wearing of uniform, 
etc.) suddenly altered the draftees’ appearance and brought their previous 
set of values into question. Consequently, most recruits experienced a sort 
of loss of individuality, which was made worse both by the compulsory 
abandonment of their own dialects (at least in off icial conversations) and 
by the senior soldiers’ attempts to impose the informal hierarchy upon the 
newcomers by force.
When draftees had to decide their future after discharge, they had 
already passed this diff icult phase. Actually, the affidati anziani could 
attain the unoff icial rank of senior (anziano). And life in the barracks was 
much more pleasant for senior soldiers even if rules were theoretically the 
same for everyone. Their comrades’ respect and the constraints of discipline 
varied according to seniority, sometimes even despite ranks and positions. 
Therefore, the f irst year in the army was unanimously considered to be the 
hardest, not only because of the extreme rigidity of the NCOs’ control, but 
also because of the psychological pressure and the physical violence which 
characterized the asymmetrical relationship between senior soldiers and 
the younger ones.
95 Mondini, “Esercito e Nazione”, p. 106. Naturally, linking warfare and nation-building is not 
an Italian peculiarity. For the British case, see Colley, Britons; for the German one, see Ritter, 
The Sword and the Scepter, especially vol. I, The Prussian Tradition, 1740-1890. For a comparative 
approach, see Leonhard, Bellizismus und Nation.
96 Torre, Della leva sui giovani nati nell’anno 1845 e delle vicende dell’esercito dal 1 ottobre 1865 
al 30 settembre 1866, p. 9.
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Several memoirs and even some off icial studies remarked on the high 
rate of mortality in the Italian barracks during the f irst year of service.97 
One explicitly linked mortality to hazing, while most testimonies restricted 
themselves to describing the off icers’ attitude to “reconcile discipline 
with the indispensable regard and special consideration” towards “senior 
soldiers who knew one more than the devil”.98 Such an unwritten untouch-
ability was conf irmed also by court-martial statistics: senior soldiers 
were sentenced much more infrequently and mildly than their younger 
comrades.99Therefore, it is at least plausible that another reason why con-
scripts reenlisted was that they had already passed the adaptation phase 
of military life and consequently they attained the privileges of their rank 
in the informal hierarchy of the regiment.
Although at a f irst glance senior soldiers had more than one good reason 
for reenlisting, for some of them commodifying their labor was much more 
a forced choice than the outcome of a freely def ined strategy. According 
to La Marmora’s law, youngsters were recruited at the age of twenty and 
they actively served for f ive years before discharge. Therefore, military 
service not only stripped draftees of about one-seventh (and even more in 
the poor southern regions with lower life expectancy rates) of their whole 
life,100 but also broke their cycle of life exactly at the core point. Naturally, 
the military service’s effects on the recruits’ cycles of life changed accord-
ing to individual situation. However, going home after military service 
was a shock for many conscripts, as they found their own world totally 
changed. In fact, during the conscripts’ absence, parents or relatives often 
died, girlfriends married other villagers, and friends emigrated forever.101 It 
was no coincidence that draftees left their villages only after saying a f inal 
goodbye to all their fellow villagers.
97 Sormani, Mortalità dell’esercito italiano.
98 Lazzerini, In caserma, pp. 125-126. Naturally, descriptions of hazing largely differed accord-
ing to the rank of the memoirist. It was depicted from the off icers’ perspective by De Rossi, La 
vita di un ufficiale italiano sino alla guerra, while it was reported from the simple soldiers’ point 
of view by ADN, L.D.M., Ragazzo, alpino, parà, Mg/01.
99 Rovinello, “Tra Marte ed Atena”. An opposing trend characterized 1830s French substitutes. 
See Humann, “Rapport au Roi présentant le compte général de l’administration de la justice 
militaire”, p. 502.
100 In 1874, the life expectancy at the age of 20 was still just 37.7 years (31.2 at birth): Corsini, 
“Per una storia della statura in Italia nell’ultimo secolo”, p. 18.
101 Popular songs and tales are very interesting sources for analyzing the discharged draftees’ 
perception of their experience in the military. See Ferraro, Canti popolari monferrini, and Nigra, 
Canti popolari del Piemonte. 
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The draft affected many youngsters’ professional lives too. Actually, the 
military service’s consequences on the professional sphere largely depended 
on the draftee’s job. Obviously, peasants were less disturbed by draft, since 
they could go back home and start again tilling the soil without looking for 
another job. And f inding a job after discharge was quite easy for farmhands 
too. Even if the long absence from the village weakened the conscripts’ social 
capital, the draft was not perceived by their fellow villagers as a voluntary 
absence. Thus, most draftees were not excluded from the informal welfare 
system which traditionally helped the former emigrants to get back into 
the local community and the working world.102
By contrast, craftsmen were more damaged by the draft, since most of 
them were still doing an apprenticeship with older artisans when they were 
drafted. As true vocational training was still to be defined in nineteenth-
century Italy, learning by doing represented the core of apprenticeship. 
Therefore, abandoning their apprenticeship for f ive years in practice 
thwarted any plan and mostly forced former conscripts to be content with 
less remunerative jobs. Although the skills required for setting up shop were 
not very complex, those young men had not still acquired enough expertise 
to be able to work on their own. Moreover, most ex-conscripts joined the 
army with very low educational attainment and regimental schools did 
not really help them improve their nonmilitary knowhow, since training 
and schooling in the military primarily aimed to transform recruits into 
disciplined soldiers. Once discharged, this techno-military knowhow was 
the only skill conscripts had gained by serving. Such expertise had little 
use outside the army, whereas many memoirs stressed the diff iculties that 
former draftees faced once they tried to start their “career” again.103
In short, many Italian ex-draftees shared the postdischarge destiny of 
their Austrian and French comrades, as, after many years in the army, they 
had no other professional choice than to “voluntarily” remain soldiers.104 
Naturally, this circumstance cannot be generalized, especially because no 
source enables us to know the reenlisted men’s professional background 
and to precisely quantify the percentage of craftsmen within this group. 
Nevertheless, it is very likely that the reduction of the civilian employment 
chances stemming from f ive-year-long military service led conscripts to 
reenlist.
102 On the informal welfare system operating in most nineteenth-century Italian villages, see 
Lorenzetti and Merzario, Il fuoco acceso. 
103 Fambri, “La società e la Chiesa”.
104 See Deák, Beyond Nationalism, and Hippler’s contribution in this volume. 
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Altogether, analyzing military recruitment in terms of labor relations 
leads us to underline both the limits of some previous interpretations 
of reenlistment and the problems originating in the use of the off icial 
taxonomy in describing social actors’ professional choices. On the one 
hand, reenlistment cannot be simply considered as a sign of the ex-soldiers’ 
patriotism. Other decisive factors – both economic and noneconomic – en-
couraged draftees to reenlist in the army. On the other hand, the boundary 
between volunteerism and compulsory service, as well as that between 
forced and commodif ied military labor, was not so clear. Actually, most 
affidati were draftees who prolonged their term of service. In other words, 
compulsory service and volunteerism were not two antagonistic approaches 
to military life, but two successive phases. At the same time, the volunteer 
status of many reenlisted men was questionable, since commodifying their 
labor force in the army after discharge could be read as the consequence 
of the juridical constraints that forced these people to serve as conscripts 
and – in so doing – to renounce any other career.
Generally speaking, the 1860s Italian army was a “typical” conscript 
standing army, and it simply consisted of randomly selected conscripts, 
volunteers, and voluntarily reenlisted soldiers. Practically, some features 
of the Italian military system made the army not correspond to the theory. 
First, conscription was not universal, and it actually involved only the 
poorest part of the f it young population. Secondly, most “true volunteers” 
(those who had left their own home to join the army during the 1859-1860 
campaigns) were discharged shortly after the end of the war, since they were 
suspected of antimonarchy sentiment. Therefore, volunteerism was mostly 
an alternative to the regular army, not a part of it. Thirdly, long-term ser-
vice and the government’s preference for a French-style semi-professional 
militia kept the 1860s Italian army’s professionalization rate high. This 
policy enabled the army to act as a great employer in nineteenth-century 
Italian labor market, but it also affected the demand/supply equilibrium 
by drastically reducing conscripts’ freedom of choice, both while serving 
and after discharge.
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From state-building to nation-building: volunteers and draftees 
in Italy after 1870
Although scholars still discuss whether Ricotti’s reform was a continuation 
of the Destra Storica’s military policy,105 the attempt to balance the army’s 
social composition “in name of a principle of sacred equality among all 
citizens in face of the so-called blood tax” 106 represented a true cultural 
and practical revolution which had important consequences for post-1870 
labor relations within the military. The most relevant one concerned the 
change in the general attitude toward commodifying military labor. During 
the 1860s, Catholic values107 and personal benefits stemming from service 
were largely used by the liberal ruling class for ideologically justifying the 
military obligation. The extra allowance for reenlistment was obviously 
one of the most convincing arguments.
In addition, commodifying the labor force was largely accepted as a 
legitimate economic behavior, just as paying for liberation was mostly 
considered to be a right indissolubly attached to elite status. In other words, 
both practices were not only legal, but also morally acceptable. This idea of 
military obligation had been hegemonic for some years. However, already 
in the second half of the 1860s, the 1854/1862 recruitment system started 
showing its limits. On the one hand, a mix of cultural (the end of patriotic 
enthusiasm), demographic (the retirement of most of the veterans of the 
battles of the Risorgimento), and economic (the increasing job supply 
deriving from the recent industrialization in northern Italy, that is, the 
traditional source of volunteers)108 factors reduced the number of volunteers. 
Consequently, the military administration was soon forced to allow lib-
erations without having enough substitutes to comply with the numerous 
applications, and not to renounce the precious income stemming from the 
related fees. In practice, liberation rapidly became a sort of ill-concealed 
exemption tax.
105 The Ricotti policy’s continuity with those of his predecessors was f irst suggested by Corsi, 
Italia, 1870-1895. For a contrasting view, see Minniti, “Preparazione ed iniziativa”.
106 Ricotti’s report on his law proposal is quoted by Ilari, Storia del servizio militare in Italia, II, 
p. 285.
107 Although the religious tolerance stated by the 1848 constitution and the tensions with 
the pope prevented Catholicism from supplying off icial ideological justif ication for the draft, 
Christian virtues played a central role in Italian pedagogy for conscripts. See Paiano, “Religione 
e patria negli opuscoli cattolici per l’esercito italiano”. The same happened in tsarist Russia. See 
Wirtschafter, From Serfs to Russian Soldiers. On the French case, see Roynette, “Bons pour le 
service”, chs 5-6.
108 The opposite trend is precisely described in Del Negro, “La leva militare in Italia”, p. 191.
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On the other hand, La Marmora’s discriminatory draft contributed 
little to making the army a well-organized war machine and an eff icient 
nationalization agency, even if the liberal propaganda continuously stressed 
the central role of the army in “making the Italians”. In this context, the 
defeats in Custoza and Lissa during the Third War of Independence (1866) 
against Austria did not cause the definitive crisis of La Marmora’s approach 
to the recruitment question, but reinforced a preexisting double trend: 
on the one side, poor military performance discredited the army’s public 
image definitively, and transformed a military career into an unattractive 
professional choice; on the other side, military defeat was attributed to the 
soldiers’ lack of attachment to the nation. Consequently, military obligation 
off icially became a personal duty, the possibility to buy oneself out of the 
obligation was denounced as illegitimate, and the army stopped employ-
ing a commodif ied labor force because allowing liberation was morally 
equivalent to letting people betray their country.
In addition, from the 1870s onwards Italian youngsters had fewer good 
reasons to reenlist. The army was no longer a mechanism for upward 
mobility. Budgetary constraints drastically reduced soldiers’ promotions 
to NCOs. Moreover, NCOs from the rank and f ile had very few chances to 
become COs without attending academy courses.109 The advantages of a good 
standardized educational background were evident by then, especially in 
countries – such as Italy – where off icers had the crucial mission of shaping 
recruits both morally and patriotically. In fact, these “national cadres” were 
expected to have suff icient technical knowledge, adequate education, and 
certain pro-monarchy and antisocialist inclinations which the government 
supposed were naturally linked to higher social ranks.110 Being bourgeois 
was regarded as a guarantee on its own, the way “Piedmontness” had 
been immediately after unif ication. Therefore, high fees and scholarships 
reserved for off icers’ sons prevented most of the common people from 
embarking upon a military career and definitely made the high ranks in 
the army an elite-only prerogative.111 Most conscripts perfectly understood 
109 The professionalization of the off icer corps was a European trend in the second half of 
the nineteenth century. On the professionalization of the German off icer corps, see Demeter, 
The German Officer Corps in Society and State. On the French side, see Strieter, “An Army in 
Evolution”.
110 On the COs’ leading role in the army’s nationalization effort in the 1870s-1880s, see Del 
Negro, “La professione militare nel Piemonte costituzionale e nell’Italia liberale”.
111 On military schools and academies in nineteenth-century Italy, see Caciulli, “Il sistema 
delle scuole militari in età liberale”, and Pecchioli, Le accademie e le scuole militari italiane.
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the message and preferred to be discharged after the regular term.112 Very 
limited career prospects and discrimination in the regiment’s everyday 
life113 became additional reasons for the professional soldiers’ discontent, 
already stoked by the ever more antimilitarist Zeitgeist prevailing in the 
so-called Age of Capital.
In the 1870s-1880s, most draftees perceived military life not only as 
routine, out of date, and brutal,114 but also as an unprofitable parenthesis to 
close as soon as possible. Although many conscripts’ memoirs still spoke of 
military service as a hard and long experience,115 it was no longer the f ive-
year-long uprooting ordeal. Both the term reduction and Ricotti’s insistence 
on the integration between the army and civilian society enabled draftees to 
still “feel like civilians” while serving and to quickly reintegrate themselves 
in their village communities once they were discharged.
As long as recruits were under the colors, the 1872 discipline regula-
tions encouraged them to establish relations with locals. Furthermore, 
conscripts had to attend not only elementary school courses, but also 
periodic conferences about practical subjects such as hygiene, agronomy, 
and family management. Obviously, political and moral indoctrination was 
the core of those lessons, since the liberal government wanted ex-draftees 
to “continue their beneficial action by spreading the habit of wisely living 
and the deep respect for the laws in the whole nation”,116 especially among 
those youngsters who had escaped the intensive indoctrination process 
thanks to a “good number”. However, the effective and systematic education 
program laid out by Ricotti’s regimental schools reform of 1872 also provided 
draftees with precious nonmilitary skills they could successfully use in 
the civilian labor market along with their social capital.117 When conscripts 
came back home after “only” thirty months under the colors, they could 
112 Many memoirs talk about the author’s refusal to reenlist. See ADN, E. Serventi, Epistolario, 
E/89, p. 24.
113 General De Bono stated that the former NCOs who were promoted as COs were usually 
ostracized in everyday barracks life by their own colleagues who had attended academy courses. 
See De Bono, Nell’esercito nostro prima della guerra, p. 27.
114 On the nineteenth-century spirit, see Hobsbawm, The Age of Capital, 1848-1875.
115 ADN, S.S., La storia di famiglia, Mp/91, pp. 36-37. 
116 Ministero della Guerra, Regolamento di disciplina militare del 1. dicembre 1872, article 10, § 46.
117 On regimental schools, see Manghi, “Scuola e caserma”; Mastrangelo, Le “scuole reggimentali” 
1848-1913; Della Torre, “Le scuole reggimentali di scrittura e lettura tra il Regno di Sardegna e il 
Regno d’Italia”. On Italian military pedagogy, see Labanca, “I programmi dell’educazione morale 
del soldato”. Italian pedagogic effort had much in common with those elsewhere, e.g., in France, 
Germany, and the United Kingdom. See Roynette, “Bons pour le service”, chs 5-6; French, Military 
Identities, ch. 3; Kirn, Soldatenleben in Württemberg 1871-1914, ch. 16.
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still rely on their previous networks and – in addition – they had acquired 
signif icant human capital. It consisted not only of reading, writing, and 
other practical skills, but also of the social prestige they gained within their 
own village communities thanks to the experience they had had during 
military service. Conscripts traveled a lot, visited big cities, took part in 
grandiose ceremonies, and sometimes even met the king personally; in 
other words, military service made them more educated and open-minded 
than most of their fellow villagers. This was a significant competitive advan-
tage within local labor markets and enabled former conscripts to become 
well-respected members of their village communities despite their young 
age. Therefore, discharged draftees were really free to choose their job either 
in the military or civilian world, as long as these two options existed. And 
most ex-conscripts chose the second option.
Actually, the increasing lack of substitutes was not a minor factor in the 
government’s decision to banish commodif ied labor force from the army. 
Although the defeat in the 1866 war played a role in bringing commodifica-
tion into question both from a military and an ethical point of view, it would 
be misleading to read the renunciation of reenlistment as an unilateral and 
strictly political choice. The evolution in the Italian mentality and the labor 
market affected labor relations within the military as well.
For years the Italian semiprofessional army had successfully fought for 
manpower against civilian employers mostly thanks to four elements: f irst, 
the competitive set of benefits offered to reenlisted soldiers; secondly, the 
youngsters’ patriotic enthusiasm because of the unexpected unif ication; 
thirdly, the tendency to consider draftee replacement and commodifying 
the labor force as legitimate economic strategies; and, fourthly, the lack 
of alternative job opportunities for ex-draftees, especially craftsmen and 
clerks. By the second half of the 1870s all these conditions had changed and 
military careers increasingly lost their appeal. Consequently, the govern-
ment decided (or was forced?) to base the post-1870 army upon unfree 
labor, i.e., exclusively upon thousands of conscripts forced to look at the 
army as a “second family” 118 and f ight for the only legitimate reason: help-
ing the nation to win the Darwinian struggle for survival. After Ricotti’s 
reform had forbidden the corps to hire men on behalf of rich draftees, the 
only form of volunteerism in the Italian army was represented by one-year 
volunteers. However, as mentioned above, most one-year volunteers were 
not “true volunteers”; instead they were a privileged group of conscripts 
118 Ministero della Guerra, Regolamento di disciplina militare del 1. dicembre 1872, article 9, § 39.
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who enlisted as volunteers simply in order to make their military service 
easier and shorter.
Again, a standard taxonomy is misleading when mechanically applied 
to the different types of man who enlisted in the Italian army, particularly 
to volunteers. Actually, voluntary and forced labor continued to be inter-
mingled until the eve of World War I.
Conclusions
This brief overview of the Italian conscription experience suggests the 
necessity of prudence in applying tricky concepts, such as “universal con-
scription”, “volunteer”, and “draftee”. On the one hand, different phenomena 
risk being erroneously confused under the vague label of “conscript army”. 
On the other hand, the shift from the pre-unif ication professional-dynastic 
militia toward the national conscript army risks being wrongly regarded 
as a linear progression.
Actually, the wide range of draft systems operating on the peninsula 
(both synchronously and diachronically) shows that conscription is the 
product of a constant and dialectic process which involves the draftees and 
the state. On the one side, the state tried to make the opposing needs of 
political and military authorities compatible. On the other side, conscripts 
react actively to their military obligation. In so doing, draftees contributed 
to shaping conscription laws and practices, since their resistance forced 
the central power both to repress the extreme expressions of refusal and 
to compromise, by granting some return, material or otherwise, for the 
draftees’ peaceful acceptance of their military duty.
Naturally, the outcome of this negotiation depends mostly on the state’s 
contractual power. Long- and short-term factors (the lack of f inancial 
resources, infrastructure, and eff icient bureaucracy, etc.) can undermine 
the state’s ability to impose its authority over the entire country and to put 
its conscription policy in practice exactly as had been planned. In such 
disadvantaged conditions, conscription can help the ruling class construct 
a centralized state that can effectively impose its authority on its subjects 
– but it is also a very dangerous issue. Actually, drafting men from uncon-
trolled provinces is similar to committing the two most important elements 
of modern “stateness” – the monopoly of legitimate violence and the right 
to defend the territory from external threats – to unreliable people, both 
military and politically. In these cases, a “conscript army” tends to become 
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nothing more than a legal framework for different forms of recruitment 
whose major aim is to select recruits according to the ruling class’s interests.
Italy in the 1860s was a perfect example of this. Soon after unification, the 
liberal government introduced the draft into every annexed land in order to 
enforce its control over the new provinces and to prevent any external threat 
to its independence. Nevertheless, the ruling class reduced the risk of arm-
ing untrustworthy men by making conscription not genuinely universal. In 
other words, in the f irst decade after unification, the government needed its 
own citizens but it did not trust most of them. La Marmora’s draft system 
was the solution to this dilemma. In fact, recruiting the Italian nation 
according to Piedmont draft law was the cornerstone of the government’s 
strategy to keep the loyalty of the newborn militia under control.
On the one hand, substitution and liberation enabled the military authori-
ties to prevent anti-monarchy and anti-unif ication feelings from eroding 
the core of the monarchic power by funding – through the replacement 
fees – the enlistment of reliable substitutes instead of potentially disloyal 
draftees. Besides, in 1860s Europe, buying oneself out of military duty was 
still considered to be morally legitimate by public opinion. Similarly, hiring 
a commodif ied military labor force was largely accepted, especially in 
those countries – such as Italy – where employment conditions in the army 
were decent, and off icial rhetoric described reenlistment as a prof itable 
employment opportunity for jobless and poor men.
On the other hand, long-term service enabled off icers to transform 
draftees into disciplined soldiers and loyal Savoy subjects. Moreover, a f ive-
year-long absence from the civilian world led many conscripts to revise their 
plans, and “voluntarily” reenroll because of a lack of alternatives. Although 
it is very diff icult to state the reason why more than 1,000 males reenlisted 
every year, these features of the draft help us explain how the army could 
be competitive in the struggle for unskilled labor, despite budgetary con-
straints. Moreover, it shows to what extent a sharp distinction between free 
and unfree military labor was misleading in nineteenth-century Italy. Any 
taxonomy must be carefully used.
After 1870, the fulf illment of the unif ication process led the government 
to modify the aims of conscription from state-building to nation-building. 
In peacetime, “making the Italians” became the first goal of military service, 
and a German-style draft system was set up to achieve this aim. In fact, 
Ricotti’s new recruitment law looked much like the German one: military 
service became a personal obligation, the service term was halved, and 
liberation and ordinary substitution were replaced by “one-year volunteer-
ism”. Naturally, the reform affected several variables of post-1875 military 
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labor: duration, income, and legal constraints at least. Briefly, voluntary 
enlistment was no longer either a profitable employment or a mechanism 
for upward mobility.
However, the new conscription’s most significant effect on labor relations 
in the military was ideological. In particular, the abolition of liberation not 
only prevented the army from employing ex-draftees as substitutes, but 
also delegitimized the commodif ication of labor force in itself. Escaping 
military service by paying a tax was considered more and more a sign of the 
draftees’ unjustif iable indifference to the destiny of the fatherland. At the 
same time, replacing liberated men was more and more seen as an immoral 
way to earn money from helping those reluctant “Italian brothers” avoid 
fulf illing their own obligations to the national community.
Consequently, starting from the early 1870s, the idea that lower ranks 
should be military professionals lost its legitimacy and the army in the main 
stopped employing free and commodif ied labor force instead of draftees. 
Serving in the military became a personal mission that men had to ac-
complish in the name of the natural brotherhood of countrymen, rather 
than a job to be performed by professionals.
In conclusion, the Italian case study suggests that the features of the 
draft systems mostly depend on political issues. An exemption system, 
replacement, liberation, and voluntary enlistment are the most common 
means through which the ruling class keeps the sociological composition 
and the political reliability of the army under control. Technical arguments 
are usually used by the government to justify its military policies, but they 
actually do not deeply influence the choices concerning the draft.
Similarly, ideological issues – particularly those connected with 
nation-building – affect the draft. Charging the army with the task of 
nation-building produces signif icant changes in draft practices not only 
in technical terms (the length of service, the size of the annual call-up, etc.), 
but also in the off icial ideological justif ication of the draft, in the meaning 
of military obligation, and in the legitimacy of commodifying military 
labor. A strong ideological link is established between military service, 
citizenship, and national identity. The Italian draft after 1870 would be not 
understandable outside this ideological framework.
Economic factors also played an important role. In particular, budget-
ary constraints affected the Italian draft in two ways. On the one hand, 
they f ixed the number of conscripts effectively enlisted. On the other, 
they limited the competitiveness of the army in the struggle against other 
employers for the labor force.
Conversely, the demographic issue is a much less influential factor, as the 
Italian population largely overwhelmed the recruitment needs. If anything, 
the sudden availability of new population after unif ication represents a 
problem for the Piedmontese military authorities, since it reduced the 
percentage of politically reliable draftees and supplied the new national 
army with very few further reliable volunteers. Supply on the military labor 
market cannot be measured simply by quantifying the eligible volunteers. 
The employer’s political and regional prejudices against some of the avail-
able “employees” reduces the supply of labor on the market in reality.
Verifying to what extent the nineteenth-century Italian conscription 
experience shares these features with other draft systems is the reason why 
this case study has been involved in an ambitious diachronic and global 
comparison, the Fighting for a Living project.
 Nation-building, war experiences, and 
European models
The rejection of conscription in Britain
Jörn Leonhard
At the crossroads of state-building, nation-building, and war 
experiences: the evolution of the model of a nation-in-arms
The evolution of nations and nation-states was linked with experiences of 
war.1 The long process of external and internal state-building was a history 
of warfare and its revolutionary impacts. Most of the numerous territorial 
states of the early modern period did not survive this violent restructuring 
of Europe. Between the last third of the eighteenth century and the end 
of the nineteenth century the number decreased from about 500 states 
around 1500 to about 20 around 1900. State-building, so much intensif ied 
between 1794 and 1815, was directly linked to the experience of wars, and the 
British war-state of the eighteenth century is a particular illustration of this 
fundamental aspect of modern history.2 As a part of this complex process, 
justif ications of war changed, pointing to the new meaning of nation and 
nation-state as dominant paradigms of political and social legitimacy.3
But war not only accompanied the external processes of state-building. 
It also represented, from the 1750s onwards, a possible means of political 
emancipation and participation and hence became part of internal nation-
building: this is why the modern concept of conscription is such a powerful 
analytical tool. War changed its character: from being merely dynastic 
affairs, and cabinet wars, fought with hired mercenaries from different 
countries who did not identify with an abstract notion of the nation, to 
wars fought, in theory at least, in the name of the whole nation and by 
the whole nation-in-arms. On the one hand, and from the last third of 
1 See Leonhard, Bellizismus und Nation, “Nation-States and Wars”; see the chapters by Frevert, 
Jaun, Strachan, Förster, and Beyrau in Frevert, Militär und Gesellschaft im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, 
pp. 17-142; for the German case, see the chapters by Schmidt, Carl, and Buschmann in Langewi-
esche and Schmidt, Föderative Nation, pp. 33-111.
2 See Brewer, The Sinews of Power.
3 See Tilly, The Formation of National States in Western Europe, “Reflections on the History 
of European State-Making”, p. 42, “States and Nationalism in Europe 1492-1992”.
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the eighteenth century, new forms of “national wars” or “people’s wars”, 
in particular the American War of Independence and then the French 
revolutionary wars after 1792, meant that more groups of society were now 
directly affected by war. Warfare based upon mass armies and collective 
conscription transcended the traditional separation of the civilian popula-
tion from the direct experience of violent conflict, as had been the aim of 
traditional cabinet wars since the mid-seventeenth century, fought in the 
name of monarchical, dynastic, and territorial interests, and avoiding at 
the same time the horrors of civil war as they had been experienced in the 
confessional wars of the seventeenth century.4 On the other hand, national 
wars strengthened the state as the only legitimate institution which could 
provide the f inancial and military means of warfare.
A war fought in the name of the entire nation provoked hitherto un-
known expectations of political and social participation. That became 
obvious in the course of the later eighteenth century, and it became an 
essential aspect of the new concept of a nation-in-arms which also formed 
the ideological basis of conscription. The ambivalence of war – externally 
as a form of collective aggression and violence and, internally, as a means of 
participation – already played a major role in contemporary war discourses 
and controversies over the precise meaning and possible justif ication of 
war.5 Thus, the concept of civil war, so dominant in the critical periods of 
the seventeenth century with its religious conflicts in various European 
societies, found its way back into justif ications of war after 1750. But, in 
contrast to the seventeenth century, it was now no longer a civil war caused 
by confessional conflicts, but fought in the light of the secular concepts 
of liberty and equality as derived from the philosophy of human rights. 
Already in the 1760s the French philosopher Abbé de Mably described the 
expansionist wars of the eighteenth century as the natural consequence 
of monarchical despotism. This justif ied a new and international civil 
war of all suppressed peoples against their monarchical oppressors. Mably 
regarded such an international civil war as a “bien”, legitimizing in this 
context the “nation militaire”.6
During the French Revolution and the subsequent wars from 1792 to 
1815 such ideas assumed a new meaning. However, the wars of this period 
4 See Münkler, Über den Krieg, pp. 53-55, 75-77; for the state of German research, see Ech-
ternkamp and Müller, Die Politik der Nation; Rösener, Staat und Krieg; Wolfrum, Krieg und 
Frieden in der Neuzeit, pp. 49-51, 66-68, 95-97.
5 Forrest, “The Nation in Arms I”; French, “The Nation in Arms II”; see also Kunisch, Staats-
verfassung und Heeresverfassung in der europäischen, Fürst - Gesellschaft - Krieg.
6 Mably, Des droits et des devoirs du citoyen, pp. 93-94. 
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demonstrated that the paradigm of an international and revolutionary civil 
war of all suppressed peoples against their despotic suppressors was soon 
replaced by national wars between distinct states. Conflicts from the 1790s 
onwards stood between the practice of traditional cabinet or state wars that 
had characterized European history since the end of the Thirty Years War 
and a new ideological concept of civil war in the name of abstract principles 
among which the paradigm of the nation became most prominent.7
The complexity of war experiences became more obvious over the course 
of the nineteenth century: on the one hand, the wars of the nineteenth 
century were in many ways still fought according to the rules of tradi-
tional cabinet wars, although the wars of the 1860s clearly showed signs 
of transformation from Clausewitz‘s “absolute war” into “total war”.8 On 
the other hand, these wars reflected, in theory at least, each individual 
f ighter‘s identif ication with a more abstract notion of nationality and na-
tion. This justif ication of war was clearly a legacy of the civil war paradigm, 
as revived through experiences in America and France from the last third 
of the eighteenth century. If the contemporary concept of “national war” 
pointed already to the connection between the citizens’ duty to defend the 
fatherland and their recognition as politically participating subjects, then 
the “people’s war” transcended this connotation even further.9 Already 
during the 1760s and 1770s many American writers had referred to the war 
against the British as a “people’s war”, representing a people’s ability to 
organize and mobilize its military in the absence of a monarchical state 
and at the same time challenging the traditional state’s monopoly of arms 
on violence.10 In France the prospect of a revolutionary people’s war was 
also perceived as a potential threat by the new revolutionary regimes after 
1792. The regimes therefore responded with deliberate attempts to control 
and channel this development.
In the course of the nineteenth century, the invention of the new 
nation-in-arms generated distinct forms of warfare. Three ideal types can 
be distinguished: f irst, guerrilla warfare stood for the ideal type of people’s 
war. Following the collapse of a state’s authority, it was the population which 
in this case organized and carried out military actions, not in traditional 
battles but rather in small, individual actions, exemplif ied by the Spanish 
guerrilla war against Napoleonic regular troops in 1808. Second, militia 
7 See Kunisch and Münkler, Die Wiedergeburt des Krieges aus dem Geist der Revolution.
8 Clausewitz, “Vom Kriege (1832/34)”, pp. 318-319. 
9 Wohlfeil, “Der Volkskrieg im Zeitalter Napoleons”.
10 Ramsay, The History of the American Revolution, I, p. 325.
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armies combined the two principles of voluntary service with those of state 
control and professional military leadership in order to f ight larger battles 
and to use the mass mobilization of nations-in-arms. The American War of 
Independence as well as the early years of the French revolutionary wars 
after 1792 provide examples for this type. Third, mass conscript armies 
represented the attempt to fully control and regulate a people’s mobilization 
for war. It provided the military and f iscal state with enormous resources 
of power. The principle of conscription as a means of defending the whole 
nation also justif ied the use of force necessary to overcome popular resist-
ance against the rigors of compulsory military service. France (during 
the Napoleonic Empire) and Prussia (from the early nineteenth century 
onwards) exemplif ied this type.11
However, mass conscription did not mean an equal share of the burden 
of military service. Despite the myth of the revolutionary citizen-soldier, 
the French system allowed many exemptions, and the Napoleonic armies 
were far from mass conscript armies integrating the whole nation-in-arms. 
Prussia, during the anti-Napoleonic wars, came much closer to the ideal 
of mass conscription without exemptions. Yet in contrast to France, the 
Prussian military reforms under Gerhard von Scharnhorst and August 
Neidhardt von Gneisenau never resulted in a realistic promise of political 
participation in return for military service.12 After the end of the Napoleonic 
Wars, European governments were keen to return to professional armies 
which were regarded as safer tools against the revolutionary contagion of 
arming the people. France and the German states after 1815 were particular 
examples of this development. It was only in the context of further military 
reforms and against the background of industrialization after 1850 that 
conscription became an option again, as the European wars in the 1850s, 
1860s, and early 1870s demonstrated. However, the examples of 1859, 1866, 
and 1870-1871 also exemplif ied the advantages of short military operations 
which did not force societies to fully mobilize the nation-in-arms and which 
tried to avoid the combination of revolution and war. Only in the case of the 
American Civil War from 1861 to 1865 did mass conscription really develop 
the means of modern warfare with all its disastrous consequences.13
11 Förster, “Vom Volkskrieg zum totalen Krieg?”, pp. 78-79; on conscription in general, see Ki-
ernan, “Conscription and Society in Europe before the War of 1914-18”; Foerster, Die Wehrpflicht; 
Förster, “Militär und staatsbürgerliche Partizipation”; Levi, “The Institution of Conscription”; 
Frevert, Die kasernierte Nation; Flynn, Conscription and Democracy; Moran and Waldron, The 
People in Arms.
12 Frevert, “Das jakobinische Modell”, p. 26.
13 Förster and Nagler, On the Road to Total War.
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In these wars of the later nineteenth century, particular elements of 
total warfare became obvious, although “total war” with its new industrial 
character and hitherto unknown numbers of victims did not become a 
collective experience in Europe until 1914. Yet already the wars of the second 
half of the century – the Crimean War, but in particular the American Civil 
War between 1861 and 1865 and the Wars of German Unif ication between 
1864 and 1871 – pointed to a transformation in the meaning of war and the 
changing character of modern warfare: this was essentially characterized 
by a new combination of technological progress, based upon increased 
f irepower and railway transport, and mass mobilization in the name of 
an abstract ideal of nationality and nation-state. The state’s f inancial, 
economic, and military means to achieve its aims reached a peak. This new 
dimension of mobilization also necessitated a new ideological justif ication 
of war. War was no longer regarded as a conflict over territory or dynastic 
interests, but it was fought for the ultimate existence of nations and peoples. 
This necessitated the stigmatization of the enemy and the overcoming of the 
traditional separation between a state’s armies and its people. This essential 
distinction between the military and the civic sphere became questioned, 
as illustrated by both the actions of the North American General William 
Sherman in the Southern states of the Confederation during the American 
Civil War and, on a lower level of collective violence, the popular warfare 
of the French against the German invaders after September 1870.
It was the intensive interaction between war and nation-building from 
the eighteenth century that generated the ideal notion of a nation-in-arms. 
It included at the same time the new ideal of the politically participating 
citizen as the natural defender of the fatherland and hence a resurgence 
of the civil war paradigm against the idea of cabinet wars, separating the 
military sphere from that of civil society. From that point of view, the 
perceived national character of conflicts after 1792 instigated civic connota-
tions of citizenship and political expectations, and participation through 
conscription was the most obvious of these. If the model of a nation-in-arms 
marked the beginning of a long-term process toward a radicalization of both 
national self-images and images of the enemy, thereby integrating many 
ethnic connotations focusing on belligerent myths and military memories, 
it was at the same time an ideal type of definition: not even the often quoted 
examples of Prussia in the 1860s, Germany after 1871, or France after 1871 
ever implemented a conscription that encompassed the complete nation.14 
14 Frevert, “Das jakobinische Modell”, pp. 42-47; Krumeich, “Zur Entwicklung der ‘nation 
armée’ in Frankreich”, “The Myth of Gambetta and the “People’s War” in Germany and France”.
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It was the experience of World War I with hitherto unknown numbers of 
victims that fundamentally challenged for the concept of a loyal nation-
in-arms.15
This chapter tries to reconstruct the particular case of conscription in 
Britain, taking into account the British discussion of military models in 
Europe since the last third of the nineteenth century. In view of a European 
comparison, the reasons why conscription was rejected in Britain for such 
a long period have to be identif ied. In comparison with both continental 
nation-states and empires such as tsarist Russia, the Habsburg monarchy, 
and the Ottoman Empire, which introduced conscript legislation, Britain 
did so only during World War I in 1916 when in the context of industrialized 
warfare the number of volunteers no longer met the military demands 
of the western front. In the f irst part, fundamental premises about the 
relationship between the British military, society, and empire are discussed. 
The second part concentrates on the changing image of the British military, 
the contemporary perception of continental warfare, and the concept of a 
nation-in-arms since the 1870s. Third, I will look more closely at the meaning 
of the Boer War in that context. Finally, in a brief overview, I discuss the 
complexities of imperial defense before 1914 and the empire’s role for Britain 
in World War I.
Military, society, and empire: some British peculiarities
In a classical liberal statement on the British Empire, Sir Henry Campbell-
Bannerman in 1903 stated “that we cannot provide for a f ighting empire, 
and nothing will give us the power. A peaceful empire of the old type we are 
quite f it for.” 16 Against the background of Britain’s painful experiences dur-
ing the Boer War he formulated a fundamental problem which affected the 
British Empire and also anticipated future challenges: how could Britain’s 
traditional military structure be reconciled with the realities of military 
conflict within the British Empire? How was Britain to respond to the 
new concept of a nation-in-arms, which had decided the outcome of the 
European wars of 1866 and 1870-1871 and was more and more regarded 
as a precondition for the political survival of great powers in a period of 
increased international competition?
15 Chickering and Förster, Great War, Total War.
16 Quoted in Spender, The Life of Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman, II, p. 88; see Holland, “The 
British Empire and the Great War”, p. 114.
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In stark contrast to continental European societies, Britain in the second 
half of the century did not witness a debate over national and people’s wars, 
such as developed in Germany, France, and Italy, or in the United States 
during the American Civil War. Whenever these concepts were used in Brit-
ish discourse, they referred to countries other than Britain.17 Already this 
symptom points to particular differences between war experiences and the 
meaning of the military on the continent and across the Channel. Histori-
cally, Britain’s geographical position without direct neighbors allowed it to 
rely on a relatively small professional army. Even before 1914 its planned size 
was less than a quarter of that of most continental armies.18 Furthermore, 
large standing armies had always been regarded as symbols of absolutist 
despotism. But in contrast to the continent where, as a consequence of 
the religious wars of the seventeenth century, princes and dynasties had 
established absolutist rule on the basis of standing armies, the absolutist 
experiment had failed in Britain with the end of the Stuarts in 1688. The 
Whig interpretation of these conflicts and its continuous influence in the 
early nineteenth century provided ample room for the identif ication of 
standing armies with absolutist, potentially Catholic, and therefore un-
English principles.
When confronted with increased and intensif ied armament programs 
and the introduction of mass conscription in other European nation-states, 
discussions in Britain after 1870 did not focus primarily on a conscript 
army. Even Lord Roberts, the popular president of the National Service 
League, did not demand a mass conscript army but favored specific military 
units capable of defending the island of Britain in case of an invasion.19 
There was no equivalent to the continental experience which, as in the 
French revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars before 1815, and during the 
conflicts that developed in the course of nation-state-building in Italy and 
Germany from the late 1850s to the early 1870s, had catalyzed discourses 
about the changing meaning and justification of war. In addition, the British 
perception of the American Civil War seemed to underline that British 
society was far from becoming a military nation. Thus the concepts of a 
nation-in-arms and a people’s war retained a foreign connotation which 
in the eyes of contemporaries could be applied neither to Britain’s present 
situation nor to its history.
17 Strachan, “Militär, Empire und Civil Society”; Paris, Warrior Nation.
18 Spiers, The Army and Society.
19 Adams and Poirer, The Conscription Controversy in Great Britain, pp. 16-18; Roberts, Defence 
of the Empire.
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Furthermore, and distinct from the ideal of a nation-in-arms accord-
ing to which all groups of society should at least in theory be trained to 
defend the fatherland, the British army for a long time was regarded as a 
microcosm of rural society. According to this view, off icers were recruited 
from the landed aristocracy and gentry. Together with volunteer soldiers 
from the countryside, they represented, in the eyes of contemporaries, the 
uncorrupted virtues of the nonindustrial sectors of British society. In the 
British Army of the early nineteenth century, “multiethnicity” referred to the 
disproportionally high numbers of Scottish and Irish soldiers f ighting in the 
British forces.20 Originally, only Protestants could serve as soldiers or officers 
in the crown’s armed forces. However, the empire’s rapid expansion during 
the eighteenth century as well as the military’s development in general neces-
sitated the recruitment of Irish Catholics. Already in the 1770s enlistment of 
Irish Catholics had started. Very soon large numbers were recruited for the 
marines and especially for the East India Company’s army.21 By the time of 
the Indian Mutiny, nearly 50 per cent of the Company’s army of 14,000 soldiers 
were Irish, and 40 per cent of the 26,000 British troops in India were Irish, 
mostly recruited from poor Catholic families. The fundamental role played by 
Irish regiments in putting down the Sepoy Mutiny revealed to many British 
people the extent of the Irish presence in India.22 An Anglo-Irish off icer 
corps developed, playing a role out of proportion to their numbers in the 
British army in the nineteenth century. They accounted for approximately 
17 per cent of all off icers in the British armed forces, and at least 30 per cent 
of all off icers serving in India. Whereas most of the Irish soldiers serving in 
the British armed forces were Catholics, the off icers were mainly recruited 
from Protestant lower gentry families who sought careers for their sons.23
Traditional interpretations of the British army in the nineteenth century 
have highlighted that it was this constellation that prevented any military 
professionalization by adhering to an amateur ideal of gentleman-off icers 
and peasant-soldiers.24 But in the light of more recent research, this point of 
view needs a closer look. In comparison with France, Germany, and Italy, it 
was not the concept of the national wars or people’s wars of 1859-1861, 1864, 
1866, and 1870-1871 that dominated contemporary war discourses in Britain, 
20 Henderson, Highland Soldier.
21 Bartlett, “Ireland, Empire, and Union, 1690-1801”, pp. 73-74.
22 Bartlett, “The Irish Soldier in India, 1750-1947”; Kenny, “The Irish in the Empire”, pp. 104-105.
23 Kenny, “The Irish in the Empire”, pp. 106-107; Bartlett, “The Irish Soldier in India, 1750-1947”, 
pp. 20-21.
24 Strachan, “Militär, Empire und Civil Society”, p. 79; see also Beckett, The Amateur Military 
Tradition.
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but the “small wars” that accompanied the expansion of the British Empire.25 
Throughout the long nineteenth century, Britain was engaged in more or less 
constant military actions in its colonies, and these war experiences were 
certainly distinct from the national wars on the continent between 1848 
and 1871. It was also in this context that the army’s image as a microcosm 
of rural Britain came to be challenged. The military crisis that the British 
faced in the Boer War, in the eyes of many contemporary observers, seemed 
to be the result of the social degeneration of off icers and soldiers, due to 
urbanization and industrialization in the British motherland.26 The experi-
ence of imperial warfare thus led to a new and critical assessment of British 
industrial society’s modernity and its price.
As a result of the colonial small wars, it was not only the political role 
of the army that changed, but also its social composition, with decreasing 
numbers of off icers recruited from the landed gentry and aristocracy. The 
army as a whole became more urban and, in contrast to the ideal of Irish, 
Scottish, and Welsh soldiers, also more English.27 This was not a multieth-
nic conscript army meant to integrate the many different ethnic groups 
within the empire. Multiethnicity in this context did not primarily refer 
to language but to a notion of Otherness as it had historically developed 
in the different regions of the British Isles. The expectation that the army 
had to play a fundamental role in keeping the empire together was instead 
derived from a different collective image that was identified with the armed 
forces. According to this image, the army was itself a symbol of the union 
with its high proportion of Irish and Scottish soldiers and off icers. At the 
same time the union was regarded as the very center of the British Empire. 
Hence the army’s role for the union could not be separated from that for 
the empire, as the Irish case demonstrated.
In order to understand this change in public perception of the military, 
the change in the liberals’ attitude toward army and war needs to be taken 
into consideration. For a long time historians used to point to the antagonism 
between Gladstonian liberalism and its focus on Home Rule for Ireland 
on the one hand, and the army as a symbol of the union under English 
dominance on the other. This relation changed fundamentally in the later 
nineteenth century. With the institutionalization of regular police forces, 
25 Callwell, Small Wars.
26 Cairnes, The Absent-Minded War; Amery, The Times History of the War in South Africa; Forster, 
The Army in 1906.
27 Strachan, “Militär, Empire und Civil Society”, p. 86; Harries-Jenkins, The Army in Victorian 
Society; Skelley, The Victorian Army at Home; Hanham, “Religion and Nationality in the Mid-
Victorian Army”.
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the army was freed from domestic functions of maintaining law and order. In 
combination with the heroic and Christian image of the military in colonial 
conflicts, army and fleet became incarnations of the British Empire and 
an imperial idea of Britishness. This dimension underlines the necessity of 
carefully distinguishing between the armed forces’ social composition on 
the one hand and the public view of army and navy on the other.
The empire-nation and the new model of the nation-in-arms
British contemporaries of the wars of German unif ication between 1864 
and 1871 could not anticipate the new meaning of large conscript armies 
and a new national connotation of the military. Hence the perception of 
continental warfare and the experience of the empire’s military conflicts 
became essential factors in determining the relationship between British 
society and the military prior to 1914.28 Britishness gained a new meaning 
which went far beyond the union and received fundamental stimulations 
from the perception of continental and imperial warfare.29 The wars of 
1870-1871 seemed to reveal a new kind of mass warfare which went together 
with a “decline of the chivalry of war”.30 The image of a professional army, 
composed of mercenaries, was challenged by large conscript armies symbol-
izing the apparent necessity of whole nations-in-arms: “The restless military 
spirit which produced the soldier of fortune is now on the wane.” 31
At the same time, the Leitmotiv of the British military as “Christian 
soldiers” shaped public perceptions of the army. It was essentially derived 
from the experiences of the empire’s wars. Given the absence of large stand-
ing armies in Britain itself, the image of the “true Tommy” as the incarnation 
of national and Christian values became ever more popular and began 
to overshadow traditional notions of antimilitarism.32 That process had 
already started during the wars against France before 1815 and was revived 
28 Preston, Patriots in Arms; Maurice, War; Henderson, The Science of War, “The British Army”, 
“Foreign Citizens”, “War”, all three in Henderson, The Science of War; Hart, Reflections on the Art 
of War, Moral Force in War, A Vindication of War; Oman, A History of the Art of War; Risley, The 
Law of War; Maude, “M. Bloch as a Prophet”; Browning, Wars of the Century and the Development 
of Military Science; Foster, Organization.
29 Ely, The Road to Armageddon; MacDonald, “A Poetics of War”; Wilkinson, Depictions and 
Images of War in Edwardian Newspapers; Jahr, “British Prussianism”.
30 Dalberg, The War of 1870, p. 41.
31 Grant, British Heroes in Foreign Wars, p. vi.
32 Anderson, “The Growth of Christian Militarism in Mid-Victorian Britain”.
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during the Crimean War and the Indian Mutiny in 1857-1858. The civic 
element of antimilitarism, derived from the conflicts of the seventeenth 
century and so important for the English national self-image, became more 
and more overshadowed by ethnic and racial connotations of the superior 
British empire-nation, thus at the same time integrating the different parts 
of the union. Against the background of the Crimean War, Lord Panmure 
underlined the changing image of the army in 1855: “I trust our present 
experience will prove to our countrymen that our army must be something 
more than a mere colonial guard or home police; that it must be the means 
of maintaining our name abroad and causing it to be respected in peace as 
well as admired and dreaded in war.” 33 The Times in 1856 added that “any 
hostility which may have existed in bygone days towards the army has long 
since passed away. The red coat of the soldier is honoured throughout the 
country.” 34 The successful repression of the Indian Mutiny in 1858 provoked 
numerous reactions pointing to Britain’s Christian mission, its pioneering 
role for civilization, and its superiority over the barbarian. As the Baptist 
Magazine remarked in 1858: “The tide of rebellion [has been] turned back 
by the wisdom and prowess of Christian men, by our Lawrences, Edwardes, 
Montgomerys, Freres, and Havelocks [...] God, as it were, especially selecting 
them for this purpose.” 35
God’s mission in this view served to legitimize even the highest sacrif ice: 
“Such a deed is done [...] when a soldier, true to his Queen and country, is true 
also to his God and preaches while he practices the principles and gospel 
of the Prince of Peace, in the presence of those with whom he acts his part 
in the world’s drama.” 36 Thus the topos of the “soldier of Christ” generated a 
suggestive self-image: the British nation seemed to act in accordance with 
a godly mission. Off icers and soldiers should act as Christian heroes or die 
as martyrs. Contrasted with the realities of British industrial society, the 
imperial connotation of the military generated an exotic counterimage of 
a nonconditioned existence. This also explains the enormous successes of 
contemporary war literature which time and again presented the British 
Empire as a counterworld to Britain’s industrial society.37 “British gallantry” 
33 Quoted in Bartlett, Defence and Diplomacy, p. 126.
34 The Times, 22 October 1856, p. 6.
35 Baptist Magazine l (1858), p. 323.
36 R. M. Ballantyne, In the Track of the Troops. A Tale of Modern War. With Illustrations (London, 
1878), quoted in Hannabus, “Ballantyne’s Message of Empire”, p. 68; see also Ballantyne, The 
Settler and the Savage, Blue Lights; or Hot Work in the Soudan.
37 Hodder, Heroes of Britain in Peace and War; Rhodes, Khartoum. Khartoum has fallen, and 
Gordon a Prisoner, p. 5; Howard, “Empire, Race and War in Pre-1914 Britain”; Walls, “Carrying 
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became a key term in this context. It was used to characterize a collective 
quality of the British, as their example in India seemed to prove: “Every 
leaf in the history of the Indian campaigns shines with a brilliant record 
of British gallantry. In a country where all the forces of nature were often 
opposed to the advance of troops, now against a climate of unparalleled 
severity, and then under f ierce burning rays of tropical sun [...] England and 
Englishmen may well feel proud of the victories so hardly gained against 
native troops of exceeding valour in f irst-rate military training.” 38
Apart from this change in the army’s perception, the empire in the 
course of the 1870s gained a new meaning for Britain’s military position 
in the world. When Russian troops launched an attack against the Otto-
man Empire, Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli ordered indigenous troops 
from India to intervene. It was now no longer the British colonial troops, 
but the combination of navy, colonial army, and indigenous military that 
secured Britain’s status and served as an integration of the whole empire. 
No doubt this was an idealized interpretation, but it explained why the 
nation-in-arms model as it had developed on the European continent was 
not regarded as a necessity for the British Empire: “England must have 
seen with pride the Mediterranean covered with her ships; she must have 
seen with pride [...] the discipline and devotion which have been shown to 
her and her Government by all her troops, drawn from every part of the 
Empire. I leave it to the illustrious duke [...] to bear witness to the spirit of 
imperial patriotism which has been exhibited by the troops from India.” 39
This image and the focus on the differences between the British and 
continental military traditions were clearly challenged by the experiences 
of the continental wars in the 1860s and early 1870s. British contemporaries 
now had to respond to the implicit comparison between the ideal of a 
small professional army on the one hand and large conscript armies on 
the other. However, in contrast to the continental multiethnic empires, 
these reactions did not lead to a complete overthrow of the British army’s 
organization before the experience of World War I, but they stimulated an 
increasingly intense debate about the relation between the military and 
society in general and imperial defense in particular. The reason for not 
following the example of the Habsburg monarchy, tsarist Russia, or the 
Ottoman Empire, to say nothing of Germany or France, may be seen in the 
geographically absence of imperial wars conducted by Britain. The British, 
the White Man’s Burden”.
38 Armytage, Wars of Queen Victoria’s Reign, p. 228.
39 Disraeli, “Berlin Treaty. Speech in the House of Lords, 18th July 1878”.
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at least prior to the Boer War, were never confronted with the kind of direct 
military crises which tsarist Russia had experienced in 1856, the Habsburg 
monarchy in 1859 and 1866, or the Ottoman Empire in the 1870s and again 
during the Balkan Wars. There was no similar pressure for the British to act, 
a factor which was reinforced by the dominance of the Royal Navy, which 
was never really challenged.
Nevertheless, the perception of the continental model of a nation-in-
arms, accompanied by popular Social Darwinism, stimulated a dynamic 
discussion about British military organization and the future prospects of 
the empire. The imagined war of the future forced contemporaries to criti-
cally reflect upon and challenge the traditional view of the military and led 
to new concepts of war. When James Ram published his Philosophy of War in 
1878 he insisted on the belligerent origins of the English nation in analogy 
to the Romans: “In effect the English nation [...] grew out of a concourse 
of kindred tribes engaged in incessant warfare among themselves. In the 
course of time domination over the rest was achieved successively by tribes 
of higher and higher degrees of pugnacity, and so the lines of a great nation 
were laid down. It was just the same in ancient Italy and in Greece, where 
Rome and Macedon respectively took the f inal lead.” In comparison with 
France prior to and after the defeat of 1871 Ram came to see the vitalizing 
effects of war which he applied to the English nation as well: “Was any pure 
nation ever known with whom war was not a sacrif ice enthusiastically 
offered in defense of what it held holy? In what country is public life so pure 
as in England? And the English are always at war in some part of the world. 
The lower French Empire was peace, but what a corrupting peace it was, and 
how much purer has France been since the Franco-German war.” 40 At the 
same time Ram saw Britain as in danger of losing its reputation and power 
status if it continued to rely on volunteers for a small professional army. The 
military successes of disciplined and effective conscript armies had clearly 
demonstrated the superiority of the model of a nation-in-arms. Britain, in 
contrast, was about to lose the means to secure the nation’s and hence the 
empire’s survival: ”If England cannot command voluntary soldiers enough 
to defend her homes or to maintain her empire, the sooner we give up the 
role of a powerful nation the better. A nation that cannot f ind voluntary 
soldiers of her own stock deserves to be conquered by any other that can.” 41 
Ram’s premises were derived from a Social Darwinist model of selection, 
40 Ram, The Philosophy of War, pp. 32-33, 40, 47.
41 Ibid., p. 72; Hayes, Conscription Conflict; Adams and Poirier, The Conscription Controversy 
in Great Britain.
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and he used them to criticize the traditional arguments against conscription 
as anachronistic and dangerous: “When nature [...] erects the lists of natural 
selection [...] are we English to give way to competitors really inferior to us? 
[...] The arming and training of whole nations for supreme struggles with 
each other, is the latest call that she has made upon their energies, and 
will do more than anything else to determine with what races superiority 
really lies, and which are best f itted to occupy and replenish the earth.” 42
For Ram the dual perception of both the European continent and the 
empire generated a military dilemma for Britain. The European wars fought 
in the name of entire nations highlighted the differences between Britain 
and the continent.43 Whereas Britain focused on its fleet and the image of 
a naval power, the traditional military structure came under increasing 
pressure when confronted with the militarization of continental societies: 
“Characteristic of the modern system is the increased interest evinced by 
all classes in each and every country in its military organization, means 
and methods. This is very observable in the states of the continent, par-
ticularly where universal service has been longest established. In Germany 
conversance with things military pervades all classes. In France the army 
is enthusiastically supported.” In Britain, he argued, the navy was “our f irst 
line” and he could not f ind any cause to complain of the interest the public 
bestowed on it. With regard to the army the British legislature “while equally 
responsible with that of any continental nation” seemed less endowed with 
the critical knowledge “requisite for the use of its controlling power”. Ram 
attributed this to the “circumstances of our national history”. But contrary 
to the ideal of a nation-in-arms, prepared to mobilize the resources of the 
whole nation, the British military continued to rely on the voluntary system 
as it seemed to correspond both to British historical experiences and its 
constitutional self-image: “Whether before the enemy, on the sea, or in the 
foreign garrison, the quality of spirit and the tone which the voluntary system 
confers are of incalculable value; nor is it only so in the regular army, the 
volunteer who gives willingly, as many as one does, more than the number 
of drills necessary to secure his grant, is equally an exponent of its value.” 44
Despite the army’s popularity prior to and after 1815, the concept of 
a nation-in-arms remained a foreign, un-English one. The reality of the 
empire’s small wars, which were geographically distant events without a 
42 Ram, The Philosophy of War, p. 75.
43 Kinglake, The Invasion of the Crimea, VI; Barrington, England on the Defensive; “Imperial 
Defence”, Royal United Service Institution Journal (1884); Hamley, National Defence.
44 Dalton and Goodenough, The Army Book for the British Empire, VI, pp. 88-89.
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direct military impact on Britain itself, added to the belief that a radical 
change in the military structure was not an imminent necessity. It was 
not until the 1890s that this position came under serious pressure. Not 
least against the background of an Anglo-German naval rivalry, a future 
European war which would directly affect Britain now became ever more 
realistic. This catalyzed discussions about an adequate military structure, 
and imperial defense served as a key word in these debates.45 Still it was the 
Royal Navy that seemed to guarantee the status of the maritime empire-
nation: “The Royal Navy is to the British Empire all and far more than 
her army is to Germany [...]. Naval supremacy [...] signif ied the promise 
of a mighty future. To the British Empire of to-day, it is the only possible 
guarantee of national existence.” 46 But fears of a future invasion and the 
naval race between Germany and Britain challenged the premise of the 
geographically distant empire wars. Numerous novels about a future war 
and f ictitious invasions of the British Isles contributed to collective hysteria 
prior to 1914.47 Germany now took over the role of a prime national enemy 
which Spain had played in the sixteenth and France in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries.48 Confessional and ideological enemy images were 
replaced by a structure of competing industrial societies. Military power 
was regarded as a direct consequence of national strength as it became 
visible in industrial effectiveness.
The Boer War as a crisis of imperial warfare
After the perception of continental warfare in the 1860s and 1870s, the 
experience of the Boer War marked a major watershed in British discourses 
on the concept of a nation-in-arms. The combination of initial problems 
in British military operations, the Boers’ successful campaigns and the 
45 “England’s Unreadiness for War”, National Review 9 (1887), pp. 153-169; “Naval Warfare and 
National Defence”, Quarterly Review 174 (1892), pp. 534-566.
46 Clarke and Thursf ield, The Navy and the Nation, p. 3; Clarke, “The German Strategist at Sea”; 
Thursf ield, “Captain Mahan’s Writings”, “The Jeune École Française”; see Rüger, “Nation, Empire, 
and Navy”.
47 “The Battle of Dorking”, Blackwood’s Magazine (May 1871); Colomb et al., The Great War 
of 189. [sic] A Forecast; Cave and Tebbutt, The British Army and the Business of War; Le Queux, 
Invasion of 1910, with a full Account of the Siege of London; A Second Franco-German War and Its 
Consequences for England (London, 1907); Wells, War in the Air; Ford and Home, England Invaded; 
Chesney, The Battle of Dorking, being an Account of the German Invasion of England; Doyle, Great 
Britain and the Next War.
48 Searle, The Quest for National Efficiency; Robbins, Present and Past.
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character of the events as a modern media war with a global audience 
distinguished this experience from earlier small wars within the British 
Empire.49 In contrast to the 1870s, this time Britain was directly affected and 
experienced a serious crisis of its ability to effectively defend the empire. As 
a result, the self-image as a successful empire-nation suffered severely. The 
Boer War also marked a watershed in that it demonstrated the realities of 
an imperial war. Thousands of volunteers from Canada, Australia, and New 
Zealand had joined the British forces in order to conquer two small states 
and integrate them into the British Empire. Despite some Irish f ighters on 
the Boer side, the pro-Boer movement in Britain made the war initially 
quite popular, as the “Khaki” elections in 1900 showed. Initially it had been 
decided not to include “coloured troops” from other parts of the empire in 
order to make it “a white man’s war”. However, both the British and the Boers 
were forced to include soldiers recruited from the African population in the 
course of the conflict. Consequently, more than 100,000 Africans served as 
scouts and labourers. Lord Kitchener, the commander-in-chief of the British 
forces in 1900-1902 had to admit to the arming of more than 10,000 men, 
but research into the topic has shown that David Lloyd George’s estimation 
of approximately 30,000 was much more realistic.50 What became more 
important was that the military conflict soon revealed the deficiencies of 
the British colonial military. Final victory was achieved only by quantita-
tive superiority and by radicalizing the means of war, especially by the 
systematic destruction of Boers’ farms and the deportation of women and 
children into newly established “concentration camps”.51
Below the surface of war enthusiasm, public responses to the events in 
South Africa and their interpretation by the new mass media also reflected 
a deepening crisis in the self-image of the empire-nation. William Lecky 
stated that the war meant a huge disappointment for the British nation.52 
In addition the military operations provoked widespread criticism, which 
49 Hampton, “The Press, Patriotism, and Public Discussion”; Steinsieck, “Ein imperialistischer 
Medienkrieg”.
50 Saunders and Smith, “Southern Africa, 1795-1914”, pp. 618-619.
51 Price, An Imperial War and the British Working Class; Pakenham, The Boer War; Warwick 
and Spies, The South African War; Friedberg, The Weary Titan; Grundlingh, “The Bitter Legacy 
of the Boer War”; Surridge, Managing the South African War, 1899-1902; Dennis and Grey, The 
Boer War.
52 Lecky, Moral Aspects of the South African War, p. 7; see Ellam, “Capitalist Patriotism and 
Its Effects in South Africa”; Warren, “Some Lessons from the South African War”; Robertson, 
Patriotism and Empire; Yate, “The Spirit of the Nation in War”; Mahan, “The Influence of the 
South African War upon the Prestige of the British Empire”; Kent, “Patriotism or Imperialism?”; 
Goltz, “The Military Lessons of the South African War”; Grey, The Land We Love.
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now turned against the traditional impirial patriotism. For critical con-
temporaries the war had underlined that the empire was more and more 
founded on uncivilized violence and that it caused a huge f inancial burden 
for Britain, which prevented it from following the German model of progres-
sive social reforms at home.53 In this context, it seemed that conscription, 
if ever introduced, would become yet another burden for British workers: 
“Empire and Conscription? […] What have you to say, John Smith, you who 
are to pay and bleed? No one dare seriously propose Conscription to-day, 
but in the histories of nations come days of imminent danger and panic; 
fears become excited and people lose their heads. If Conscription ever comes 
to England, it will come at some such crisis.” 54 Other observers pointed to 
the general unpopularity of conscription in British society and to practical 
diff iculties in applying it to the empire: “Conscription is talked of, but that 
would not be popular, our people don’t want to be driven. They will always 
answer the call in thousands, and storm any position to give their enemy 
the cold steel, there is no lack of pluck, but soldiers must be trained, and 
their training must be kept up these days, and the best trained will win 
the day. Again with India and our many Colonies and responsibilities how 
would conscription act, you would have three or four different armies, each 
under different rules.” 55
Yet, on the other hand, parts of the British public identif ied enthusiasti-
cally with the fate of the British “Tommy” who fought as a volunteer for the 
nation. According to this position, he deserved at least the same estimation 
as the military in continental conscript armies, if not more. The superior-
ity of the volunteer over the conscript was defended: “Our hero is not a 
conscript. He enters the army of his own free will and choice [...]. It will be 
interesting to note whether any ‘snubbing’ process will be inflicted upon 
him after he has done his best for the glory and honour of the country, – or 
whether hats will be touched as he comes and goes in places of resort and 
amusement, out of respect for the uniform he wears, as is the case with his 
brothers in Austria and Germany.” As a soldier of the crown and dressed in 
the Queen’s uniform he ought to expect “as much respect throughout the 
English Empire wherever he goes, as a soldier of the German Emperor in 
the Emperor’s uniform receives in every part of the German Empire, – nay 
53 Maude, War and Patriotism, p. 31.
54 Thompson, Towards Conscription, p. 16.
55 Godwin-Austin, An Army without Conscription, pp. 1-2.
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even more, for the German ‘Tommy’ is compelled to serve, while his English 
brother serves by choice.” 56
Kenelm Digby Cotes’s Social and Imperial Life of Britain, published in 
1900 and widely read, tried to analyze the new relation between the British 
nation and the military in the light of recent war experiences. To him, 
as to many contemporaries, the Boer War had underlined the necessity 
of mobilizing all the resources of the nation. War had become a test of 
the nation’s survival in an age of dynamic international competition, 
which Britain could only survive on the basis of a community of citizens 
and not as a society of antagonistic classes. Hence political participation 
and imperial defense became necessarily interrelated: “The connection 
between war and the national character, important as it always was, is of 
immeasurably greater importance at the present time [...]. Now that the 
citizen soldier has almost taken the place of the paid soldier, war will be, 
more than it ever was, an index of the state of the country.” Following the 
classical premises of the Whig interpretation of history, military service 
and political participation had to go hand in hand. In the highly idealized 
sense of a linear process of uninterrupted constitutional progress, the end 
of dynastic wars and arming the people seemed to come together. It was 
again the self-image of evolutionary continuity that served as a national 
self-aff irmation: “In England, each stage in arming the people is a stage of 
industrial and constitutional progress.” 57
The contemporary mass media’s interest in the Boer War placed the 
army at the very center of public concern. Yet at the same time earlier 
questions about the British ability to conduct a future war and to defend the 
empire against a growing number of European competitors were revived.58 
Although conscription was still no alternative, the contemporary war dis-
courses around 1900 took a new direction, in that recent war experiences 
were related to the development of industrial society and parliamentary 
government as they had progressed in nineteenth-century Britain. Hence 
the conscription controversy after 1900 ref lected the different and 
controversial interpretations of Britain’s modernity in comparison with 
continental nation-states, in particular the second German Empire of 1871.
In a highly signif icant contribution to this debate, Charles Ross stated 
in 1903 that the British nation had been falsely immunized against the 
vitalizing effects of wars by its economic successes. In comparison with 
56 Corelli, Patriotism or Self-Advertisement?, pp. 6-7.
57 Cotes, Social and Imperial Life of Britain, I, pp. 427-428, 642.
58 [Cairnes], The Army from Within, pp. 1, 148.
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continental societies that had survived their critical moments in past wars 
only as nations-in-arms, Britain was now threatened by decline: “The nation 
is [...] over-civilised which, through the ease, comfort, and security of its 
existence, gives no thought to war [...]. Such a nation quickly degenerates; 
for it is by war, and by the constant study of war, alone, that a nation can 
maintain itself in such a condition as will enable it to combat and overcome 
its enemies.” Ross and many of his contemporaries regarded war as the 
supreme test in the process of human evolution, and modern conscript 
armies seemed to be the quasi-natural means for that test. From this point 
of view, nations-in-arms responded to a new stage in human evolution, 
caused by the development of industrial societies. The Boer War seemed 
to have underlined that, as a successful empire-nation, Britain was already 
in decline. Ross also identif ied the structural causes behind this painful 
experience: it was the nation’s one-sided focus on politics, administration, 
and economic well-being as well as the traditional mistrust of the military 
that had long overshadowed its belligerent qualities and prevented the 
necessary autonomy of the military in a modern society. For Ross it was 
a fundamental weakness of representative government that “soldiers and 
sailors [...] are placed in a position subordinate to civilian off icials, whose 
duty it should be [...] to confine their attention to civil matters”.59
Ross reflected upon the primacy of politics, which he regarded as a central 
problem of European societies around 1900: were democratic systems at all 
capable of conducting a future war, or would their complex decisionmaking 
processes on the basis of parliamentary governments and a primacy of the 
civil over the military not render them incapable of effectively defending 
themselves in time of war? Here the discussion went far beyond the practical 
problems of changing a professional into a conscript army.60 Unsurprisingly, 
Ross developed his argument on the basis of an explicit comparison with 
Germany and against the background of highly increased international 
competition. According to him, the German Empire after 1871 had success-
fully established a political and constitutional system which corresponded 
adequately to its military necessities as a new nation-state: “A military 
despotism which consists of a whole nation in arms, each man of which is 
as it were his own despot in peace-time and in matters connected purely 
with his personal comfort, but who is a disciplined member of a great force 
wielded by the head of the nation in war, is not, it would seem in reality, 
59 Ross, Representative Government and War, pp. 7, 11, 162-163.
60 Wilson, “Democracy and the War”, “The Anti-National Party in England”; Quelch, Social-
Democracy and the Armed Nation.
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despotism. The German nation appears to have succeeded where the Ro-
mans failed, inasmuch as it would seem to have found a form of government 
which is not incompatible either with success in war or with true liberty. 
All other nations liable at any moment to invasion have followed this lead.” 
In a future war against a nation-in-arms constituted like Germany, Britain 
seemed inevitably inferior.61
The British Empire’s particular situation with its ethnic groups and 
heterogeneous structures made the situation still worse. In the light of these 
fundamental problems integrative institutions were needed to compensate 
for the lack of unifying war experiences which characterized the conti-
nental concept of a unifying and integrative nation-in-arms. In contrast, 
the British Empire presented only a “conglomeration of [...] nations” which 
could be kept together neither through language or family ties nor on the 
basis of economic relations. Ross argued in favor of military cohesion and 
advocated an imperial military community, which he called a “brotherhood 
in arms”. For him the lack of such a military community explained many 
of the empire’s problems. According to him, it had been military service 
within the British union which had brought the different ethnic groups of 
the British Isles together: only this experience of common military service 
had finally integrated Scots, Welsh, and Irish into the Union of Great Britain. 
The union model of a successful military community now had to be applied 
to the empire at large. The military experience of the union served as a 
model for integrating the whole empire, and this allowed Ross to link the 
South African crisis to the Irish problem when referring to the role played by 
Irish soldiers in the British armed forces: “The assimilation of South Africa 
is no more a complicated problem than is the suppression of rebellion in 
Ireland. The sole diff iculty lies in bringing an uneducated nation governed 
by sentiment and a popular government to grasp the necessity for action. A 
whole race, related to the Empire in blood, but distinct from it in language, 
in tradition, and in religion, must be brought to form an integral part of 
the Empire. No more loyal man than the Irish soldier exists; he has fought 
side by side with other men of his race, and knows their worth, even as they 
know his. He is proof against the wiles of the pedagogue and the politician. 
A brotherhood in arms, the great bond which establishes fast friendship 
between nation and nation as between man and man, will alone bind South 
Africa to the remainder of the Empire, as it will alone bring to a termination 
the intrigue and covert rebellion in the South of Ireland.” 62
61 Ross, Representative Government and War, pp. 221-222, 292.
62 Ibid., pp. 362-363, 365.
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Imperial defense prior to and after 1914
The link which contemporary observers established between the war in 
South Africa and the Irish crisis is highly signif icant for the British Empire’s 
complexity before 1914. The military was in many ways the very link between 
these different scenarios. Ireland was, as Engels had once put it, England’s 
f irst colony, but it also formed part of the empire’s metropolitan center by 
supplying the empire with soldiers, settlers, and administrative personnel, 
thus taking advantage of possible careers in the military, in the colonial 
administration, or in commerce and trade.63 That was per se no exception: 
Indians also helped to govern India, and colonial subjects of the French 
Empire engaged in similar functions.64 But nowhere did the dual role generate 
such a paradoxical constellation. The example of the Boer War demonstrates 
this: two Transvaal Brigades were formed by the Irish on behalf of the Boers, 
but serving on the opposite side were about 28,000 Irish soldiers in the 
British army. Ireland’s status as both colonial and imperial became obvious 
during the war: if pro-Boer agitation inspired the Irish republican movement, 
serving the empire against the Boers in South Africa was an important aspect 
of Ulster Unionism. Yet comparing Irish and Boer secessionist nationalism 
ignored the Boers’ treatment of black Africans. Pro-Boer agitation certainly 
radicalized nationalist feelings in Ireland before 1914, in that parliamentary 
representation was increasingly seen as irrelevant.65
This highly complex identity as both colonial and imperial is obvious 
from many biographies of leading Irish Home Rulers in the last third of 
the nineteenth century: they were proud of Irish feats within the British 
forces, yet critical of the British Army itself, which they often regarded as 
a repressive force in the hands of Protestant Unionists. They welcomed the 
individual careers of their children in the colonial forces or in the impe-
rial administration, but were critical of the rulers of the empire as such. 
Hundreds of Irish nationalists exemplif ied this paradoxical constellation 
in their own biographies and careers: they welcomed Home Rule, but they 
also fought in the British forces after 1914, and yet later proceeded in the 
ranks of the Irish Republican Army.66
63 Kenny, “The Irish in the Empire”, pp. 92-93; Holmes, “The Irish and India”, p. 235; Jeffery, 
“An Irish Empire”?
64 Kiernan, Colonial Empires and Armies.
65 Kenny, “Ireland and the British Empire”, pp. 19, 193.
66 Jackson, “Ireland, the Union, and the Empire”, pp. 137-139.
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The interrelation between imperial and colonial identity also continued 
after 1914, but now the constellation began to change. An estimated 200,000 
men from all parts of Ireland served in the British forces during World War 
I. Thus Irishmen made up about 10 per cent of the British army recruits 
in 1913 compared with 20 per cent in 1870. In the Dominions, enlistment 
during World War I varied between 13 per cent and 19 per cent of the overall 
white population, but for Ireland the f igures were down to only 6 per cent. 
Recruitment from Ireland declined especially after the Easter Rising of 
1916.67 At the same time a very influential antiwar movement emerged that 
included veterans from the Transvaal Committee. The complexity of empire 
relations meant that serving the British forces did not exclude secessionist 
and radical nationalism. There was still an elaborate overlapping of military 
service and revolutionary agitation against London.68
Finally, the contemporary reference to Ireland in the context of coming 
to terms with the experience of the Boer War certainly overshadowed the 
fact that prior to 1914 it was with regard to the Home Rule debate that serious 
tensions arose between parts of the military elite and the government in 
London. The army presented itself as the most important integrating force 
of both union and empire, as the Curragh mutiny demonstrated. When in 
March 1914 off icers of the 6th Cavalry Brigade in Ireland declared that they 
were not prepared to march to the North to implement autonomy, Lord 
Roberts openly supported their position and demanded the resignation of 
the chief of the General Staff.69 Here, the army’s self-image as the guarantee 
of the British union as the empire’s center became apparent. Ireland and not 
the maritime empire was the testing ground for this process which, because 
of the outbreak of World War I, was postponed until 1918. The example of 
the violent actions of demobilized soldiers in Ireland after the end of the 
war underlined the role of the military at the periphery.70
It was World War I that brought about both a new role of the colonies 
and Dominions and a fundamentally new relationship between Britain 
and the empire. Radicalizing the earlier experience of the Boer War, the 
67 Kenny, “The Irish in the Empire”, pp. 108-109; Jeffery, Ireland and the Great War, pp. 39, 
107-143, The British Army and the Crisis of Empire, p. 1.
68 Kenny, “Ireland and the British Empire”, 20; Jackson, “Ireland, the Union, and the Empire”, 
p. 142.
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empire now came close to being a single military entity with joint military 
operations in various theaters of war.71 Pan-British sentiments dominated in 
the white Dominions, and the outbreak of war was often used to defend the 
very different positions held in the hierarchy of the empire. Thus reactions 
from Canada or Australia differed from those in India, where the annual 
Indian National Congress in Madras during December 1914 was poorly 
attended.72 What became clear, however, was the growing importance of 
imperial troops for the military theaters around the world, as the numbers 
of imperial soldiers sent abroad and lost in military operations demonstrate 
(see Table 17.1).
















british isles 46,000,000 5,000,000 10.9 705,000 14.1
canada 8,000,000 458,000 5.7 57,000 12.4
australia 5,000,000 332,000 6.6 59,000 17.8
south africa 1,400,000 136,000 9.7 7,000 5.1
new Zealand 1,100,000 112,000 10.2 17,000 15.2
Source: all data, except percentages, are taken from table 5.1 in holland, “the british Empire and 
the Great War”, p. 117.
A special role was played by the Indian army. From summer 1914 to the end 
of 1918 it recruited another 826,868 combatants and 445,592 noncombat-
ants. Indian army casualties off icially included 64,449 killed and 69,214 
wounded. In sum, 16.2 per cent of all Indian soldiers recruited during the war 
were killed or wounded in action. In 1918, a total of 943,344 Indian troops 
were serving in major war theaters: 14.1 per cent in France, 5.0 per cent in 
Africa, 62.4 per cent in Mesopotamia, 12.3 per cent in Egypt, 1.0 per cent in 
Salonica, 5.2 per cent in Aden and in the Gulf. Making India the “barrack in 
the Eastern seas” also meant changing its weight within the empire, and the 
result was a new equation between war contributions and political status. 
A new tacit principle emerged that anticipated future developments: “no 
contribution without representation”.73
71 Jeffery, The British Army and the Crisis of Empire, p. 1.
72 Holland, “The British Empire and the Great War”, pp. 114-117.
73 Ibid., pp. 122-123; Brown, “War and the Colonial Relationship”.
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Conclusion: Britain in comparative perspective
Whereas French, German, or Italian societies experienced their war ideal 
in national wars, fought in their collective imagination by nations-in-arms, 
the British referred to the empire’s small wars, in which the army came to 
represent an imagined empire-nation, an idea encompassing many ethnic 
and racial connotations. In contrast to continental societies, the tendency 
to anticipate a major future war in Europe as a conflict over the existence 
of the entire nation was a rather late development in Britain. Only after 
1890, and in the context of the naval race with Germany, did a possible 
German invasion lead to hysterical reactions among the British public. 
These invasion panics had their origins in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and 
eighteenth centuries when they had been focusing on Spain and France as 
the main political and confessional enemies, a perception that was renewed 
before 1815 and again during the three anti-French panics of 1848, 1852, and 
1859.74 It was only from the 1890s onwards that Germany began to replace 
France as the anticipated invader of the future. This collective perception 
increased the popularity of both the army and the navy before 1914. But 
in contrast to continental countries, it was not a cult of a nation-in-arms 
that characterized this development, but rather a belated militarization of 
society, as the numerous paramilitary activities of army and navy leagues, 
boy brigades, and boy scout movements illustrated.75
National wars, shaping the religious and national identity of the British, 
had characterized the conflicts with Spain and France in the early modern 
period and during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Instead 
of the short national wars on the continent between 1859 and 1871, Britain 
witnessed more or less constant military action in its colonies. The absence 
of large conscript armies on the British island and the colonial small wars 
allowed the imagination of an empire-nation, symbolized by the army 
abroad which came to represent British and Christian values. In contrast 
to continental cases, belligerent images of the British nation paradoxically 
developed both earlier and later: earlier in the wars from the sixteenth to 
the eighteenth centuries against Spain and France and later, in the context 
of armament races, in the anti-German invasion panics during the decade 
before 1914. With the disappearance of traditional antimilitarism, ethnic 
74 Colley, Britons.
75 Strachan, “Militär, Empire und Civil Society”, p. 90; Cunningham, The Volunteer Force; 
Strachan, History of the Cambridge University Officers Training Corps; Beckett, Riflemen Form.
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and racial connotations of Anglo-Saxon superiority and British-Christian 
civilization increasingly dominated contemporary war discourses.
Before 1914 a large spectrum of connotations associated with modern 
warfare characterized the British case. The presence of positive and affirma-
tive or critical positions reflected the complexity of a modern industrial 
society which fell under increasing pressure from the empire’s overstretch 
and international competition. War was accepted as a necessary means and 
a ferment of state-building.76 It could be seen as a universalized principle 
of competition, selection, and rationalization: “The science of organisation 
must raise and standardise the art and practice of all organisations, whether 
employed in military warfare, in the warfare which society or a nation 
wages as a whole, or in a warfare which a section of society wages – must 
apply to an Empire as to a municipality, to a public department as to a 
private business.” 77 If Britain did not experience the nation-in-arms model 
by the introduction of conscription, it certainly experienced a process of 
militarization of society. Popular notions of a belligerent jingoism were a 
prominent feature of prewar mass culture. Veterans’, voluntary and military 
associations, youth movements, and students played an important role in 
this militarization of British society before 1914.78
Yet at the same time the numerous articles, essays, and books on imperial 
defense also underline the impact of implicit comparisons between the 
British Empire and continental powers which were perceived as belliger-
ent nations-in-arms.79 Conscription remained a controversial issue. This 
comparison was made even more diff icult in the light of British workers’ 
distance toward the military, which was regarded as a potential weakness 
in a future war: “The mass of the people is utterly oblivious of sound military 
principles [...] there are millions of the working classes to whom England, 
as England, does not exist. They recognise [...] no allegiance to a country in 
which their whole stake is the chance of wresting a bare subsistence from 
the blind commercial force by which they are wholly dominated.” 80
76 Holsti, “The Relation of War to the Origin of State”.
77 Williams, Military and Industrial War and the Science of Organisation, p. 14.
78 Price, “Society, Status and Jingoism”; Pryke, “The Popularity of Nationalism in the Early 
British Boy Scout Movement”; Ward, Red Flag and Union Jack; Levsen, Elite, Männlichkeit und 
Krieg, pp. 123-125, 171-173.
79 Dilke and Wilkinson, Imperial Defence; Wilkinson, The Great Alternative, “Preparation 
for War”, The Brain of an Army, Britain at Bay, War and Policy; Horsfall, National Service and 
the Welfare of the Community; Underwood, A Plea for National Military Training in Britain; 
Arnold-Foster, Military Needs and Military Policy; James, “The Moral Equivalent of War”; Callwell, 
“Introduction”.
80 Cornford, The Defenceless Island, pp. 235-236.
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This was no exception in European comparison. In stark contrast to his 
belief in maintaining political and military control of war, the military 
hero of the German Wars of Unif ication, Helmuth von Moltke, who had 
benefited so much from the military power of a disciplined conscript army, 
in one of his last speeches in the Reichstag in May 1890, pointed out that the 
traditional concept of cabinet wars had now irrevocably come to an end. 
Reflecting upon the dilemma of the nations-in-arms, he saw traditional 
cabinet wars replaced by new peoples’ wars as they had developed since 
1848. Wars were no longer fought on the basis of a political and military 
primacy, but seemed more and more influenced by social interests, social 
conflicts, and public opinion. Moltke argued that the causes that made 
peace so diff icult to maintain were no longer princes and governments, 
but peoples and classes, pointing in particular to the lower classes’ social 
interests and their will to use revolutionary force in order to improve their 
socioeconomic position. Nations-in-arms would ultimately mean arming 
the people – with all the social and political consequences that would have. 
Under these circumstances a short and decisive war seemed no longer 
possible. Given the enormous armaments of all European powers, a future 
war was likely to last indefinitely. A decisive reason for this prospect was 
the fact that mass conscription had transformed the limited size of earlier 
armies into nations-in-arms with virtually unlimited human resources. 
Anticipating an experience which all European societies would share 
after 1914-1918, he argued that no power could be totally defeated, and that 
consequently peace treaties would have only a temporary signif icance. 
Moltke was convinced that the war of the future would no longer be fought 
for territorial gain or power positions, but for the very existence of nations 
and nation-states. Future wars would therefore transform the complete 
social and political basis of existing nations and of civilization itself.81
Confronted with wars against revolutionary and Napoleonic France, 
Prussia at the beginning of the century had introduced universal con-
scription and, in contrast to the French model, exemptions had not been 
allowed. However, and again in contrast to France, Prussia denied any 
coupling of conscription and citizenship rights. Moltke noticed to what 
extent the new tendencies toward nations-in-arms and people’s wars, 
which he saw advancing after the conflicts of the 1860s and 1870s, would 
ultimately include the right of political and social participation of all classes 
of society and hence question the foundations of the new German Empire 
81 Moltke, “Speech in the Reichstag, 14th May 1890”; see also Schlieffen, Über die Millionenheere 
(1911); Leonhard, “Nation-States and Wars”.
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of 1871. The war discourses of the later nineteenth century anticipated what 
would become reality only after 1914: a new concept of national service, 
based upon common war sacrif ices, by which all classes of society could 
demand to participate equally in a democratic society. Britain, prior to 
World War I, had experienced a different path toward this development, but 
the consequences of relating national war service to political participation 
after 1918 became a common feature of all western societies which had 
experienced the Great War.

 Mobilizing military labor in the age of 
total war
Ottoman conscription before and during the Great War
Mehmet Beşikçi
As warfare became more industrialized and total from the mid-nineteenth 
century onward, conscript labor became increasingly necessary to meet the 
manpower needs of modern mass armies. As a multifront and prolonged war 
of attrition, the Great War represents the apogee of this process. Military 
employment in the form of obligatory service, required of every male citizen 
as a patriotic duty, also defined a new interaction (both inclusive and exclu-
sive) between the state and society, providing the centralizing state with a 
new mechanism of control at the local level. As a result, conscription was on 
the agenda not only of nation-states, but also of multiethnic empires, includ-
ing the Ottoman Empire. This chapter deals with the Ottoman experience 
of conscription. After discussing Ottoman conscription from its beginnings 
in the nineteenth century, it focuses on its application during the Great War. 
Rather than presenting a thorough description of Ottoman conscription, 
the chapter explores its major characteristics and peculiarities. While basic 
categories of military labor were similar, the practice unfolded in different 
ways in different settings. Therefore, emphasizing “the Ottoman difference” 
is as important as underlining the similarities with other cases. Besides 
providing a critical analysis of Ottoman conscription, this chapter also 
aims to shed light on the Ottoman experience in order to bring it into a 
comparative perspective within the global history of military recruitment.
The evolution of Ottoman conscription
The French Revolution’s levée en masse was enacted in 1793 to confront the 
threat of a multifront war with foreign powers and of rebellions at home 
by summoning all able-bodied men to defend the “nation”. The levy was 
regarded as an action that would put into practice Rousseau’s prescription 
in the social contract that “every citizen should be a soldier by duty, not 
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by trade”.1 Whereas the French revolutionary mass levy was an ad hoc 
measure, conscription acquired a systematic form in the age of Napoleon.2 
But it was the mid-nineteenth-century Prussian model that gave the system 
a more established obligatory character and formed a military structure 
drafting large numbers of men in an eff icient way.3 Conscription not only 
increased the eff iciency of armies in the age of industrialized warfare, but 
also, and perhaps more importantly, formed new relations between state 
and society. It signalled an intrusion of the state into people’s lives and 
created an area of contention between the state and society. Conscription 
can also be depicted as a battleground between “individual and local com-
munities on the one hand and a distant impersonal state on the other”.4 
Compulsory military service in nineteenth-century Europe was envisioned 
as a way of creating a new form of loyalty to the state, as a form of nationalist 
socialization, and as a new system of drill and training to ensure military 
eff iciency.5
European models, the Prussian one in particular, inspired and influenced 
the Ottoman conscription system, but a more direct “role model” in this 
respect was Mehmed Ali Pasha’s (r. 1805-1848) modernized Egyptian army.6 
His well-trained army of conscripted Egyptian peasants prevailed over Mah-
mud II’s (r. 1808-1839) Ottoman army in Syria in 1831-1833, when Mehmed 
Ali was still nominally an Ottoman governor and Egypt a province of the 
Ottoman Empire. However, while the European influence was signif icant, 
the evolution of Ottoman conscription was determined to a considerable 
extent by its own internal dynamics, culture, politics, and challenges.
When the Ottoman state embarked upon a process of military reform in 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries to establish a centralized 
modern army integrated with the population, it increasingly became aware 
of the potential of obligatory military service as the main recruitment 
mechanism to realize its goals.7 Conscription would not only serve as an 
eff icient way of meeting manpower needs of the newly formed standing 
1 Woloch, The New Regime, p. 382. 
2 Woloch, “Napoleonic Conscription”.
3 On the reorganization of the conscription system in Prussia especially after the defeat of the 
Prussian army at Jena in 1806, see Hippler, Citizens, Soldiers and National Armies, pp. 163-189. 
4 Woloch, The New Regime, p. 380; Forrest, Conscripts and Deserters, p. viii.
5 Mjoset and Van Holde, “Killing for the State, Dying for the Nation”, pp. 9, 51. 
6 Zürcher, “The Ottoman Conscription System in Theory and Practice”, p. 81. On the Egyptian 
conscription system during the time of Mehmed Ali Pasha, see Fahmy, All the Pasha’s Men.
7 On the background and beginning of this reform process, see Aksan, Ottoman Wars, 1700-
1870. See also Erdem, “Recruitment for the ‘Victorious Soldiers of Muhammad’ in the Arab 
Provinces”; Çadırcı, Tanzimat Sürecinde Türkiye.
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army, but it would also contribute to a more general reform attempt of 
the Ottoman state, which involved a move toward centralization and 
better permeation of state power into provinces and local populations. In 
this sense, the willingness on the part of the Ottoman state to introduce 
conscription not only stemmed from the necessities of the changing nature 
of warfare,8 which compulsory military service served better than previous 
forms of recruitment, but it was also closely related to the state’s changing 
political-ideological preferences. Conscription was attractive because a 
well-established conscription mechanism would give the political center 
more control at the local level and it would provide more effective power 
over local magnates who had accumulated considerable autonomy in the 
eighteenth century.9 Therefore, it is not surprising that one of the earlier 
steps taken towards creating a modern centralized conscript army in the 
Ottoman Empire was the formation of the reserve corps (redif ) in 1834 as 
a permanent armed force stationed in the provinces.10 In establishing this, 
Mahmud II acted with a dual objective. This would not only be a reserve 
force for the army to be activated for external uses during wartime, but it 
would also contribute to the imposition of central authority over Anatolia, 
particularly over the rebellious tribes and nomadic groups.11
Conscription was also one of the main agendas of the Tanzimat (Reor-
ganization) edict of 1839, which ushered in major administrative reforms 
8 This change occurred both in the sense of “hardware” (weapon technology, infrastructure, 
etc.) and in that of “software” (military drill, tactics, strategies, etc.). 
9 For a concise analysis of this process, see Khoury, “The Ottoman Centre versus Provincial 
Power-Holders”.
10 The redif units initially recruited men from local populations on a voluntary basis, and 
then, after 1844, by the drawing of lots. The redif soldiers can be seen as “part-time soldiers”. 
They were required to gather for training twice a year, and they were called up during wartime. 
At other times, they continued their civilian lives. The main reason for this method was the 
scarcity of labor force in agriculture. Compared to conscription, the redif system allowed, during 
peacetime, the manpower that was employed in agriculture to be left in place. On the redif 
sytem, see Çadırcı, Tanzimat Sürecinde Türkiye, pp. 27-63. The Ottoman reserve corps system 
became dysfunctional over time and was abolished in 1913; the corps were replaced by regular 
army units.
11 Aksan, “Ottoman Recruitment in the Late Eighteenth Century”, p. 33. In fact, at a more 
general level, the main motive for the entire process of Ottoman military reform was to control 
endemic violence both internal and external. Similar to Charles Tilly’s view, Aksan has linked 
militarization and the articulation of the modern state: “control of internal violence and defence 
of shrinking borders drove mobilization and military f iscalism in the late eighteenth century, 
and propelled the emergence of Ottoman mid-nineteenth-century absolutism” (ibid., 22). See 
also Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States. For a similar discussion of the abolition of 
the janissaries and the coming of a modern standing army based on conscription in the era of 
Mahmud II, see Yıldız, Neferin Adı Yok. 
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aimed at creating a centralized modern bureaucracy, an eff icient modern 
f iscal system, and a modern powerful army. As of this date, conscription 
was always referred to in the off icial discourse not only as one of the major 
foundation blocks of the military reform, but also as a new tool that would 
be useful in creating an “Ottoman citizenry” out of a multireligious and 
multiethnic imperial population in the age of nationalism.12
However, the implementation of conscription in the Ottoman Empire was 
not a smooth process. Although a commitment to conscription emerged in 
the early 1830s, Mahmud II’s modern standing army continued to be a pro-
fessional army for a while; it recruited men as “volunteers” to be employed as 
paid soldiers. The f irst comprehensive legislation concerning conscription 
was issued only in 1846.13 What pushed Ottoman conscription to be a more 
established and standardized system were the large-scale modern wars 
in the second half of the nineteenth century, such as the Crimean War 
(1853-1856) and the Russo-Ottoman War (1877-1878). These multifront and 
industrialized wars demanded much larger mass armies. The coming of 
the age of “total war” with the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) and the Great War 
required a more eff icient system of conscription, which could provide a 
large-scale and permanent mobilization.14 However, Ottoman conscription, 
while becoming more established, continued to be incomplete as well as 
discriminatory to a considerable extent.
The incompleteness had mostly to do with infrastructural problems. The 
level of the Ottoman state’s “infrastructural development” was far from 
being satisfactory in the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries.15 
For example, the system of universal conscription required a reliable 
census to determine where the potential manpower could be found. Such 
a demographic mechanism then necessitated a sizeable growth in the 
state bureaucracy, which would include an eff icient recruitment organi-
zation, economic power to supply provisions to conscripts, and security 
12 On the changing nature of the Ottoman recruitment system in the Tanzimat period, see 
Heinzelmann, Cihaddan Vatan Savunmasına; Şimşek, “Ottoman Military Recruitment and the 
Recruit”. 
13 Various major legal revisions were made in 1869, 1886, 1909, and 1914. On the documentation 
of the Ottoman laws concerning conscription, see Ayın, Osmanlı Devleti’nde Tanzimat’tan Sonra 
Askere Alma Kanunları.
14 For a concise account of these wars, see Uyar and Erickson, A Military History of the Ot-
tomans.
15 I am using “infrastructural development” in the sense Michael Mann has used it. See 
Mann, The Sources of Social Power, II, The Rise of Classes and Nation-States. See also Weiss, 
“Infrastructural Power, Economic Transformation, and Globalization”. 
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forces and eff icient sanctions to combat draft-evading and desertion.16 
Nineteenth-century Ottoman modernization achieved a certain amount of 
progress in these respects, but never to the extent that would bring about 
remarkable success. There were severe geographical differences. The system 
almost never worked in the economically underdeveloped regions where 
the infrastructural power of the state was quite weak, such as the tribal 
Kurdish-populated parts of southeastern Anatolia and certain regions of 
the Ottoman Middle East, where a nomadic lifestyle was still dominant.
Where and when unable to implement conscription on the individual 
basis, the Ottoman state resorted to earlier practices in such regions, such 
as getting into contact with communal or tribal leaders and encouraging 
them to join the Ottoman armed forces by forming “volunteer” units from 
their local populations under their own leadership in return for certain 
political and material gains from the state. One of the best examples of this 
practice was the Hamidiye Cavalry Regiments, which were established by 
Abdülhamid II (r. 1876-1909), but also continued in different forms through 
the Great War. This was an irregular militia composed of select Kurdish 
tribes. The basis of joining this militia was, at least in principle, voluntary. 
Besides its intended function as being an auxiliary force in the region acting 
on behalf of the Ottoman state, the Hamidiye was also a part of a larger 
sociopolitical project aimed at creating a special bond of unity between 
the center and the Kurds. It was meant to “tie the empire more f irmly to 
its Muslim roots and provide a defense against Russia and the Armenians, 
both increasingly aggressive after 1878, and the Kurds could be used as a 
balance against the urban notables and the provincial governments”.17 On 
the other hand, some regions where the state not only lacked the capacity to 
control but also did not have “reliable” connections with local leaders, such 
as Yemen, were completely left out of the Ottoman system both formally 
and informally.
The Ottoman conscription system was discriminatory. The system had a 
marked religious character and always remained predominantly Muslim in 
practice. While the universality of conscription was accepted in principle, 
in practice the focus of the systme was on the Muslim Ottomans. In fact, 
the Ottoman military reform can be described as “the re-construction 
of a Muslim army”.18 In this sense, Ottoman conscription served the re-
16 Lucassen and Zürcher, “Introduction”, p. 10.
17 Olson, The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion, p. 8. See also 
Van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State; Klein, “Power in the Periphery”.
18 Aksan, “Ottoman Recruitment in the Late Eighteenth Century”, p. 22.
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Islamization of Ottoman identity rather than creating a secular Ottoman 
citizenry. This does not mean that there were no non-Muslim soldiers in 
the Ottoman armed forces. In certain specif ic positions in which there 
were not enough Muslims, such as medical off icers, the Ottoman Arme-
nians, Greeks, and Jews were welcome in the army, and held the ranks 
of lieutenant and captain.19 As for enlisted men too, in some cases, such 
as the navy, non-Muslims were enlisted in the Ottoman armed forces as 
early as the 1830s.20 But such examples were usually related to the specif ic 
needs of the Ottoman military at certain times, and they never constituted 
a standardized common practice integrated into the system. However, 
non-Muslims were not totally excluded; on the contrary, they were always 
kept within the system, but in a discriminatory way.21 The Reform Decree 
(Islahat Fermanı) of 1856 extended the obligation of military service to 
non-Muslims but allowed for exemption upon payment of a fee. Buying 
exemptions in this way almost became the norm for non-Muslims, and 
the exemption fee in practice replaced the cizye, the tax that Islamic law 
required of non-Muslims.22 The extent of the exemption fee was restricted 
in the legislations of 1909 and 1914, but it never disappeared entirely.
While the application of the exemption fee was more standardized for 
non-Muslims, the method of buying exemption was not closed to Muslims, 
either. But it was not just that this option offered to Muslims was often 
revised with new regulations; in addition, the payment that they had to 
make was much higher (it was 50 gold liras after 1870), and only quite rich 
Muslims could afford it.23 So, conscription was unequal in economic terms, 
too. The burden of actually serving in the army almost always fell on the 
poor in general and peasants in particular.
On the other hand, the universality of military service did not mean that 
all able-bodied Muslim males of military age would be obliged to serve in 
the military, either. For various pragmatic reasons, there was an extensive 
system of exemptions for Muslim Ottomans as well. Until more restrictive 
regulations were put into effect in 1909 and 1914 as well as during the Great 
War, many categories of Muslims in the empire had the right to be exempt 
19 Zürcher, “The Ottoman Conscription System in Theory and Practice”, p. 89.
20 Heinzelmann, Cihaddan Vatan Savunmasına, p. 206.
21 On the history of the conscription of Ottoman non-Muslims, see Gülsoy, Osmanlı Gay-
rimüslimlerinin Askerlik Serüveni. 
22 Heinzelmann, Cihaddan Vatan Savunmasına, p. 250. 
23 Zürcher, “The Ottoman Conscription System in Theory and Practice”, p. 87. There was also 
the option of personal replacement to avoid service, but this method disappeared relatively 
early. 
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from military service. These included religious functionaries, medrese 
students, Muslim residents of Istanbul and the Hijaz province (the holy 
cities of Mecca and Medina), high- and even middle-ranking bureaucrats, 
much needed skilled laborers, and males who were the only breadwinners 
of their families.
Was there an ethnic dimension in Ottoman conscription in the sense of 
being based on a certain ethnicity and excluding others? There were certain 
“ethnic” preferences, but it is hard to say that the Ottoman conscription 
system had a clear ethnic dimension from the beginning. Discrimination 
was based on religion rather than ethnicity. But it should be noted that 
there was an ethnic hierarchy in Ottoman conscription. The Anatolian 
Muslim population (Turks, Kurds, Circassians, and Laz) in general and the 
Turkish element in particular constituted the backbone of the Ottoman 
military. The “dominance” of the Turkish element was evident as early as 
during the military reforms Mahmud II.24 This element was preferred as 
the most trusted group in attempts to make the state more centralized and 
to subject, for example, “peripheral” Arab provinces to the centralization 
process. The ethnic core of the new Ottoman army established by Mahmud 
II was “made up of ‘Turks’, the Türk uşağı (‘Turkish lads’) which Ottoman 
commanders increasingly saw as the most reliable, most malleable cannon 
fodder”.25 The Ottoman state always tried to integrate its Arab population 
into its military, but a certain amount of ambivalence towards and distrust 
of the Arabs also always existed, reaching unprecedented levels during the 
Great War.26
Was the Ottoman conscription system popular? It is evident that the 
system had to cope with occasional major resistance coming from various 
segments of society. First of all, it should be noted that, while the system was 
discriminatory against non-Muslims, there was no particular enthusiasm 
on the part of the latter about serving in the Ottoman armed forces, either. 
It is true that since inclusion into obligatory military service would provide 
certain political gains and an increase in status, leading to full citizen-
ship, various political or religious representatives of the Ottoman Greeks, 
Armenians, and Jews often expressed off icial approval of the extension of 
obligatory military service to their communities. For example, an influen-
24 The Turkish element here refers to a sociological category, rather than an ethnic one. This 
category had certain common characteristics, the most determining of which were being Muslim 
(mostly Sunni Muslim), speaking Turkish, and preferably being settled (not being nomadic). 
25 Aksan, Ottoman Wars, 1700-1870, pp. 357-358; Yıldız, Neferin Adı Yok, pp. 181-183.
26 On the relations between the Young Turk regime and the Arabs, see Kayalı, Arabs and Young 
Turks. 
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tial Armenian political f igure, Krikor Zohrab, a deputy from Istanbul in 
the Ottoman parliament after 1908, considered the equal military service 
obligation as an important step towards the creation of a solid Ottoman 
citizenship and described it as “a matter of brotherhood”.27 Similarly, the 
Grand Rabbi of the Jewish community, Haim Nahum Efendi, who had had 
political ties with the Young Turks since the preparation for the 1908 Revolu-
tion, openly supported the idea of obligatory military service for Ottoman 
Jews and worked to convince his congregation in this respect.28 But this 
remained merely off icial rhetoric to a great extent. Ordinary members and 
potential draftees of these communities usually showed reluctance about 
conscription. Draft-evasion and desertion of Ottoman non-Muslims were 
common problems.29
Nor was resistance to conscription a problem unique to the non-Muslim 
Ottomans. Similar forms of resistance also occasionally appeared on the part 
of the Muslim Ottomans. Draft-evasion and desertion by Muslims increased 
especially after the 1909 regulations which restricted the exemption status 
of many Muslim groups. For example, the decision to draft those medrese 
students who failed to pass their exams in time made many people, not just 
the medrese students, quite unhappy, because there had been many fake 
medrese students (among them even illiterate peasants), who had abused 
this method of avoiding military service.30 Moreover, the move to draft men 
from the regions which had previously remained outside the recruitment 
system also caused the emergence of acts of resistance in those regions. 
For example, after the 1909 regulations, the Ottoman state had to deal with 
occasional rebellions against the draft, which came from various sections 
of the Laz and the Kurds in Anatolia, and the Arabs in Arab provinces.31 
Similar acts of resistance, mostly in the forms of draft-evasion and desertion, 
sometimes also appeared on the part of the Anatolian Muslim-Turkish 
population, the backbone of the Ottoman army. As I will show, such forms 
of resistance constituted a serious problem during the Great War.
27 Koptaş, “Meşrutiyet Döneminin Umut ve Umutsuzluk Sarkacında Ermeni Devrimci Partileri 
ve Krikor Zohrab”, pp. 73-74.
28 Shaw, The Ottoman Empire in World War I, I, Prelude to War, pp. 153-154.
29 Gülsoy, Osmanlı Gayrimüslimlerinin Askerlik Serüveni, pp. 145-146.
30 On the issue of conscripting Ottoman medrese students, see Bein, “Politics, Military 
Conscription, and Religious Education in the Late Ottoman Empire”. 
31 Shaw, Ottoman Empire in World War I, I, pp. 166-170. 
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Reforms after the Balkan defeat
The humiliating defeat of the Ottoman army in the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 
led the Ottoman authorities to conclude that it was urgently necessary to 
bring in “a new spirit and enthusiasm” to the army, for which an overall 
reform and reorganization in the army was needed.32 This situation was 
very much similar to the discussions for a major overhaul in the in Russian 
military after the defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of 1905.33 Reforming the 
army was a primary agenda of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) 
government which had established single-party rule in 1913. After less than 
a month, the Regulation for the General Organization of the Military was 
issued on 14 February 1913 to execute organizational reforms concerning the 
army.34 But a major overhaul began to take place when Enver Pasha, the lead-
ing CUP leader in military affairs, became the minister of war on 3 January 
1914.35 This process also included a foreign contribution. After the Ottoman 
state signed an agreement with the German military on 14 December 1913, 
the German Military Mission, under the leadership of Otto Liman von 
Sanders, came to the Ottoman Empire to help reform the armed forces.36 
The German Military Mission provided help with the reorganization of the 
army, and also offered useful advice to revise the conscription system and 
the mobilization plans in line with the Prussian-German experience.37 The 
German contribution to Ottoman mobilization continued after the secret 
treaty of alliance signed on 2 August 1914, and also after the Ottoman entry 
into the war on the German side on 2 November 1914.38
The main aim of the process was to create a highly eff icient army struc-
ture, which could easily and rapidly be utilized in a wartime situation 
when needed. The new structuring of the army closely and signif icantly 
32 Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi, III, part 6 (1908-1920), p. 192. 
33 Sanborn, Drafting the Russian Nation, pp. 25-29. 
34 For the complete text of the regulation, see Osmanlı Ordu Teşkilatı, pp. 147-161. 
35 Enver remained at this post through the end of the war, until 14 October 1918. In this capacity 
during this period he also served as the acting commanding general of the Ottoman army (the 
titular commander-in-chief was the sultan) and as the chief of the General Staff. 
36 Similar agreements were also made with other European countries in the same period. The 
Ottomans invited a British mission to help reform the navy and a French mission to improve the 
gendarmerie. But the British and French missions left the country when the Great War began. 
See Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Harbi, I, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun Siyasi ve Askeri Hazırlıkları 
ve Harbe Girişi, pp. 179-180. 
37 For a postwar account of the German Military Mission by a German off icer-historian who 
also served in the mission, see Mühlman, İmparatorluğun Sonu, 1914, pp. 13-55.
38 Strachan, The First World War, p. 104. 
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depended on the recruitment system for its vitality, and required a large 
number of additional troops within a short period of time. In other words, 
in order for the new army structure to be eff icient, there needed to be an 
eff icient conscription system.
The new structure required about 500,000 troops in total, while the 
number of the available troops in the army dropped as low as around 
200,000 in 1913 due to discharges after the Balkan Wars.39 According to 
calculations made in summer 1914, a total of 477,868 drafted men and 12,469 
off icers were needed to bring the army to full wartime capacity.40 To cope 
with the demands of this sudden increase, the existing conscription system, 
which had been characterized by many setbacks from the beginning and 
functioned unsatisfactorily during the Balkan Wars, needed to be revised 
and reformed. Moreover, a revision in the conscription system was needed 
also because the manpower pool of the empire was considerably reshaped 
after the Balkan Wars. In addition to about 340,000 casualties41 and subse-
quent loss of territories in the Balkans, the immigration of around 400,000 
Muslim refugees42 from the lost territories into the empire also changed 
the demographic composition from which the military was to be drawn.
Under these circumstances, a new law for military service was issued 
on 12 May 1914.43 The main concern of Ottoman authorities was to have an 
eff icient recruitment mechanism which would improve the conditions 
for an eventual mobilization. The new law aimed to tackle the problem 
of exemptions. The 1909 regulations had tried to make revisions in this 
respect, but they were not very successful in practice. The new law of 1914 
aimed to minimize exemptions, allowing only for really necessary ones. 
The law also aimed to make the military service obligation more extensive 
in drafting more segments of society for active service, including the non-
Muslim Ottomans. While a discourse of Ottoman equality accompanied 
this objective, the real aim was more pragmatic: acquiring the maximum 
number of draftees. In accordance with the aim of extending the obligation, 
there was also the intention to abolish, or at least restrict, the exemption fee.
39 Larcher, La guerre turque dans la guerre mondiale, p. 66. 
40 Erickson, Ordered to Die, p. 7.
41 Erickson estimates that the number of total Ottoman casualties during the Balkan Wars 
was about 340,000, of which 50,000 were killed in action, 75,000 died of disease, 100,000 were 
wounded, and 115,000 were prisoners of war. See Erickson, Defeat in Detail, p. 329. 
42 MacCarthy, Death and Exile, p. 161. 
43 For the text of the law, see Düstûr, series II, vol. 6, pp. 662-704. 
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Mobilization for the Great War
The possibility of a general mobilization became reality only about three 
months after the announcement of the law, and it was at that point that 
the actual process of testing began for the above-mentioned objectives. The 
general mobilization was declared on 2 August 1914. The response to the 
call to arms was much better than it had been during the Balkan Wars. But 
it was not consistent geographically. It was better in western and central 
Anatolia, but not as good in eastern Anatolia and the Arab provinces. The 
units in Yemen and Hijaz (almost the entire Arabian peninsula) were never 
mobilized, and the XI, XII, and XIII Corps, which were stationed in eastern 
Anatolia, Mosul, and Baghdad respectively, never reach their intended 
effective strength due to the high amount of draft-evasion and desertion.44
After the declaration of mobilization, the eligible men aged from twenty 
to forty-f ive were called up for service.45 But these initial age requirements 
became insuff icient to f ill in the gaps in manpower in the armed forces as 
the war continued, and new arrangements were made in the following years. 
For example, the minimum age for the draft dropped to as low as eighteen 
on 29 April 1915.46 Then the maximum age for recruitment was increased to 
a high of f ifty on 20 March 1916.47 Moreover, the duration of military service, 
which was two years in peacetime, was also extended in wartime until a 
special order was issued to determine when it would end.48 In practice this 
meant that enlisted men would have to serve until the end of the war.49
According to estimates from the Ottoman War Ministry and the General 
Staff at the beginning of the mobilization, the empire had the potential to 
mobilize about 2 million men for service within a single year. This was about 
10 per cent of its general population, which was close to 23 million on the 
eve of the war.50 However, although the initial level of the Ottoman state’s 
recruitment performance could be considered adequate, this estimate 
remained a distant possibility throughout the war. The number of troops 
44 Birinci Dünya Harbi’nde Türk Harbi, I, p. 182. 
45 Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri, III, part 6, p. 288; Düstûr, series II, vol. 6, p. 913. 
46 Düstûr, series II, vol. 7, p. 589.
47 Ibid., series II, vol. 8, p. 730. 
48 The Ottoman Archives, Istanbul [henceforth, BOA], MV., 196/116, 24 February 1915.
49 BOA, DH.MB.HPS.M., 15/24, 8 July 1914. 
50 Of these 23 million, around 17 million lived within the borders of present-day Turkey, more 
than 3 million in Syria and Palestine including Lebanon and Jordan, and about 2.5 million in 
present-day Iraq. Additionally, about 5.5 million lived in Yemen and Hijaz under Ottoman rule. 
See Pamuk, “The Ottoman Economy in World War I”, 112. On the Ottoman population in 1914, 
see also Karpat, Ottoman Population, 1830-1914, pp. 170-190.
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in the Ottoman army was 726,692 around the time when mobilization was 
declared (it was around 295,000 in 1913), and it reached as many as 780,282 
men by 25 September 1914.51 According to the off icial statistics, the total 
number of drafted men cumulatively increased to 1,478,176 by March 1915, 
and reached 1,943,720 by 14 July 1915. By March 1916 it increased to 2,493,000 
and by March 1917 to 2,855,000.52 If we add up the “volunteers” including 
the Kurdish and Bedouin cavalry volunteer units, the number of which is 
estimated to be around 80,000-100,000, the cumulative total number of men 
mobilized during the four years of the war would be around 3,000,000.53
The Ottoman effort to mobilize men for war declined steadily as the war 
prolonged, and it suffered some serious internal problems and insuff icien-
cies. First of all, there was the problem of lack of standardization among 
regions regarding recruitment. In practice, the conscription system did 
not work in the Ottoman Middle East. While it remained predominantly 
an Anatolian institution, it was not standard in Anatolia, either. Secondly, 
although at the beginning a short war was generally expected, the Ottoman 
state began to have diff iculty in sustaining a large-scale and permanent 
mobilization as the war continued. And, thirdly, resistance to conscrip-
tion in the forms of draft-evasion and desertion became a major problem 
especially in the second half of the war. As the war necessitated more and 
more military labor, the actual war conditions recurrently required changes 
in the conscription system. Where the formal conscription system did not 
function suff iciently, the state still tried to acquire necessary manpower 
by amalgamating old methods of recruitment with modern conscription 
methods and creating alternative recruitment categories. Volunteers consti-
tuted such an alternative category, which not only helped the state mobilize 
51 Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri, III, part 6, p. 290; Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi, X, Osmanlı Devri, 
Birinci Dünya Harbi, İdari Faaliyetler ve Lojistik, p. 102; Shaw, The Ottoman Empire in World War 
I, I, p. 148. 
52 Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri, X, pp. 164-165; Shaw, The Ottoman Empire in World War I, I, p. 148. 
See also the Turkish Military Archives, Ankara [henceforth, ATASE], BDH, Folder 62/File 309A/
Index 005.
53 The estimates of the total number of recruited men in the Ottoman armed forces during the 
Great War vary in secondary sources. For example, Ahmed Emin Yalman claimed that 2,998,321 
men were enrolled in the army during the four years of war. See Yalman, Turkey in the World 
War, p. 252. M. Larcher, who claims that he based his research on the off icial Ottoman data, 
gives a f igure of 2,850,000 men mobilized during the war. See Larcher, La guerre turque dans la 
guerre mondiale, p. 602. The most recent estimated total number is given by Edward Erickson 
as 2,873,000, which he has reached by cross-checking the existing statistical data published in 
the secondary literature. Erickson also breaks up the total f igure into armed service classes: 
2,608,000 in the army, 250,000 in the gendarmerie, and 15,000 in the navy. See Erickson, Ordered 
to Die, p. 243. 
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those segments of its population that could not be conscripted formally 
due to infrastructural problems, but also provided the armed forces with 
additional manpower that could be used in “special” military missions.54
Volunteers in the Ottoman army: irregular conscripts or hired 
labor?
The use of volunteers in the Ottoman armed forces, a practice that had 
already been applied in the previous wars, became more systematic dur-
ing the Great War, with new legal and practical regulations. There were 
various categories of volunteers, each of which was supposed to serve a 
distinct purpose. One of the major categories was tribal volunteers. Where 
the formal conscription system did not work, the state tried to apply the 
method of recruiting people as “volunteers”. This practice mainly targeted 
the Kurdish tribal population in Anatolia. Kurdish tribal volunteers were 
usually employed as separate cavalry forces in the Great War, which served 
as auxiliary units on the fronts that were near their native regions, such 
as in the Caucasus and Mesopotamia. Volunteerism in this case was not 
individual-based: the state entered into dialogue with tribal or community 
leaders, such as local chieftains, sheikhs, or aghas. The latter decided on 
behalf of their communities. This decision was itself not entirely voluntary 
either, because it had to be made under political pressure from the central 
state, though it promised political and material gains in return. Obeying 
the state’s call for volunteers politically meant that a particular tribal com-
munity expressed compromise with the central authority. In return for 
this obedience, the central authority recognized that tribe as a peripheral 
power-holder and allowed it a certain amount of autonomy through which 
that tribe could regenerate its power in its local setting. On the other hand, 
the volunteers who were recruited this way did not actually act according 
to their own will, although they were called “volunteers”.
Muslim immigrants and refugees (muhacirs) constituted another major 
category of volunteers, who were employed both for guerrilla operations 
and in the regular units. The Muslims who were forced to emigrate because 
of invasion or political oppression in various territories of Russia and the 
Balkans had reshaped the demographic composition of the Ottoman Empire 
since the late nineteenth century. Their numbers particularly increased 
54 For a detailed social history of the Ottoman mobilization during the Great War, see Beşikçi, 
Between Voluntarism and Resistance.
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with the inf lux of hundreds of thousands of Muslims from the former 
Ottoman territories in the Balkans into Anatolia after the Balkan Wars 
of 1912-1913. As far as the obligation for military service was concerned, 
the muhacirs in the Ottoman lands had to fulf ill the requirements of the 
Ottoman conscription system to acquire full Ottoman citizenship status. 
However, the Ottoman state tended to provide a degree of flexibility to these 
newcomers in order to make their process of settlement and adaptation 
easier. This f lexibility also covered those muhacirs who had previously 
been the subjects of the Ottoman state, who immigrated into Anatolia 
from the ex-Ottoman territories in the Balkans. Article 135 of the Law for 
Military Service of 1914 determined that all past and future muhacirs would 
be subject to the military service procedure six years from the date they 
arrived in the empire. Consequently, during the Great War when almost all 
able-bodied males of the empire were already conscripted in the military, 
the male population of such muhacirs provided an attractive source of 
energetic volunteer f ighters for the Ottoman armed forces. When the Ot-
toman state expected them to volunteer, they also tended to respond to 
this call positively for various reasons. Volunteering for the armed forces 
would confirm their rights to be granted land and status in the Ottoman 
territory and expedite their integration into Ottoman society. Volunteering 
would open up new channels for muhacirs to engage in dialogue with the 
Ottoman state, a dialogue which would further establish their legitimate 
existence in the Ottoman Empire and increase their status.
The Ottoman state’s appeal to muhacir populations to mobilize vol-
unteers was shaped by the specif ic conditions and objectives of military 
campaigns on a particular front. As far as the Caucasus front was concerned, 
for example, former Muslim residents of the Caucasus and the Laz people of 
the eastern Black Sea region were most preferred. Thus, the Ottomans tried 
to mobilize Circassian muhacirs who had settled in Anatolian provinces 
and in Syria during the previous decades.55 These muhacirs would be useful 
in two ways: f irst, they were familiar with the mountainous geographical 
conditions of the region and, secondly, “they had come into the empire 
because they been driven out of their homes by the Russians, so they were 
particularly interested in joining the Ottoman forces that were attempting 
to regain control of the lands that they had been forced to leave”.56 The 
sentiment of revenge was a major motivating factor in their mobilization.
55 BOA, DH.EUM.EMN., 89/14, 29 July 1914.
56 Shaw, The Ottoman Empire in World War I, I, p. 157.
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The third major category of volunteers included individually recruited 
volunteers, who would be used in “irregular” warfare, such as in the armed 
bands of the Special Organization (Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa), a secret paramilitary 
intelligence organization founded by Enver Pasha soon before the war 
on the model of Balkan paramilitary groups (especially the Bulgarian 
IMRO).57 The Special Organization not only undertook a major role in car-
rying out propaganda activities to attain support from Muslim populations 
in India, Russia, Iran, and Egypt for the Ottoman holy war (cihad), but 
also engaged in guerrilla warfare on major fronts throughout the war. The 
Special Organization also carried out operations to intimidate the local 
non-Muslim Ottoman population in Anatolia, particularly the Armenians, 
on the pretext that the organization acted as a counterinsurgency force 
against disloyal elements of the Armenian population, some of whom, after 
evading the draft or deserting the army, formed their own armed bands 
and voluntarily joined the Russian army.58 But this mission of the Special 
Organization took the form of direct abuses of, attacks on, and massacres 
of civilian Armenians during their forced migration in 1915.59 Though no 
precise statistical data are available, the Special Organization is said to have 
raised as many as 30,000 f ighters at its height, most of whom consisted of 
prisoner-volunteers.60 Convicted prisoners, who were ready to be used in 
any form of violent operation in return for their release and also certain 
material gain, constituted one of the main sources of such volunteers. Many 
prisoners from various jails across Anatolia applied to become volunteers to 
57 Stoddard, “The Ottoman Government and the Arabs”. For more on the Special Organization, 
see also Cemil, Birinci Dünya Savaşı’nda Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa; Sencer, Turkish Battle at Khaybar; 
Shaw, The Ottoman Empire in World War I, I, pp. 353-456. 
58 Shaw, The Ottoman Empire in World War I, I, p. 354. On the Armenian volunteers in the Rus-
sian army, see Gorganian, “Armenian Participation in World War I on the Caucasian Front”. There 
are also examples showing that some Ottoman Jews and Greeks voluntarily joined the Entente 
powers. For an example of the case of Ottoman Jews volunteering for the French army, see BOA, 
HR.SYS., 2403/7, 20 September 1914. For two examples of Ottoman Greeks volunteering for the 
British and Greek armies, see BOA, DH.EUM.3.Şb., 5/19, 29 April 1915 and BOA, DH.EUM.3.Şb., 
8/61, 13 September 1915. 
59 Yalman, Turkey in the World War, p. 220; Akçam, “Ermeni Meselesi Hallolunmuştur”, 168-180. 
In contrast, Guenter Lewy has argued that the incomplete character of the available documents 
does not allow us to attribute all of the abuses against the Armenians to the Special Organiza-
tion – although he has not denied the existence of convicted criminals in the armed bands and 
has confirmed the attacks of “irregulars” or “volunteers” against the Armenian deportees. Lewy 
has also written that Kurdish irregular and volunteer forces, as well as Circassian volunteers, 
played a considerable role in the massacres of the Armenian deportees. See Lewy, The Armenian 
Massacres in Ottoman Turkey, pp. 82-89, 221-228.
60 Shaw, The Ottoman Empire in World War I, I, 373; BOA, DH.ŞFR., 46/134, 1 November 1914.
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f ight in the armed bands (çetes) of the Special Organization when off icial 
announcements were made that prisoner-volunteers would be accepted 
for guerrilla f ighting.61 These armed bands, which can also be regarded as 
militia units, were loosely connected to the Ottoman military’s chain of 
command (the commanders of some were provided by the army), and they 
acted autonomously in practice.
It can be argued that, when the demand for military labor was so high, 
authorities could consider it quite legitimate to acquire the locked-in 
manpower that could potentially contribute to the war effort. Theoreti-
cally, like other enlisted men, the volunteers were required to comply with 
the existing conscription regulations from the moment they joined the 
armed forces. This included their duration of service. No volunteers were 
supposed to leave service during the war unless there was a demobilization 
order, which in practice meant they had to serve until the end of the war. 
However, the available evidence implies that maintaining discipline among 
the volunteers, especially the tribal volunteer units which were usually 
used as separate units, sometimes became a serious problem. Desertions 
were particularly widespread among them, especially among the tribal 
volunteers on the Caucasus front.62
On the other hand, while the law obliged them to act like conscripts 
in theory, there was also an aspect of commodif ication involved in this 
process. Many volunteers actually served as paid soldiers, because they 
received payment from the state in either an explicit or an implicit way. 
The volunteers who were employed in the Special Organization’s missions 
either received regular money payments from the discretionary fund of the 
Ottoman military budget or were promised material benefits in return for 
their service, which was indeed a motivation for many people (especially 
for prisoners) to become willing to join the Special Organization’s armed 
bands as voluntary f ighters.63 At the very least, being a volunteer in such 
an armed band could secure a free subsistence throughout the war years, 
since the provisions of such armed bands (at least those on the Caucasus 
front) were legally decided to be provided by the local population in the 
form of a “donation” (iane).64 This situation gave the members of armed 
61 BOA, DH.ŞFR., 46/134, 1 November 1914.
62 For example, it was reported that, after the battle of Köprüköy in November 1914, the number 
of Kurdish tribal volunteers in the Third Army, which was around 20,000 at the beginning, 
dramatically dwindled to around 3,000 because of desertions. See Aytar, Hamidiye Alaylarından 
Köy Koruculuğuna, pp. 140-141. 
63 Cemil, Birinci Dünya Savaşı’nda Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa, p. 118.
64 Ibid., pp. 85-86; BOA, DH.ŞFR., 61/88, 23 February 1916.
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bands the de facto right to act as if they were war-tax collectors and put 
pressure on civilians for this purpose. They were also effectively entitled 
to seize “booty” during their raids in enemy territory, mostly in the form 
of livestock.65 Money payments and material rewards were also involved 
in the Ottoman state’s relationship with the tribal volunteer groups as a 
means of encouraging such groups to volunteer and of maintaining their 
loyalty to the state.66
Can the volunteers who were paid or received material benef its be 
regarded as a kind of professional soldier and be placed in the category of 
free labor? It is hard to say that they f it neatly into this category, because 
there was no contract between them and the military authorities. Moreover, 
payments were usually made on an ad hoc basis, on the initiative of army 
commanders or militia leaders, and one can hardly speak of a standard 
procedure in this respect. The situation was more complex in the case of 
tribal volunteers, since it was the tribal leader who conducted the negotia-
tion with and personally received the payment from military authorities; 
ordinary members of tribal volunteer units had no say in this process and, 
although they might receive a share of their leaders’ payment, their case 
still remained close to the category of “unfree labor”. And, as mentioned 
above, the law wanted to oblige them to comply with the conscription 
regulations. But it is obvious that this compliance clause did not make them 
conscripts per se, and it is equally hard to f it them in the conscript labor 
category. Instead it was an amalgamation of both forms, which resulted in 
a pragmatic form that included aspects of both categories.
Here it is also interesting to note that, although their numbers were few 
(statistically negligible), the Ottoman army also employed professional 
foreign soldiers who served for money during the Great War. A well-known 
example is the Venezuelan off icer Rafael de Nogales (1879-1936). After his 
attempts to join various European armies (French, Belgian) failed, he ap-
plied in 1915 to serve in the Ottoman army as an off icer. He served on the 
Caucasus and Mesopotamia fronts, f irst as a captain and then major.67
65 Cemil, Birinci Dünya Savaşı’nda Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa, pp. 48, 59. 
66 Askeri Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi, no. 117 (January 2004), Document no. 43, p. 124.
67 He published his memoirs in 1926, in which he gave signif icant details about daily life in 
the Ottoman army and presented his observations about social life in the localities where he 
served. See de Nogales, Four Years beneath the Crescent.
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Unskilled vs. skilled labor? The problem of exemptions
Whereas the Ottoman conscription system had been characterized by a 
long list of exemptions, Ottoman authorities were determined in 1914 to 
restrict every “unnecessary” exemption. However, while this resolution 
was never abandoned during the war, it needed to be reshaped and revised 
under the actual conditions of mobilization and due to political prefer-
ences, f inancial necessities, and the need for technical-skilled labor in the 
economic and bureaucratic sectors. Therefore, as some exemptions were 
abolished, others remained in operation and sometimes new exemptions 
were introduced. The Ottoman Great War experience shows that, although 
military service was legally declared universal, there was still a general 
division of labor regulating who would be employed in a military and who 
in a nonmilitary function, even when meeting the need of military labor 
was the utmost priority. Those whose civilian skills were considered more 
useful and important than the service they would provide on the battlefield 
were granted exemptions and allowed to remain in their post during the 
war. Generally speaking, the obligation of military service actually fell on 
the shoulders of those who were providers of unskilled manual labor. A 
similar division also existed between the rich and the poor, as those whose 
f inancial contribution was regarded as more signif icant than their physical 
contribution could also be offered an alternative.
While some forms of military labor (especially in the case of professional 
armies) are based on making a payment to the military laborer, the system 
of conscription may sometimes require the opposite: the potential military 
laborer himself is needed to make a payment to the state to avoid service. 
The issue of the exemption fee, which stood at the junction of the state’s 
political preferences and f inancial needs, constituted a major portion of 
the exemptions in the Ottoman conscription system. But the exemption 
fee always remained in effect in practice, and the state in actuality did not 
want to press too hard to abolish it. The Ottoman state never dared to risk 
this extra source of f inancial revenue, which served to alleviate its f inancial 
burdens. Moreover, its continuation was not regarded as so disturbing by 
those who paid it, namely the middle and upper strata of Ottoman non-
Muslims, who did not have a long history of military service in the Ottoman 
Empire and were never particularly enthusiastic about revisions after 1909 
aiming to include them into the active service obligation.68
68 On this reluctance of Ottoman non-Muslims after the 1909 Regulations, see Gülsoy, Osmanlı 
Gayrimüslimlerinin Askerlik Serüveni, pp. 141-148. On the reluctance of Ottoman non-Muslim 
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This general approach of the Ottoman state to the exemption fee can 
be said to have continued during the Great War, while some signif icant 
modif ications were made. Parallel to the off icial discourse from 1909, it 
was announced in 1914 that the abolition of the exemption fee was among 
the main targets of the new legal and organizational reforms regarding 
the conscription system.69 But the points which this discourse needed to 
emphasize to justify itself acquired different dimensions after the declara-
tion of mobilization. While the language of Ottomanism which stressed the 
abolition of the exemption fee as a way of equating Muslim and non-Muslim 
Ottomans through including them into the same military service obligation 
continued to some extent, the discourse now also needed to address certain 
sources of discontent in the public sphere concerning the unequal treatment 
of different economic classes in society. The “National Economy” policies of 
the CUP government offered many economic opportunities and privileges 
to the Muslim-Turkish elements of the empire and, apparently, a consider-
able number of well-off Muslims began to use the exemption fee option 
by the late 1914.70 This seems to have led to rumors that the conscription 
system favored the rich and that the burden of defending the fatherland 
was imposed on the shoulders of the poor. Therefore, in propagating their 
intention to abolish the exemption fee, Ottoman authorities needed to 
emphasize that the rich were obligated to serve in the armed forces as 
much as the poor: “Now the most genteel and the richest would defend 
their motherland in the same way as the poor peasant little Mehmeds […] 
What an honor!” 71
But neither the new law on military service nor the mobilization regula-
tions could abolish the exemption fee entirely. And the class dimension of 
the conscription system, namely the inequality in military service caused 
by economic inequality, continued. But certain restrictions applied.72 First 
of all, from now on, paying an exemption fee instead of actively serving in 
the armed forces did not mean that the payer would be exempted forever. 
Article 121 of the new law required that, even if a person paid an exemption 
fee, he was required to get basic military training for six months in the 
nearest infantry division. The law also stipulated that, while the exemption 
recruits during the Balkan War of 1912-1913, see Adanır, “Non-Muslims in the Ottoman Army 
and the Ottoman Defeat in the Balkan War of 1912-1913”. 
69 Behic, Mükellefiyet-i Askeriye Kanun-ı Muvakkatinin İzahı, p. 7. 
70 On the “National Economy” policies in this period, see Toprak, Türkiye’de Milli İktisat, 
1908-1918.
71 Behic, Mükellefiyet-i Askeriye Kanun-ı Muvakkatinin İzahı, p. 14. 
72 Ibid., p. 14. 
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fee remained in effect, it would be available only in peacetime and nobody 
would be given this option in wartime.73
But not only did the exemption fee continue after the mobilization was 
declared and during the war, various of its restrictions were also loosened. 
Initial statements that condemned the practice would have to compromise 
with actual war conditions and be modif ied time and time again. For ex-
ample, the new law on the exemption fee, which was enacted on 6 March 
1915, confirmed that the practice would continue in war conditions.74 The 
practice did not disappear during the war and was legally renewed with 
some modif ications.75
While the mobilization during the Great War made military labor top 
priority, the need for skilled labor in various departments of the state bu-
reaucracy and economy was no less pressing. To keep its large bureaucratic 
machine running during the war, the Ottoman state also needed to exempt 
its bureaucrats and off icials at key posts from conscription. For this reason, 
according to Article 90 of the law on military service, even if they were at 
the age of military service, state employees such as ministers, top off icials, 
ambassadors, governors, judges, and muftis were not obliged to serve in the 
armed forces. But, more importantly, the state also needed its middle- and 
lower-ranking civil servants and technical personnel to continue their 
work in wartime, as their job description now also included supervising 
the mobilization process in their localities, as well as fulf illing their routine 
work. People such as post off ice clerks and telegram technicians, bank 
clerks, railway technicians and clerks, accountants, policemen, and so 
forth were equally indispensable during the war. Article 91 of the same law 
included a long and detailed list of middle- and low-ranking civil servants 
from many departments.
However, though their function was signif icant, civil servants increas-
ingly came under the control of military authorities during the war. The 
martial law situation, which continued throughout the war, gave not only in 
practice but also off icially the ultimate authority to military commanders 
in local administration. Although the mobilization decree gave the Interior 
Ministry the power to declare martial law, it was the War Ministry that 
actually ran all things military.76 This created a process in which state 
employees in the provinces, including the top local administrators, were 
73 Ibid., p. 149. 
74 Düstûr, series II, vol. 7, pp. 434-435. 
75 Ibid., series II, vol. 8, pp. 380-381. 
76 Shaw, The Ottoman Empire in World War I, I, p. 175. 
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required to obey the authority of military commanders. The War Ministry 
occasionally stressed this requirement in its correspondence to the Interior 
Ministry, whereupon the latter needed to warn its local off icials that they 
should have considered and carried out the measures and proposals coming 
the commanders.77 Recruitment became a top priority in which civilian 
off icials were expected to be particularly careful during the war. Civilian 
off icials of the provinces were repeatedly warned by the center about their 
crucial function in ensuring that the draft procedure was carried out ef-
f iciently in their localities.78
The law on military service also provided exemptions for religious 
functionaries of every religion. According to Article 91, not only high- and 
middle-ranking religious representatives of all religious communities in 
the empire, but also low-ranking ones, were exempted, including priests, 
monks, and deacons (who had a certif icate) for the Christians, and rab-
bis and deputy rabbis for the Jews. For the Muslim low-ranking religious 
functionaries, the exemption list was more detailed. It was stipulated that 
for each mosque, one imam, one Quran reciter (hafız), one call-to-prayer 
reciter (müezzin), and one caretaker (kayyım) would be released from the 
military service obligation.
Apparently, the Ottoman state was relatively flexible in the case of reli-
gious functionaries and provided them with an exemption status, especially 
where Muslim religious functionaries were concerned. Of course, there 
were reasons for this. Obviously, this f lexibility did not stem only from 
the concern for providing uninterrupted religious service for believers 
in wartime. Low-ranking religious functionaries, particularly the village 
imam, also played a crucial role in mobilizing men for the war. Through his 
sermons, and as a respected personage among the local community, the 
imam was the key f igure in justifying the military service as a sacred duty. 
He was the one whom local people took most seriously about the exaltation 
of martyrdom in war. The imam was also influential in convincing draft-
evaders and deserters to rejoin the armed forces. Therefore, since the imam 
was regarded as one of the main propagators and motivators of the Ottoman 
mobilization at the grass-roots level, their exemption status ensured that 
enough of them were available in every locality.
77 BOA, DH.ŞFR., 55/157, 22 August 1915. 
78 BOA, DH.ŞFR., 42/155, 30 June 1914.
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Forced labor through conscription? The labor battalions
Whereas the efforts that were made in 1914 to minimize exemptions and to 
extend the military service obligation to all elements of Ottoman society 
were interpreted by some observers as a step towards the principle of Otto-
man citizenship based on equality (as decreed in the Ottoman Constitution 
of 1876),79 such a perspective of equality was still lacking not only in the 
legislation, but also in the practice of mobilization. The Ottoman perspec-
tive regarding the inclusion and treatment of different religious and ethnic 
elements of the empire into the conscription system during the Great War 
was based on an understanding of Ottoman unity which was built upon a 
nationalist pragmatism. The Ottoman mobilization effort that was run by 
the nationalist CUP government of course wished to include and make use 
of the entire population of the empire. But this wish also tended to thwart as 
much as possible any political expectations and demands of dialogue with 
the state, which would emerge on the part of the same elements in return 
for their participation in the mobilization effort. Service of even the most 
distrusted elements could be accepted by the CUP government as long as 
that service was used in the way defined by the government itself and as 
long as that service did not produce any political expectations on the part 
of the providers.
The Law on Military Service of 1914 included certain ambiguities that 
could in practice easily be interpreted in a discriminatory way. Article 
34 of the law divided active military service into two categories, “armed” 
and “unarmed service”. In other words, while some drafted men would be 
regarded as “normal” soldiers who were able to bear arms, others would be 
denied arms and instead employed in units that would mostly fulfill manual 
work behind the front lines. However, while this division might seem to be 
a standard procedure that any army might have, the Ottoman conscription 
law left two points ambiguous: f irst, it did not specify exactly who would 
be registered in the armed and who in the unarmed category. No clear 
criteria were stated in this regard. The law was much more specif ic on the 
procedures concerning medically unfit men who had physical problems or 
illnesses that could prevent them from carrying out active service (articles 
34, 48). But no such clear procedures were defined for the unarmed service 
category. There are some implications in explanatory texts about the law 
79 For example, see Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri, III, part 6, p. 232. For a discussion of the Ottoman 
conscription practice with respect to its relationship with the principle of Ottomanism, see 
Hacısalihoğlu, “Inclusion and Exclusion”.
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that the division might have essentially been based on physical condition of 
a drafted man, such as having a minor bodily problem which would prevent 
him from fulf illing active military service on the battlef ield but did not 
hinder him doing manual jobs. There are also some implications that the 
assignment to unarmed service could be done according to the profession 
and artisanal skills of enlisted men: medical personnel, for example, could 
be assigned to medical corps, and the literate could be assigned to posts as 
scribes in military units.80 Secondly, the law did not specify precisely what 
unarmed service would involve. In practice, it became synonymous with 
hard labor and, more specif ically, with the labor battalions.
Forming labor-based military units was not an entirely new phenomenon 
in the Ottoman army. There were similar battalions called the “Service 
Battalions” which had been formed during the Balkan Wars.81 Nor was it 
unique to the Ottoman army. Since the work of war required vast amounts 
of labor, all combatant nations in the Great War constituted labor units 
to support their war effort. And in many cases, such labor units included 
recruits who were deemed to be “noncombatants”, a category which was 
def ined by political authorities in a discriminatory way based on race, 
ethnicity, religion, gender, or age. Forms of recruitment and treatment of 
these laborers not only varied according to labor demands, but also were 
shaped by political circumstances.82 To give but a few examples, a large 
number of recruits from India were assigned to the labor and porter corps 
used in Iraq by the British Army in its invasion of the region in the Great 
War. These labor units, which were pejoratively called “coolie” corps, also 
included prisoners.83 Similar labor units were formed in Russia for non-
Russian draftees such as the Kirgiz.84
Originally, labor units in the Ottoman army were manned mainly by 
men too old or too young to serve in the army, by wounded or injured 
soldiers who had become unf it for combatant posts on the battlef ield, 
and by older drafted men who were assigned to active reserve or territo-
rial reserve units.85 But during the Great War the labor battalions were 
manned overwhelmingly by the non-Muslim Ottoman enlisted men, who 
were regarded as “untrustworthy” to bear arms, regardless of their age or 
80 Behic, Mükellefiyet-i Askeriye Kanun-ı Muvakkatinin İzahı, pp. 52, 188. 
81 Özdemir, “I. Dünya Savaşı’nda Amele Taburları”, p. 32. 
82 For a comparative account of labor battalions in the Great War, see Proctor, Civilians in a 
World at War, 1914-1918, pp. 40-75. 
83 See Singha, “Finding Labor from India for the War in Iraq”. 
84 Sanborn, Drafting the Russian Nation, p. 79. 
85 Shaw, The Ottoman Empire in World War I, I, p. 341. 
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physical condition. By a deliberate decision of Ottoman military authorities, 
non-Muslim drafted men were mostly assigned to the “unarmed service” 
category, even if they were physically f it for the armed service category. 
In an order of the War Ministry issued on 3 August 1914, it was explicitly 
stated that “the labor battalions were to consist as much as possible of 
non-Muslims”.86 Those who were registered in the unarmed category were 
almost entirely employed in the labor battalions.
In this sense, the labor battalions not only carried out useful manual 
work, but they also acted as a means of controlling “suspect” conscripts 
in the army. These suspect elements included almost all non-Muslim 
subjects during the Great War, who were seen as undependable by the 
CUP-dominated state authority, which believed that if control over them 
was loosened even a little, they could easily turn into a subversive group 
supporting the enemy. For example, after the defeat in Sarıkamış on the 
Caucasus front, where desertions of Armenian soldiers to the Russian side 
caused anger among Ottoman authorities who then also claimed that that 
the local Armenians were in collaboration with the Russians, the acting 
commander-in-chief Enver Pasha issued an order to all military units on 
25 February 1915, instructing that “Armenians shall strictly not be employed 
in mobile armies, in mobile and stationary gendarmeries, or in any armed 
service.” 87
However, it should also be noted that, as in the case of many orders given 
by Ottoman authorities during the war, the application of this order was 
not always so strict and standardized. Not only after this order, but also 
after the Armenian population was deported from Anatolia and exposed 
to ethnic cleansing, there were still some Armenian soldiers serving under 
arms in various places. For example, there were Armenian soldiers in the 
Ottoman army f ighting with arms on the Sinai-Palestine front as late as 
spring 1916.88 In fact, it can be argued that, whereas the existence of such 
men implies the limits of the Ottoman power in executing its decisions, 
such exceptions might actually also be desired by the same power since it 
was congruent with Ottoman pragmatism during the war. If some elements 
of an ethnic-religious group could provide useful labor for the Ottoman 
mobilization effort in the way def ined by the Ottoman state, Ottoman 
authorities did not hesitate to utilize it even when they expressed open 
aggression toward that group in general. For example, since the Ottoman 
86 Özdemir, “I. Dünya Savaşı’nda Amele Taburları”, p. 31. 
87 Gürün, The Armenian File, p. 206. 
88 Zürcher, “Ottoman Labour Battalions in World War I”, p. 192. 
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army suffered from insuff icient medical personnel, non-Muslim military 
doctors were not assigned to the labor battalions; they were always kept in 
regular combat units.89 While their personnel were overwhelmingly non-
Muslim, many labor battalions themselves did not have military doctors.90
In the case of non-Muslims, control by conscription or, more specif ically, 
control by employment in unarmed labor was a premeditated practice in 
the Ottoman system, as shown by the off icial correspondence between 
Ottoman authorities. More direct references to this method can be found 
in the later phases of the war, and especially during the early phase of the 
Turkish National Struggle (1919-1922). For instance, this was adopted in order 
to neutralize the Greek population in the central and eastern Black Sea 
region, who were regarded as a potential f ifth column. By conscripting the 
most physically able elements of their male population, Turkish authorities 
also aimed to eradicate any potential resistance to the occasional deporta-
tion of Greek villagers.91
While the majority of the enlisted men in the labor battalions consisted of 
Ottoman Greeks and Armenians, there were also non-Muslims from smaller 
communities, such as the Assyrians (Süryani). Nor did the labor battalions 
include only non-Muslims: Muslim conscripts were also employed in them. 
But these Muslim enlisted men were usually the ones who were too old or 
regarded as not entirely f it physically or useful for armed service. The labor 
battalions also included Muslims released from prisons to contribute to the 
mobilization effort.92 Sometimes labor units were manned by convicts as a 
form of alternative punishment, in which way their labor would be more 
useful than locking them away. For example, in the Third Army zone of 
the Caucasus Front in 1915, about 3,000 captured draft-evaders and desert-
ers were ordered by the army command to be sent to the provinces of 
Diyarbekir and Mamuretülaziz to work in agriculture and transportation.93
Another common way of compensating for the depletion of the agricul-
tural workforce by using “outcasts” during the war was to assign captured 
prisoners-of-war to large farms urgently in need of manpower, a method 
that was used especially in the major provinces of Istanbul, Hüdavendigâr/
Bursa, and Edirne, and in the districts surrounding these urban centers, 
89 Mutlu, Birinci Dünya Savaşı’nda Amele Taburları, p. 159.
90 Özdemir, “I. Dünya Savaşı’nda Amele Taburları”, pp. 120-121, 132, 135. 
91 Balcıoğlu, Belgelerle Milli Mücadele Sırasında Anadolu’da Ayaklanmalar ve Merkez Ordusu, 
pp. 79, 83, 87, 190.
92 Shaw, The Ottoman Empire in World War I, I,p. 341.
93 Öğün, Kafkas Cephesi’nin I. Dünya Savaşı’ndaki Lojistik Desteği, p. 89.
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such as İzmit and Çatalca.94 It is understood from documents that many 
Russian prisoners-of-war were mostly employed in agricultural work this 
way.95 Upon the request of landowners, various numbers of POWs were 
assigned to the farms on condition that the landowner would house, feed, 
and guard them. Landowners were also required to report every week to 
their local administration and the military supply station inspectorate 
(menzil müfettişliği) about the situation of the POWs assigned to them. In 
the case of desertions, urgent reporting was required together with physical 
descriptions of the POWs.96
Terms of service in the labor battalions were not limited during the war, 
but drafted men were generally kept in the labor battalions for a minimum 
of three years.97 The main tasks fulf illed by the labor battalions during the 
war consisted of working in the construction and maintenance of roads 
and railroads, in the construction of fortif ied posts, helping transport men 
and materiel to the fronts, and helping in agriculture.98 Separate labor bat-
talions were organized in each army district of the empire. But they were 
not static units and they could be transferred to any region of the empire 
whenever they were needed.99 There were ninety labor battalions at the time 
of mobilization was declared and each battalion was planned to include 
around 1,200 men. In total, there were approximately 100,000 men employed 
in them in 1914.100 There are no precise data available about the total number 
of men employed in the labor battalions during the four years of the war, 
but it can be estimated that the total number exceeded 100,000, taking into 
account the fact that the War Ministry decided to form f ifty more labor 
battalions in 1915.101
94 BOA, DH.EUM.5.ŞB., 34/25, 12 March 1917; Toprak, İttihad – Terakki ve Cihan Harbi, 227 n. 14. 
95 BOA, DH.EUM.5.ŞB., 37/21, 17 May 1917. Another interesting application in this respect was 
that Muslim prisoners of war in the hands of the Germans were transferred to the Ottoman 
Empire to be employed in agriculture and factories, where a labor force was needed. See ATASE, 
BDH, 1835/30/1-37. 
96 BOA, DH.EUM.5.ŞB., 31/36, 12 June 1917. It is also important here to note that regular Ottoman 
troops could also be employed in agricultural work in times of urgent need, if there was no 
combat on the battlef ield. For example, an order issued from the War Ministry in November 
1916 required that, where and when possible, regular troops should perform agricultural work 
in their zones. See Öğün, Kafkas Cephesinin I. Dünya Savaşı’ndaki Lojistik Desteği, p. 93. For a 
similar practice, also see BOA, DH.ŞFR., 76/134, 16 May 1917. 
97 Shaw, The Ottoman Empire in World War I, I, p. 342. 
98 Özdemir, “I. Dünya Savaşı’nda Amele Taburları”, p. 32.
99 Shaw, The Ottoman Empire in World War I, I, p. 345; Özdemir, “I. Dünya Savaşı’nda Amele 
Taburları”, p. 31. 
100 Özdemir, “I. Dünya Savaşı’nda Amele Taburları”, pp. 21-22, 33.
101 Ibid., p. 63. 
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The labor battalions in the Ottoman army were characterized by notori-
ously poor living and working conditions. Some of the major problems 
which the labor battalions suffered from throughout the war were poor 
accommodation and lack of supplies and equipment. Eyewitness accounts 
confirm that many soldiers in the labor battalions were underfed and suf-
fered from disease.102 Moreover, the treatment of soldier-laborers in the labor 
battalions was generally bad. Conditions in the labor battalions became 
particularly atrocious for the Armenian enlisted men especially after the 
deportation of the civilian Armenian population began in 1915.103 Such 
notorious aspects of the labor battalions, which became known from the 
experiences of early draftees and were spread among communities verbally 
from person to person,104 intimidated potential draftees and created an extra 
motive among reluctant non-Muslims to evade military service.105 Because 
of such problems, desertions from the labor battalions were frequent106 and, 
although non-Muslims constituted the majority, Turkish soldiers-laborers 
also deserted.107
Resistance to conscription: the problem of desertion
Ottoman conscription was unpopular among the masses it targeted, and 
occasional resistance to getting conscripted, in the form of draft-evasion 
and desertion, had accompanied the system in times of both peace and 
war. However, in terms of its considerable extent and intensity, resistance 
in the form of desertion ( firari, the Ottoman-Turkish term for deserter, 
actually covers both deserters and draft-evaders) during the Great War 
102 For example, Rafael de Nogales states in his memoirs that, while he was in Adana in 1915, he 
observed that some Armenian and Greek soldiers in four labor battalions in the region, working 
in road construction, suffered severely from and died of famine: de Nogales, Four Years beneath 
the Crescent, pp. 176-177. 
103 After this date, the number of armed guards in the battalions was increased and control 
over the Armenian soldiers became stricter. For an example on such measures, see Askeri 
Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi, 81 (December 1982), document no. 1837, p. 181. Eyewitness accounts also 
recorded direct assaults on the Armenians in the labor battalions in eastern Anatolia, and some 
have claimed these even included massacres. See, for example, Künzler, In the Land of Blood and 
Tears, pp. 16-20.
104 Sotiriou, Farewell to Anatolia, pp. 70-71. 
105 For example, this point is wittily explained in the memoirs of an Ottoman Greek. See 
Spataris, “Biz İstanbullular Böyleyiz”: Fener’den Anılar, p. 147. 
106 BOA, DH.EUM.6.ŞB., 44/32, 20 June 1915; BOA, DH.EUM.KLU., 6/39, 10 January 1915. 
107 Özdemir, “I. Dünya Savaşı’nda Amele Taburları”, p. 96. 
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presents a unique case. The problem of desertion was a major factor that 
eroded Ottoman war performance. The total numbers in the off icial Ot-
toman casualty statistics do not provide a separate f igure for desertions, 
but include it under the more general heading of “deserters, POWs, sick, 
missing”, which reached the total of 1,565,000.108 According to the accounts 
of various high-ranking military authorities who served during the Great 
War, the proportion of desertion in this f igure was estimated to be as high 
as 500,000.109 Various secondary sources also confirm this estimate.110 This 
represents nearly 17 per cent of all the men mobilized (3,000,000) during the 
war. The same percentage was about 1 per cent in Germany111 and slightly 
higher than 1 per cent in the British armed forces.112
Nearly every ethnic or religious group in the empire is represented in 
this picture. As mentioned earlier, desertions of Armenian soldiers were not 
infrequent and such desertions in the early phase of the war113 led Ottoman 
authorities to employ them in the labor battalions. Ottoman Greeks even 
coined a specif ic term for their deserters, “the attic battalions”, to describe 
those who hid in the attics of their buildings to avoid Ottoman recruit-
ment authorities.114 Ottoman Jews were not particularly enthusiastic about 
military service, either. Among various methods to avoid service, obtaining 
a false medical report declaring an individual unf it for military service 
was apparently quite popular among this group.115 Similarly, desertions of 
Arab soldiers were also frequent, especially in the second half of the war.116 
However, most desertions were attempted by Anatolian Muslims (namely, 
Turks as majority, Kurds, and to a lesser extent Circassian and Laz elements) 
108 ATASE, BDH, 62/309A/005; Larcher, La guerre turque dans la guerre mondiale, p. 602.
109 See, for example, Liman von Sanders, Five Years in Turkey, p. 190; İnönü, Hatıralar, I, 2nd 
edn, pp. 126-127.
110 See, for example, Yalman, Turkey in the World War, pp. 261-262; Erickson, Ordered to Die, 
p. 243. 
111 Zürcher, “Between Death and Desertion”, p. 257. It has to be mentioned here that desertion in 
the German army proportionally increased in the last year of the war, and it was remarkably high 
in certain units on certain fronts. For example, the spring offensive of 1918 brought the German 
soldier to the limits of his endurance: “Up to 10 per cent of men deserted in the preparatory 
stages en route from the eastern front.” See Englander, “Mutinies and Military Morale”, p. 198.
112 Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire during the Great War, p. 741. 
113 Shaw, The Ottoman Empire in World War I, I, pp. 93-105.
114 Spataris, “Biz İstanbullular Böyleyiz”: Fener’den Anılar, p. 148. 
115 Aaronsohn, Türk Ordusuyla Filistin’de, 45. Feigning illness and malingering were also com-
mon among Muslim enlisted men. See, for example, Bir Doktorun Harp ve Memleket, pp. 72-73. 
116 See, for example, BOA, DH.EUM.KLH., 5/56, 22 December 1915. The issue of frequent Arab 
desertions is also commonly mentioned in the memoirs of German off icers who served in the 
Ottoman Empire. See, for example, Guhr, Anadolu’dan Filistin’e Türklerle Omuz Omuza, pp. 144, 211.
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who constituted not only the majority of the Ottoman population, but also 
the bulk of the enlisted men in the Ottoman army.117
Neither the presumed strong Ottoman-Turkish military culture con-
demning desertion nor severe penal laws or references to the Islamic 
injunctions against avoiding military service could prevent desertion from 
becoming a major problem. The reasons for desertion varied. The most 
common, mentioned in the interrogation reports of deserters captured 
by Ottoman authorities, as well as of those captured by the British in Iraq 
and Palestine, include physical and mental exhaustion stemming from 
dire conditions at the front, despair and frustration resulting from the 
prolongation of the war, abuse at the hands of off icers, the impossibility of 
obtaining home leaves, and reactions to the almost unlimited extension 
of term of service.118 Although almost all captured deserters express regret 
about their actions, they also implicitly or explicitly explain that they left 
as a last resort, when the conditions became unbearable and intolerable. 
This suggests that, although conscription was an obligatory form of military 
service, the enlisted men could still see a “tacit” contractual aspect in it. 
Although an individual potential draftee was legally obliged to enlist, this 
obligation was accepted as long as certain of the draftee’s basic expectations 
(provision of basic daily needs, fair treatment, reasonable term of service, 
continuation of one’s belief in the legitimacy of the service, providing for 
his family while he is away, etc.) were met by the authorities.
There were of course thousands of deserters who could not be caught 
immediately. Many of them turned into brigands to survive, forming armed 
bands, the size of which ranged from about a dozen to a few hundred people. 
Such armed bands, which were usually formed on the basis of common 
ethnic and religious ties, presented a major security threat across Anatolia. 
The trouble they caused reached an intolerable level in the later phase of 
the war. A telegram sent by the Interior Minister Talat Pasha to all local 
administrative units on 1 June 1918 complained that murders committed 
by bands of deserter-brigands were occurring in almost every corner of the 
117 For instance, according to a report on deserters in the province of Aydın, covering the period 
from the beginning of mobilization (2 August 1914) to June 1916, shows that Muslims constituted 
the majority of deserters (28,950 out of a total of 49,228): BOA, DH.EUM.6.ŞB., 9/8, 6 September 
1916. The province of Aydın included at this time the subprovinces of İzmir (the centre of the 
province), Aydın, Denizli, and Saruhan (Manisa). 
118 For various examples of such reports, see ATASE, BDH, 2322/71/1-1; ATASE, BDH, 2322/71/1-7. 
For some examples from British intelligence, see the National Archives of the UK, Kew [hence-
forth, TNA]:PRO WO 157/703, March-April 1916; TNA:PRO WO 157/800, June 1917; TNA:PRO WO 
157-727, May 1918.
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country.119 Next to murder, the more routine crimes included the pillaging 
and robbing of villagers and townsmen.120 This turned desertion into a 
much larger issue of public security, which required the state to reorganize 
its gendarmerie to cope with the problem. On the other hand, there are 
examples showing that roaming deserters in the Ottoman countryside 
were not treated as complete outcasts by local populations; on the contrary, 
quite a few of them could easily hide in the vicinity of their own villages 
and were provided with shelter and food.121 Ottoman military authorities 
often note the support of the local populations and also lament the fact 
that this encouraged further desertions.122
In fact, it is even difficult to argue that deserters were treated as complete 
outcasts by the state, either. When the need for military labor was so pressing 
and the number of deserters was so high, Ottoman authorities were always 
looking for a way to restore deserters into service during the Great War. 
Although military law required the death penalty for deserters, authorities 
typically reserved it for repeat offenders and those who committed serious 
crimes during their absence. Milder forms of punishment such as beating 
or imprisonment were usually applied to those who were caught during 
or after their f irst attempt.123 More importantly, three general amnesties 
were issued for all deserters on behalf of the sultan. The f irst one of these 
came as early as the declaration of mobilization (6 August 1914), the second 
appeared on 28 June 1915, and the third was announced in the last year of the 
war (15 July 1918).124 These promised pardons for deserters who surrendered 
to the authorities within a specif ied time period. The objective of all three 
amnesties was basically to bring the deserted military labor back in service, 
which would also help decrease the security problem in the countryside. 
There were other measures designed to recover the deserted labor, which 
were implemented in the absence of an amnesty. For example, the Interior 
Ministry circulated an announcement to all local administrative units on 
119 BOA, DH.ŞFR., 88/3, 1 June 1918.
120 BOA, DH.ŞFR., 79/17, 2 August 1917.
121 Zürcher says that the fact that local people often sympathized with deserters is one of 
main aspects that differentiate the Ottoman case from West European countries. See Zürcher, 
“Refusing to Serve by Other Means”, p. 50. 
122 See, for example, ATASE, BDH, 2880/323/3, Report sent from the commander of the 37th 
Caucasus Division to the II Caucasus Corps on 20 June 1917.
123 This was also observed by the Dutch embassy as early as May 1916, which reported that 
“the army has replaced prison sentences with corporal punishment in the f ield in order not to 
deplete the strength of the army further”. See Zürcher, “Little Mehmet in the Desert”, p. 234. 
124 For the texts of these amnesties respectively, see Düstûr, series II, vol. 6, p. 981; vol. 7, p. 630; 
vol. 10, p. 553.
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21 September 1918, stating that deserters surrendering of their own free 
will could be enlisted as gendarmes if they met the necessary criteria for 
eligibility.125 Such surrendered deserters were usually employed in pursuit 
squads formed by the Ottoman gendarmerie to capture deserters and f ight 
armed bands in the Anatolian provinces.
Such measures were not entirely ineffective, but Ottoman authorities 
continued to struggle with the problem of desertion until the end of the 
war. It remained a major factor eroding Ottoman performance on the bat-
tlef ield and challenged state authority on the home front. According to the 
off icial Ottoman statistics, the number of enlisted men under arms was 
560,000 when the Armistice of Mudros was signed on 30 October 1918.126 As 
mentioned above, the total number of desertions had reached almost the 
same level by that time.
Conclusions for a comparative analysis
Obligatory military service became increasingly more compelling as a 
method of securing military labor in the age of modern warfare, from the 
late eighteenth century onwards, and the Ottoman case is no exception. As a 
total war that demanded a permanent and large-scale mobilization of man-
power, the Great War was the apogee of this process and made obligatory 
military service a necessity for all the belligerents. Conscription, however, 
was never purely a military matter, but was also signif icantly related to 
political concerns and internal security. Since its f irst phase of application 
in the era of Mahmud II, the system of conscription was in congruence with 
the state’s centralizing policies. Conscription with a working infrastructure 
would give the central state an increased ability to control the men at the 
local level and would help it counteract the power of local notables in the 
provinces. In this sense, from the state’s perspective the coming of conscrip-
tion was important also in terms of internal security. The evolution of the 
system was far from smooth, mainly due to the infrastructural weakness 
of the state, but the political logic behind conscription remained relevant 
throughout the Great War.
The ideological preferences of the Ottoman state also played a determin-
ing role in shaping the nature of conscription. The religious and ethnic 
hierarchy of the Ottoman polity was reflected in it. Not only in its human 
125 BOA, DH.UMVM., 124/182, 21 September 1918.
126 ATASE, BDH, 62/309A/005.
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composition, but also in its symbolism and ideological justif ication, the 
system was predominantly a Muslim institution. Conscription was hardly 
universal in the Ottoman context. But this did not mean a complete exclu-
sion of Ottoman non-Muslims. Instead, their situation was characterized 
by a discriminatory inclusion within a pragmatic outlook. For a long time, 
non-Muslims were loosely included in the system: they were denied ac-
tive service, but were obliged to pay an exemption fee instead. The new 
regulations after 1909 and then in 1914 made Ottoman conscription more 
comprehensive, but still in a pragmatic fashion. When the demand for mili-
tary labor was very high during the Great War, more and more non-Muslims 
were enlisted into the armed forces. But the overwhelming majority of the 
enlisted non-Muslims were employed in the unarmed labor battalions. 
Employing them in this way not only supplied useful labor for manual work, 
but also provided a means of control which would keep physically able 
non-Muslim male populations submissive, at a time when the nationalist 
CUP government increasingly considered them as a potential f ifth column. 
In this respect, conscription as a “nation-building” project failed in the 
Ottoman case. One may even speculate that it accelerated the dissolution of 
the imperial demographic composition. On the other hand, it can be argued 
that Ottoman conscription served as a precursor for, a sort of catalyst of, the 
Turkish-Muslim identity that became the main basis of Turkish nationalism.
Ottoman conscription was a form of tributary and noncommodif ied 
labor, in which eligible males had to serve from legal obligation. There 
would be no payment in return for this service, the duration of which was 
supposed to be limited by law. However, wartime conditions could alter 
this limit. While the duration of active military service was declared to be 
two years for the army in May 1914,127 it was continuously extended as the 
war prolonged. Consequently, enlisted men had to serve until the end of 
the war. It can be said that this extension pushed conscript labor toward 
the unfree end on the axis of free/unfree labor.
127 According to the Law on Military Service of 1914, the total duration of service had three 
parts: beginning with the date of enlistment, the f irst two years were for active army service 
(nizam); then sixteen years for active reserve service (ihtiyat); and, f inally, seven more years 
in the territorial reserve service (müstahfız). The total period of service was twenty-f ive years. 
However, the two years of active service was actually only for the infantry; it varied for the 
gendarmerie and the navy: it was three years for the former and f ive for the latter. On the other 
hand, according to the Article 6 of the law, active army service in all military classes could be 
extended in wartime, which did actually happen during the Great War. See “Mükellef iyet-i 
Askeriye Kanun-ı Muvakkati”, 29 Nisan 1330/12 May 1914, Düstûr, series II, vol. 6, pp. 662-704. 
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As had been the case in European conscription systems after the French 
Revolution, obligatory military service was presented to the public as a 
form of taxation incumbent upon all citizens as a requirement for citizen-
ship. In the Ottoman case religious justif ication played an important role 
as well. The discourse of obligatory military service as a patriotic duty 
was amalgamated with a religious discourse referring to the Islamic legal 
concept of Holy War.128 This religious discourse culminated in a “binding” 
document for Muslims when the Ottoman state off icially proclaimed Holy 
War (cihad). A religious decree, issued through the off ice of the Sheikh 
al-Islam on 11 November 1914, invited all Ottoman Muslims to f ight as a 
religious duty, as well as demanding support from Muslims all over the 
world. The emphasis on masculinity, which equated military service to 
a “rite of passage” into manhood, was another mechanism for justifying 
conscription, with deep roots in Ottoman-Turkish popular culture.129
Ottoman conscription practice also shows that, even when conscription 
is the most dominant form of military labor, existing social-economic-
political conditions and the multiple necessities of warfare require the 
simultaneous existence of different forms of recruitment. In the Ottoman 
case, conscription was never total, because of the infrastructural weak-
nesses of the Ottoman state, and the extent of manpower needs for specif ic 
purposes. The pragmatic needs of the state and the specif ic requirements 
of war simultaneously produced hybrid forms of recruitment (old and new). 
As discussed above, besides conscript labor, the Ottoman army developed 
and utilized various hybrid forms under the general heading of “volunteers”. 
Different from conscript labor, volunteers represented a certain degree of 
commodification, as many of them received payment or obtained material 
benefits in return for their service. However, they were still subject to the 
conscription regulations and had to serve until the end of the war once 
they joined the colors. Even mainstream Ottoman conscription included a 
different level of commodification, as it allowed (and sometimes in practice 
obliged, as in the case of non-Muslims) the avoidance of service through the 
payment of an exemption fee. The labor battalions can also be mentioned in 
this respect. These constituted a separate subcategory within conscription, 
through which conscript labor was used in manual works primarily related 
128 Heinzelmann, Cihaddan Vatan Savunmasına, p. 264. 
129 This emphasis on manhood was frequently used in the Ottoman propaganda literature 
during the war. In such literature, usually in the form of short and simple stories, the mothers 
and other female loved ones of potential draftees were always depicted as encouraging their 
boys to join the war to protect their virtue (namus) against the inf idel enemy. For an example, 
see Seyf i, “Oğlumu Hududa Gönderdikten Sonra”, pp. 103-104.
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to military need, but also in other economic sectors such as agriculture. It 
can be said that enlisted men in the labor battalions were employed “forced 
war workers” within a military framework.
The coexistence of different types of military labor was certainly not 
unique to the Ottoman case. In his seminal article on the evolution of 
recruitment types in the modern west, John Lynn has already pointed to 
the continuity of “old” forms and the possibility of coexistence of different 
types.130
In this sense, the Ottoman practice of conscription confirms that types 
of military labor were rarely entirely exclusive. Various factors such as 
the pragmatic needs of warfare, infrastructural problems, and political 
preferences mitigated exclusive categories and required a more hybrid 
system. Rather than following a teleological line of transition, it is more 
reasonable to argue that a particular type became dominant at a specif ic 
time and place, still allowing room for other types, as in the case of the 
Ottoman Great War experience.
Finally, the problem of desertion, which reached its peak during the Great 
War, demonstrates that resistance to compulsory military service was an 
integral part of the history of Ottoman conscription. The recruitment of 
military labor in a tributary form did not guarantee absolute control over it. 
Despite the existence of legal obligation, the threat of severe punishment, 
peer pressure, and religious-nationalist-cultural discourses that praised 
military service, the Ottoman case reveals that there was always a limit to 
obedience to conscription. The Great War was a time for the Ottoman state 
to use its actual and discursive power to mobilize the maximum amount 
of manpower but, ironically, it was also a period in which the evasion of 
military service reached very high levels. The extent of the problem al-
lows us to argue that enlisted men were not entirely passive; they had an 
agency through which they could react to that obligation – at least when 
basic expectations, which had been implicitly or explicitly promised by the 
conscription law at the beginning, were not met by the state. This reaction, 
which forced the state to take measures both within the military and on the 
home front, was a major variable that played an important role in reshaping 
the way conscription was executed.
130 Lynn, “The Evolution of Army Style in Modern West”.
 Soldiering as work
The all-volunteer force in the United States
Beth Bailey
On 30 June 1973 Dwight Elliot Stone, the last man to be conscripted into 
the US military, reported for basic training. The following day the United 
States began its experiment with an all-volunteer force.1
Most Americans understood this move as a major and unprecedented 
transformation – even as a radical experiment – even though the longstand-
ing draft was, in fact, the aberration. Until Cold War pressures convinced 
Americans that a large standing army was justif ied, the nation had relied on 
a volunteer force, turning to conscription only in time of war. But memories 
were short. Even though the draft had been in effect for only thirty-three 
years, from 1940 through slightly more than three decades of war and tense 
peace, conscription had come to seem normal, an expected part of young 
men’s lives.
Short memories aside, however, those who saw the all-volunteer force 
(AVF) as a radical experiment had a point. It was clear in 1973 that the nation 
would need to recruit 20,000 to 30,000 nonprior service (NPS) accessions a 
month – vastly more than in the all-volunteer past. And they would have 
to do so from a population of youth that could generously be characterized 
as antimilitary, persuading them to join a troubled institution at the end 
of a diff icult and unpopular war. The chair of the House Armed Services 
Committee was widely quoted as he quipped – repeatedly – that the only 
way the United States could get a volunteer force was to draft one.2
The American move from one military form to another was not messy 
and gradual, as are many of the transitions discussed in this volume. 
Instead it was clear and absolute, from one day to the next, and both the 
end of conscription and the structure of the new system were argued over, 
legislated, planned, observed, analyzed, and evaluated. Thus it is possible to 
discuss not only the key social, economic, demographic, and technological 
variables that produced the United States’ modern volunteer force, but also 
the struggles to shape that force and to give meaning to the experience of 
military service in the post-Vietnam War United States. Significantly, many 
1 Evans, “The All-Volunteer Army After Twenty Years”, p. 40.
2 Quote in O’Sullivan and Meckler, The Draft and Its Enemies, p. 228.
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of those at the forefront of the move to an AVF consciously and purposely 
attempted to redef ine military service as labor. Rejecting the idea that 
military “service” was an obligation of citizenship, these partisans worked 
to shift decisions about who would f ight from the community and the state 
to the individual and the market.
In the f irst half of this chapter I will offer a history of the move from 
conscription-based to volunteer force in the United States and explore 
some of the major consequences of that transformation. Looking past the 
formative decade, I will discuss the implications of def ining soldiering 
as work and relying on a national labor market to f ill the military ranks, 
always reminding readers that the US all-volunteer force is the product 
of a specif ic historical time and place. I will then situate the AVF in the 
broad taxonomy of military service as labor, analyzing it in relation to 
the standard set of proposed variables in order to allow crossnational and 
chronological comparisons.
My analysis here focuses on the US Army. While each force – the army, air 
force, navy, marines, and coast guard – had specific and somewhat different 
experiences in the transition to and development of an all-volunteer force, 
the army was affected more than any other service. As the largest branch 
of the US armed forces (with active component end strength of 562,400 in 
2010, compared to the next largest branch, the navy’s 324,239), the army has 
to recruit, train, and maintain a much greater number of troops than any 
other service.3 And, signif icantly for a study of military service as labor, 
the army is the least specialized service, the one with the largest range of 
military occupational specialties (MOSs) or, in language even the army 
sometimes adopted, “jobs”.4
3 For 1960s-1970s f igures, Steward, American Military History, pp. 372-373. Recent statistics 
from Off ice of Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness, can be found at “Population 
Representation in the Military Services”, http://prhome.defense.gov/MPP/ACCESSION%20
POLICY/PopRep2008/contents/contents.html (accessed 10 January 2011).
4 The second reason for my army focus is a practical one. Although the AVF is a natural topic 
for labor historians, that promise has not yet been fulf illed. Very little has been written on the 
post-1973 volunteer force, and most of what exists is on the army. See Bailey, America’s Army, 
and Robert K. Griff ith’s meticulously researched internal history, The US Army’s Transition to the 
All-Volunteer Force. Rostker, I Want You!, offers a detailed policy history with an accompanying 
CD of archival documents. Given the multiple differences in size, structure, organization, and 
recruiting strategies among the services, I am discussing general factors leading to the move 
from a conscription-based to an all-volunteer military, but focusing on the implications for and 
actions of the US Army.
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Historical background
From 1973 through the early 1980s, the US Army called itself the MVA: the 
modern volunteer army. “Modern”, here, distinguished this volunteer army 
from those that came before. Although the draft had been in place (with 
only a short break) since 1940, the United States had relied on a volunteer 
force for most of its history. In the beginning, the British colonies in North 
America had adopted the British militia system, which def ined all able-
bodied citizens of each colony as members of a common militia, jointly 
responsible for defense of their homes. While this sounds like universal 
military obligation, that understanding rests on an anachronistic reading of 
“citizen”. Only free white males had the rights and obligations of citizenship. 
And although an active militia, composed of volunteers, stood ready, if too 
few stepped forward, men could be conscripted from the larger common 
militia. Even in such cases, exemptions were common. More than two hun-
dred laws offered excuse from military obligation, and not surprisingly most 
of them favored the economically successful and socially well-positioned.5
The militia system carried over into the new nation, despite President 
George Washington’s desire for a standing army subject to federal author-
ity. It was not until the US Civil War (1861-1865) that a federal system of 
conscription was implemented. This war was fought with mass armies – 2.2 
million Union troops and more than 750,000 Confederate – and both gov-
ernments turned to conscription. Nonetheless, the Confederacy exempted 
slaveholders and in the north men were allowed to purchase “substitutes”. 
And conscription met with great resistance; the f irst Union draft inductees 
were announced in New York just days after more than 5,500 men died in 
the battle of Gettysburg. The draft riots that followed cost more than a 
hundred lives.6
From the Civil War until 1940, the United States maintained a small, 
volunteer, standing army, turning to conscription in times of war. But in 
1940, aware that the United States would not likely stand apart from the war 
raging in Europe, President Franklin D. Roosevelt instituted the nation’s 
f irst peacetime draft. A long f ive years later, as the nation began the process 
of demobilizing the more than 12 million men and women in uniform, 
5 Segal, Recruiting for Uncle Sam, pp. 18-24. Segal offers a history of manpower policy from 
colonial times through the 1980s. Other signif icant works on the selective service system in the 
twentieth century are Flynn, The Draft, 1940–1973, and Chambers, To Raise an Army. See also 
Cohen, Citizens and Soldiers.
6 Segal, Recruiting for Uncle Sam, pp. 25-26; Bernstein, The New York City Draft Riots, p. 5; 
Flynn, The Draft, 1940-1973, pp. 167-168.
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Americans assumed that the draft had been, once again, an unwelcome 
necessity of war. But the Cold War seemed to demand a large standing army, 
and a brief experiment with voluntarism left way too many boots unfilled. 
And then the North Korean army crossed the 38th parallel.
In a society still shadowed by world war, its people still versed in the 
language of service and sacrif ice, military service and citizen’s obligation 
remained closely joined.7 The joint congressional committee on the draft 
stated unequivocally in 1951 that “the duty of bearing arms in defense of the 
nation is a universal duty”, and Dwight D. Eisenhower, former commander-
in-chief of World War II Allied expeditionary forces in Europe, insisted 
repeatedly during his 1952 presidential campaign that military service 
was “an obligation that every citizen owes the nation”. High school stu-
dents encountered the familiar argument in “Are You Ready for Service”, 
a f ilmstrip that was distributed to classrooms across the nation by the 
same production company responsible for the instructional f ilms “Are You 
Popular?” (1947) and “What to Do on a Date” (1951), in which a World War II 
veteran explained to his sons, one already in uniform, that military service 
was the most signif icant obligation of citizenship.8
Though young American men were subject to the draft, those charged 
with defending the nation’s security saw a new world in which victory would 
be won through scientif ic and technological development, not with the 
mass armies of the past. (In fact, the overarching message of “Are You Ready 
for Service” was: stay in school.) The director of the Scientif ic Manpower 
Commission argued, rather coldheartedly, that a GI was quickly trained 
whereas a physicist was not, and such reasoning supported deferments 
not only for students studying science and technology but for most college 
students who managed to pass their courses.9 These deferments, however, 
were not especially controversial because so few men were drafted.
In the years following World War II the children born of the postwar 
American baby boom moved though American society like, as people said 
at the time, a pig in a python. The population bulge that caused elementary 
schools to sprout on the American landscape at the beginning of the 1950s 
translated into a flood of young men eligible for military service in the early 
1960s. There were 8 million men between the ages of nineteen and twenty-
7 For a more complete version of this discussion, see Bailey, America’s Army, pp. 1-33.
8 Flynn, The Draft, 1940-1973, pp. 136, 164; “Service and Citizenship”, part 3 of Are You Ready 
for Service? (Coronet Instructional Films, 1951), Prelinger Archives, www.archive.org (accessed 
December 2011).
9 Flynn, The Draft, 1940-1973, pp. 140, 148.
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f ive in 1958; six years later there were 12 million. At the same time, the army 
(by far the largest service) had fallen from 1.5 million to 860,000 active 
troops over the course of the 1950s.10 Abundance created its own challenges: 
deferment categories were expanded; qualif ications were raised – but there 
were still too many men available for a shrinking armed forces, and no way 
to conceive of enough legitimate deferments to manage the glut of available 
manpower. The Pentagon discussed ending the draft in 1958; the issue got 
some attention again during the 1960 presidential election, as Democrats 
criticized the existing system, and in 1964 Republican presidential candi-
date Barry Goldwater, true to his libertarian values, announced that he 
would end the draft if elected and incumbent Lyndon B. Johnson ordered 
yet another study of the issue. But in 1965 Johnson authorized a large-scale 
buildup of American ground troops in Vietnam and, in an attempt to deflect 
national attention from the escalation, decided to rely on the draft instead 
of activating the reserves.11
Transition to an all-volunteer force
On 17 October 1968 – two and a half weeks before the presidential election, 
and at the height of American involvement in the Vietnam War – Republican 
candidate Richard M. Nixon proposed to end the draft. It was not quite so 
radical a proposal as it sounds; Nixon made clear that conscription would 
continue in some form until the United States resolved its role in Vietnam. 
Nonetheless, he pledged, if elected president, to begin moving immediately 
toward that goal.12
Nixon’s motivations were, of course, primarily political. He meant to 
shake up the campaign in its f inal days, to show himself as someone capable 
of thinking boldly and of taking action. Nixon had chosen an issue that 
mattered to a great many Americans and, if many of them did not cross 
party lines to vote for Nixon, they nonetheless supported his plan. By the 
late 1960s there was, in effect, a perfect storm of factors that led to the end 
of conscription, some of which had little directly to do with the military: a 
strong and widespread sentiment that the draft was not fair, a demographic 
10 Flynn, The Draft, 1940-1973, pp. 165, 169; Segal, Recruiting for Uncle Sam, p. 33.
11 On Johnson’s decision, see Olson and Roberts, Where the Domino Fell, p. 127, and Dallek, 
Flawed Giant, pp. 271-277.
12 Richard Nixon, “The All-Volunteer Armed Force”, address on CBS radio network, 17 October 
1968, in All-Volunteer Army-Misc., Center of Military History, Fort McNair, Washington, DC.
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bulge in the draft-age population, attempts by liberals and the left to make 
it more diff icult to send troops to war, newly powerful claims that the free 
market provided the best solution to most problems, and shifting pos-
sibilities for women and members of ethnic and racial minority groups in 
American society. Nonetheless, it was the Nixon administration’s concerted 
efforts that brought an end to the draft.13
Many, in early 1969, believed that Nixon’s promise had been no more than 
last-minute politics, a move meant to sway wavering supporters in a time 
of enormous political anger and national division. After all, Nixon had not 
discussed his proposal with the Pentagon, with military leaders, or with 
members of Congress. Nonetheless, one of his f irst actions as president was 
to establish the President’s Commission on the All-Volunteer Force, a group 
of civilian and former military leaders that was charged not with exploring 
the possibility of an AVF, but with crafting a plan to create one.
The commission, often referred to as the Gates Commission because it 
was chaired by former secretary of defense Thomas Gates, included both 
civilian and retired military members.14 At the beginning, opinion was 
divided and Gates himself told President Nixon that he was opposed to 
the change. This group, over several months, moved from initial divisions 
to a unanimous report. That was due, in large part, to the sorts of evidence 
they considered. The frame of the debate had been set well before the com-
mission heard testimony or considered evidence. It was the staff, not the 
commissioners, who proposed the agendas, directed the research, gathered 
the evidence, drafted the report. And four of the f ive staff members were 
anti-conscription free-market economists with signif icant public reputa-
tions of their own. It is not that they were able to impose their opinions 
on the distinguished members of the commission – it is hard to imagine 
retired four-star generals and a former secretary of defense being pushed 
around by their staff – it was that they asked certain types of questions and 
provided evidence to answer them. Believing in clear data and quantif iable 
proof, they had little patience for qualitative questions about the meaning 
of military service or the obligations of citizenship. Their carefully gathered 
data supported the “hidden tax” argument. Their evaluation of economic 
variables strengthened the arguments of the three free-market economists 
13 For a more complete discussion of Nixon’s proposal and the Gates Commission, see Bailey, 
America’s Army, pp. 21-33.
14 For records of the President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force (the Gates 
Commission), see the Lauris Norstad Papers and the Alfred M. Gruenther Papers, Dwight David 
Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas [henceforth, DDEL].
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who sat on the commission: Milton Friedman, Alan Greenspan, and W. 
Allen Wallis. Thus, while opposition to the draft took a wide variety of forms, 
the report that would structure the new AVF built on one key premise: the 
military must compete more effectively in the national labor market. The 
main answer the Gates Commission offered was competitive wages.
The strongest opposition to the move came from the armed services, 
though once confronted with an order from their commander-in-chief all 
generally worked hard to put successful plans in place. From the military 
and the general public, there were three major objections to the end of the 
draft.
The first was philosophical. Those who believed that military service was 
an obligation of citizenship worried about the centrality of money in this 
new model. One member of the Gates Commission initially noted that he 
had “serious philosophical reservations about paying people to die for their 
country”, to which Milton Friedman replied that he did “not see how morale 
and effectiveness were enhanced by paying people substandard wages”, for 
the “logic of such an approach would dictate paying them nothing”.15 Even 
though, in the end, the commission report was unanimous, some members 
remained convinced that there were moral issues that could not be reduced 
to economic terms. And in both public discussions and congressional hear-
ings, the term “mercenary” was frequently used.
The second objection, voiced most strongly by members of the military, 
was that military service is not simply a job nor the military simply an 
employer. It was not only the risks that were different, but the other de-
mands: the military required immediate obedience to authority; it exercised 
control over almost all aspects of individuals’ lives; it attempted to separate 
its members from the comforts and distractions of civilian society. And 
while some civilian workers might risk their lives in the course of their 
work – police off icers, f iref ighters – none of them could be ordered to kill. 
From a different vantage, others argued that men who think of military 
service primarily as a job, who are drawn by the promise of a wage, simply 
would not make good soldiers.
Finally, many commentators and analysts worried that it was imprudent 
to leave the military at the mercy of the market. Some argued that the mili-
tary might not compete well in the open market – a reasonable assumption 
at the end of an unpopular war, though the economic downturn that began 
in 1973 did create more fertile ground for recruiters. Others feared that the 
15 Gates Commission, Minutes of 13 May 1969 meeting, 9, folder 1, box 1, and Minutes of 
6 September 1969 meeting, p. 23, folder 5, box 1, both in Gruenther Papers, DDEL.
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AVF would simply replace the selective service system with an “economic 
draft” and that the new all-volunteer force would be f illed with poor, alien-
ated African American men (though some were objecting to such potential 
exploitation while others worried about angry black men with guns and 
weapons training). Still others quoted the chair of the House Armed Services 
Committee’s claim: the only way to get a volunteer force would be to draft 
one. They believed it just could not be done. In the end, however, almost 
all involved in the debates over the AVF believed the volunteer force would 
serve as the core of the US military and as the nation’s peacetime force. In 
the event of a major conflict or long-lasting war, they assumed, the United 
States would once again turn to the draft.
Implementation
The military did, in fact, face an enormous challenge, and the army most 
of all. In the wake of a war gone badly wrong, an unpopular institution 
wracked by internal crisis had to recruit 20,000 to 30,000 young Americans a 
month (by contrast, in 2010 army recruiting aimed for approximately 65,000 
nonprior-service recruits a year) from a racially, culturally, and politically 
divided society in which young people were overwhelmingly opposed to 
the military and more comfortable with the urging to “question authority” 
than with an automatic “yes, sir”. As one quick illustration: a carefully 
conducted survey in April 1971 discovered that 88 per cent of young men 
either “probably” or “def initely” did not want to join the army.16
Faced with such grim prospects, the army began two linked efforts, 
each of which relied, at least partially, on models of civilian labor or the 
market. During the early 1970s, in an attempt to improve its image, the 
army initiated a series of highly publicized reforms. Many were based on 
research into what young people would f ind acceptable work conditions 
and often relied on analogies to the civilian workplace. In the early 1970s 
potential volunteers were promised forty-hour work-weeks and paid vaca-
tions. Announcing the end of reveille and bed-checks, army reformers made 
the point that civilian bosses did not check to see if their employees were 
16 Rome Arnold & Company, “US Army Recruiting Advertising Test”, conducted for US Army 
Recruiting and N.W. Ayer & Son, Inc., September 1971, p. 3, All-Volunteer Army Collection, 
Military History Institute (AVA-MHI), Carlisle, PA.
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in bed at 10 p.m.17 More sophisticated arguments also used the language of 
work. When Pete Dawkins, a young and highly decorated major who had, 
while at West Point, won the Heisman Trophy for the most outstanding 
player in American college football, testif ied before Congress about the 
coming “modern volunteer army”, he played down the reform of living 
conditions and the army’s newly competitive pay, emphasizing instead a 
different aspect of labor. To attract volunteers, he argued, the army would 
need to offer recruits “the ability to grow in one’s work, the ability to achieve 
recognition for achievement, the opportunity to really have work chal-
lenges […].” The army Dawkins envisioned would offer the satisfaction of 
meaningful labor.18
The military also began trying to compete more effectively in the labor 
market, offering benef its that research suggested would attract the sort 
of volunteers they wanted: bonuses for enlistment, money for college, job 
training, leadership skills, travel, adventure, and (initially, for women) 
good marriage prospects. Far-sighted reformers also began to focus on 
advertising.19 This was also, in a different sense, a turn to the market, though 
a market more broadly defined. Economists had, at that time, not yet begun 
to factor irrational forces into their calculations and the economists whose 
arguments shaped the Gates Commission conclusions had relied on fairly 
basic labor models of supply, demand, and competitive wages. Offer young 
men a decent wage, they claimed, and a suff icient number would enlist. 
Individuals would make decisions based on rational understandings of 
their own economic self-interest.
These, however, were not days of measured rationality in American 
society. And the market, in 1970s America, was not simply a realm of rational 
economic choice. It was a site of consumer desire; it was a volatile space 
of inchoate needs, hopes, and fears. These military off icers, paradoxically, 
understood the complexity of this “market” better than the Chicago School 
economists. They adopted consumer capitalism’s most powerful tools, turn-
ing to the most sophisticated marketing and advertising f irms of the day in 
attempts to discover what young people wanted and sell it back to them in 
the shape of the military. Although the slogans varied (“Today’s Army Wants 
17 On civilian employers, see Leavitt A. Knight, Jr., “What the Army Is Doing to Make Out 
without the Draft,”, American Legion Magazine, April 1971, p. 4. For a more detailed discussion 
of army reforms, see Bailey, America’s Army, pp. 34–66.
18 Dawkins’s comments in Special Subcommittee on Recruiting and Retention of Military 
Personnel, House Committee on Armed Services, Recruiting and Retention of Military Personnel, 
29 September 1971, p. 59; quotation is from unedited transcript of hearings in AVA-MHI.
19 See Bailey, “The Army in the Marketplace”.
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to Join You” was the initial campaign), all attempted to convince young 
people that military service was not about obligation, but opportunity.
That opportunity took different forms. Some of it was slightly miscon-
ceived reassurance: the initial advertisements made the unlikely claim 
that joining the army required no sacrif ice of individuality – an important 
concept to 70s youth – not even the traditional “skin-head” haircut. At the 
same time, these ads offered a chance to “build your mind and body […] 
further your education, become expert at a skill, have opportunities for 
advancement, travel, and 30 days vacation a year”. One series of advertise-
ments asked potential volunteers to “Take the Army’s 16-month tour of 
Europe”, a witty turn on the multiple meanings of tour that conflated the 
army tour of duty with the grand tour of Europe that more prosperous 
youth enjoyed. But many ads made a more basic offer. “We’ve got over 300 
good, steady jobs”, read the headline on a Reader’s Digest advertisement that 
prompted more than 30,000 young men to send in postcards requesting 
more information. Another ad inquired, “What are you doing after school?” 20
Initial results of the move to an AVF: “quality”, race, and gender
The turn to the labor market would have profound implications for the 
composition of the army. Even though selective service system regulations 
had allowed college youth to defer or avoid military service in high numbers 
over the previous decades, and even though military reliance on quantita-
tive test scores to sort draftees into different military occupations meant 
that more privileged youth were less likely to f ind themselves on the front 
lines, the draft did reach more widely and deeply through American society 
than would a volunteer force.
The army entered the national job market with a great disadvantage in 
that historical moment. While it continued to draw young men and women 
who had a family military tradition or other cultural reasons to enlist, few 
of those who had other options chose to enter the military in the immediate 
aftermath of the Vietnam War. In the early years of the all-volunteer force, 
the army relied primarily on those young men who were least competitive 
20 Advertisements created for the US Army by N.W. Ayer are collected in the N.W. Ayer Advertis-
ing Records, Archives Center, National Museum of American History, Smithsonian Institution, 
Washington, DC.
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in the civilian labor market.21 As the unemployment rate skyrocketed in 
the early 1970s, from 4.9 per cent 1973 to 8.5 per cent 1975 (or 16.1 per cent 
for sixteen- to twenty-four-year-olds), the military had greater appeal. But 
the army still struggled to f ind a quarter-million nonprior service recruits 
a year, and struggled also with the fact that the men the marketplace most 
easily supplied were not those deemed “high-quality”.
“Quality”, according to the US military, is a quantif iable term based on 
two key criteria. A high-quality recruit holds an earned high school diploma 
(not a GED) and scores in the top half of the Armed Forces Qualif ication 
Test (AFQT) portion of what is now called the ASVAB (Armed Services 
Vocational Aptitude Battery). Test scores are divided into f ive categories, 
which fall into a bell curve. Thus scores that fall into categories I-IIIA signal 
“high-quality”. To make clear what military and civilian leaders were argu-
ing about: no one had a problem with category IIIB recruits or even, in many 
cases, category IVA. But the 10-15 AFQT scores that put potential recruits 
into CAT IVB were, according to the army, roughly equivalent to IQ scores of 
71-81. In the early 1970s, the army was permitted 18 per cent CAT IV nonprior 
service recruits a year; currently the limit is 2 per cent.
Some of those involved in the transition, most particularly in these early 
days, insisted that “quality” did not matter. A body is a body, after all, and 
what mattered most was f illing boots. Others, those who would win the 
day, argued that modern warfare requires soldiers of above-average mental 
capacity and the sort of day-to-day discipline shown by completing a high 
school degree. Army studies, over time, found that those who fell into 
the bottom of CAT IV were very diff icult to train for even basic technical 
tasks; ultimately, only about one-third of such recruits were capable of the 
basic tasks expected in the modern army. Such concerns, however, were 
subsumed in political debate. The White House, aware that the army was 
not wholeheartedly enthusiastic about the move to an AVF, claimed that 
discussions of quality were simply an attempt to sabotage the volunteer 
force. And the Department of Defense dismissed army concerns: “how many 
Vietcong have PhDs?” was the slightly contemptuous phrasing.22
Concern about quality was complicated by the fact that African Ameri-
cans were significantly more likely than whites to fall into the “low-quality” 
category. Virtually everyone involved in the discussion pointed to socioeco-
21 For a more complete discussion of “quality” and market forces, see Bailey, America’s Army, 
pp. 88-129.
22 Griff ith, The US Army’s Transition to the All-Volunteer Force, pp. 186-188; George Doust, 
interview by Robert K. Griff ith, 30 March 1983, AVA-MHI.
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nomic explanations: inferior schools, disadvantaged backgrounds – but, in 
that era of powerful racial division, all discussions of quality were shadowed 
by the explosive topic of race. When, in the mid-1970s, Bo Callaway, who 
served as Nixon’s and Gerald R. Ford’s secretary of the army, attempted to 
raise the quality of army recruits by mandating higher cut-offs across racial 
lines, opponents charged that he was trying to limit the number of black 
soldiers. The next secretary of the army, Clifford Alexander, agreed. He 
insisted that the army’s measure of quality – the high school diploma and a 
I-IIIA AFQT score – was unnecessary and prejudicial, and he had the scores 
removed from the f iles of 400,000 soldiers in order to prevent their “abuse”.23 
(The scores did indeed shape soldiers’ careers, helping to determine not only 
initial MOS but also the course of promotion and advancement.)
Alexander argued that the army should measure individual accomplish-
ment and success rather than relying on such scores, as they predicted 
success or failure only in the aggregate and so ruled out many potentially 
successful soldiers. Army proponents conceded his point, but argued for 
eff iciency. One thousand recruits with high school diplomas yielded 940 
soldiers at the end of six months. It took 1,400 recruits without earned high 
school diplomas to yield the same number of soldiers.24
Despite all the debate, the labor market was functioning: individuals 
were making decisions, weighing the army against other forms of labor. 
Some of their decisions were economically rational. Although Congress 
had increased military pay rates to equal those of basic entry-level civilian 
jobs in 1973, wages did not keep pace with inflation or the civilian scale and 
became steadily less competitive over the course of the decade. Cultural 
and ideological reasons also played a role; antimilitarism did not disappear 
with the end of the war in Vietnam.
By the end of the 1970s, the all-volunteer free-market army was in crisis. 
Forty-one per cent of the army’s enlisted ranks were high school dropouts. 
According to a study done in 1976 at Fort Benning, site of army basic train-
ing, 53 per cent of men read at or below f ifth-grade level (roughly age ten). 
The army began rewriting training manuals, moving from eleventh- to 
seventh-grade reading level, and then to comic books. The American press 
reported to US citizens and other interested observers around the world 
that 90 per cent of nuclear-weapons maintenance specialists had failed 
23 “Doubts Mounting about All-Volunteer Force”, Science, 5 September 1980, pp. 1095-1099.
24 Robert B. Pirie testimony, Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel, Senate Armed 
Services Committee, “Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for FY81, part 
3: Manpower and Personnel”, 10 March 1980, 96th Cong., 2nd sess., p. 1290.
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their qualif ication tests in 1978, as had 82 per cent of Hawk surface-to-air 
missile crews. As a June 1980 cover story in Time magazine noted, falling 
capabilities f it poorly with the rising complexity of weaponry: the modern 
Blackhawk helicopter, for example, had “257 knobs and switches, 135 circuit 
breakers, 62 displays and 11.7 sq. feet of instruments and controls”. At the 
same time, social problems undermined discipline and capability. Crime 
was rampant, drugs and alcohol abuse endemic, desertion common. Faith 
in the AVF, never strong, plummeted. In 1978 an American television 
network ran a documentary titled “The American Army: A Shocking Case 
of Incompetence”. 25
What seemed like domestic debates about the success or failure of the 
AVF took on new weight in 1979, when Iranian protesters overran the US 
embassy in Tehran, taking hostages, and the eventual military rescue 
mission failed, leaving eight US servicemen dead. The Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan on Christmas Eve 1979 added new pressures. In the midst of 
international turmoil, with the clear possibility of military action, stories 
of a military in crisis had new resonance. In the face of such international 
instability and widespread concern about the quality of the US military, 
President Jimmy Carter asked Congress to reinstate registration for the 
draft. He was not proposing an end to the military’s all-volunteer status, 
but wanted the draft mechanism in place in case it was needed.
As the turn to the labor market initially left the army in a crisis of qual-
ity, it also fundamentally changed its composition. The selective service 
system had mechanisms that could be used to create a roughly proportional 
representation by race; the new AVF did not. Very quickly, the percentage of 
African American men began to rise. Black men who had suffered in a civil-
ian job market characterized by racial discrimination found opportunity 
in the military, and that opportunity was, in part, due to the functioning 
of the labor market. In the initial years of the AVF the army could not 
attract enough well-qualif ied men, and African American men (who were, 
in aggregate, less likely to be well educated and otherwise competitive 
in the civilian job market) took advantage of the disparity in supply and 
demand. And, in various ways, the army encouraged black enlistment. An 
army recruiting ad that ran in Ebony, a popular magazine aimed at African 
Americans, read: “It’s tough to get ahead when you start so far behind. No 
skills. No experience. No jobs to look forward to, except the ones anyone 
25 “Who’ll Fight for America” (cover story), Time, 9 June 1980, pp. 24, 25; see Bailey, America’s 
Army, pp. 120-122.
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can do.” 26 By 1974, 30 per cent of new accessions were black, compared to 
slightly over 11 per cent of the US population. Many of them were men 
who could f ind no other jobs, and a high percentage of black volunteers 
were designated “low-quality”. Those recruits did not qualify for technical 
MOSs or for any f ield that required signif icant advanced training. Thus a 
disproportionate number of African American volunteers were allocated 
to the combat arms.
It is not surprising that critics claimed exploitation. African American 
men had died in disproportionate numbers during the early years of the 
Vietnam War, and even after the Pentagon attempted to make certain that 
black soldiers were not overrepresented on the front lines, the language of 
“cannon fodder” and “genocide” persisted. These were, as well, days of racial 
division and anger both in the United States and in its military. Charlie 
Rangel, the congressman who would continue to argue against the AVF 
through the f irst decade of the twenty-f irst century, claimed that the all-
volunteer force was simply conscription by another name, the drafting of 
the poor and black under the language of choice.27
What is more surprising is the counterargument, which found legitimacy 
in the army’s attempt to reposition itself during the transition to an AVF. 
The key spokesman for this position was Ron Dellums, an African American 
former marine with an MA in social work from the University of California, 
Berkeley, who was elected to the US Congress on an antiwar platform in 1970. 
What, he asked, if the army really was, as it claimed, about opportunity? 
What if there were no war? What if the army did offer good, steady jobs? 
Should African Americans not have equal access to them? Should African 
Americans not, f inally, have equal opportunity?28 These were diff icult con-
versations, especially in conjunction with concerns about quality. During 
the 1980s and 1990s, as overall “quality” numbers rose dramatically, African 
Americans (both male and female) continued to enlist in disproportion-
ate numbers. During the 1990s, however, 59 per cent of African American 
recruits scored in the upper half of exam results (CAT IIIA or higher). These 
“high-quality” recruits had options, both within the military and outside 
it, and disproportionately few chose combat arms.29
26 Advertisement in Ebony, December 1972.
27 Charles B. Rangel, “Black Hessians in a White Man’s Army”, New York Times, 17 April 1971, 
p. 29.
28 Dellums, Lying Down with Lions; Dellums’s 1974 correspondence in Rostker, I Want You!, 
accompanying CD (G0548.pdf). 
29 Moskos and Butler, All That We Can Be, pp. 39-40.
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The changing racial demographics of the army during this time of transi-
tion concerned many Americans. But the change in racial demographics 
required much less management than did the growth in the number of 
women. The shift from conscription-based to all-volunteer military had 
an enormous impact on women in the military, both their numbers and 
functions. Of course activists in the women’s movement of the 1960s and 
1970s played a signif icant role in creating new opportunities for women 
in the military, as they insisted that women deserved equal rights and 
opportunities and mounted legal challenges support their claims. But it 
was the move to the labor market that jumpstarted the full integration of 
women into the United States’ armed forces.30 The President’s Commission 
on the All-Volunteer Force, in a case of extreme short-sightedness, had not 
factored women into any of its quantitative market calculations about 
the feasibility of f illing the ranks (aside from a proposal to dispense with 
women altogether), but army planners quickly understood that the army 
would have to increase the percentage of women in the army in order to 
meet recruiting goals.31
This would be a major transformation. According to legislation passed in 
1948, women could not comprise more than 2 per cent of the nation’s mili-
tary. That limit had been dropped in 1967, but its legacy remained: in 1971, 
women made up only 1.3 per cent of the military’s enlisted ranks. When the 
US Army moved to all-volunteer status in 1973, women were still members of 
a separate “Women’s Army Corps”. Women could not hold a permanent rank 
higher than Lt. Colonel. Pregnancy brought mandatory discharge. Married 
women could not enlist (though women could marry while in the service), 
nor could women with children under the age of eighteen. Women were 
restricted to just over one-third of military occupational specialties (MOS), 
but fewer than 1.5 per cent of actual army positions were open to women.32
From 1971 to 1979, army enlisted ranks moved from 1.2 per cent female 
to 8.4 per cent female (for the entire military, f igures were 1.3 to 7.6 per 
30 The discussion of women is drawn from Bailey, America’s Army, pp. 130-171. Key works on 
women in the military include Morden, The Women’s Army Corps; Binkin and Bach, Women and 
the Military; Franke, Ground Zero; and Stiehm, Arms and the Enlisted.
31 Gates Commission, Minutes of 12-13 July 1969 meeting, p. 20; Forrester to Rogers, “A Concept 
for Expanded Use of Women in the Army, February 22, 1973, in Gen. Bailey’s Background Papers, 
1971-1975, WAC 99, box 14, Women’s Army Corps, 1945-1978, RG 319, National Archives and 
Records Administration, College Park, MD; Army 75 Personnel Concept Study, prepared by 
Battelle Institute under contract to Personnel Studies and Research, Off ice of the Deputy Chief 
of Staff for Personnel, in “Women and the AVF” folder, AVA-MHI.
32 Binkin and Bach, Women and the Military, pp. 27-28; Morden, The Women’s Army Corps, 
pp. 265-269, 285.
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cent). This shift mirrored changes taking place in American society, as 
economic crises propelled more women into the workforce and a powerful 
women’s movement challenged traditional limits on women’s public and 
workplace roles. But the rapid growth of women in the armed forces was 
also a byproduct of the shift from powerful cultural traditions of military 
service to the structural imperatives of labor-market capitalism.
As the army relied increasingly on women, it had to reconsider the roles 
women were allowed to play. In 1972, the army ended restrictions on all 
MOSs except combat arms. However, as the civilian labor market had done 
until the practice was outlawed by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the army 
continued to designate each position – not only general job categories but 
individual slots – by gender: M, F, or I (for interchangeable). In 1973, under 
structural pressure, the army began reevaluating the gender designation 
for each of the individual slots.33 Realizing that if the army needed women 
who wanted to repair trucks it likely should not advertise for women who 
were concerned about their “femininity”, the recruiting command also 
recast recruiting ads. By the late 1970s they emphasized equal opportunity; 
in the early 1980s ads portrayed women as members of the team, with no 
gender-specif ic pitch.
Congress ruled that the first women would be admitted to the US military 
academies in 1976, and the Women’s Army Corps was dissolved in 1978. 
However, when the nation reinstated draft registration in 1980, following 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979, Congress excluded women 
from registration, a decision that the US Supreme Court endorsed in 1981. 
According to the Supreme Court, the purpose of the draft was to f ill the 
ranks of combat troops, and as women were not allowed to join the combat 
arms there was thus no purpose in registering them for the draft.
Stabilizing the all-volunteer force
Many of the arguments that swirled around the all-volunteer army in its 
early days hinged on its uneasy relationship to the labor market. Was the 
military analogous to an employer, its members akin to workers? Or was 
the military exceptional (because it was responsible for the defense of the 
nation), unbound by either labor law or the rule of the market? The army 
itself had helped to create the ambiguity. Army recruiting advertisements 
33 Binkin and Bach, Women and the Military, pp. 27-28; Morden, The Women’s Army Corps, 
pp. 265-269, 285.
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offered “good, steady jobs”. Reformers within the ranks frequently compared 
army privates to civilian employees, urging that the men of the US Army 
be allowed the freedom to behave responsibly, turning up on time to their 
jobs each morning just as civilian workers do. At the same time, army 
noncomissioned officers and officers expected levels of authority and obedi-
ence that extended well beyond those demanded of civilian workers, and 
recruits were often unhappy that what had been portrayed as a job (or an 
“opportunity”) was, in fact, still the army.
Given these challenges – of recruiting suff icient numbers, of securing 
volunteers who could make successful soldiers, of managing a fundamental 
change in the makeup of the force, of dealing with the fact that calling 
military service a “good job” did not negate the fact that it was still the 
military, of dealing with international challenges – how did the AVF persist? 
Why, given the multiple failures of the fledgling AVF, did the United States 
not return to the draft?
Largely, I would argue, this was because there was no political will or 
powerful immediate threat. Nothing is ever monocausal, of course, and it 
is important to acknowledge the new patriotism of Reagan’s America and 
the waning shadow of the war in Vietnam. Military funding grew during 
the 1980s, and the army instituted internal reforms, including a new econo-
metric, computer-based system of recruiting. But market forces also played 
a role, both labor-market forces of supply and demand and the cultural-
consumer marketplace of meaning. Perhaps the most important factor 
was a change in demand. Congress lowered the target enlisted strength 
of the army – most dramatically after the Berlin Wall fell in 1989 – and as 
the army needed fewer soldiers, it raised its standards for admission. Not 
surprisingly, quality begat quality. Army rebranding mattered, as well: this 
version of the army offered to help American youth “Be All You Can Be”.
Targeted benef its were also critically important. College benef its not 
only drew more highly qualif ied recruits; they also helped to rebrand the 
army. Army researchers had discovered, in the early 1980s, that the biggest 
disincentive to enlistment was a potential volunteer’s mother. Mothers 
evidently equated military enlistment with failure; success, to them, was 
college enrollment. This research gave the army’s deputy chief of staff 
for personnel (DCSPER) a brilliant idea: link the army to college; make 
army enlistment the path to college enrollment; transform those mothers’ 
concerns into pride. In all fairness, the army advocated ceaselessly for 
the new GI Bill that was instituted in the mid-1980s, and in 2010 the army 
spent $220 million on higher-education assistance for active-duty soldiers. 
But as much as the DCSPER cared about the actual education benefits his 
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soldiers might receive, he meant to use the promise of education to help 
rebrand the army. And instead of competing with colleges for young men 
and women, the military would offer higher education as an earned benefit 
of military service.34
During this same period, the army began a large new program of family 
benefits. The army did not do so to draw more soldiers with dependants, 
though that was the consequence. Instead, family benefits were deemed 
necessary to retain soldiers. This is the logic: a conscription-based force 
relies on a reenlistment rate of about 10 per cent; an AVF, manpower analysts 
projected, would require almost 50 per cent of its personnel to reenlist. And 
researchers, trying to understand reenlistment decisions, discovered that 
it most often came down to a single question: is my family happy?35
The move to an AVF had transformed the demographics of the army in 
ways that went beyond gender and race; the new volunteers were more often 
older (the current maximum age of enlistment is forty-two; the average age 
is twenty-one), more often married, more often parents. But the military 
made little provision for dependants; “if the Army wanted you to have a 
family it would have issued you one”, as the saying used to go. Spouses 
(mostly wives) and children were often frustrated and unhappy, and good 
soldiers thus too often faced a choice: family or career. The army’s solution 
was a broad new program of family-oriented benefits: excellent child-care 
programs, dental care, and excellent medical coverage; recreation services; 
psychological counseling; even subsidies for relocating family pets. Such 
programs made the stark family-or-military decisions ever less likely. But 
they accelerated the transformation of army demographics. Excellent fam-
ily benefits drew more men and women with families to enlist; excellent 
family benef its kept more soldiers with families in the army. There are 
now 1.5 army dependants for every active duty member of the army. In 2010 
47 per cent of soldiers had dependent children, 72 per cent of them under 
the age of eleven.36 This demographic shift has signif icant implications in 
those instances when the “job” becomes deployment to a war zone, and 
is a signif icant piece of the debate about labor markets, workplaces, and 
military exceptionalism.
34 Alan Ono, interview by author, 29 July 2005, Honolulu, HI.
35 “Army Celebrates 25th Anniversary of Army Family Action Plan”, Information paper, 
12 September 2008, Army OneSource, www.myarmylifetoo.com. For statistics, see Army Posture 
Statements, www.army.mil, or the current “Army Prof ile”; for the origins of the program, see 
John A. Wickham, Jr., “White Paper 1983: The Army Family”, Off ice of the Army Chief of Staff, 
Washington, DC, 15 August 1983.
36 For statistics, see Army Posture Statements, www.army.mil.
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By the late 1980s the military’s downward trend had been decidedly 
reversed. The army was no longer in crisis; politicians and pundits and 
military off icers declared the all-volunteer army a success. The navy and 
marines offered similar success stories, though neither had suffered quite 
so much as had the army in the transition. (The air force was largely exempt 
from the problems the other services faced in the initial decade of the AVF, 
as it remained quite competitive throughout the transition.) After a rocky 
beginning, the military had learned to maneuver successfully in the market 
system. Nonetheless, it is important to acknowledge that the military was, 
in fact, still protected from the labor-market laws of supply and demand. It 
could compete in the market because it was underwritten by the state – by 
rising military budgets funded by American taxpayers and citizens.
Despite the success of the all-volunteer force, tensions remained between 
labor and military models. These tensions came into stark conflict in 2003 
as the United States went to war in Iraq. During the 1990s, army recruit-
ing had tried to distance itself from war. When a New York Times reporter 
suggested that the army’s success in the Persian Gulf War (1990-1991) must 
be great for recruiting, the Recruiting Command’s director of advertising 
disagreed. “We don’t want to be misleading”, he said, “but too much combat 
footage interferes with the long-term attributes of army service that we 
want to portray: money for college, skills training and relevance to a civilian 
career.” 37
Of course, army leaders always understood that the mission of the US 
Army is to preserve the peace, a mission they understand f irst as deter-
ring armed violence and second as, when deemed necessary by civilian 
leaders, f ighting and winning the nation’s wars. But the all-volunteer army 
had, quite purposely, played down prospects of war and of combat. It had 
portrayed itself as a site of employment, as a source of opportunity. Young 
men and women who joined the army in the pre-Iraq War years knew, on 
some level, that the global situation might change, that they might well be 
deployed. But some of those who joined the Army Reserve on the promise 
of “One Weekend a Month”, or who enlisted in the active ranks drawn by 
promises of money for college were understandably upset by what they saw 
as a bait-and-switch.38
In the early months of the war in Iraq General Eric Shinseki, chief of 
staff of the army, directed the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) 
to def ine a “warrior ethos”. Driven in part by the conditions of combat in 
37 “The War in Military Ads? What War?”, New York Times, 8 March 1991, p. D1.
38 Bailey, America’s Army, pp. 245, 247.
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Iraq and the recent death of eleven soldiers and capture of twenty-year-old 
maintenance clerk Jessica Lynch and her f ive companions in an attack on 
their convoy, the TRADOC task force concluded that all soldiers, no matter 
what their MOS or gender, had to be prepared for combat. The army replaced 
the Soldier’s Creed that had been adopted in the years after the Vietnam 
War with one that emphasized the Warrior Ethos. The new creed replaced 
the initial phrase, “I am a member of the United States Army”, with “I am a 
Warrior and a member of a team.” In the early twenty-first century, key army 
leaders were attempting to counter the notion that soldiering was a job.39
Key variables: the all-volunteer force in the United States
The United States traditionally relied on some form of a volunteer force, 
turning to conscription only during major wars. Between the end of World 
War II and the Vietnam War, the military expected to f ill its ranks largely 
with volunteers, drafting only enough additional men to reach accessions 
goals for each service. A relatively small percentage of those who served 
were draftees during these years, with the exception of the Korean War. 
In 1949, for example, volunteers were suff icient to f ill the ranks; not a 
single man was drafted. Still, it is important to distinguish between “true” 
volunteers and draft-motivated volunteers, or men who enlisted because 
they expected to be drafted and knew they would have more control over 
their assignments and prospects if, instead, they volunteered for service. 
Although it is diff icult to collect such data with precision, army researchers 
concluded that 49.7 per cent of volunteers in 1969, during the Vietnam War, 
were draft-motivated.40
While individuals face no compulsion to join or serve in the US military, 
once enlisted, members of the military are subject to specif ic legal con-
straints. Most fundamentally, enlistment changes the recruit’s status from 
individual, able to enter freely into contract, to servicemember, bound by 
the regulations of the US military. In 1890, in its decision In re Grimley, the 
US Supreme Court ruled that “enlistment is a contract, but it is one of those 
contracts which changes the status, and where that is changed, no breach 
of the contract destroys the new status or relieves from the obligations 
which its existence imposes”. To clarify, the justices offered the analogy 
39 Ibid., pp. 248-249.
40 Griff ith, The US Army’s Transition to the All-Volunteer Force, p. 53; Flynn, The Draft, 1940-1973, 
pp. 88-113.
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of marriage. While the “contract obligations” of marriage include “mutual 
faithfulness, […] a breach of those obligations does not destroy the status 
or change the relation of the parties to each other”.41
For example, in 1978 Captain Leon T. Davis, a thirty-year-old radiologist, 
faced court-martial for desertion after he refused to take his assignment in 
Korea. Captain Davis argued that, in a volunteer force, military service was 
based on a two-way contract. He had joined the army, he testif ied, based 
on promises made by recruiters and by army advertising, most particularly 
the claim that army doctors would have modern, state-of-the-art medical 
equipment. Because that was untrue the army was in breach of contract and 
he was thus “legally and morally excused” from filling his contractual obliga-
tions. Captain Davis was court-martialed, though a $2,000 f ine replaced 
the potential sentence of eight and a half years of hard labor. The military 
court decision was based on In re Grimley: the contractual act of enlistment 
had transformed Leon Davis from an individual into a soldier and, once his 
status changed, no breach of contract could destroy his new status or relieve 
him of the obligations it carried. That decision, obviously, brings into relief 
the difference between military service and civilian employment.42
A second legal constraint on military service as free labor is the practice 
of “stop loss”. Stop loss is the involuntary extension of an individual’s active 
duty service beyond the specif ied initial term of service, which may be 
up to the contractual end of obligated service (eight years). The policy, 
which was created by Congress after the end of US involvement in the 
war in Vietnam, is based on Title 10, United States Code, Section 12305(a): 
“the President may suspend any provision of law relating to promotion, 
retirement, or separation applicable to any member of the armed forces 
who the President determines is essential to the national security of the 
United States”.43 The standard Armed Forces enlistment contract includes 
the following statement: “In a time of war, my enlistment may be extended 
without my consent for the duration of the war and for six months after its 
end (10 U.S.C. 506, 12103(c)).” 44 Stop loss has been used during the wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, primarily to extend when the soldier’s unit is to deploy 
41 For complete text of decision, see Justia.com.
42 George C. Wilson, “Verdict Due in Doctor’s Court Martial”, Washington Post, 4 November 
1978, “Army Lawyer: Recruiting Ads Simply Puffery”, Washington Post, 3 November 1978.
43 For this regulation, see http://us-code.vlex.com/source/us-code-armed-forces-1009 (accessed 
January 2012).
44 Enlistment/Reenlistment contract available at www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/infomgt/
forms/eforms/dd0004.pdf (accessed January 2012).
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within ninety days of his or her end of initial enlistment. According to the 
army, 58,300 soldiers were affected by stop loss between 2002 and 2008.45
Stop loss is invoked in unusual circumstances. In most cases, individuals 
serve an agreed-upon term. Duration of service varies, as branches of the 
armed forces offer different enlistment options at different points in time 
based upon the recruiting market and the mix of immediate and longer-
term military needs. One argument in favor of the volunteer force, which 
typically requires longer periods of enlistment than those mandated by the 
draft (ranging from twenty-one to twenty-four months in the post-World 
War II era), is that longer periods of training and experience are necessary 
to master increasingly sophisticated military technology. Most current 
enlistments in the military are for three or four years, although those 
who have served are contractually obligated for eight years and maintain 
“individual ready reserve” status, in which they have no military obligations 
but may be called up during the balance of that time, as in the stop-loss 
policy described above.
Military pay in the United States is linked to civilian pay. Until 2006, 
military pay raises were at least 0.5 per cent higher than each year’s civilian 
pay raise, as calculated by the Employment Cost Index (ECI). Since 2007, 
military pay is automatically raised to equal the ECI increase, but may 
exceed that f igure if so authorized by Congress. Military pay follows a 
carefully calibrated system of pay grades, based on a combination of rank 
and seniority, which are consistent across all services. Enlisted ranks range 
from E-1 (private, airman basic, or seaman recruit) through E-9 (equivalent 
ranks to army sergeant major through sergeant major of the army); warrant 
off icers, which only exist in some services, run W-1 through W-5; off icer 
ranks from O-1 (second lieutenant/ensign) through O-10 (general/admiral). 
In 2011, pay for E-1 was $1,467.60 per month. Members of the US military 
also receive benefits, including health care for self and dependants, housing 
allowances (where applicable), clothing allowance, family-separation al-
lowance, access to lower-cost goods on post, and various forms of incentive 
and special pay, including that for hazardous duty.
The AVF is based on free labor, although the choice to enlist is, obviously, 
not made in a vacuum, and critics have, at various times, charged that the 
AVF replaced the selective service system with an economic draft. Civilian 
designers of the American all-volunteer force intended for the military to 
compete in a national labor market and called frequently on principles 
of free labor as they discussed the shape of the force. Willing or not, the 
45 Tom Vanden Brook, “DOD Data: More Forced To Stay in Army”, USA Today, 23 April 2008.
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military has since designed recruiting strategies for labor-market competi-
tion, although most who shape such campaigns understand that more is 
involved in the decision to enlist than the rational economic interests of 
potential recruits. While I doubt many of those serving in the US military 
think of his or her service in these terms, an all-volunteer force would fall 
on the “commodif ied labor” end of the axis.
Major factors contributing to the emergence and persistence of 
the US all-volunteer force
Many factors contributed to the United States’ decision to move from a 
conscription-based to an all-volunteer force. To turn to cliché, a perfect 
storm of opposition to the draft emerged during the late 1960s, creating 
strange bedfellows as right and left joined in opposition to the draft. Despite 
the wide range of factors that undermined the draft, the two most important 
were demographic and ideological.
Demographic change in the US population was perhaps the most impor-
tant factor behind the move from conscription-based to all-volunteer force. 
Between 1964 and 1973, the front end of the baby boom came of age. Close to 
27 million young men entered the draft pool during those years, the largest 
cohort of men between eighteen and twenty-f ive before or since. Only 2.7 
million of them would serve in Vietnam, fewer still in combat.
Over the course of the war in Vietnam Americans came to believe – ac-
curately – that the selective service system was unfair and inequitable, 
allowing those with resources to escape its reach. Historian Christian 
Appy calls Vietnam “the working-class war”, and class undeniably played 
a powerful role in predicting which young men would be drafted. Those 
from relatively well-off families were more often able to f ind a sympathetic 
doctor who would provide documentation for a medical exemption. Higher 
education, paid for by individual students or their families rather than by 
the state, was grounds for deferment and, in 1966, only 6 per cent of those 
serving in Vietnam had college degrees. (The percentage rose to 10 by 1970, 
with the end of exemptions for graduate students and teachers.) African 
Americans were more likely to be drafted than whites, more likely to be put 
into the infantry, and, in the early years of the war, disproportionately likely 
to die. Black Americans overwhelmingly believed that the toll of the war 
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fell most heavily on their sons, even though military policies had lowered 
black casualty rates by the late 1960s. 46
The larger point, however, is that there were vastly more young men 
than the military required, even at the height of the Vietnam War, and the 
military continued to rely on deferments to manage that oversupply. (It 
moved to a lottery system with more limited deferments for 1970 summons.) 
However, the deferments that had seemed relatively innocuous during 
times of peace had much greater stakes in an era when a draft notice likely 
meant deployment to Vietnam. As draft calls rose and more and more young 
American men died on foreign soil, the selective service system seemed 
less and less fair.
Many Americans wanted to end the draft because they believed the 
United States’ selective service system was unfair. That belief, ultimately, 
was due to demographic factors. Because there were so many more young 
men of draft age than were required for military service, most particularly 
for combat in Vietnam, risk and sacrif ice were, by def inition, not fairly 
shared. Most young men worried about their draft status, but a relatively 
small percentage of them were conscripted, and a relatively small percent-
age of those fought in Vietnam. World War II, in contrast, had disrupted 
the lives of almost all the nation’s citizens, with virtually every able-bodied 
young man serving in the military or doing “essential” defense work. The 
children of the president of the United States, along with large numbers of 
students from Harvard, Yale, and Princeton, served in the military along 
with the sons of struggling hourly workers and middle-class shopkeepers 
and small farmers. And throughout World War II, despite the much greater 
loss of life, Americans had confidence in the selective service system. In 1942 
93 per cent believed the draft operated fairly; in May 1945 the system still had 
the confidence of 79 per cent.47 That was not true during the Vietnam War.
The demographically created inequities helped to discredit the US 
selective service system, but ideological and political objections were also 
critical to the creation of the all-volunteer force. Proposals to replace the 
draft with voluntary service came from all parts of the political spectrum. 
First of all, President Nixon’s proposal to end the draft was a calculated 
political move intended to undermine antiwar protest. Antiwar movement 
leaders had often mobilized opposition to the war by focusing on the draft, 
and anger over the draft did fuel antiwar protest. Both Johnson and Nixon 
understood that some part of the antiwar protest was so motivated (though 
46 Appy, Working Class War, esp. pp. 21, 26.
47 Flynn, The Draft, 1940-1973, p. 121.
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their focus on the opposition to the draft led them to underestimate the 
depth and breadth of opposition to the war), and Nixon meant to undercut 
the antiwar movement by winnowing out some of those who were mainly 
concerned with the draft. The draft provided an opportunity for action. 
Perhaps antiwar protest would quiet if the draft were not such an issue.
Those on the left made two key arguments. Many to the left of the politi-
cal center argued that it would be more diff icult for American presidents 
to engage in military adventurism if they could not rely upon conscription 
but instead had to convince young people to voluntarily put their lives 
on the line. Their reasoning, though shown by subsequent events to be 
flawed, has a certain logic. The president would not be able to send troops 
to war cavalierly, knowing that the draft would supply however many 
bodies required. Young Americans would not volunteer for unpopular or 
illegitimate wars. According to this reasoning, an all-volunteer force would 
be a check on the nation’s ability to go to war.
Men and women who believed that the United States’ war in Vietnam was 
illegitimate also questioned the legitimacy of the draft. Why, they asked, 
could the government compel men to go to war against their will, to kill and 
to risk death in a war that a majority of their fellow citizens did not support? 
Revelations that the US government had lied to the American people about 
the initial reasons for escalation of the war, US wartime actions, and the 
war’s progress lent strength to such questions and helped to undermine 
willingness to continue conscription. Widely publicized tales of fragging, 
alcohol and drug abuse, combat refusal, wartime atrocities, desertion, and 
other acts of disobedience by US combatants during the war contributed 
to popular antimilitary sentiment and further undermined support for 
compulsory military service. Thus the specif ic war mattered greatly, giving 
force to political and ideological objections to the draft.
Conservative opposition to the draft was much less focused on the 
war in Vietnam; conservatives supported American war policies much 
longer than did the liberal-left. Nonetheless, policy-oriented conservatives 
and libertarians had long been arguing for the end of conscription. Some 
conservative proponents of an all-volunteer force presented the draft as a 
“gross infringement on personal liberty”, while a powerful cohort of free-
market economists argued that conscription imposed a “hidden tax” on 
those who were drafted – an argument that goes back to the demographic. 
Those who are drafted, according to this argument, lose not only the dif-
ference between civilian salaries and low military pay during their legally 
mandated service, but also delay their further education, apprenticeship, 
or accumulation of seniority, the benefits of which accrue over time. Those 
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who escape the draft – a much larger portion of the population and of their 
peers – are not so penalized.48
These free-market critics of the draft believed that the military should 
compete in the national labor market and insisted that recruiting would pose 
no difficulty if military compensation matched entry-level civilian pay and 
benefits. Martin Anderson, the man who convinced Nixon to make his pledge 
to end the draft, was a junior player in this world. Nixon, in fact, used such 
language in his 1968 radio address: the armed forces, he explained, were the 
“only employers today who don’t have to compete in the job market […]. They’ve 
been able to ignore the laws of supply and demand.” Higher pay and increased 
benefits, Nixon claimed, would make military jobs “more competitive with 
the attractions of the civilian world” and the all-volunteer force a possibility.49
Finally, changes in military technology and doctrine played a role. 
Echoing Eisenhower, Nixon told the nation in 1968 that in a nuclear age 
“huge ground armies operating in massive formations would be terribly 
vulnerable”, and thus the nation needed a smaller number of “motivated 
men” with the “higher level of technical and professional skill” necessary 
to operate the “complex weapons of modern war”.50 Nixon’s claim may have 
been disingenuous, but changes in military technology and doctrine would 
alter the way the military def ined desirable – and acceptable – recruits.
Some of the factors that led to the end of the draft and the creation of the 
AVF remain critically important to its persistence, while others episodically 
threaten to undermine it.
Demographics remain signif icant. While demographic shifts – the baby 
boom that supplied a large excess of draft-age men – helped make the move 
to an all-volunteer force feasible, demographics has worked against the AVF 
in more recent decades. At the height of the baby boom in 1957, the US birth-
rate was 25.3 (per 1,000 population); by 1973 it had fallen to 14.9. Of course 
overall population had increased, so the drop in numbers is not so extreme 
as the more than 40 per cent decline in birthrate might suggest. Nonetheless, 
births dropped from a high of 4,308,000 in 1957 to 3,136,965 in 1973, or roughly 
27 per cent. Put in other terms, the US fertility rate hit a twentieth-century 
high of 3.8 per cent in 1957, declining to 1.7 per cent in 1976. It did not again 
reach replacement rate (2.0) until 2007. The US military’s overall recruitment 
goal for 1974 was just under 428,000. That f igure declined steadily over the 
48 For a detailed discussion of the “hidden tax”, complete with primary documents, see Rostker, 
I Want You!, pp. 113-120.
49 Nixon, “The All-Volunteer Armed Force”, radio address.
50 Ibid.
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following years, especially rapidly in the post-Cold War era. Recruitment 
targets for the US military were approximately 292,000 in 1989; they were 
down to 200,000 in 1992, and only 181,000 in 2004. Army recruitment goals, in 
parallel, were 211,600 (1974); 119,875 (1989); 75,000 (1992); and 77,000 (2004). (It 
is important to note that these goals are only for active-duty enlisted troops 
and include both nonprior service and reenlistment.)51 The army obviously 
found it much easier to recruit 75,000 volunteers a year than 211,000.
A signif icant number of these military volunteers are not US citizens. In 
recent years the US immigration rate, both legal and nondocumented, has 
accounted for a greater percentage of American population growth than 
does its birthrate. As of 2006, 40,000 noncitizens served in the US military, 
with approximately 8,000 resident aliens enlisting for active duty each 
year. By law, enlistees must be legally in the United States and hold a green 
card, which is evidence that the holder may be legally employed. President 
George W. Bush signed an executive order allowing noncitizens to apply 
for citizenship following a single day of active service in the US military, 
and as of 2006 25,000 men and women have applied for and been granted 
US citizenship through military service.52 The “Dream Act”, a bipartisan 
congressional effort targeted at the approximately 65,000 young people 
without legal status in the United States who graduate from American 
high schools each year, would offer a six-year path to citizenship based 
on earning a college diploma or serving for four years in the US military.
While the military requires a relatively small percentage of draft-age 
youth, military enlistment standards combine with labor-market pressures 
to create ongoing struggles to f ill the ranks. In the contemporary United 
States, the military is def initely not an employer of last resort. Seven out of 
ten young Americans do not meet the standards for military enlistment. Of 
the 31.2 million Americans between the ages of seventeen and twenty-four, 
only 4.7 million are considered “qualif ied military available”, and only 1.6 
million are in the army’s target market: young men and women between 
the ages of seventeen and twenty-four, with earned high school degrees, in 
good physical condition, capable of scoring in the top half of the military 
qualif ication exam, and without criminal records.53
51 “Total Enlisted Accessions to Active Duty”, in “Numeric Goals and Achievement”, www.
defenselink.mil/prhome/mpprecruiting.html (accessed 15 March 2005).
52 Prepared Statement of David S. C. Chu, Undersecretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), 
for testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 109th Congress, 2nd sess., 10 July 2006; 
armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2006/July/Chu%2007-10-06.pdf (accessed January 2012).
53 For an overview of ineligibility, see William H. McMichael, “Most US Youth Unf it to Serve, 
Data Show”, Army Times, 3 November 2009.
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The US military competes with colleges and universities and with civilian 
employers for the more able of American youth. As of October 2009, 70.1 per 
cent of those who graduated from high school in spring 2009 were attending 
college or university.54 While a great many young people do not graduate 
from high school, they fall outside the military recruitment target market. 
In 2007, for example, despite recruiting pressures during two unpopular 
wars, only 1.4 per cent of enlisted recruits had not graduated from high 
school or earned a GED. That contrasts with 20.8 per cent of all Americans 
aged eighteen to twenty-four.55
Other criteria rule out a great number of potential volunteers. At the end 
of the f irst decade of the twenty-f irst century, approximately 17 per cent of 
Americans in the target age group are signif icantly overweight or obese. 
Signif icant numbers used prescription drugs that disqualif ied them from 
service. And until 2011, although gay men and women who volunteered 
for military service were not prohibited from joining or questioned about 
sexual orientation upon enlistment, they were not allowed to serve openly 
and risked discharge upon discovery. Approximately 13,000 men and women 
were discharged from the military under the provisions of “Don’t Ask, Don’t 
Tell” between 1994 and 2011.56 Thus, the reduction of total end strength has 
made it possible to f ill the ranks despite the shrinking pool of eighteen- to 
twenty-four-year-olds, but high admissions criteria make that task more 
challenging than numbers alone would suggest.
One of the predicted drawbacks of a volunteer force was its cost, and 
the high costs of recruiting and maintaining an all-volunteer force work 
against its persistence. The AVF is enormously expensive. Obviously much 
of the US military budget is driven by high-cost weapons systems, the global 
presence of the US military, and the US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. But 
the labor-market military has added extraordinary new costs. According to 
the Congressional Budget Office, basic pay for lower-ranked enlisted troops 
54 US Bureau of Labor Statistics, “College Enrollment and Work Activity of 2009 High School 
Graduates”, USDL-10-0533, 27  April 2010, http://www/bls/gov/news.release/hsgec.nr0.htm 
(accessed 20 February 2011).
55 Shanea Watkins and James Sherk, The Heritage Foundation, “Who Serves in the US Military? 
The Demographics of Enlisted Troops and Off icers,” 21 August 2008, (http://www.heritage.org/
Research?NationalSecurity/cda08-05.cfm (accessed 16 September 2008); McMichael, “Most US 
Youth Unf it to Serve”. According to the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (“Occupational Outlook 
Handbook, 2010-11 Edition: Job Opportunities in the Armed Forces”, http://www.bls.gov/oco/
ocos249.htm (accessed 20 February 2011)), 92 per cent of American enlisted troops had earned 
high school diplomas in 2008, a f igure that rises to 98.5 per cent if GEDs are included.
56 Ed O’Keefe, “Fight for Gays in the Military Isn’t Ending Any Time Soon”, Washington Post, 
10 February 2011; McMichaels, “Most US Youth Unf it to Serve”.
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doubled between 1971 (two years before the AVF began) and 1975 (two years 
after it began), when adjusted for inflation. The US General Accounting 
Off ice estimated that the AVF added approximately $3 billion a year to the 
military’s 1974 budget (more than $10 billion in 2006 dollars). Those who 
argued that the draft imposed a hidden tax on draftees see that f igure as 
evidence of the scale of the tax imposed. Others make the point that this 
is not necessarily a cost of an all-volunteer force, as draftees should be paid 
at reasonably competitive civilian rates.57
Not only does labor-market competition require higher salaries and 
signif icant nonpay benefits, initial costs of recruiting have risen steadily 
over the decades. Estimates vary depending on what categories are included, 
but it is safe to say that the army currently spends close to $25,000 to recruit 
each nonprior service volunteer. Through most of the war in Iraq it took 
7,500 recruiters and a budget of millions of dollars each year to convince 
about 80,000 nonprior service volunteers to join the army. The army offered 
large bonuses: its budget for f iscal year 2011 included $465 million as bonuses 
for new recruits.58 An NPS recruit could qualify for a “quick ship” bonus of 
$20,000 by reporting for duty within thirty days of enlisting, and those 
qualifying for high-demand MOSs got up to $40,000 for a four-year enlist-
ment. Reenlistment bonuses were also common, and with private security 
contractors offering to pay up to $200,000 a year for the best former special 
operations troops, the army (very rarely) offered reenlistment bonuses of up 
to $150,000. These f inancial incentives were combined with college educa-
tion benefits and student-loan repayment programs.59 The family benefits 
that were developed both to encourage reenlistment and in recognition 
of the changing demographics of the army are also extraordinarily costly. 
The US military counts about 1.4 million on active duty, but its military 
health system covers 9.6 million people, the majority of them dependants 
of both active-duty and retired veterans. Pentagon spending on health 
care has risen from $19 billion in 2001 to a projected $50.7 billion in 2011, 
in part because of wartime casualties, but also because the military plan 
is more generous than any potential civilian coverage. In addition, family 
57 Congressional Budget Off ice, “The All-Volunteer Military: Issues and Performance”, July 
2007, www.cbo.gov/doc.cfm?index=8313&type=0&sequence=1 (accessed 10 January 2011).
58 Jim Tice, “2011 Budget: Funds for Pay Hike, Bonuses, Surge”, Army Times, 15 February 2010, 
www.armytimes.com/news/2010/02/army_budget_021510w/ (accessed 10 January 2011).
59 Phillip Carter and Brad Flora, “I Want You . . . Badly: A Complete Guide to Uncle Sam’s 
Recruiting Incentives”, Slate (online), 7 November 2007.
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support programs cost $8.3 billion a year – which includes childcare spaces 
for 200,000.60
Economics certainly plays a role in enlistment rates, and thus in the 
continuation of an AVF. The recession that began in 2009 led to a flood of 
enlistments, including more and more young people who have completed 
college. But the AVF is not an economic draft, in that those who come from the 
poorest, most disadvantaged backgrounds are much less likely to qualify for 
enlistment: they are less likely to have graduated from high school, more likely 
to have gotten in trouble with the law, more likely to have physical ailments, 
from obesity to asthma, and more likely to have gone to inferior schools and 
thus more likely to score below the cut-off on military entrance exams. The 
American military is solidly middle-class, if middle-class is defined by the 
nation’s median household income, which was $50,428 in 2007. At the same 
time, military recruiting focuses heavily on small towns and rural areas in 
which capable young people f ind few employment opportunities, and it is 
clear that volunteer rates predictably climb with unemployment rates.61
Finally and most fundamentally, war has a profound impact on the health 
and persistence of the all-volunteer force, whether in the form of military 
doctrine and war planning or as wars actually fought. “War”, however, is not 
a generic category; the specif ic circumstances of each war or conflict are 
critically important. The Vietnam War made the move to an AVF possible, 
largely by creating discontent with the selective service system and fostering 
antimilitary sentiments. But the antimilitary sentiments aroused by the war 
in Vietnam also made it diff icult to recruit quality soldiers and forge a suc-
cessful volunteer force in that war’s aftermath. The US military’s performance 
in the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War, despite some problems with mobilization, 
convinced many skeptics that the AVF was a capable force and quieted the 
calls for a return to the draft that had begun almost before conscription 
ended. During the 1990s, the US military was frequently deployed in MOOTW 
(Military Operations Other Than War), including disaster relief and nation-
building or stabilizing efforts. Such efforts continue in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
and female personnel are increasingly important in interactions with women 
in sex-segregated societies. New technologies that require experience and 
maturity more than youthful physical vigor extend the potential age of 
service, an important consideration in a nation with an aging population.
60 Greg Zaroya, “Military’s Health Care Costs Booming”, USA Today, 25 April 2010; United 
States Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2012 Budget Request, Overview, February 2011, pdf 
at http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget.html (accessed January 2011).
61 Watkins and Sherk, “Who Serves in the US Military?”
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When the United States began its preemptive war in Iraq in 2003, few 
discussed a draft. This was in part because the Bush administration pre-
sented the invasion of Iraq as a brief and easily accomplished task, but also 
because most Americans had forgotten that the AVF was envisioned as a 
peacetime core around which a wartime military could be constructed. 
Even as servicemen and -women were returned for second, third, and fourth 
tours of Iraq and were compelled to remain in the military past the end of 
their enlistments by stop-loss provisions, few military or political leaders 
seriously contemplated returning to the draft.
Conclusion
There was from its beginning a tension at the heart of the all-volunteer 
army. The end of conscription did not change the army’s purpose: the 
fundamental mission of the US Army is to f ight and win the nation’s wars. 
But the all-volunteer army had, quite purposefully and more powerfully 
over time, tried to recast the meaning of military service. It downplayed 
notions of duty and service and obligation; it sold itself to potential recruits 
and to the broader American public both as a source of opportunity and as 
a “good job”. And while a great many men and women did f ind opportunity 
and stable employment in the army during the decades of relative peace, 
peace was never guaranteed.
Was it legitimate, critics periodically asked, to sell the army as money 
for college or as job training or as a source of health coverage for one’s 
children when those erstwhile students or skilled employees or parents 
would also be soldiers, subject to orders that override other obligations and 
other roles, and that might well end their lives? Back in 1978, as the false 
promises of some army recruiters made news and drew the attention of 
Congress, recruiters were ordered to give all applicants a written reminder. 
“The Army is a military organization”, the statement read, “which may be 
called upon to participate in combat operations (to f ight) while you are a 
member of it.” 62 One can understand the bitterness of members of the Army 
Reserve, which had relied for years on the recruiting slogan, “One Weekend 
a Month”, who in 2003 embellished their Army Reserve truck in Iraq with 
a sign: “One Weekend a Month, My Ass!”
62 “Recruiting Scandals: Symptom of Trouble for Volunteer Forces”, US News and World Report, 
16 October 1978, p. 44.
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What does it mean that the vast majority of Americans remained untouched 
by war, not even subject to the shared risk of the draft or the obligation of 
service, while a small volunteer force was sent repeatedly to war during the 
first decade of the twenty-first century? This is the ultimate but rarely stated 
problem with an all-volunteer force: the AVF cushions most Americans from 
the impact of war. By replacing the logic of citizen’s obligation with that of 
the market and defining soldiering as employment, it excuses citizens from 
their basic obligation to pay attention to what is done in their name and of 
acting, as citizens, whether to support or to prevent US military actions.
The solution might be obvious – a return to the draft – but that proposal 
runs up against hard evidence and f irm belief. US military leaders are 
certain that a volunteer force offers the best means of national defense, at 
least as they envision current and future conflicts. It takes a fair amount 
of intellectual competence to be a soldier in today’s army – or to serve in 
any branch of the military – and it takes a great deal of training. While a 
no-deferments draft would def initely capture more of the most compe-
tent American youth, it would also capture a great many more of the less 
competent. And drafting young men and women, as a matter of course, for 
more than a year’s term would be hard to justify. But a one-year stint in the 
army does not offer time for adequate training on increasingly sophisticated 
weapons, nor does it allow a new soldier time to develop the necessary 
experience and instincts to function in complex and rapidly changing 
operational environments. In addition, as the army learned all too well 
in the last years of conscription, those who are drafted against their will 
tend to be much less highly motivated than those who have volunteered.
Two other problems further complicate the notion. Reinstituting the 
draft would create a political storm over women’s roles. Currently, women 
may enlist in the military but are not required to register for the draft. That 
policy would certainly be challenged – and few politicians want to contend 
with that struggle. The demographic issue remains, as well: the military 
needs but a fraction of the nation’s youth, and a draft that took a small 
percentage of young men (or young men and women) would, certainly, be 
intensely unfair. Bottom line: less-able, less-well-trained, less-experienced, 
less-motivated soldiers are more likely to fail in their missions. And they 
are more likely to get themselves – and their comrades – killed. While the 
army had enormous reservations about the move to an all-volunteer force 
back in the early 1970s, it more strongly opposes the return to the draft 
today. Thus, despite the various factors that work against the persistence 
of the all-volunteer force, short of massive, total war, the United States will 
almost certainly maintain an all-volunteer force.
 Private contractors in war from the 
1990s to the present
A review essay1
S. Yelda Kaya
The single most important change in military affairs in recent history is 
the unprecedented role private contractors have come to play in modern 
warfare. This has been a trend in the making from the 1990s on. Quite a 
number of things have changed since then, though, and this is not just about 
sheer numbers. Equally important is the fact that today the biggest clients 
of private military services are the world’s richest, most advanced states. 
So employment of contractors in combat is no longer about “state failure” 
as it was in the 1990s when African states lacking any sort of internal props 
or any means of substantial control over their territories hired mercenary 
forces to f ight insurgents.
The use of contractors in war can be considered as the privatization of 
(certain) military functions. This is why the phenomenon is usually taken 
to challenge what is the most basic feature of the modern state for many: 
the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence. Most scholars recognize that 
this monopoly has never been complete and that modern states have indeed 
delegated the use of force to private agents in this way or some other. Some 
argue, for instance, that the history of military contracting in the United 
States dates back to the Civil War. Nonetheless, it is crucial to see that what 
we have been witnessing for the last two decades is a break from the past. 
There has been a dramatic change in the magnitude of military contracting:
In Vietnam, for every one hundred soldiers one contractor was 
employed. During the Gulf War (1991), one contractor was on the 
battlef ield for every f ifty soldiers. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, 
1 The following books are reviewed in this chapter: Deborah D. Avant, The Market for Force: 
The Consequences of Privatizing Security (New York, 2005); James Jay Carafano, Private Sector, 
Public Wars: Contractors in Combat – Afghanistan, Iraq, and Future Conflicts (Westport, CT, 
2008); Simon Chesterman and Chia Lehnardt (eds), From Mercenaries to Market: The Rise and 
Regulation of Private Military Companies (New York, 2007); Jeremy Scahill, Blackwater: The 
Rise of the World’s Most Powerful Mercenary Army (New York, 2008); and P.W. Singer, Corporate 
Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (2003, 2nd revised edn, New York, 2008).
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contractors made up one out of every ten personnel. Only six years 
later, one contractor supported government operations in Iraq for 
about every 1.5 soldiers.2
Private contractors are now heavily employed in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
They are training local security forces (army and police), providing logistics 
support for the US military, escorting convoys, securing headquarters, and 
guarding top-level off icials.
In what follows, I will review f ive of the most prominent studies on 
private contractors, which will hopefully help us reach an understanding of 
the current state of the f ield. The books are introduced briefly below, which 
is followed by f ive sections organized around some basic questions, namely: 
what are the reasons for the move toward much greater participation of 
private actors in warfare? Is it proper to call contractors “mercenaries”? 
What do contractors do in warfare and how can firms be classified? Who are 
the people employed by contractor f irms on the battlef ield and what kind 
of “work” do they do? Is there a limit to privatization of military functions 
in the sense that certain tasks are seen as inherently governmental and 
thus ill suited for delegation to the private sector?
Peter Singer’s Corporate Warriors is the f irst major study on the subject. 
The book appeared before the invasion of Iraq, in 2003, and as a result, it is 
not about private military activities in Iraq – or even Afghanistan. The cases 
Singer examines are mainly from the 1990s. Corporate Warriors centers 
the discussion on three cases. First there is the now defunct Executive 
Outcomes, formed in 1989, whose combat operations in Africa brought 
forth a concern about private military f irms for the f irst time. Military 
Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI) is the second case. Founded 
in 1987 by senior military off icers, MPRI is one of USA’s favorite military 
companies, especially in advisory and training-related missions. The f inal 
case is Brown & Root Services, which has been awarded many back-end 
support contracts by the US government in contingency operations from 
1990s onward. The updated edition of 2008 of Corporate Warriors, on the 
other hand, involves a postscript on Iraq, in which Singer notes that the 
situation in Iraq reinforces the arguments he initially formulated. Some 
people would disagree with the statement; nevertheless Corporate Warriors 
is a study everyone working in the field engages with in some way. Especially 
notable is the typology of privatized military f irms Singer proposes, the 
2 Carafano, Private Sector, Public Wars, p. 38. According to Jeremy Scahill, the ratio is already 
one-to-one (Blackwater, p. 460).
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“tip-of-the-spear” model, which disaggregates f irms on the basis of their 
relative proximity to the tactical battlef ield. Tip-of-the-spear typology has 
received many criticisms, and almost everyone has put forward alternative 
typologies in response to Singer’s; nonetheless, it may well be argued that 
his compares favorably with the rest.
Deborah Avant’s Market for Force overlaps in signif icant ways with 
Corporate Warriors. This is not only because the cases examined are more 
or less the same. It is also that the two analysts share common concerns 
regarding the privatization of military functions, which basically relate to 
the twin problems of unaccountability and loss of democratic control over 
the use of force. On the other hand, the scope of Market for Force is narrower: 
it is confined to the consequences of outsourcing military functions. Avant 
is particularly interested in the ways in which privatization has had an 
impact on the control of violence. Avant introduces the triple concepts of 
functional, political, and social control of force. Functional control is about 
the “ability to deploy coercion effectively to defend the state’s interests” 
(p. 40). The concern here is with getting the job done with minimum cost. 
Political control refers to the political processes by which decisions regard-
ing employment of force are made. The issue Avant focuses upon is whether 
privatization erodes existing procedures of decision making and changes 
the balance of power between (old and new) institutional actors. Finally, 
social control pertains to the containment of force within acceptable norms 
stemming from human rights, international law, democracy, etc. Avant 
inquires whether privatization reinforces or attenuates the integration of 
coercive institutions with these norms. Avant includes two intervening 
variables in her analysis, the f irst one being the character of the state which 
outsources. There is a single distinction here: strong versus weak states. 
The second variable has to do with the questions as to which functions 
are privatized and in what ways. Then the author explores the ways in 
which the variable of state strength interacts with that of the nature of the 
military function to produce varying patterns of change. Finally, we should 
also note that Market for Force is valuable in particular in scrutinizing 
cases of privatization where the client is not a government but instead a 
nongovernmental organization or a multinational corporation. Many NGOs 
and MNCs working in troubled zones, so to speak, either hire contractors to 
secure their headquarters/facilities or simply f inance the services contrac-
tors provide for the host governments. The prominent example of this sort 
of privatization is Nigeria, where Shell and Chevron have f inanced (and 
deployed) public security forces in the face of a popular movement against 
oil operations.
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Then there is From Mercenaries to Market. This edited volume has two 
major concerns. The f irst major is with identifying the new private actors 
engaged in military activities. In a nutshell, contributors define contractors 
as distinct from mercenaries. The other concern has to do with the regula-
tion of private military activities. The bulk of the book is actually devoted 
to the second topic, regulation – quite understandably because it is a major 
challenge to come up with procedures according to which contractors 
will be prosecuted and punished for wrongful deeds. This constitutes a 
problem because, on the one hand, private contractors are not part of the 
military chain of command and they fall outside the military code of justice. 
Therefore, unlike the US soldiers they accompany, American contractors 
working for the US government in Iraq cannot be court-martialed.3 Another 
dimension to this problem is that international law is directed toward 
national militaries; and private actors seem to be lying outside its jurisdic-
tion. There is also the fact that Order 17 issued by the Coalition Provisional 
Authority bestowed upon foreign contractors immunity against prosecution 
under Iraqi law; contractors cannot be taken to Iraqi courts because of 
crimes they commit on Iraqi soil. All these combine to make regulation a 
burning issue. Contributors to From Mercenaries to Market consider many 
different scenarios ranging from voluntary self-regulation to regulation by 
states (that is, states, like the USA or the UK, which export private military 
services).4 The problem of regulation is not critical for my purposes, but 
the problem of identif ication is, and I am going to examine it in the pages 
to come.5
3 It is true that there has been a recent change in the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 
According to the code, civilian contractors fall under military justice only in times of declared 
wars, which is very much a rarity. The application of the code was extended in 2007: now 
contractors can also be prosecuted for misconduct during contingency operations. The impact 
of the amendment is yet to be observed.
4 The most interesting contribution in this respect is Chia Lehnardt’s “Private Military 
Companies and State Responsibility”, which argues that it is wrong to write off international 
law as irrelevant. This is because, although international law is biased toward states, it is still 
possible to make use of it through attributing the misconduct of private companies back to 
hiring states.
5 The following contributions will be referred to in the paper: David Isenberg, “A Government 
in Search of Cover: Private Military Companies in Iraq”, pp. 82-93; Elke Krahmann, “Transitional 
States in Search of Support: Private Military Companies and Security Sector Reform”, pp. 94-112; 
Chia Lehnardt, “Private Military Companies and State Responsibility”, pp. 139-157; Kevin A. 
O’Brien, “What Should and What Should Not Be Regulated?”, pp. 29-48; Angela McIntyre and 
Taya Weiss, “Weak Governments in Search of Strength: Africa’s Experience of Mercenaries and 
Private Military Companies”, pp. 67-81; and Sarah Percy, “Morality and Regulation”, pp. 11-28.
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James Jay Carafano’s Private Sector, Public Wars stands out in its polemical 
style. A retired army lieutenant colonel, historian, and columnist, Carafano 
argues that the public-private balance in military affairs has changed for 
good. This is most certainly not something to be lamented. It is simply 
that an unimpeded free market can “provide services faster, cheaper, and 
more effectively” than any government; military services are no exception 
(p. 37). For Carafano, private military industry has the potential to be one 
of the United States’ “greatest competitive advantages in the twenty-f irst 
century” (p. 12). Carafano has devoted many pages to responding to crit-
ics. At times his account runs the risk of belittling the problems (such as 
contractor accountability before the law; employee misconduct; contractual 
problems such as overcharging) associated with privatization of military 
functions; more often, though, the conviction is that those problems are 
not inherent to outsourcing, which means that they may well be corrected. 
The US government up to now has been a “pretty lousy customer”, unable to 
properly select or manage contractors (p. 12). The key to alleviating problems 
is “good governance” (p. 37). Good governance involves institutionalized 
mechanisms of criticism and oversight, by which he means judicial and 
legislative checks on the executive branch on the one hand, and media and 
interest groups on the other (pp. 37-38). The book is not all about vindication 
of military outsourcing, however. It also includes the most detailed narrative 
of the history of military contracting in the United States prior to the 1990s, 
focusing chiefly on relevant regulations and procedures of contracting. 
On the other hand, while private military activities in Iraq are reasonably 
documented, Afghanistan is conspicuously absent; and unfortunately the 
same is true for the rest of the studies under consideration here.
Jeremy Scahill’s Blackwater is an in-depth journalistic analysis of the 
“leading mercenary company of the US occupation” (p. 13). It is only in 
Scahill’s book that military contractors are identif ied as “mercenaries”. It 
goes without saying that he is also the harshest critic of the entire phenom-
enon of military contracting. Scahill not only provides us with a thorough 
account of Blackwater’s f ive-year work in postinvasion Iraq, which is replete 
with many deadly incidents; he at the same time locates the f irm within 
American politics and the neoconservative network in particular. Moreover, 
his book has to be credited for touching upon certain issues which are noted 
only in passing by the other, scholarly studies. One such issue concerns the 
people employed by military f irms. Dozens of questions pose themselves, 
including: who are these people? Why do they risk their lives working in 
Iraq? How much do they make? How do they f ind employment in Iraq? Is 
this like any other employment? Can they quit if they want to? Scahill’s 
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book sheds some light on such questions. Scahill presents a glimpse of the 
prime contractor/subcontractors nexus too. When rewarded government 
contracts, many big companies split the job, and contract parts of it to 
smaller/more specialized companies, which is an important facet of the 
whole business of outsourcing. Finally, one can also discover in the book 
some clues as to the self-image of a mercenary company, through studying 
the speeches and congressional testimonies of the intriguing Eric Prince, 
Blackwater’s sole owner.
Reasons for change
Detailed treatments of reasons underlying the rise of private military 
companies are to be found in Corporate Warriors and The Market for Force. 
For both Singer and Avant, the question is one of explaining the origins of 
a market, which, by def inition, is constituted by supply and demand. The 
reasoning is simple: there should have been some marked changes in both 
supply and demand so that a previously nonexistent market was brought to 
being in the 1990s. Singer and Avant concur on the idea that the end of Cold 
War was of crucial importance, because it eventually created a demand for 
and supply of private military services.
There arose a demand for private military services, f irst of all, because 
western militaries (those of former eastern bloc states included) were 
signif icantly downsized following the fall of the Berlin Wall; they, however, 
were not reorganized to compensate for their much smaller size, so much 
so that, when new security challenges emerged, it turned out that state 
militaries were unable to effectively respond with their own resources.6 The 
rest of the world too witnessed an upsurge in demand for private military 
services, for the end of a bipolar world also meant that “developing” states 
no longer had superpower patronage, or military aid, to rely on.7 Bipolariza-
tion had in fact entailed stability for such states, as internal and external 
conflicts had been kept in check by superpowers.8 And when old conflicts 
did resurface in areas which used to be sites of Cold War confrontation, 
superpowers were now reluctant to intervene as these hot spots ceased to 
6 Avant, The Market for Force, pp. 30-31, 146; Singer, Corporate Warriors, p. 53.
7 Avant, The Market for Force, pp. 36, 159; Chesterman and Lehnardt, From Mercenaries to 
Market, p. 1; Singer, Corporate Warriors, pp. 50-51, 55.
8 Isenberg, “A Government in Search of Cover”, p. 82; Singer, Corporate Warriors, p. 50.
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have any “strategic” importance.9 The “developing” countries, with their 
shallow political institutions and feeble armies, had no choice but f ind new 
forms of military aid.
As for the supply side, downsizing freed a great many number of 
qualif ied military personnel, who in turn made up a vast labor pool for 
military companies to draw upon.10 Even ex-KGB agents were out there in 
the market looking for new employment venues, not to mention special 
operations personnel from all over the world. Especially noticeable were 
South Africans, who came to the market place in hordes when the mas-
sive repressive apparatus of the apartheid regime was dismantled.11 Thus 
there were plenty of men to be hired by private companies; and some of 
whom actually became entrepreneurs themselves founding, most notably, 
Executive Outcomes.12 The end of the Cold War facilitated the emergence 
of private military companies in yet another way. When the Warsaw Pact 
was dissolved, weaponry from its member states flooded the market, creat-
ing a mass inventory which could be readily bought and used by private 
actors.13 When Germany was reunif ied, for example, each and every item 
in East Germany’s arms stock was auctioned and sold at bargain prices.14 
The market was thus saturated by every sort of weaponry making it cheaper 
for companies to stage their operations. Executive Outcomes, for instance, 
employed Soviet weapons in its African operations.15 Because soldiers and 
arms were in abundance, it was relatively easy to start a business in this 
nascent industry.
To conclude, analysts agree that downsizing was the initial spurt behind 
the beginnings of privatization of military functions. Downsizing has had 
long-term consequences, and its impact is still being felt today. Nonetheless, 
there also are other factors that can be said to have reinforced the impact 
of downsizing. One such factor might be gathered from Avant’s analysis. 
For Avant, a key element paving the way for the employment of military 
companies has been the emergence of “global security concerns”, which 
have to with novel phenomena such as international terrorism, interna-
9 Singer, Corporate Warriors, p. 58.
10 Avant, The Market for Force, p. 30; Singer, Corporate Warriors, pp. 49-50, 53.
11 Avant, The Market for Force, p. 138; Chesterman and Lehnardt, From Mercenaries to Market, 
p. v.
12 Singer, Corporate Warriors, p. 53.
13 Chesterman and Lehnardt, From Mercenaries to Market, p. v; Singer, Corporate Warriors, 
pp. 53-54, 166-167.
14 Singer, Corporate Warriors, p. 54.
15 Ibid., p. 106.
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tionally operating drug cartels, and so forth (pp. 32-34). The problem is 
that nation-states’ security organs cannot successfully deal with these 
new sources of insecurity in today’s “globalized” world as there is a “scale 
mismatch”. Avant is nonetheless cautious to add that the rise of global 
security concerns cannot be said to have necessitated privatization. After 
all, multilateral institutions should be well suited to meet these new security 
challenges. However, the UN and the NATO have proven to be ineffective 
in dealing with security problems of that sort because they cannot act 
unless a political agreement is reached among member states (pp. 34-38). 
Employing private contractors is simply the easier option.
The US war on global terrorism in the aftermath of the 11 September 
attacks alone goes a long way in explaining the newly emerged reliance 
on private contractors in warfare. In Afghanistan and Iraq there has been 
an unparalleled boom in contracting spreading to virtually every kind 
of military function from force training to personal security of senior of-
f icials. As mentioned before, Afghanistan does not f igure often in the books 
reviewed, but there are some explanations offered regarding the reasons 
why private contractors have been indispensable for Iraqi operations. The 
most obvious explanation is that US regular forces were already heavily 
employed in Afghanistan. Secondly, the United States initiated its Iraqi 
operation with insuff icient forces, which was partly due to miscalculation, 
as the administration underestimated the number of troops that would 
be required once the invasion was over.16 Yet this was not solely about a 
failure of military planning, because sending more troops would at the 
same time be a politically undesirable move in that it would disturb the 
American public.17 Thirdly, the Iraqi operation was virtually unilateral, thus 
lacking signif icant allied support to rely on, which turned private contrac-
tors themselves into an allied force .18 Also absent were UN peacekeeping 
forces, which had been present in the Balkans, for example.19 Finally, Scahill 
notes that the decision to dissolve the Iraqi military (as well as the police 
and internal security services) as part of the process of “de-Baathif ication” 
had played a part too, not only because it engendered a massive security gap 
but also because out-of-work soldiers and other security personnel joined 
the resistance forces, making the situation in Iraq even worse (pp. 129, 
16 Isenberg, “A Government in Search of Cover”, p. 83; Singer, Corporate Warriors, pp. 243-245.
17 Singer, Corporate Warriors, p. 244.
18 Scahill, Blackwater, pp. 46, 60; Singer, Corporate Warriors, pp. 244, 247.
19 Avant, The Market for Force, p. 239; Singer, Corporate Warriors, p. 244.
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182-183, 227). All these combined to make contractors the largest partner 
of the US military in Iraq.
Afghan and Iraqi operations aside, it is also the case that the advent of 
the global war on terror is enhancing the strategic importance of parts of 
the world, such as Central Asia and the Caucasus. Because these areas are 
now crucial to the US f ight against terrorism, they are designated sites for 
security sector reform, where private military companies are contracted 
to provide force training.20 This is best exemplif ied by the interest in the 
Caspian Sea region. According to Scahill, rich oil and natural gas reserves 
and, more importantly, its close proximity to Iran explain the strategic 
salience of the region, where Blackwater and Cubic have been hired to 
train local security forces.21 The interest in the region is linked to the war 
on terror, writes Scahill, because the US administration is in a search for 
“operating sites” to be utilized in case there is an attack against Iran.22
If it were thirty years ago, US soldiers in uniform would be training, say, 
Azerbaijani or Georgian forces – this says a lot about the pace of downsiz-
ing in military subf ields. That is, in the United States, for example, the 
Clinton government urged the military to focus on “core tasks”, i.e. combat 
functions; remaining functions were to be outsourced to private f irms.23 
As noted above, downsizing hit a heavy blow at back-end support units, 
which explains why f irms specializing in logistics blossomed so rapidly. 
Also affected were training facilities and programs. In particular, succes-
sive Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Acts deprived the military 
of many training venues.24 This is actually the backdrop to Blackwater’s 
entry the industry in 1998: the f irm began to operate a training facility, 
which in fact was little more than a shooting range, in Camden County, 
Missouri.25 Similarly, the MPRI’s sprout on home soil owes much to US 
military’s outsourcing of education and training programs, most notably 
the Army Reserve Off icer Training Corps programs.26 MPRI and other US 
f irms working in what Singer calls the consultant sector have grown rapidly 
since then, providing training services all over the world.
Not everyone is satisf ied with the downsizing argument, though. For 
Carafano (p. 43), the downsizing argument is no more than a myth. That is, 
20 Krahmann, “Transitional States in Search of Support”, p. 99.
21 Scahill, Blackwater, pp. 231-243.
22 Ibid., pp. 237, 239.
23 Krahmann, “Transitional States in Search of Support”, pp. 99, 111.
24 Scahill, Blackwater, p. 93.
25 Ibid., pp. 96-100.
26 Avant, The Market for Force, pp. 116-120.
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it is erroneous to associate the reliance of US military on private contractors 
with downsizing. His argument is that the US military became “hollow” long 
before the end of the Cold War and the consequent process of downsizing: 
the military was underfunded from the end of the Vietnam War. Hence, 
in the years following the war, personnel and equipment were in short 
supply with no widespread programs of modernization or training. On the 
other hand, Carafano does not propose a solely negative explanation of the 
increasing reliance on contractors. There is also a positive explanation, 
namely the US military’s contentment with its experiment with outsourcing 
of construction works during the Vietnam War. For the Pentagon, he writes, 
the employment of contractors was a “big success”. So, Carafano holds that 
privatization would have continued anyway – even without the advent 
of downsizing following the end of the Cold War. And this corresponds 
to a major change in warfare in terms of the balance between public and 
private forces.
In Carafano’s account the dominant motive behind military outsourcing 
in the United States is f iscal. There has been, for three decades now, a huge 
strain on federal budget owing to the ever mounting federal debt, which 
necessitates cost-saving when it comes to defense spending (pp. 53, 75). So 
the government had to cut back on military spending (through outsourc-
ing) and this is actually what has been going on since the early days of 
the Clinton administration. It needs to be stated that, for Carafano, the 
strain on the budget had not been caused by military spending in the f irst 
place. On the contrary, at the root of the f iscal problem is in fact mandatory 
government spending on entitlement programs such as Social Security, 
Medicare, and Medicaid, which now account for about half of the federal 
budget (pp. 55, 129). In other words, entitlement spending is booming at 
the expense of military spending; and this does not appear to be an easily 
reversible tendency unless, of course, entitlement programs are stringently 
reformed: the United States has to spend less on defense if it is to continue 
pouring tax money into health care and other social benefits. The reform 
of entitlement spending in this way turns out to be the gist of the matter 
from the author’s neoconservative point of view.
Needless to say, the idea here in this argument is that governments can 
save if they privatize some of the functions that have been traditionally 
performed by national militaries (p. 43). Carafano writes that the primary 
reason why militaries are more expensive relates to “upward-spiraling 
manpower costs” (p. 56). Soldiers are expensive not because they have 
high base salaries but because in addition they receive numerous in-kind 
benefits for themselves and their families (pp. 54, 100, 195). The value of 
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benef its a soldier and his/her family are entitled to is almost as high as 
the base salary itself, which means that we need to multiply the salary 
by two to get the total value of military compensation (p. 100). This is not 
the case with civilian compensation because a private contractor does not 
receive benefits, s/he has to pay for insurance and pay tax (whereas soldiers 
who are abroad on combat missions enjoy tax exemptions) (pp. 99-100). To 
conclude, although it is true that a contractor’s pay is usually much higher 
than a soldier’s, the contractor is nevertheless cheaper.
Moreover, as Carafano points out, militaries and private companies are 
organized in dissimilar ways, as a result of which they require different 
numbers of employees to get the same job done (p. 96). That is, private units 
are organized on an ad hoc basis, which means that they are “scaled precisely 
to the task order in the contract”. For instance, Carafano calculates that 
the army would have to deploy 48,000 soldiers to perform the exact same 
security work that Blackwater is doing in Iraq with just 1,000 employees.
Nonetheless, it needs to be questioned whether the governments save 
money by contracting in every instance. Many observers are disturbed by 
the fact that most contracts are rewarded with little or no competition; this 
is the case with sole-source (“no-bid”) contracts. According to Singer, for 
instance, the practice of sole-source contracts neutralizes the “cost-saving 
advantages of competition” (pp. 235-236). Still, given the necessity to urgently 
support US operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, Carafano asserts that it is 
perfectly acceptable to limit competition in the awarding of contacts: the 
normal procedures simply take too long (p. 81). He also adds that the practice of 
sole-source is not as common as the critics would have us believe; and neither 
is it confined to military contracting (pp. 78-79). Then there is the problem of 
cost-plus contracting. In this type of contract, the client guarantees to pay for 
the costs that company incurs during the mission and, what is more, there is 
also an incentive fee measured in profit percentage (Singer, 2008: 140). So in 
a cost-plus contract, the more the company spends, the more it profits, which 
induces contractors to exaggerate their costs. Hence there is a major problem 
of overcharging.27 Carafano, again, defends the practice. For him, it is wrong 
to conclude in advance that contractors working in Iraq are overcharging the 
government, because the cost of security has indeed dramatically risen due to 
escalating insurgency in the country (p. 82). So companies are not pocketing 
immense profits; they are just passing the rising costs onto the US government.
It certainly may be the case that the actual practice of military contract-
ing failed to deliver its promise, that is, better services at a lower overall cost. 
27 Singer, Corporate Warriors, pp. 155-157, 248, 252.
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Nonetheless, this would not change the fact that efficiency concerns played a 
considerable part in orienting governments toward outsourcing. This is best 
explained with reference to the appeal of the general idea of privatization, 
which has spilled over into every f ield from health care to, eventually, war.28
For Carafano, there is a further reason why reliance on contractors is 
almost unavoidable in the US context: despite the shortage of military 
personnel and plummeting defense spending, reinstatement of the draft is 
very improbable (pp. 56, 171-172). The draft, which was in effect between 1940 
and 1973, was an exception in the US history – and an exception dictated by 
successive, large-scale wars. Policymakers saw conscription as the cheapest 
way of raising troops, which implies that the worth of conscription was 
instrumental; raising an army of citizens was never an end in itself (pp. 56, 
171). The United States’ three-decade long draft was politically palatable 
because it was conceived as just, since “virtually everybody who could serve 
had to serve” (p. 56). Today, the size of the military and the draft-age popula-
tion have changed such that, if the draft were to be reintroduced today, only 
a fraction of all eligible men would have to be conscripted (pp. 56, 171-172). 
Hence a draft today would be unjust and “socially divisive” (p. 56).
In any case, Carafano writes, conscription is at odds with the US volunta-
rist tradition, which has historically derived from the “anti-standing army 
ideology” (p. 6). In Anglo-American political tradition, a large standing army 
bears a tremendous risk, namely, it can be turned into an instrument of 
despotism and tyranny and, as such, it can overwhelm individual liberties 
(pp. 29, 31-32). Consequently, “peacetime conscription” is associated with 
“militarism and authoritarianism” in American political culture (p. 32). 
Accordingly, the convention has been one of keeping the standing army as 
small as possible without, of course, jeopardizing security (pp. 31-32). When 
the need arises, the military is to be supplemented, preferably by volunteers, 
and only subsequently by conscripts if it is absolutely necessary, as it was 
during the Civil War and World War II (pp. 29, 32, 56).
The whole story about military companies rising to prominence should 
not be only about economics and politics. In addition, the way wars are 
fought has certainly changed, which brings up the following question: are 
military companies somehow better adapted than national militaries to 
the reality of warfare in the twenty-f irst century? Unfortunately, none of 
the studies examined here dwells much on the relation between change in 
the technology of war and the rise of military companies. There are some 
28 Chesterman and Lehnardt, From Mercenaries to Market, p. 1; Avant, The Market for Force, 
p. 35; Singer, Corporate Warriors, pp. 66-69.
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scattered remarks, but they do not add up to a def initive answer. Take 
Avant’s The Market for Force, in which this theme is taken up twice. She 
mentions the growing “technological sophistication of weapon systems” 
and writes that “more and more contractors have been hired to work with 
troops to maintain and support these systems” (p. 19). Then she cites a 
couple of examples, which, however, fall short of giving a comprehensive 
picture as to the relative weight of this factor for the transition to privatized 
wars. Then, elsewhere in the book, she holds that there have been changes 
in the nature of conflicts and that as a result certain previously nones-
sential tasks now occupy the forefront of security; the examples she gives 
are, again, the operation of sophisticated weapons systems and “policing”, 
which are among the services that private companies commonly offer 
(p. 3). Similarly, Singer notes that technological sophistication has brought 
about a “revolution in military affairs”, which “reinforce[s] private f irms’ 
critical importance to high-level military functions” as states are unable 
to supply such high-tech services from within (p. 231). The essence of the 
revolution in military affairs is the integration of information technologies 
to warfare (pp. 62-63). What is so revolutionary about “information warfare” 
is that small, decentralized, nonstate units are better suited to taking full 
advantage of new technologies, which renders militaries more and more 
reliant on private service providers (p. 63). It is not a stretch to take Singer’s 
reflections to mean that we might be heading toward a new era in which 
states/regular militaries will no longer be “the most effective organizations 
for waging warfare” for the f irst time in modern history (p. 61).
Before concluding this discussion of the reasons for change, we should 
lastly take a look at Avant’s reflections on political control of force and 
how it is affected by privatization, which is the most intriguing part of 
The Market for Force. One of the cases she discusses here is the United 
States, which is an instance of a “strong state” that outsources many diverse 
military functions. The emphasis, though, is placed on the deployment of 
contractors in Iraq and how that alters the political process. Her account 
culminates in a number of conclusions: (1) privatization strengthens the 
executive as opposed to the legislature; (2) privatization impairs account-
ability and brings about less transparency; and (3) new actors get involved 
in the decision making process as a result of the privatization drive (pp. 62, 
68, 82, 128-130, 145, 258-259).29
29 It seems that these three trends are most clearly observed in the case of the training of 
foreign militaries by private companies. In such cases, a military company has a foreign govern-
ment as its client. Although this is a purely “private” matter in being a transaction between the 
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Especially the f irst two conclusions might be shown to be relevant to 
the discussion of the reasons for change, if we turn Avant’s theory upside 
down. To clarify, what Avant delineates as consequences of privatization 
can be reconceptualized as functional benefits to be gained from military 
contracting. In other words, the advantage of employing private military 
companies instead of regular military is that it is possible for the executive 
branch of government to evade congressional oversight and public account-
ability to a degree impossible within normal procedures of decision making. 
This is a heaven-sent opportunity for executives specifically when domestic 
support for operations is lacking. At times Avant too seems to opt for such 
an explanation. To demonstrate, she writes that
The use of PSCs [private security companies] is often regarded as a 
lower political commitment that reduces the need to mobilize public 
supplier and the client, the US licensing system requires that this transaction be approved by 
the government in the f irst place (Avant, The Market for Force, pp. 149-150). In other words, US 
military companies cannot sell their services to clients abroad unless the government ascertains 
that the deal is in accordance with US national interests. The whole point about the redistribu-
tion of power among the branches of government is that the f inal decision about outsourcing 
and licensing is made by the executive and there is little congressional oversight (p. 128). In 
fact, Congress is not even informed about most contracts, since a congressional notif ication 
is needed only when the contract in question exceeds the $50 million mark (p. 151). However, 
Avant notes that this is far from an insurmountable obstacle if the executive is determined to 
override the legislature: when a contract is for more than $50 million, it is possible to partition 
it into several smaller contracts to avoid congressional scrutiny (p. 151).
 This is how privatization of military functions disadvantages the legislature vis-à-vis the 
executive, resulting in a less transparent process of decision making, which in turn entails 
dwindling accountability. As for Avant’s third conclusion, the one about the actors who have 
come to possess preponderance in decision making, the most striking development is the 
emergence of military companies themselves as hefty players. Military companies are not 
merely usually the sole source of information that the executive has to rely on when deciding 
upon the technicalities of force deployment (p. 62); at the same time they endeavor to influence 
policymaking via lobbying – and they def initely constitute an important interest group that 
government are bound to reckon with. MPRI’s lobbying to get its contract with the government of 
Equatorial Guinea licensed is a case in point perfectly illustrating the clout of military companies 
as interest groups (pp. 154-155). When MPRI applied for a license to train the Equatorial Guinean 
military for the f irst time, it was turned down by US government on account of country’s poor 
human rights record. But the company did not give up and carried out a successful campaign to 
convince the decision makers that rapprochement with Equatorial Guinea was in the govern-
ment’s best interest because, its dismal human rights record notwithstanding, the country had 
oil reserves the United States should take advantage of. Apparently these arguments resonated 
well, as the MPRI lobbying paid off; the contract with Equatorial Guinea was approved, albeit 
with an almost two-year delay. The fact remains though: a private company proved capable of 
affecting US foreign policy objectives.
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support for foreign engagement activities. Indeed, congressional lead-
ers and the public appear to be less aware, interested, and concerned 
about sending PSCs than sending US forces. The use of PSCs […] makes 
decisions to use […] force abroad less visible and less transparent. 
It thus enhances the authority of individual decision makers in the 
executive branch and reduces the processes of inter-agency coopera-
tion and institutional wrangling.30
Therefore, there could be a political cost-saving logic behind the deploy-
ment of contractors. This could also be what Singer has in mind when in 
the postscript to Corporate Warriors he draws attention to “the irony that 
for all the focus on contractors as a private solution, the cost savings were 
political in nature”.31 And it is certainly Scahill’s contention, who writes that 
mercenaries are necessary tools for “offensive, unpopular wars of conquest”.32
This is also about conduct of foreign policy, of course. On the basis of 
compelling evidence, Avant (along with some other analysts)33 contends that 
privatization of this sort furnishes the government with a new and much 
more “flexible” foreign policy tool. It is a f lexible tool not only because it 
avoids Congress, it also has the advantage of deflecting criticism from the 
international community. MPRI’s training of Croatian forces during the 
Balkan conflict, which is cited by almost every one working in the f ield, is 
the paradigmatic example. The MPRI contract came when there was a UN 
arms embargo on Yugoslavian successor communities (pp. 101, 113). Hence 
it was impossible for any law-abiding government to provide military as-
sistance in the form of training programs to any of the forces. There is some 
disagreement as to how the deal between MPRI and the Croats was struck, 
but there seems to be grounds to assume that it was the US government 
which advised the Croats to seek help from MPRI (p. 104, n. 120). The reason 
for this intervention is that the United States saw it in its interest to support 
(a coalition of) Croats and Bosnians against the Serbs (p. 104). Yet, in the 
face of the arms embargo, the government could not do this directly by, 
for instance, sending US forces to train the Croats or Bosnians. MPRI was 
the stand-in in this awkward situation. The MPRI training program was 
called the “Democracy Transition Program” and it was, on paper at least, 
designed to democratize and reorganize the Croatian military to bring it 
30 Avant, The Market for Force, p. 133.
31 Singer, Corporate Warriors, p. 245.
32 Scahill, Blackwater, p. 463.
33 E.g. Singer, Corporate Warriors, pp. 125-133; Avant, The Market for Force, pp. 144, 152-154. 
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nearer to NATO standards (p. 102). On the other hand, the rumor is that 
MPRI was not just training but at the same time helping the Croats plan an 
offensive attack on the Serbs (p. 103). As would be expected, MPRI denies 
this; nonetheless, many observers agree that it probably was MPRI which 
planned the attack (p. 103). In any case, the MPRI training program turned 
out to be a success; the ensuing Operation Storm by Croatian forces was an 
immense victory against the Serbians and a turning point in the making 
of the new Balkan landscape (p. 103). The strategic interests of the United 
States were thus fulf illed – without the US government getting involved.
This is what Avant calls “foreign policy by proxy” (pp. 104-113, 152-153). 
Thanks to proxies of this sort, the US government (and other governments, 
for that matter) has the leverage to “affect conditions abroad without mo-
bilizing broad support for troops or (sometimes) even money” (p. 68). The 
opportunities private military companies create for foreign policy by proxy 
should also be regarded as a functional benefit of privatization and, as thus, 
a reason for governments’ opting for military contracting.
Modern mercenaries?
With the exception of Scahill, the analysts whose work I am examining here 
are resolute against the identification of contractors as mercenaries. It is fair 
to state that this is at least in part because they build on the internationally 
recognized def inition of “mercenary”. This def inition was crafted as an 
international response to the problems wrought by mercenary involvement 
in Africa during the decolonization period.34 From the 1950s to well into the 
1970s, foreign soldiers for hire abounded in decolonizing Africa – the most 
well-known case is Congo in the 1960s, where French, British, and South 
African mercenaries were recruited to f ight for a secessionist movement; 
and it was an Anglo-Belgian mining cartel which hired them in defense of 
its commercial interests.35 The international community was then urged 
to deal with the problem of mercenary involvement in conflicts, and the 
consequent legal arrangements aimed at banning the trade in “guns for 
hire”.
34 Chesterman and Lehnardt, From Mercenaries to Market, p. 1; Percy, “Morality and Regula-
tion”, pp. 12, 24; Singer, Corporate Warriors, p. 37.
35 McIntyre and Weiss, “Weak Governments in Search of Strength”, p. 67; Singer, Corporate 
Warriors, p. 37.
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The use of mercenaries is thus outlawed by international agreements, 
that is, the Geneva Conventions36 and the International Convention against 
the Recruitment, Use, Financing, and Training of Mercenaries.37 According 
to the International Convention, a mercenary is
someone who is specif ically recruited for the purpose of participating 
in a concerted act of violence aimed at overthrowing a government 
or undermining the territorial integrity of a state, is motivated by the 
desire for private gain and material compensation, is neither a national 
nor a resident of the state against which such [an] act is directed, has 
not been sent by a state on off icial duty, and is not a member of the 
armed forces of the state on whose territory the act is undertaken.38
This is obviously a very restricted def inition. And this is not accidental, 
because the signatory states had an interest in keeping the definition as 
specific as possible so that they could use mercenaries in internal conflicts.39 
It is equally obvious that private contractors do not qualify as mercenaries if 
we are to employ this legal definition. For one thing, contemporary contrac-
tors are not individual mercenaries, but they have evolved into business 
enterprises, which are similar in form to any other sort of enterprise, having 
CEOs, shareholders, and the like.40 In addition to the “corporatization” of 
private military services,41 the analysts also underline that today’s contrac-
tors are employed by legal governments42 and that they are sanctioned by 
their parent states.43 All in all, the argument is that modern contractors are 
“market-driven”, “state-sanctioned”, and hence, legal.
36 Article 47 of the First Additional Protocol of 1977 deals with the issue of mercenaries.
37 This is a UN convention, which was opened to signature in 1989 but entered into force only 
in 2001 after many ratif ications. 
38 Avant, The Market for Force, p. 231.
39 O’Brien, “What Should and What Should Not Be Regulated?”, pp. 34-35; Singer, Corporate 
Warriors, p. 41.
40 Chesterman and Lehnardt, From Mercenaries to Market, p. 7; Singer, Corporate Warriors, 
pp. 45-46.
41 Singer, Corporate Warriors, p. 40.
42 This is not necessarily the case, however. Singer notes that private military companies have 
worked for rebels, drug cartels, and even jihadist groups – the latter received military training 
in combat techniques and explosive devices from a British military company in the late 1990s: 
Singer, Corporate Warriors, pp. 181, 220.
43 This is an overgeneralization too: the South African government chose to delegitimize 
private military companies by legislation in 1998: Lehnardt, “Private Military Companies and 
State Responsibility”, p. 139.
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On the other hand, for some, the problem with the term “mercenary” 
is more analytical. For instance, Avant refrains from using the epithet 
precisely because it is a slippery term: it has been employed to describe 
anything from the Hessian troops to the adventurous individual men 
roaming Africa during Cold War years. This, Avant says, makes the term 
analytically quite unserviceable.44
There is yet another argument in favor of dropping the mercenary label. 
Contemporary private companies, the argument goes, simply do not do what 
“mercenaries” of the previous eras had done. As Avant writes, “today’s PSCs 
do not so much provide the foot soldiers, but more often act as supporters, 
trainers, and force multipliers for local forces”. In other words, the fact 
that (most) contractors are not engaged in combat operations is assumed 
to justify the distinction between traditional mercenaries and modern 
contractors. There seem to be at least two problems with this presumption. 
On the one hand, they may be small in number, but some private military 
companies do engage in combat. On the other hand, it can be plausibly 
claimed that noncombat functions are no less military. Not only did they 
used to be considered military functions to be performed (almost) exclu-
sively by national militaries, it is also the case that both logistics support 
and training are there to facilitate actual combat.
Disaggregating the industry
It is easily discerned that there is a strong tendency in the literature to 
dissociate active/armed/offensive services from passive/unarmed/defensive 
services – as well as the companies that provide them. The distinction 
boils down to the opposition of combat and noncombat services and/or 
companies. Kevin A. O’Brien’s contribution to From Mercenaries to Market 
is a case in point. O’Brien distinguishes “contracted operations that aim to 
alter the strategic landscape and those that involving local – in the narrow-
est sense – immediate impact only” (p. 40). The former category denotes 
operations such as “defeating an insurgency, ending a war, undertaking 
peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operations, rescuing a besieged govern-
ment” (p. 38), whereas the latter involves “nonfront-line” services such 
as “transport, force professionalization training, para-medical services, 
physical guarding, humanitarian aid, convoy protection, administration 
and logistics” (p. 40, n. 13). This corresponds to the much-employed distinc-
44 Avant, The Market for Force, p. 30.
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tion, respectively, between private military companies (PMCs) and private 
security companies. According to O’Brien, companies that do aim at altering 
the strategic landscape – PMCs – are atypical of the industry (p. 29), as 
PSCs are now perceived as “the norm” (p. 35). This assertion to the effect 
that the industry is evolving into noncombat, security service providers is 
very typical of the literature. The problem, however, is that the practice of 
contracting in Iraq poses major challenges to the proposed distinction, as 
admitted by O’Brien himself alongside Sarah Percy, who seems to employ a 
similar typology. That is, the presence of “security” f irms which are armed 
and which occasionally engage in combat-like operations in Iraq eludes 
this categorization.45
Much the same is true for Avant’s attempt at classifying the private 
military industry. Avant notes that the very same firm may provide different 
kinds of services to different clients, which makes classif ication on the basis 
of f irm unconvincing. She instead suggests that contracts be taken as the 
unit of analysis (p. 17). She then distinguishes contracts that offer military 
services (“external security services”) such as operational support, military 
training, and logistic support from those offering police functions (“internal 
security services”) such as site security, intelligence, and crime prevention 
(pp. 16-21). Nonetheless, she admits that there is a grey area between the 
two sets of functions. This is the case, she writes, with contracts that offer 
counterinsurgency services. Companies that operate on such contracts 
carry out armed response against insurgent groups. Interestingly, she men-
tions Blackwater here. Given the fact that what Blackwater does in Iraq is 
mostly site and convoy security, its contracts would normally lie within the 
category of police functions. But in reality the company has been involved 
in offensive attacks against Iraqi insurgents “in ways that [are] hard to 
distinguish from combat” (pp. 21-22). And this is far from an aberration; on 
the contrary the presence of military companies in Iraq evinces a “blurring 
of the lines between policing and combat” (p. 22).
More promising is the classif ication proposed in Corporate Warriors. 
Singer thinks that binary oppositions such as active/passive, armed/
unarmed, and offensive/defensive, which are used to differentiate the 
services provided by military companies, are not very fruitful for two 
important reasons: f irst, they ignore that there usually are transitions and 
some overlapping between the seemingly opposite pairs; secondly, they 
are based on an antiquated notion of “war” as, for instance, being armed 
45 O’Brien, “What Should and What Should Not Be Regulated?”, p. 35; Percy, “Morality and 
Regulation”, pp. 12-14.
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or otherwise does not make much difference today (pp. 89-90). It is also 
the case that this kind of classif ications conveys the idea that the second 
terms in the oppositions are somehow less central to military practice; for 
Singer, however, this is an erroneous assumption – a so-called passive or 
unarmed activity may equally have “strategic effects” (p. 89). Singer instead 
proposes a three-tier typology of military companies: military provider 
f irms, military consultant f irms, and military support f irms.
Military provider f irms sell actual combat services in the form of either 
implementation or command; and, depending on the contract and the 
situation in hand, they may provide “stand-alone tactical military units” 
or smaller, specialized units to augment the public forces of the client 
country (pp. 92-93). The best examples are Executive Outcomes (South 
African) and Sandline International (British), which made headlines in 
1990s helping the governments in Sierra Leone and Angola f ight off armed 
rebels. Executive Outcomes, which is probably the most controversial 
privatized military f irm, is the case that Singer examines in his study, and 
in reading his account it is easy to see why its operations in Sierra Leone 
and Angola aroused so much disturbance. First of all, the intervention of a 
private foreign actor as a belligerent party into someone else’s “war” seemed 
outrageous to the contemporary observers. Secondly, Executive Outcomes 
recruited exclusively from the bloodstained special operations personnel 
of the apartheid regime (pp. 102-103). Thirdly, the f inancially challenged 
governments of Sierra Leone and Angola could not actually pay for the 
services of the f irm in cash or in installments; instead, Executive Outcomes 
was indirectly paid in oil and mining concessions – indirectly because it 
was an aff iliated company, the Branch-Heritage Group, which was given 
mining privileges (pp. 104-105, 109, 117).
It is possible to observe that most analysts assume that Executive Out-
comes is somehow an aberrent case; and they seem to read too much into 
company’s demise. That is to say, it is as though the company’s decision to 
dissolve itself (in 1999) is a sign that the industry is maturing and becoming 
a respectable (meaning, above all, noncombat) international player. On 
the other hand, Singer appears to see the matter in another light, because 
he writes that the closure of the f irm in no way signaled the end of the 
military provider sector, which is still alive with many active f irms (p. 118). 
Furthermore, unlike some others, Singer does not imply that provider f irms 
are now employed by “failed states” of the third world. On the contrary, he 
writes that there are provider f irms at work in Iraq, employed by the USA, 
doing “convoy escort and protection of key bases, off ices, and facilities from 
rebel attack”, among which he cites Blackwater (p. 248).
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Back to Singer’s typology: the second type, i.e., the consultant f irms, 
provide military advice and training to armies (pp. 95-96). Singer points 
out that, although consultant f irms are not engaged in actual combat, the 
services they provide have strategic impact on many regional hostilities, as 
evinced in the Balkans when the training Croatian forces received from a US 
f irm (MPRI) eventually changed the balance of power in the region (p. 95). 
Singer focuses upon MPRI, a very high-profile American company, whose 
ranks are f illed with the “highest levels of retired US military personnel” 
(p. 119). MPRI has had many contracts (both analysis and implementation) 
with the US military as well as with foreign militaries. The peculiar thing 
about MPRI is its close ties both to government and to current military 
ranks, which render the f irm almost “a private extension of the US military” 
(p. 121). There is also a self-proclaimed company policy: never work for a 
foreign client unless that suits US foreign policy goals – this, too, brings 
the company into a cozy relationship with the government, which in turn 
has allegedly recommended the f irm to some foreign allies (pp. 119, 121).
Finally, military support f irms support troops in the f ield by providing 
“nonlethal aid and assistance, including logistics, intelligence, technical 
support, supply, and transportation” (p. 97). Many of these f irms began in 
business as nonmilitary engineering f irms and later diversif ied into mili-
tary services (p. 136). Support f irms comprise the largest sector in military 
services (p. 97). This has been a result of the confluence of the downsizing 
of the logistics units of national militaries and the almost contemporaneous 
upsurge in multinational operations (pp. 97, 147). This is especially the 
case with the US military, which was, in the early 1990s, “underresourced” 
and “overextended” at once with deployments in Africa, the Middle East, 
and the Balkans (p. 147). Singer notes that most studies on the subject of 
privatized military services do not examine this third kind of f irm, because 
they take the services provided by the support sector to be no different 
from what “traditional contractors” conventionally do (p. 97). This is not so 
for Singer – what support f irms do might seem “less mercenary”, but their 
services are nevertheless “military” as they are indispensable to military 
missions (pp. 97, 145-146). Here Singer takes up the United States’ favorite 
logistics support f irm, Brown & Root Services (BRS), which accompanied 
US forces everywhere from Rwanda to Kosovo in the 1990s. With the advent 
of the “war on terror” BRS got some new lucrative contracts, including a 
contract for the construction of a military base in Central Asia, and it also 
helped build the Guantanamo detention camp in Cuba (p. 146). Then the 
company (now called KBR) signed a number of logistics contracts in Iraq, 
to an estimated value of $20.1 billion in total (pp. 246-247).
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Before going on to the next section, it is worthwhile to say a few words on 
Blackwater, as it f igures prominently in the discussions about classif ication. 
Blackwater is indeed an atypical case because, while military companies 
that do engage in combat are usually at pains to deny it, which surely is about 
the desire to be recognized as legitimate and respectable f irms, Blackwater 
boasts about its military role. Blackwater’s history in Iraq is highlighted 
by a number of high-prof ile security contracts, the f irst of which came 
about in 2003 when the company was hired to provide personal security for 
pro-consul Paul Bremer.46 Other contracts then followed, as a result of which 
Blackwater came to provide security for “at least f ive regional US occupation 
headquarters”.47 In the course of these contracts, Blackwater was implicated 
in many suspicious incidents, all of which involved civilian Iraqi casualties; 
and the company was accused of misconduct. The company owner, Eric 
Prince, and its lawyers testif ied before congressional committees a number 
of times as a result; their defense was all about Blackwater’s role as part of 
the US military force: for them, Blackwater employees should be immune 
from prosecution, because if they were made liable, then this would impair 
“nation’s war-f ighting capacity” (pp. 57, 300-301). The company could not 
restore its tarnished image, however, and changed its name in 2009 (it is 
now called Xe Limited) as part of an attempt at rebranding.
The employees
It is diff icult to say that military contracting as a form of employment in 
any sense comprises a major concern for the studies under consideration. 
On the contrary, the issue is largely neglected or subordinated to other 
concerns. For instance, Avant takes up the issue summarily just a few times 
and in a very limited sense. She claims that contractors’ background is 
important in deciding how privatization affects social control, because 
if companies employ ex-soldiers, who therefore have been socialized into 
norms of human rights, the rule of law, and the like, there is a much greater 
likelihood that privatization of force will reinforce compliance with such 
values (pp. 60, 110-111, 130-131, 133). There is no further discussion of any other 
dimension of the composition of the workforce or working conditions in 
this almost 300-page book.
46 Scahill, Blackwater, p. 133.
47 Ibid., p. 186.
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This is not to say that no insight emerges from the books. There is some 
information regarding the type of employment, for instance. That is, Singer 
calls privatized military f irms “virtual companies” because they have a 
very small number of permanent, full-time employees; when contracts 
are signed, positions are f illed from companies’ databases of qualif ied 
personnel; and databases are usually supplemented by advertisements.48 
Databases are nonexclusive; a special operations veteran may be on the 
databases of several companies, and may work for Blackwater on a contract 
and then for Triple Canopy on another.
There is not much information about the databases or the people included 
in them. Scahill notes that Blackwater’s database includes as many as 21,000 
men (p. 433). Singer mentions MPRI’s database of 12,500 on-call personnel, 
95 per cent of whom are former US military personnel (p. 120). In more 
general terms, Singer writes that qualif ied people included in databases 
are predominantly former soldiers of all ranks from all over the world, who 
retired, left their forces, or were downsized and that they are mostly in their 
twenties or thirties (p. 76). And although he cites low pay and “diminishing 
prestige” as reasons for young people to leave armed forces and work for 
private companies (p. 77), he also mentions that this new industry “provides 
an employment opportunity for those […] who have been forced out of 
public military activities for past misdeeds” (p. 221).
We know that ex-soldiers from the United States, the UK, and South 
Africa are featured extensively. There are grounds to assume that most 
of these men work for companies from their native countries. It can also 
be speculated that these men get jobs or get on the company databases 
through former colleagues in a fairly informal way. As for the rest, all the 
Fijians, Jordanians, Colombians, Chileans, etc., it is necessary to ask how 
they become aff iliated with the companies. Apparently, there are some 
middlemen who recruit ex-soldiers and put them in touch with private 
military f irms. This is at least true for Chilean ex-commandos who work 
for Blackwater in Iraq. Scahill reports that a f irm called Grupo Tactico, 
which was founded by an ex-army off icer from Chile, mediates between 
the ex-soldiers and Blackwater (2008: 246-265).
Until now, we have been talking about the elite security personnel who 
do convoy, site, or personal security. These men are on regular pay and, 
according to Singer, they are “paid anywhere from two to ten times as much 
as in the off icial army and the police” (2008: 74). Reading Scahill’s book, 
one gets the impression that there is a signif icant pay discrepancy on the 
48 Avant, The Market for Force, pp. 15-16; Singer, Corporate Warriors, p. 75.
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basis of nationality: Chileans appear to be the most expensive ex-soldiers 
of Latin America. For Scahill, this is because they had been seasoned in 
General Augusto Pinochet’s dictatorship.
The elite security personnel are in fact only a minority of contractors 
working in Iraq. There are thousands of people f illing low-paid, unqualif ied 
positions, such as washing dishes or doing laundry. Carafano (p. 67) points 
out that less than 20 per cent of these contractors in Iraq are US citizens. 
As for the rest, there are not mostly Iraqis either. For instance, the majority 
of KBR employees in 2005 were shown to be “third-party nationals” with 
quite a number of people from the Philippines. The so-called third-party 
nationals are a major concern for the writer as they are “more at risk of 
abuse and exploitation” (p. 109).
The issue was brought to public attention when Cam Simpson of the 
Chicago Tribune wrote a report in 2005 on Nepalese menial workers em-
ployed in US military bases in Iraq. Workers were recruited by brokers in 
Nepal who did business with Middle Eastern f irms providing workforce 
for KBR-run bases – the Middle Eastern brokers actually were subcontrac-
tors to KBR. Most of the men from Nepal were misinformed about their 
destination: they did not know that they would work in military bases 
in Iraq. Yet they could not leave: not only were they indebted to Nepalese 
brokers on the one hand, the Middle Eastern brokers had also seized their 
passports. The report pointed out that this was human traff icking (not the 
least because the Nepalese government prohibits its citizens from working 
in Iraq) and that KBR was denying responsibility as recruitment was done 
by its subcontractors.
The plight of third-country nationals working as contractors in Iraq is 
thus a pressing problem, so much so that the International Peace Operations 
Association (IPOA), the industry association formed with the leadership 
of the notorious Blackwater, has included the issue in its code of conduct 
stating that potential employees should be thoroughly informed about the 
nature of their employment, that they should be “treated with respect and 
dignity”, that they should not be paid less just because of their nationality, 
and that they should be free to terminate employment.49
And, f inally, it should come as no surprise that contract employees are 
not unionized.50
49 Carafano, Private Sector, Public Wars, p. 110.
50 Singer, Corporate Warriors, p. 200, n. 20.
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What to privatize?
Is there an unambiguous dividing line between military functions which 
are appropriate to privatize and those which are not? This question may 
be answered in a number of steps. First, one should inquire whether there 
are any inherently governmental functions which, therefore, should not be 
outsourced. Combat functions, for instance, can legitimately be regarded 
as one such. There have been numerous allegations, raised by the press, 
politicians, and analysts, that private companies do engage in combat in 
Iraq. The US Department of Defense was quick to respond, stating that “PSCs 
are not being used to perform inherently military functions and that contrac-
tors are utilized to free troops for offensive actions”.51 Similarly, Pentagon 
regulations stipulate that private contractors can use “deadly force” either 
in self-defense or when it is “necessary to execute their security missions, 
such as protecting embassy personnel, consistent with the tasks given in 
their contract”; yet launching “preemptive attacks” cannot be interpreted as 
one such mission since it is regarded an inherently governmental activity.52 
So almost all – but apparently not all – forms of offensive action are beyond 
what contractors are entitled to do. But the problem is that functions such as 
personal and site security are indeed privatized in Iraq and most of the time 
it is diff icult to tell offense from defense, because this is not a battlef ield in 
the classical sense. As Lehnardt argues,53 in “low-intensity conflict” areas 
such as Iraq, where there are no clear frontlines, “protecting individuals and 
buildings can easily slide into participating in hostilities”. This might be one 
reason why the counterposition of PMCs and PSCs is so diff icult to sustain.
Secondly, it may be the case that some functions are too critical or stra-
tegic to be left to the commercial sector. After all, it is possible to argue that 
a national military should be self-suff icient to a certain extent. This does 
appear to be a major concern, because according to the military doctrine, 
the US military is supposed to privatize only those services that are 
not “emergency-essential support” functions; that is, those functions 
which, if not immediately available, would not impair the military’s 
mobilization and wartime operations.54
51 Lehnardt, “Private Military Companies and State Responsibility”, p. 147, emphasis added.
52 Carafano, Private Sector, Public Wars, p. 48.
53 Lehnardt, “Private Military Companies and State Responsibility”, p. 148.
54 Singer, Corporate Warriors, p. 162.
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Singer, though, asserts that the Pentagon did outsource certain mission-
critical functions. He takes up weapons procurement and writes that, 
while the army is supposed to “achieve self-suff iciency in maintaining 
and operating new weapons systems within 12 months of their introduc-
tion”, in reality, the operation and maintenance of weapons are contracted 
out.55 Hence the military is depended on private companies in this crucial 
function. Finally, it is possible to speculate that certain functions are just 
too risky to outsource, because, for examples, there may be abuses. Abu 
Ghraib, for instance. Recalling the incident, Isenberg claims that tasks 
such as interrogation of prisoners are “too sensitive to be outsourced”; they 
should thus remain governmental functions.56 The reality is quite different, 
of course. To wrap up, although there is some notion in the military doctrine 
regarding what not to outsource, it has already been transgressed.
While members of the military, scholars, and journalists complain that 
past experience of contracting bred a massive problem of over-outsourcing, 
the industry is heading in new directions. Take Blackwater. Scahill writes 
that company’s latest interest is immigration and border security. Here, as 
always, the company is in tune with the neoconservative political agenda 
which calls for outsourcing of border-training programs (pp. 401-405). On 
the other hand, Blackwater aspires to diversify into a peacekeeping force 
which, they hope, will be hired by NATO or the UN; the company has already 
presented a detailed proposal to the UN regarding Blackwater deployment in 
Darfur (pp. 411-420). Meanwhile, a development of immense importance has 
already occurred: following Hurricane Katrina, Blackwater was deployed 
on US soil for the f irst time, and that was on a contract with Department 
of Homeland Security to protect federal reconstruction projects (pp. 60-61, 
392-400). And it was not just Blackwater – other military companies too 
were in New Orleans, their employees fully armed and in battle gear.
55 Ibid.
56 Isenberg, “A Government in Search of Cover”, p. 92.
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